A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 


A    LEAGUE    OF 
NATIONS 


BY 

HENRY    NOEL    BRAILSFORD 

Author  of 
"  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,"  &c. 


SECOND  AND  REVISED  EDITION 


NEW  YORK 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 


First  Eil  1 1  ion  .  February  K)i7 
Reprinted  .  .  April  1917 
Second  Edition  .  November  /y/7 


PREFACE 

THE  war  has  called  forth  some  good  books  on  the 
future  international  organization  of  the  world,  and 
others  on  the  settlement  of  the  war  itself.  To  my 
thinking,  these  two  questions  are  a  single  problem 
which  must  be  solved  as  a  whole.  The  task  which 
for  us  exceeds  all  others  in  importance,  and  must 
be  made  to  include  all  others,  is  the  making  of 
conditions  which  promise  security  from  further  wars. 
The  settlement  of  the  national,  colonial,  and 
economic  questions  involved  in  this  war,  must  be  a 
settlement  which  will  help  the  creation,  and  ensure 
the  harmonious  working  of  a  League  of  Nations 
founded  to  maintain  peace.  In  this  book  I  have 
tried  to  consider  how  far  such  a  League  of  Nations 
as  President  Wilson  has  proposed,  can  guarantee 
the  security  of  Europe.  Its  success  will  depend, 
not  merely  on  the  wise  drafting  of  its  constitution, 
but  upon  the  solution  reached  in  the  war-settlement 
of  our  problems  of  nationality,  colonial  expansion, 
international  trade,  sea-power,  and  alliances,  I  have 
groped  in  fhe  following  chapters  for  an  answer  to 
this  question  :  Under  what  political  and  economic 
conditions  would  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations 
be  a  hopeful  adventure? 

The  book  was  written  during  the  summer  of  1916 
and  finished  in  the  last  days  of  October.  Much  has 
happened  since  the  manuscript  was  completed-^the 
fall  of  the  Coalition  Cabinet,  the  German  o'ffer  of 
negotiation,  and  the  entry  of  America  into  the  war. 
While  the  military  position  shows  comparatively  little 

8f6l70 


vi  PREFACE 

change,  the  political  transformation  of  Europe  has 
proceeded  rapidly.  Russia  has  become  a  Republic  ; 
Austria  under  a  new  Emperor  is  following  a  new 
course,  and  in  Germany  the  Reichstag  is  struggling, 
not  without  a  measure  of  success,  to  win  supremacy 
for  the  representatives  of  the  people.  A  series  of 
revelations  is  shattering  the  old  secret  processes  of 
diplomacy.  The  Pope,  meanwhile,  has  taken  up  the 
work  of  mediation  which  Mr.  Wilson  was  forced  to 
abandon,  and  the  answers  of  the  Central  Powers, 
with  their  adoption  of  the  ideas  of  arbitration  and 
disarmament,  reveal  a  change  of  mind  since  the 
fatal  days  of  1914.  How  much  nearer  we  are  in 
time  to  the  coming  of  peace  no  man  can  say,  but 
unquestionably  the  intellectual  preparation  of  an 
enduring  peace  has  advanced. 

These  large  events  made  a  new  edition  of  this 
book  desirable.  Some  fresh  material  has  been 
introduced,  especially  in  Chapters  I,  IV,  and  V. 
The  constructive  chapters  (VI-X)  have  been  revised, 
but  not  substantially  altered.  I  have  added  in  an 
appendix  a  note  dealing  with  some  historical  aspects 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

My  warmest  thanks  are  due  to  Mr.  Noel  Buxton 
for  his  encouragement  and  help. 

H.  N.  BRAILSFORD. 
October  IQIJ. 


CONTENTS 


tHAPTEK 

PREFACE     . 


I.       FROM    FORCE   TO    CONFERENCE        .  .  .1 

II.      AMERICA    AND    THE    LEAGUE    OF    PEACE  .  ,       39 

III.      ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE      .                 .  .  .      67 

IV.       PROBLEMS   OF    NATIONALITY     •  -97 

V.      THE    ROADS   OF   THE    EAST                    .  .  .    142 

.VI.       THE    FUTUKE   OF   ALLIANCES              .  .  .    178 

VII.      ON    SEA  POWER         .                 .                 .  .  •     '97 

VIII.       EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE  .  .    2IQ 

IX.      THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE                .  .  .    257 

X.      THE    CONSTITUTION    OF   THE    LEAGUE  .  .    293 

CONCLUSION  .....    323 

APPENDIX    .                 .                .                 .  .  .    335 

INDEX            .                 .                .                 .  .  .345 

MAPS 

THE    RACES   OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  .  Ai  tnd 

THE    POLISH    POPULATION                  .  .  „ 

THE    POADS   OF   THE    EAST                .  .  „ 

vii 


A    LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

CHAPTER  I 
FROM  FORCE  TO  CONFERENCE 

NEVER  since  the  young  levies  of  revolutionary 
France  marched  to  encounter  the  leagued  kings 
of  the  old  order  at  Valmy,  has  Europe  seen  at 
work  an  impulse  so  generous  as  that  which  fired 
the  British  democracy  in  the  early  months  of  this 
war.  The  challenge  had  found  us  mentally  unpre- 
pared. Our  attention  was  absorbed  in  our  own 
Irish  controversy.  We  believed,  and  believed 
truly,  that  our  relations  with  Germany  were  better 
than  they  had  been  for  many  years.  We  had  hardly 
noticed  the  presages  of  the  coming  storm  or  heeded 
the  controversies  over  armaments  and  the  Near  East 
in  which  the  select  spokesmen  of  the  German  and 
Russian  ruling  classes  had  during  the  spring  and 
early  summer  declared  war  upon  each  other,  even 
before  the  occasion  for  war  arose.  So  little  was 
our  mood  attuned  to  strife  that^the  murder  of  the 
Austrian  Archduke  stirred  in  us  only  horror  and 
sympathy  for  a  house  tracked  by  the  shadow  of 
incessant  tragedy.  The  result  was  that  when  war 
overtook  us,  after  a  few  days'  debate,  we  entered 
it  without  anger,  without  hate,  above  all,  without 
desire.  So  little  were  we  prepared  for  it  that  it 
struck  us  with  surprise  as  the  thing  it  is,  an 
anachronism,  an  obsolete  barbarity,  a  blot  on 


2  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

civilization.  We  had  been  living  our  own  normal 
lives,  in  which  the  idea  of  force  and  power  plays 
little  part.  We  were  not  thinking  on  this  plane, 
and  the  sudden  perception  that  big  guns,  embattled 
armies,  and  colossal  ships  are  the  factors  which 
work  out  the  destinies  of  nations  moved  us  only 
to  an  instinctive  and  all  but  unanimous  revolt.  We 
were  consciously  doing  a  thing  repugnant  to  reason 
and  instinct,  and  we  told  each  other  that  we  were 
doing  it  for  the  last  time.  The  popular  mottoes 
of  the  day  were  "  Never  again  "  and  "  A  war  to 
end  war."  A  study  of  the  leading  articles  in 
which  our  newspapers  and  reviews  discussed  the 
task  before  us  would  show,  with  rare  exceptions, 
a  recurrent  emphasis  on  the  idea  that  out  of  this 
war  would  somehow  grow  the  resolve  to  organize 
Europe  for  the  prevention  of  future  wars.  When 
that  phrase  with  the  ambiguous  mask,  "  the  crush- 
ing of  Prussian  militarism,"  was  first  adopted  as 
a  statement  of  our  aim  in  the  war,  it  implied  in 
the  national  mind  the  belief  that  Germany  alone 
had  resisted  the  evolution  of  a  peaceful  Europe. 
It  did  but  need  a  united  effort  to  overthrow  this 
single,  this  local,  obstacle  and  the  way  would  be 
clear,  if  not  to  the  actual  federation  of  Europe, 
at  least  to  the  creation  of  a  friendly  and  pacific 
society  which  would  eliminate  war.  So  far  were 
we  from  meditating  any  lasting  injury  to  the  German 
people,  that  we  liked  to  think  that  our  arms  might 
do  them  a  service  by  discrediting  and  weakening 
the  ascendancy,  as  burdensome  to  them  as  to  us, 
of  the  Prussian  military  caste.  We  were  aware 
of  the  immense  call  which  the  war  made  on  our 
energies,  and  looking  around  us,  we  saw  and  loved 
the  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  and  nobility  in  the  eager 
face  of  youth.  We  knew  that  the  will  was  good 
which  sent  these  millions  of  volunteers  marching 
shoulder  to  shoulder.  Our  eager  reasoning  ran 


FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE          3 

forward  to  complete  the  argurilent  and  fulfil  the 
prophecy.  When  such  colossal  forces,  inspired  by 
a  high  purpose,  were  set  in  motion,  could  the  result 
fail  to  correspond  to  the  effort?  We  dismissed 
the  idea  of  a  little  victory,  a  mean  victory.  The 
end,  we  thought,  must  resemble  the  beginning  ; 
it  must  be,  in  completed  fact,  in  concrete  result, 
the  vision  and  purpose  of  peace  with  liberty  which 
had  stimulated  our  minds  at  the  start.  When  the 
first  long  lists  of  dead  and  wounded  men  bade 
us  count  the  cost,  our  estimate  of  the  value  of 
the  prize  was  only  heightened.  It  could  be  no 
paltry  end,  no  petty  satisfaction  of  vanity  or  pride 
which  cost  so  dear.  We  knew  then  that  Europe 
would  number  the  slain  by  millions  before  peace 
came,  and  our  demand  was  the  firmer  that  the 
peace  must  be  constructive  and  enduring. 

Few  of  us  paused  to  ask  the  question  whether 
force,  even  when  clean  hands  wield  it  with  a 
high  aim,  can  achieve  the  ideal  ends,  the  spiritual 
purposes  which  we  reckoned  among  our  tasks.  One~7 
may  by  force  frustrate  and  annihilate  force  ;  one  I 
may  by  force  take  territories,  appropriate  colonies,  • 
delimit  spheres  of  interest  and  trade  ;  but  as  yet 
we  did  not  ask  ourselves  whether  by  force  one 
may  change  the  basis  of  civilization,  or  transmute 
to  fraternity  the  rivalries  of  Europe.  We  knew  that 
our  power^was  great  and  our  aims  high,  and  we 
scarcely  paused  to  inquire  whether  the  means  were 
appropriate  to  the  end.  A  nation  at  war  must 
subordinate  its  thinking  to  the  necessity  of  success. 
It  believes  whatever  will  conduce  to  strengthen  its 
will  and  confirm  its  purpose.  Some  beliefs,  some 
opinions,  some  forecasts  make  for  confidence  and 
victory.  These  it  selects  and  adopts.  The 
scepticism  which  questions  the  efficacy  of  force  to 
attain  its  end  becomes  for  a  people  at  war  the 
subtlest  and  most  disintegrating  treason.  It  was 


4  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

characteristic  of  the  moral  exaltation  in  which  the 
whole  nation  lived  in  this  first  period  of  war  that, 
though  we  were  using  force  to  attain  the  great 
end  of  a  constructive  peace,  our  thinking  as  yet 
scarcely  admitted  the  idea  of  power.  We  were 
very  far  from  the  megalomania  which  cements  vast 
empires  with  blood.  So  far  were  we  from  it  that 
first  among  our  conscious  purpose  was  the  wish 
to  strengthen  and  multiply  the  little  nationalities 
of  Europe.  It  became  a  generous  pastime  with 
our  scholars  to  reconstruct  the  map  of  Europe  on 
the  basis  of  nationality,  and  so  sure  were  these 
idealists  that  the  reign  of  force  would  be  abolished, 
that  few  of  them  even  paused  to  consider  whether 
a  little  land-locked  Bohemia  or  a  diminished 
but  independent  Hungary  could  maintain  their 
sovereignty  under  the  pressure  of  the  great  military 
empires  which  would  surround  them.  The  explana- 
tion of  this  paradox  is  that  we  believed  that  military 
empires  would  soon  be  a  thing  of  the  past.  We 
expected  a  future  in  which  the  greatest  empire  and 
the  smallest  nationality  would  negotiate  on  equal 
terms.  We  meant,  in  a  word,  to  abolish  the  idea 
of  power,  to  eliminate  force  as  the  decisive  factor 
in  international  relations.  Precisely  how  this  was 
to  be  achieved  we  should  consider  at  our  leisure  ; 
the  first  step  was  to  defeat  in  Prussia  the  arch- 
exponent  of  the  idea  of  power.  We  hoped  that 
defeat  would  set  up  a  more  completely  liberal  Con- 
stitution in  Germany  ;  and  it  did  not  disconcert  us 
that  by  a  contrary  working  of  cause  and  effect  we 
predicted  that  victory  would  bring  the  final  triumph 
of  constitutionalism  in  Russia.  The  world  to  our 
hopes  was  malleable  and  plastic.  The  hour  had 
come  for  all  the  belated  changes,  the  overdue 
advances,  which  the  timidity  of  diplomacy,  the  dread 
of  war,  and  the  fetish  of  the  status  quo  had  post- 
poned for  moro  than  a  generation.  But  of  all  these 


FROM  FORCE   TO   CONFERENCE          5 

changes  the  greatest  and  the  most  beneficent  would 
be  the  new  temper  of  mankind,  the  new  methods 
in  diplomacy,  the  new  structure  of  the  family  of 
nations  which  the  last  of  wars  would  forge  into 
an  enduring  peace.  Without  that  vision  of  the 
better  future  we  should  have  found  the  carnage, 
the  embitterment,  and  the  waste  of  this  war  an 
unendurable  nightmare  of  horror.  Our  mood  re- 
sembled very  closely  that  of  the  French  people  in 
the  early  phases  of  the  Revolution.  In  hours  of 
energy  and  resolve  a  nation's  task  assumes  a  con- 
centrated simplicity.  To  the  men  of  that  day  it 
seemed  necessary  only  to  make  an  end  of  priests 
and  kings,  and  the  natural  goodness  of  mankind 
would  do  the  rest.  We  were  fighting  to  defeat  a 
military  caste,  and  we  believed  that  the  idea  of 
force  would  perish  with  it. 

The  habit  of  thinking  in  terms  of  force  and 
power  was  in  normal  times  so  little  developed  among 
us  that  a  stranger,  who  compared  our  habits  of 
thought  with  those  of  any  continental  people,  would 
ask  himself  whether  we  lacked  a  sense  which  other 
races  possess.  This  peculiarity  showed  itself  in 
many  fields  outside  the  field  of  foreign  policy,  and 
if  any  people  is  distinguished  by  it  in  a  still  higher 
degree,  that  people  is  the  kindred  American 
democracy.  We  had  a  horror  of  using  force,  and 
an  even  subtler  and  stronger  horror  of  talking  or 
writing  in  terms  of  force.  What  we  condemned 
in  Germany  was  not  merely  her  abuse  of  her  military 
power,  but  the  habit  in  her  rulers,  and  even  in < 
her  thinkers,  of  talking  in  terms  of  power.  It 
offended  us  alike  in  their  academic  speculations  and 
in  their  bullying,  sabre-rattling  diplomacy.  When 
we  used  force,  an  instinct  of  good  manners,  and 
it  may  also  be  the  rooted  English  belief  that  force 
is  itself  an  evil,  taught  us  to  do  it  quietly.  We 
were  distressed,  as  no  other  European  people  is 


6  A  LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

distressed,  when  we  used  force  to  suppress  a  strike, 
above  all  if  bloodshed  resulted.  We  shrank,  as 
no  other  people  shrinks,  from  the  shooting  of 
traitors  and  rebels.  Our  embarrassment,  on  the 
very  eve  of  war,  in  dealing  with  the  Ulster  ques- 
tion came  from  nothing  but  this  typical  dislike  of 
using  force  even  to  suppress  force.  Our  repug- 
nance to  "  paternal  "  legislation  which  involves 
coercion  sprang  from  the  same  instinct,  as  our 
adherence  to  voluntary  military  service  was  its  most 
notable  expression.  Even  when  we  adopted  con- 
scription we  respected,  as  no  other  people  does, 
the  scruples  of  the  uncompromising  pacifist,  and 
refused  to  apply  to  him  the  penalty  of  death,  which 
is  his  fate  not  merely  in  Germany  but  in  France. 
The  explanation  lay,  of  course,  not  in  any  innate 
racial  peculiarity  (if  such  a  thing  anywhere  exists) 
but  in  our  history  and  our  geographical  conditions. 
The  relative  antiquity  of  our  Constitution,  the  rela- 
tive remoteness  of  our  last  civil  war,  our  long 
immunity  from  invasion  are,  of  course,  its  founda- 
tion. Our  vast  Empire  might  have  bred  in  us 
the  opposite  temper.  In  point  of  fact  it  only  con- 
firmed us  in  our  dislike  of  force.  The  lesson 
learned  from  the  attempt  to  dragoon  the  American 
colonies  was  never  forgotten,  and  even  in  the  non- 
self-governing  colonies 'Our  pride  was  that  a  handful 
of  white  men,  by  tact,  by  justice,  by  tolerance 
towards  "  native  "  ways  of  thought,  by  the  English 
instinct  of  letting  well  alone,  could  govern  without 
the  constant  display  of  force.  Let  us  not  assume 
that  all  this  implied  any  original  virtue  in  us.  These 
were  the  tactics  which  our  situation  imposed  on 
us.  A  nation  with  a  vast  Empire  and  a  little  Army 
was  obliged  to  economize  force.  It  ended  by  dis- 
liking force.  Our  experience  reacted  upon  our 
character  and  formed  our  standard  of  conduct,  and 
even  our  notions  of  "  good  form." 


I 

FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE          7 

We  possessed,  indeed,  in  the  Navy  a  tremendous 
instrument  of  force  ;  we  grudged  no  expendi- 
ture upon  it,  and  we  kept  it  in  constant  readi- 
ness for  war.  A  nation  may,  however,  maintain 
a  great  navy  without  developing  the  peculiar 
habit  of  mind  called  "  militarism."  It  does  not 
demand,  as  a  conscript  army  does,  the  passage 
through  its  discipline  of  an  appreciable  fraction  of 
our  population.  It  cannot  be  used  directly  for 
territorial  conquest,  and  few  Englishmen  thought 
of  the  Navy  as  anything  but  a  weapon  of  defence. 
The  traditional  feeling  about  it  was  expressed  in 
our  grandfathers'  phrase,  "  the  wooden  walls  of 
England,"  and  to  the  inexpert  popular  mind  the 
perception  of  its  tremendous  power  as  an  instru- 
ment, if  not  exactly  of  offence,  at  least  of  coercion, 
has  come  in  this  war  as  a  revelation.  Continental 
nations,  more  accustomed  than  we  are  to  think 
frankly  in  terms  of  power,  had  a  more  lively  sense 
than  most  of  us  of  the  possibilities  of  sea-power, 
and  understood  that  the  empire  which  wields  it 
has  the  ability  to  veto  every  movement,  to  thwart 
every  ambition  of  the  land  rival  who  wishes  to 
act  beyond  the  Continent.  We  thought  reluctantly 
and  haltingly  in  strategical  terms.  We  lapsed 
easily  into  a  comfortable  habit  of  regarding  inter- 
national policy  as  a  reasonable  exchange  of  views, 
crossed,  indeed,  by  conflicting  interests,  by  likes 
and  dislikes,  by  racial  and  political  affinities,  but 
by  no  means  governed  by  the  concept  of  force. 
We  indulged  from  time  to  time  in  those  purely 
disinterested  preoccupations  over  the  slave  trade, 
Congo  misrule,  and  Turkish  atrocities  which 
puzzled  our  neighbours  so  deeply  that  they  usually 
interpreted  them  as  a  disguise  for  some  Machia- 
vellian design.  Disinterestedness  is  the  luxury  of 
the  secure.  We  lacked  the  painful  stimuli  which 
have  made  other  peoples  alert  to  perceive  and  quick 


8  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

to  use  force.  We  had  no  unguarded  frontiers  and 
no  history  of  invasion.  We  have  never  developed 
that  vision  of  the  possible  movements  of  fleets  and 
armies  behind  all  diplomatic  intercourse,  that  habit 
of  measuring  statesmen's  words  by  the  number  of 
army  corps  behind  them.  Even  more  important,  in 
any  consideration  of  our  attitude  towards  force,  was 
the  fact  that  we  are  a  satisfied  Power.  We  have 
grown  up  without  the  hungers  and  the  appetites 
which  dictate  the  view  of  other  nations  towards 
force.  We  have  never  known  the  passion  to 
liberate  kinsmen  under  a  foreign  yoke.  We  have 
no  1870  to  avenge.  There  is  no  "unredeemed 
England  "  for  ever  calling  to  our  chivalry.  We 
have  no  romantic  tradition  that  beckons  us,  like  the 
Russian  ambition  to  acquire  Constantinople.  Nor  do 
we  feel,  as  the  Germans  have  felt  for  a  generation, 
that  our  industrial  future  demands  the  acquisition 
of  colonies  and  places  in  the  sun.  It  was  easy 
for  us  to  condemn  force,  for  we  possessed  all  that 
force  can  win. 

Out  of  this  singular  aloofness  from  the  idea  of 
power  and  force  the  war  has  dragged  us  roughly. 
We  have  gone  to  a  hard  school,  and  the  new 
lessons  lie  on  the  surface  of  our  minds,  while  the 
ingrained  dislike  of  force  survives  beneath  them. 
Something  we  have  learned  by  sympathetic  icon- 
tact  with  our  Allies.  We  are  better  able  to  under- 
stand why  official  France,  with  the  problem  of  the 
lost  provinces  unsettled,  welcomed  the  ideal  of  dis- 
armament in  the  past  decade  no  more  cordially 
than  Germany.  We  can  understand  the  primitive, 
gallant  warrior  temper  of  Serbia,  looking  always 
to  the  liberation  by  arms  of  the  brother  peoples 
severed  by  the  Austrian  frontier.  We  know  very 
well  that  in  the  years  before  the  war  such  problems 
as  those  of  Alsace  and  the  South  Slavs,  though 
statesmanship  might  have  mitigated  them,  could 


FROM  FORCE   TO   CONFERENCE          9 

have  received  a  trenchant  solution  only  by  force. 
The  cynical  game  of  guessing  when  and  on  which 
side  a  neutral  would  intervene,  taught  us  that  military 
success  may  avail  more  to  win  allies  than  com- 
munity of  race,  political  sympathies,  or  past  services . 
If  we  have  learned  much  from  our  Allies  and  some- 
thing from  the  neutrals  about  force,  our  chief  teacher 
has  been  the  enemy.  We  realize,  rather  vaguely 
perhaps,  how  much  the  German  habit  of  discipline, 
the  German  ideal  of  co-operative  work  in  science  and 
industry,  the  instinctive  subordination  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  the  community,  and  the  higher  level  of 
education  in  all  grades  of  society  has  contributed 
to  his  power.  We  have  begun  to  think  about  all 
the  concerns  of  peace,  from  trade  to  education, 
in  terms  of  war.  Our  normal  and  habitual  atti- 
tude, that  peace  is  the  rule  and  war  the  improb- 
able exception,  has  been  shaken  by  our  sudden 
experience.  When  we  talk  now  of  the  reorganization 
which  will  be  necessary  in  every  department  of 
life,  we  mean  a  reorganization  adjusted  to  the  fact 
that  the  world  is  governed  by  force,  and  that  war 
is  a  real  and  terribly  important  possibility.  We 
are  facing  the  new  facts,  and  it  is  proper  that' 
we  should  do  so.  We  are  like  a  man  who  was 
proud  to  live  in  his  old  timbered  manor-house.  He 
paid  an  insurance  premium,  for  he  had  seen  fires 
in  his  neighbours'  houses.  But  when  his  own 
pleasant  dwelling  caught  fire,  he  rebuilt  it  from 
the  foundation  with  a  single  eye  to  this  one  risk, 
and  sacrificed  boldly  both  beauty  and  comfort. 

It  is  possible  that  instead  of  loosening  the 
ties  of  alliance  which  before  the  war  divided 
Europe  into  two  hostile  groups  we  shall  tighten 
and  strengthen  them.  It  is  too  early  to  foresee 
with  certainty  whether  we  shall  make  compulsory 
service  permanent.  But  it  is  already  probable  that 
we  shall  alter  the  whole  familiar  structure  of  our 


IP  A   LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

trade.  We  have  learned  in  this  war  to  discard  for 
ever  the  lingering  eighteenth -century  conception  of 
war  as  a  struggle  waged  between  small  profes- 
sional armies  while  the  nations  live  their  usual 
lives.  We  know  now  that  war  is  a  function  of 
the  whole  people.  It  is  waged  with  trade  and 
credit  and  industry  as  surely  as  it  is  waged  with 
armies  and  fleets.  If  we  had  a  choice  between 
totally  disarming  a  dreaded  rival  or  making  and 
keeping  him  poor,  we  should  probably  choose  to- 
day, oa  purely  military  grounds,  to  take  his  capital, 
his  machinery,  and  his  credit,  and  leave  him  his 
rifles  and  his  guns.  There  is  nothing  new  even 
for  us  in  the  idea  for  making  war,  while  war  lasts, 
on  an  enemy's  trade.  That  is  a  tradition  as  old 
as  trade  and  war  themselves.  The  new  idea  for 
us  is  that  even  when  war  ceases  in  the  field  it  must 
continue  in  our  factories  and  our  ports.  We  are 
realizing  more  fully  the  immense  political  use  of 
exported  capital.  The  continental  peoples  syste- 
matized it  much  earlier  than  we  did.  There  was 
certainly  a  political  intention  in  the  vast  French 
exports  of  capital  to  Russia,  and  the  smaller  German 
exports  to  Italy.  We  alone  left  our  Government 
without  the  legal  right  to  control  our  investments 
abroad.  We  are  invited  by  the  Economic  Con- 
ference of  Paris  to  subordinate  our  markets  in  the 
same  way  to  a  political  or  military  end.  The  pro- 
posal is  that  for  a  term  of  years  we  shall  close 
them,  wholly  or  in  part,  to  the  trade  of  our  present 
enemies,  and  also  (an  even  more  formidable 
measure)  that  we  shall  cut  off  these  enemies, 
wholly  or  in  part,  from  the  supplies  of  raw  material, 
minerals,  and  foodstuffs  which  they  were  accus- 
tomed to  draw  from  Allied  territory.  Shipping, 
in  its  turn,  will  be  controlled  and  regulated  by 
political  considerations.  This  policy  means  that  we 
intend  to  subordinate  our  lives,  for  the  early  future 


FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE        n 

at  least,  to  military  considerations.  This  is  not 
Protection  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word.  It 
is  not  a  simple  proposal  to  favour  the  home  trader 
at  the  expense  of  the  foreign  trader.  It  is  a  pro- 
posal to  discriminate  between  foreign  traders, 
according  as  they  are  enemies  or  friends.  It 
brushes  aside  the  questions,  whether  they  are  good 
customers  of  our  own,  whether  they  supply  wants 
which  others  cannot  meet  so  well,  and  whether 
they  accord  to  us  a  favourable  position  in  their 
markets.  For  all  these  usual  considerations  which 
have  governed  tariff-making  in  the  past  it  sub- 
stitutes one  simple  criterion— whether  they  were  our 
enemies  in  this  war.  That  criterion  implies  the 
belief  that  the  enemy  of  to-day  will  also  be  the 
enemy  of  to-morrow.  It  introduces  the  idea  of 
force  and  power,  where  it  had  scarcely  entered 
before,  into  the  fabric  of  British  trade. 

It  meant  a  great  revolution  in  our  habits  and 
a  tremendous  breach  with  the  past  when  we 
adopted  compulsory  service.  These  proposals  for 
the  subordination  of  our  trade  to  continental 
politics,  not  under  the  momentary  stress  of  war, 
but  during  long  years  of  nominal  peace,  carry  us 
infinitely  farther.  They  carry  us  to  a  world  in 
which  the  idea  of  force,  the  conception  of  leagued 
power,  the  pitting  of  one  vast  coalition  against 
another,  must  dominate  the  ordinary  course  of  our 
lives.  The  object  of  one  coalition  during  these 
early  years  of  "  peace  "  will  avowedly  be  to  inflict 
on  the  other,  at  a  heavy  cost  to  itself,  the*  utmost 
injury  which  a  thorough  organization  of  i!:s  buying 
and  selling  power  can  compass.  The  purpose  will 
be  to  weaken  and  therefore  to  injure  the  rival  group. 
Nations  are  not  economic  machines.  They  cannot 
set  out  to  injure  each  other  without  organizing  and 
perpetuating  hate.  Their  hate  will  be  cast  like 
molten  anger  into  guns  and  armour-plate  ;  and  if  we 


12  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

move,  as  nations  commonly  do,  from  attack  to  re- 
taliation, and  from  retaliation  to  renewed  attack,  the 
new  armed  peace  must  issue,  so  soon  as  there  is 
a  new  generation  ripe  for  slaughter,  in  another 
general  war.  That  is  our  outlook.  We  have  gone 
to  school  in  the  college  of  force,  and  we  are 
graduates  already.  If  the  new  facts  are  real  and 
important  facts,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  our 
early  mood  has  not  been  wholly  submerged  by  the 
experience  of  this  conflict.  We  want  no  further 
wars.  We  would  still  echo  the  "  never  again  " 
of  the  first  w'eeks.  We  would  still  welcome,  though 
with  many  reserves,  the  conception  of  a  system 
of  arbitration  and  mediation,  a  Europe  united  in 
a  League  of  Peace.  We  believe,  as  Sir  Edward 
Grey  put  it,  in  "  conference,"  as  the  only  civilized 
method  of  settling  the  affairs  of  Europe.  The 
generous  mood  which  inspired  us  in  the  first  weeks 
of  war  is  not  extinct.  It  is  moribund  only  for  lack 
of  resolute  and  critical  self -questioning.  There  is 
a  contradiction  here  which  must  be  faced.  If  we 
say  "  conference,"  we  mean,  if  we  mean  anything, 
that  we  shall  confer  with  our  enemies,  and  settle 
with  them  in  equity  and  tolerance  our  common 
affairs.  But  does  one  sit  at  a  round  table  with 
a  man  with  whom  one  will  not  even  buy  and  sell  ? 
One  may  achieve  justice  and  fair  dealing  where 
there  is  little  cordiality  and  little  liking.  But  no 
mutual  consideration  of  interests  is  compatible  with 
the  resolve  to  use  economic  power  to  weaken  and 
injure  the  other  side.  We  hold  to  both  these  ways 
of  thought.  We  have  not  renounced  the  hope  of 
future  peace,  though  we  have  embraced  the  idea 
of  power.  We  have  not  rejected  conference,  though 
we  have  adopted  boycott.  The  contradiction  in 
our  attitude  is  the  consequence  of  the  terrific 
emotional  experience  through  which  we  have 
passed,  Overwhelmed  by  new  facts,  oppressed  by 


FROM   FORCE   TO    CONFERENCE         13 

the  horror  of  the  long  carnage,  indignant  at  the 
barbarities  of  the  enemy,  we  hasten  instinctively 
into  measures  of  retaliation  and  defence,  before  the 
deeper  purpose,  the  older  tendency  in  us  can  find 
its  clue  to  the  unfamiliar  world,  and  hew  out  a  path 
that  is  worthy  of  itself. 


The  motives  and  calculations  which  are  hurrying 
us  into  this  comprehensive  policy  of  force  are 
somewhat  mixed,  but  foremost  among  them  is  the 
resolve  to  achieve  security.  An  honest  man  would 
not  deny  that  the  desire  for  revenge,  or  for 
punishment  (if  that  word  is  preferred),  finds  a  place 
among  them.  The  brutalities  to  which  innocent 
Belgium  was  subjected  and  the  savagery  of  the 
submarine  campaign  have  left  an  ineffaceable  im- 
pression. It  is  possible  that  when  our  passions 
have  cooled,  our  Christian  Churches  will  recollect 
the  New  Testament  teaching  about  revenge.  Jn 
default  of  ethical  arguments,  however,  mere 
revenge  is  clearly  too  costly  a  policy.  There  is 
an  idealism  of  hate  as  there  is  an  idealism  of 
love,  but  the  commercial  world  has  never  shown 
much  inclination  to  idealism  in  any  form.  More 
general  is  the  feeling  that  we  prefer,  for  some 
time  at  least,  to  dispense  with  all  intercourse 
with  the  enemy.  That  is  a  natural,  if  primitive, 
feeling.  But  the  stronger  it  is,  the  less  necessary 
is  it  to  enforce  it  by  tariffs  and  prohibitions. 
There  is  another  motive  which  weighs  and  will 
•  always  weigh  in  the  balance  of  public  opinion. 
Though  no  competent  judge  believes  that  a  policy 
of  commercial  boycott  of  the  Central  Empires  can 
be  profitable  from  the  standpoint  of  the  British 
consumer,  or  even  from  that  of  the  whole  body  of 
producers,  there  are  undoubtedly  some  trades  and 
more  financial  groups  which  stand  to  gain  by  it. 


r;4  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

The  real  motive  which  is  driving  us  towards  the 
policy  of  a  permanent  anti-German  alliance,  both 
military  and  economic,  is  broader,  saner,  and  more 
rational  than  any  of  these  interested  or  sentimental 
considerations.  What  influences  us  is  simply  the 
determination  to  secure  ourselves  against  any 
possible  repetition  of  this  war.  The  wider  and 
more  formidable  we  can  make  our  alliance,  the 
less  likely  is  it  to  be  challenged  in  the  future. 
The  inclusion  in  it  of  a  species  of  commercial  boycott 
is  almost  inevitable  in  a  world  where  military 
power  depends  so  largely  on  economic  development. 
Germany,  we  reckon,  will  suffer  so  severely  from  a 
restricted  market,  and  still  more  from  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  raw  materials,  that  her  trade  and  finance 
will  recover  very  slowly  from  the  ruin  of  the  war. 
Her  expenditure  in  armaments  will  in  this  way  be 
automatically  limited,  and  she  will  not  again  be 
in  our  generation  the  menace  which  she  is  to-day. 
We  shall  by  this  policy  of  striking  at  Germany's 
material  prosperity  compel  her,  not  merely  to  keep 
the  peace  but  to  abandon  the  idea  of  bettering 
her  case  by  arms.  It  is  possible  to  challenge  this 
forecast,  but  assuming  that  it  be  sound,  it  is  still 
far  from  the  idea  which  inspired  us  at  the  outbreak 
of  war.  It  promises  no  end  to  militarism,  but 
only  a  long  reign  of  force,  in  which  the  advantage 
(such  is  our  reckoning)  will  have  passed  to  our 
side.  It  is  the  negation  of  any  conception  of 
European  fraternity.  It  is  a  course  which  we  should 
adopt  only  if  no  other  seemed  open  to  us.  So 
long  as  we  talk  in  abstract  words  about  placing 
restrictions  on  German  trade,  the  real  bearing  of 
this  policy  may  be  disguised.  But  it  must  mean, 
if  it  succeeds,  the.  relative  impoverishment  of  a 
nation,  and  the  loss,  we  may  be  sure,  will  fall  more 
heavily  on  the  working  people,  most  of  them 
Socialists,  than  upon  the  Junkers  and  the  financiers. 


FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE        15 

A  more  repugnant  use  of  force  could  hardly  be 
conceived.  Is  there  an  alternative?  Are  we  pre- 
pared, on  conference  and  conciliation,  to  found  a 
League  of  Nations,  and  to  admit  (since  that  is  their 
wish)  the  Central  Empires  to  its  society? 

Confronted  by  this  difficult  choice,  the  middle 
voices  among  Englishmen  and  Frenchmen  would 
pronounce  in  our  present  mood  for  a  temporizing 
policy.  The  argument  would  run  somewhat  as 
follows  :  "  We  do  not  despair  of  constituting  such 
a  Society  of  Nations  for  the  abolition  of  war.  We 
hope,  indeed,  that  something  of  the  kind  may  be 
created  in  our  own  day.  But  he  who  would  build 
firmly  must  build  slowly.  There  is  no  need  for 
haste.  If  only  because  the  war  has  exhausted  us 
all,  we  are  secure  for  a  term  of  years.  Time 
must  heal  these  wounds,  and  if  for  a  period  inter- 
course is  restricted  between  us  and  our  late  enemies 
at  least  the  friction  will  be  lessened.  Let  us  begin 
by  making  our  League  of  Peace  among  our  own 
Allies.  That  will  be  a  great  society.  It  will 
include  two -thirds  of  Europe,  the  whole  of  Asia 
and  Africa  (for  Germany  will  be  banished  by  our 
victory  from  these  continents)  ;  and  if  the  United 
States  would  join  it  our  satisfaction  would  be  the 
greater.  But  for  a  term  of  years  at  least  it  is  idle 
to  propose  the  inclusion  of  Germany.  Can  we  pass 
a  sponge  over  her  misdeeds  ?  Can  we  forget  a  crime 
for  which  there  is  no  parallel  since  the  days  of 
Napoleon?  Is  there  to  be  no  penalty  for  a  wrong 
that  has  come  near  to  undoing  civilization  itself  ? 
Let  a  new  generation  first  arise  in  Germany.  Let 
her  depose  her  blood-stained  rulers,  or  at  least  let  her 
fetter  their  will  by  adopting  {a  democratic  constitution. 
When  we  see  at  the  head  of  her  affairs  men  whose 
records  are  clear  of  this  offence,  we  may  open 
our  League  to  include  them.  In  the  meantime,  in 
no  vindictive  or  revengeful  spirit,  we  must  bethink 


1 6  A   LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

ourselves  of  our  own  security.  The  proposed  re- 
strictions on  trade  are  as  purely  defensive  as  the 
trenches  and  wire  entanglements  which  will  guard 
our  frontiers.  We  cannot  allow  Germany  (in  Mr. 
Runciman's  phrase)  to  '  raise  her  head  again/ 
because  we  fear  that  if  she  again  acquires  the 
wealth  which  is  the  necessary  basis  of  modern 
warfare,  her  strength  and  her  intelligence  will 
again  be  used  to  disturb  the  world.  We  can 
ensure  that  our  own  recovery  shall  be  the  more 
rapid,  and  that  step  by  step,  at  each  stage,  the 
balance  of  military  and  economic  power  is  in  our 
favour.  We  look  forward,  after  a  period  of  years, 
to  a  gradual  easing  of  the  tension,  to  a  lowering 
of  our  hostile  tariffs,  and  eventually,  perhaps,  to 
the  restoration  of  a  chastened  and  penitent  Germany 
to  full  communion  with  the  Society  of  Nations. 
For  the  rest,  we  are  not  impressed  by  the  apology 
that  the  German  people  in  this  war  believes  itself  to 
be  fighting  on  the  defensive.  A  people  subject 
to  such  delusions  is  for  that  very  reason  a  danger 
to  the  world.  If  they  defend  themselves  in  this 
way,  then  we  stand  in  continual  peril  from  their 
defence.  A  people  which  imagines  itself  to  be 
defending  hearth  and  home  when  it  hurls  ultimata 
at  half  a  continent  and  tramples  (to  defend  itself) 
across  the  innocent  soil  of  a  neutral  neighbour, 
can  be  acquitted  of  crime  only  if  it  is  convicted 
of  madness.  Finally,  when  you  suggest  that 
Germany  might  be  willing  to  sign  an  agreement 
to  settle  future  disputes  by  peaceful  means,  it  is 
plain  that  you  have  forgotten  'the  scrap  of  paper.' 
Shall  we,  with  that  example  before  us  of  the  levity 
with  which  German  statesmen  can  repudiate  their 
treaty  obligations,  stake  our  own  safety  and  the 
world's  future  on  the  chance  that  Germany  would 
treat  the  constitution  of  a  League  of  Peace  as  a 
bond  more  sacred  than  the  Belgian  treaties?  No. 


FROM  FORCE   TO   CONFERENCE        17 

A  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  will  be 
valid  and  secure  only  so  long  as  the  Allies  keep 
in  their  hands  the  means  of  punishing  a  breach 
of  faith." 

This  answer  does  not,  I  think,  overstate  the 
blackness  of  pessimism  which  weighs  upon  us.  If 
we  do  not  ourselves  perceive  how  near  it  comes 
to  a  despair  of  the  whole  future  of  civilization,  the 
reason  is  that  our  anger  is  too  vivid  to  allow 
us  to  perceive  the  full  meaning  of  our  political 
bankruptcy.  For  the  speech  which  I  have  com- 
posed, interpreting  as  fairly  as  I  know  how  the 
mood  which  dominates  the  hour,  is  a  confession 
that  the  war  in  its  larger  purposes  has  been  waged 

I   in  vain.      It  has  brought  us  to  the  admission  that 
treaties  in  the  world  which  emerges  from  this  war 

i  will  be  no  more  secure  than  they  were  in  1914. 
Their  sanctity  will  depend  on  the  force  behind  them. 
The  further  conclusion  follows  that  this  force  must 
^  be  kept  always  united  and  always  prepared.  Assume 
that  the  extremer  programme  of  the  Entente  is 
realized — that  Austria  is  broken  up  and  Turkey  par- 
titioned— Germany  (especially  if  the  German 
provinces  of  Austria  were  incorporated  in  her 
Empire)  would  still  be  by  population  the  second 
Power  in  Europe,  and  by  her  military  organization 
the  first.  Can  such  a  Power  be  kept  for  ever 
isolated?  No  alliance  and  no  enmity  is  eternal. 
Germany  and  Austria-,  Russia  and  Japan  concluded 
alliances  after  embittered  wars.  Italy  and  Rumania 
are  fighting  their  former  allies  ;  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  are  to-day  in  the  same  camp.  We  our- 
selves, in  the  brief  span  of  years  between  1898 
and  1904,  transferred  our  weight  from  one  scale 
to  the  other  in  the  European  balance,  and  within 
five  years  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  public  overtures 
of  alliance  to  Germany  entered  the  Franco -Russian 
orbit.  If  we  conceive  the  world  after  this  war 

3 


1 8  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

governed  by  the  old  principle  of  the  Balance  (of 
Power,  we  must  recollect  that  no  balance  was  ever 
stable  and  no  alliance  eternal.  There  must  be 
degrees  of  satisfaction  and  dissatisfaction  even 
among  victorious  allies.  No  victory  can  give  to 
each  of  them  all  they  want,  for  some  of  them 
want  the  same  thing.  Italy  and  Serbia,  for  example, 
have  irreconcilable  pretensions  in  the  Adriatic.  It 
needs  no  very  active  imagination  to  conceive  how 
Germany  would  feel  her  way  among  her  former 
enemies,  here  inflaming  a  sense  of  dissatisfaction, 
there  widening  a  jealous  rift  in  the  Entente.  It 
is  a  law  of  world -politics  that  dissatisfied  Powers 
will  tend  to  come  together.  Isolated,  beaten,  and 
impoverished,  Germany  would  still  be  a  formid- 
able Power,  and  she  would  serve  as  the  nucleus 
round  which  the  discontented  and  the  less  con- 
tented would  cluster.  Even  at  the  settlement  she 
would  begin  her  work,  as  Talleyrand  did  at  the 
Congress  of  Vienna.  There  are,  even  while  the 
war  lasts,  factions  in  Russia,  Italy,  and  Japan  which 
stand  for  an  understanding  with  Germany,  and  the 
Italian  Pro -Germans  were  strong  enough  to  delay 
for  two  years  a  declaration  of  war  upon  her. 
When  the  trade  boycott  is  enforced  (if  it  can 
be  enforced)  financial  and  commercial  motives 
will  reinforce  the  inevitable  political  diver- 
gences. For  the  losses  and  sacrifices  involved 
in  such  a  policy  cannot  be  equalized.  Russia, 
for  example,  can  ill  afford  to  lose  the  German 
market  for  her  grain,  and  Antwerp  would  be  ruined 
if  it  ceased  to  be  a  port  for  German  commerce. 
The  problem  of  Japanese  ambitions  in  China  may 
be  mentioned  as  the  type  of  another  set  of  diffi- 
culties. To  maintain  the  League  intact  would 
demand  from  the  leading  Powers  and  their  guiding- 
statesmen  a  wisdom  and  resource  that  would  tax 
the  utmost  scope  of  human  wit.  The  effort  would 


>•• 
FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE        19 

be  made,  and  for  a  time  it  would  succeed,  though 
at  a  great  cost  in  compromises  and  concessions. 
The  more  loyal  of  the  Powers — the  Powers  which 
held  steadfast  to  the  determination  to  keep  the 
League  together  for  the  world's  good — would  be 
called  upon  at  every  turn  to  make  sacrifices  to 
their  more  exacting  partners.  A  Power  which  chose 
to  play  adroitly  within  the  League  for  its  own 
hand  could  by  "  flirting  "  with  the  enemy  and 
threatening  to  transfer  itself  to  the  rival  camp,  secure 
for  its  own  ends  an  almost  unlimited  toleration 
and  complacency  from  its  allies. 

Towards  the  weaker  members  of  the  combination, 
the  temptation  would  be  to  use  harsher  methods  of 
pressure,  involving,  as  in  the  Greek  precedent,  an 
occasional  or  habitual  interference  in  their  internal 
affairs.  Each  ally  would  be  a  law  unto  him- 
self, for  remonstrance  would  tend  to  drive  the 
member  whose  conduct  its  allies  reprobated  into 
the  German  camp.  Neither  to  vindicate  nationality, 
nor  to  secure  the  due  observance  of  treaties,  nor 
even  to  prevent  a  minor  war  with  a  nation  outside 
the  League,  would  the  greater  allies  venture  to 
impose  moral  restraints  upon  each  other.  The 
overwhelming  consideration  of  safety,  in  a  world 
divided  into  hostile  military  camps,  would  paralyse 
the  workings  of  public  opinion.  It  may  seem  at 
first  sight  that  a  League  which  excluded  one 
Great  Power  need  not  differ  in  kind  from  a  League 
which  included  them  all.  But  the  more  the  two 
conceptions  of  a  general  League  and  a  League  of 
the  Entente  Powers  are  examined,  the  more  clearly 
will  it  appear  that  they  differ  absolutely  in  idea 
and  aim  and  effect.  The  Entente  League  would 
be  from  the  start  an  anti -German  League,  and  it 
could  with  difficulty  be  evolved  into  anything  larger. 
Its  unity  would  be  limited  to  that  one  purpose. 
It  could  coerce  Germany,  and  that  is  all  that  it 


20  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

could  do.  It  would  be  a  league  of  combat  and 
not  a  league  of  peace,  and  it  would  with  difficulty 
avoid  the  spirit  of  narrowness  and  faction,  which 
ruined  the  Holy  Alliance.  So  long  as  its  main 
preoccupation  was  in  trade,  in  armaments,  and  in 
diplomacy  to  maintain  its  front,  formidable  and  un- 
broken against  the  enemy,  it  could  make  no  advance 
towards  the  ideal  of  impartial  justice  which  must 
inform  a  league  of  peace. 

This  gloomy  forecast,  it  may  be  objected,  fails 
to  reckon  with  the  factor  of  opinion,  and  it  foi0ets 
that  the  resolutions  of  the  Paris  Conference  con- 
templated restrictions  on  German  trade,  amounting 
virtually  to  boycott,  only  for  a  term  of  years.  The 
notion  that  a  Germany  formally  excluded  from  the 
European  family  would  sit  down  quietly  under  this 
sentence  and  spend  the  years  of  her  isolation  in 
a  species  of  penitential  retreat  is  too  ludicrous  to 
deserve  discussion.  That  there  will,  if  the  settle- 
ment be  reasonable  and  just,  be  a  period  of  sharp 
reaction  in  Germany  against  militarism  and  the 
whole  tradition  of  force  is  probable,  if  not  certain. 
One  may  doubt,  however,  whether  even  so  it  will 
take  the  form  of  national  penitence  and  confes- 
sion. The  view  of  the  facts  which  led  up  to  the 
war  which  is  current  in  Germany,  has  been  fixed 
by  the  passions  of  the  war  itself  and  by  the  forcible 
suppression  of  the  minority  view.  The  theory  of 
a  defensive  war  will  probably  survive.  A  nation 
does  not  readily  turn  back  to  revise  its  memories 
when  these  have  been  hardened  by  suffering  and 
loss.  The  revision,  if  it  comes  at  all,  will  be  the 
work  of  a  new  generation.  The  Germans  are  hardly 
more  likely  to  realize  to-morrow  their  part  in 
the  aggression  than  we  as  a  nation  are  likely  to 
modify  our  own  reading  of  history  where  it  was  too 
summary  or  too  harsh.  What  one  may  expect  is 
not  so  much  the  sense  that  Germany  has  sinned 


FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE        21 

beyond  the  measure  of  other  nations,  as  a  perception 
that  the  whole  system  of  international  relations  that 
obtained  before  the  war  was  anarchical  and  faulty, 
that  every  nation  has  suffered  and  erred  by  turns 
under  this  system,  and  that  the  future  calls  for 
radical  reconstruction  in  a  spirit  of  tolerance  and 
charity.  On  such  a  basis  a  better  Europe  could 
be  built,  and  a  Germany  which  entered  on  the 
common  work  in  this  spirit  would  be  a  nation  with 
whom  her  neighbours  could  deal.  An  intellectual 
perception  that  the  European  system  was  at  fault 
would  be,  indeed,  a  more  valuable  positive  con- 
tribution to  the  common  stock  than  penitence.  It 
is  much  to  ask  for  this,  when  one  recalls  the  pride, 
the  sentimentality,  and  the  mob  passion  which  in 
all  countries  obscure  the  calm  and  critical  study  of 
contemporary  history. 

Let  us  ask  ourselves  what  must  be  the  effect 
of  her  exclusion  from  the  Allied  markets  on  a 
Germany  whose  opinions,  under  the  chastening  influ- 
ence of  loss  and  disappointment,  were  moving  hope- 
fully in  this  direction.  Would  her  Junkers  beat 
their  breasts  and  acknowledge  that  this  was  the 
just  punishment  for  their  crimes?  No  nation, 
however  gross  its  offence,  ever  has  behaved,  or 
ever  will  behave,  in  that  way,  for  no  nation  ever 
has  admitted  the  right  of  its  enemies  to  be  its 
judge.  We  need  not  look  to  Prussia  for  the  first 
exhibition  in  history  of  a  Christian  poverty  of  spirit. 
What  the  Junkers  would  say  is  a  secondary  con- 
sideration, but  the  effect  of  such  measures  would 
'be  to  make  Junkers,  Radicals,  and  Socialists  unani- 
mous. From  the  first  beginnings  of  Anglo  - 
German  enmity  in  the  last  years  of  last  century  the 
iless  kindly  among  German  politicians  and  journalists 
have  had  their  ever -ready  theory  to  explain  our 
supposed  ill-will.  It  was  said  that  we  viewed 
their  rapid  advance  as  a  manufacturing  and  sea- 


33  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

faring  nation  with  jealousy  and  alarm.  We  had 
(so  they  argued)  enjoyed  for  nearly  a  century  a 
monopolist's  position  as  the  first  of  trading  peoples, 
and  our  concern  at  the  challenge  of  German 
efficiency  was  the  deeper  because  we  realized  that 
we  lacked  the  science  and  the  habit  of  organiza- 
tion which  underlay  Germany's  success.  Our 
uneasiness,  to  their  eyes,  betrayed  itself  in  such 
devices  as  the  Merchandise  Marks  Act  and  the 
"  Made -in- Germany  "  campaign,  and  in  the  revival 
of  the  Protectionist  movement.  That  we  were  con- 
cerned at  the  increasing  German  competition  is,  of 
course,  a  fact,  and1  it  is  also  a  fact  that  the 
less  reasonable  sections  of  our  public  passed 
rapidly  from  anxiety  to  hostility.  On  the  out- 
break of  the  war  every  expression  of  jealousy  was 
culled  from  the  British  Press,  and  every  German 
knew  by  heart  that  monstrous  leading  article  in 
which  the  Saturday  Review  called  (September  1 1, 
1897)  for  a  war  with  Germany,  because  the 
destruction  of  her  trade  would  add  millions  to  our 
national  income.  The  theory  that  we  entered  on  this 
war  with  the  object  of  ruining  our  chief  rival  in  trade 
became  the  accepted  opinion.  Count  Reventlow 
produced  a  violent  but  learned  pamphlet,  "  Der 
Vampir  des  Festlandes,"  in  which  he  developed  the 
theory  that  from  generation  to  generation  British 
policy  always  has,  through  three  centuries,  followed 
the  single  aim  of  ensuring  our  supremacy  in  trade 
by  means  of  war.  First,  the  Spaniards  and  Dutch, 
then  the  French,  and  now  the  Germans  have  been 
our  victims.  Every  nation  has  its  worse  self,  which 
works  more  often  subconsciously  than  consciously. 
Our  temptation  has  never  been  the  French  love 
of  glory  but  a  calculating  use  of  the  material 
advantages  of  power.  This  is  the  charge  to 
which  we  stand  exposed,  a  charge  which  ignores, 
indeed,  all  that  is  great  in  our  record  and  all  that 


FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE        23 

is  fine  in  our  present  temper.  As  an  interpreta- 
tion of  the  mood  in  which  we  went  to  war,  nothing 
could  be  more  crudely  or  meanly  false.  A 
psychologist,  however,  would  warn  us  that  the 
whole  of  a  nation's  mind  never  comes  to  con- 
sciousness in  these  hours  of  exaltation.  The  meaner 
impulses  do  their  work  below  the  level  of  self- 
knowledge,  and  influence  conduct  when  the  first 
generous  passions  have  subsided.  From  an  enemy 
we  need  expect  no  fine  psychology.  (War  is  sof. 
little  an  ennobling  experience  that  every  belligerent  ; 
people  makes  it  a  virtue  to  think  the  worst  of  its  ' 
enemy.  This  proposal  of  a  trade  war  after  peace 
does  not  surprise  our  critics  and  detractors  in 
Germany  ;  it  merely  confirms  their  worst  and  most 
malicious  interpretation  of  our  policy  and  motives. 
They  said  that  our  jealousy  of  German  commerce 
was  our  motive — first,  in  joining  the  Franco -Russian 
Alliance,  and  then  in  entering  the  war.  Into  that 
reading  of  our  motives  the  policy  of  these  Paris 
Resolutions  fits  as  the  natural  sequel.  This  pro- 
gramme of  "  a  war  after  the  war  "  gives  the  lie  to 
those  who  proclaimed  an  idealistic  purpose  in  the 
war,  and  confirms  a  calumny  which  will  work  against 
us  in  the  future  with  a  perpetuum  mobile  of  strife. 
The  man  who  causes  it  to  be  said  of  us  that  our 
aim  in  this  war  was  something  lower  than  a  concern 
for  the  public  law  and  the  liberties  of  Europe  inflicts 
on  us  an  injury  more  lasting  than  any  defeat.  The 
injury,  however,  hurts  a  wider  interest  than  ours. 
It  must  add  immeasurably  to  the  difficulties  of 
every  progressive  party,  of  every  humane  thinker, 
of  every  charitable  mind  in  Europe.  It  is  only 
men  of  an  heroic  temper  who  will  struggle  to  be 
better  than  their  age.  Proclaim  that  this  is  an 
age  in  which  one  group  of  nations  deliberately 
schemes  how  it  may,  not  in  war  but  in  peace, 
injure  and  impoverish  another,  and  inevitably  you 


24  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

have  wrecked  the  very  idea  of  international  morals. 
The  German  Radical  and  the  German  Socialist 
who  would  have  struggled  towards  a  better  future, 
who  would  have  combated  the  fanatics  of  racial 
pride  and  military  dominion  at  home,  will  find  them- 
selves by  this  policy  silenced  and  baffled  in  their 
internal  struggles.  In  a  world  given  over  to 
organized  hatred  no  man  of  common  sense  will 
dare  to  raise  his  voice  against  great  armaments 
or  menacing  alliances.  The  popular  statesman  will 
be  the  man  who  promises  to  lead  Germany,  cut 
off  from  the  best  markets  and  the  amplest  supplies, 
by  the  shortest  and  surest  road  to  the  reconquest 
of  her  lost  freedom  of  commerce.  The  resentment 
of  the  people  will  turn,  not  as  it  might  have  done 
against  those  rulers  who  led  her  into  this  ruinous 
war,  but  against  the  foreign  enemy  who  pens  her 
in.  Even  the  Socialist  Party,  which  declared  when 
it  cast  its  first  vote  for  the  supply  of  the  war, 
that  it  held  German  diplomacy  blameworthy  for 
its  outbreak,  will  be  driven  to  move  with  the  tide. 
If  the  boycott  should  prove  to  be  as  formidable  as 
its  advocates  reckon,  will  the  workman,  as  he  turns 
away  discharged  from  his  factory,  be  philosopher 
enough  to  blame  his  own  rulers  as  the  authors  of 
his  distress?  The  chances  are  that  he  will  curse 
England,  and  cast  his  parliamentary  vote  for  the  most 
blatant  candidate  who  offers  himself.  This  is  not  to 
crush  Prussian  militarism,  but  to  destroy  German 
liberalism.  The  armed  peace  will  have  begun  once 
more,  but  with  less  disguise  than  before,  and  a 
wider  field  for  every  sort  of  hostility  that  stops 
short  of  bloodshed.  That,  if  the  Paris  Conference 
has  fixed  our  policy,  will  be  the  final  outcome  of 
"  the  war  to  end  war."  Was  there  ever  in  history 
a  more  tragic  frustration  of  high  and  disinterested 
hopes?  Driven  as  it  seems  by  the  logic  of  our 
situation,  we  must  fasten  on  mankind  a  new  era 
of  strife,  and  our  challenge  to  the  most  forrnidable 


FROM  FORCE   TO   CONFERENCE        25 

military  system  in  Europe  will  inaugurate,  not  an 
epoch  of  goodwill  but  the  reign  of  a  new  economic 
militarism  more  subtle  and  pervasive  than  the  old. 

Events  have  moved  since  the  Paris  Resolutions 
were  drafted.  Russia  has  become  a  Democratic 
Republic.  America  has  entered  the  war  "  to  make 
democracy  secure."  The  German  people  has  defined 
its  war  aims.  It  is  possible  that  the  historian  may 
reckon  the  debate  which  led  up  to  the  passage  of 
its  famous  Resolution  by  the  Reichistag  among  the 
most  decisive  engagements  in  the  world-war.  It 
was  the  fruit  of  a  sharp  political  crisis,  and  involved 
a  bold  use  by  a  Parliamentary  majority  of  the  power 
of  the  purse,  which  is  the  essential  weapon  of  repre- 
sentative government.  The  crisis  broke  out  in  the 
Financial  (Main)  Committee,  and  had  its  origin  in 
the  hesitation  of  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  to 
adopt  the  "  no  annexations  "  formula  of  the 
"  Majority  "  Socialists.  When  they  refused,  in  con- 
sequence, to  vote  the  war-credits,  the  Centre  and 
the  Radicals  took  their  stand  with  the  Socialists, 
and  the  whole  Committee,  after  an  electric  debate, 
declined  to  proceed  further  witji  supply,  until  the 
Government  gave  the  declaration  they  demanded. 
The  old  Chancellor  fell  :  the  new  Chancellor  (not 
without  an  ambiguous  phrase)  endorsed  the 
Reichstag's  formula.  Only  then  were  the  credits 
voted.  Its  stormy  origin  has  given  to  this  historic 
resolution  a  meaning  which  similar  forms  of  words 
rarely  possess.  It  has  cost  some  effort,  some  de- 
termination, and  a  long  struggle  to  say  this  thing. 
It  is  the  result  of  a  three  years'  controversy,  and 
it  sums  up  the  German  experience  of  the  war. 

Strip  the  resolution  of  the  dignified  and  mildly 
idealistic  language  in  which  it  is  phrased,1  and  it 

1  The  essential  passage  of  the  resolution  runs  thus  :  The  Reichstag 
strives  for  a  peace  by  agreement  and  the  lasting  reconciliation  of 
nations.  With  such  a  peace,  forcible  acquisitions  of  territory,  and 


26  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

will  be  found  to  suggest  a  bargain  between  land- 
power  and  sea-power.  Land -power,  thanks  to  long 
preparation,  efficient  organization,  a  central  situa- 
tion, a  unified  command,  and  the  ability  to  strike 
hard  in  the  first  weeks  of  war,  has  occupied  and 
still  holds  large  stretches  of  Allied  territory.  Sea- 
power  fastens  the  doors  by  an  impenetrable  blockade, 
seizes  colonies  overseas,  and  extends  its  control  over 
all  the  distant  markets  and  sources  of  supply.  The 
threat  of  land-power  is  to  turn  its  occupations  into 
permanent  conquests.  The  threat  of  sea-power  is 
to  prolong  the  blockade  into  an  economic  boycott. 
For  three  years  annexationists  and  their  opponents 
have  debated  whether  it  was  to  the  interest  of  Ger- 
many to  turn  these  occupations,  or  some  of  them, 
into  permanent  acquisitions.  At  first  the  Con- 
servative Junkers  and  the  National -Liberal  capitalists 
of  the  metallurgical  industries  were  opposed  only  by 
the  Socialists  and  by  little  groups  of  far-sighted 
"  intellectuals."  In  the  end  the  Junkers  and  the 
industrialists  stand  isolated,  with  all  the  rest  of  Ger- 
many against  them.  The  Reichstag  has  decided 
that  military  conquests  are  not  for  it  a  substantive 
aim  :  it  regards  the  occupied  territories  as  assets, 
as  pieces  to  bargain  with,  as  temporary  advantages 
which  it  will  surrender  in  order  to  obtain,  not  a 
"  German  "  peace,  but  a  peace  of  "  reconciliation." 
There  lies  a  long  and  educative  experience  behind 
this  decision.  It  is  primarily  prudence,  realism,  a 
clear  perception  and  measuring  of  facts.  There  is 
suffering,  loss,  and  alarm  behind  it.  In  victory 

political,  economic,  or  financial  domination  are  alike  incompatible. 
No  less  does  the  Reichstag  reject  all  schemes  which  aim  at  creating 
economic  isolation  and  enmity  among  nations  after  the  war.  The 
freedom  of  the  seas  must  be  assured.  Economic  peace  alone  can 
prepare  the  ground  for  the  friendly  intercourse  of  peoples.  The 
Reichstag  will  actively  promote  the  creation  of  international  organiza- 
tions for  public  right  (Rechtsorganisationen). 


FROM  FORCE  TO   CONFERENCE        27 

men  learned  from  hunger,  and  the  advancing 
phalanx  left  widows  in  its  rear.  The  ghastly  dis- 
illusionment of  these  years  has  done  its  work  in 
men's  minds.  The  dreams  of  dominion  have  receded, 
the  vanity  of  a  great  military  machine  has  been 
demonstrated.  In  isolation,  before  the  prospect  of 
economic  ruin,  the  German  people  is  learning  the 
limitations  of  military  efficiency.  In  some  quarters, 
far  outside  the  Socialist  ranks,  especially  among! 
Catholics,  one  detects  signs  of  a  moral  and  religious 
change.  The  Austrian  Emperor  in  granting  his 
amnesty  to  political  prisoners  deplores  "  the  policy 
of  hate  and  reprisals  which  let  loose  the  world- 
war,"  and  a  Catholic  Peace  League,  with  the  White 
Cross  as  its  symbol,  preaches  "  the  substitution  of 
Christian  principles  in  public  life  for  Machiavellian 
diplomacy."  There  is  a  change,  not  among  the 
Junkers  and  the  "  profiteers,"  but  among  the  simpler 
middle  and  working  class  of  Germany,  and  in  Austria 
in  much  higher  quarters.  A  Hapsburg  has  adopted 
44  democracy  "  as  his  watchword  :  the  fifth 
Chancellor  after  Bismarck  has  talked  of  "  recon- 
ciliation." 

Without  any  cynical  implication,  let  us  confine 
ourselves,  however,  to  the  more  prosaic  and  realistic 
side  of  this  movement  of  thought.  What  it  means, 
in  plain  words,  is  that  Germans  have  begun  to 
think  very  gravely  of  the  future  which  faces  their 
commerce  and  their  whole  national  life,  if  the  pro- 
gramme of  the  Paris  Resolutions  is  put  into  force. 
They  have  realized  that  they  must  barter  their 
potential  conquests  against  our  potential  boycott. 
The  alarm  grew  slowly.  The  Paris  Resolutions 
were  treated  somewhat  lightly  at  first.  A  solid 
Mitteleuropa  seemed  to  offer  a  big  market.  The 
two  Americas  stood  outside  the  Allied  combination, 
and  there  was  China,  with  its  vast  resources  awaiting 
development.  Russia,  it  was  thought,  might  break 


28  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

away  from  the  Entente,  after  peace,  if  not  before 
it.  A  different  prospect  presents  itself  to-day.  The 
entry  of  America  has  changed  the  landscape.  Brazil, 
the  chief  alternative  source  to  Africa  for  the  raw 
materials  of  the  tropics,  has  followed  the  Northern 
Continent,  and  she  is  not  alone.  China,  too,  has 
entered  the  Allied  camp,  a  fact  of  no  military,  but 
of  vast  economic  significance.  When  the  Paris 
Resolutions  were  drafted,  they  suggested  conflict  in  a 
bisected  world.  To-day  a  world -wide  combination 
has  made  an  unbreakable  fence.  That  is  the  new 
fact  behind  the  Reichstag's  resolution.  Some  Ger- 
mans may  feel  sincerely  that  a  future  of  boycotts 
and  animosities  among  nations  is  morally  a  repugnant 
prospect,  but  all  Germans  realize  that  it  is  materially 
a  ruinous  prospect.  Sea-power  has  vindicated  itself 
against  land-power.  One  kind  of  force  has  proved 
itself  on  the  balance  more  formidable  than  another 
kind  of  force.  The  military  decision  is  evident, 
even  though  the  present  trench  lines  should  hold. 
The  loss  of  markets  through  tariff  or  shipping  dis- 
crimination would  be  serious  :  the  control  by  the 
Entente  of  raw  materials  (cotton,  rubber,  copper, 
and  vegetable  oils)  would  be  fatal  to  the  recovery  of 
German  industry. 

The  Reichstag's  resolution  sets  for  us  an  urgent 
and  imperative  problem.  On  the  assumption  that 
our  essential  aims  of  restoration  and  security  will 
be  conceded  by  an  enemy  who  professes  his  desire 
for  a  peace  of  reconciliation,  are  we  prepared  to 
grant  what  clearly  is  his  indispensable  condition  ? 
Are  we  prepared,  if  wrongs  are  righted,  armaments 
reduced,  and  the  guarantee  of  a  League  of  Nations 
created  against  future  aggression,  to  concede 
"economic  peace"?  The  problem  is  for  us 
parallel  to  that  which  has  confronted  the  Germans. 
They  have  eventually  decided  that  their  military 
occupations  are  means  to  an  end,  and  not  substantive 


FROM   FORCE   TO   CONFERENCE        29 

aims.  Is  the  ability  to  prolong  the  blockade  into  a 
boycott  for  us  a  substantive  aim,  or  is  it  a  means 
of  extorting  a  good  peace  ?  The  enemy  holds 
Belgium.  We  hold  cotton,  copper,  and  rubber.  Are 
we  prepared  to  abandon  the  Paris  Resolutions,  as 
the  Germans  will  abandon  the  occupied  territories, 
if  the  whole  scheme  of  the  settlement  makes  for 
a  secure  and  reconstituted  world?  When  the  Paris 
Resolutions  were  published,  two  tendencies  declared 
themselves  in  this  country.  One  school  regarded 
them  as  a  satisfaction  of  its  ideal  :  it  positively 
wanted  a  "  war  after  War,"  a  competition  in  boycotts 
and  exclusions,  in  which  it  believed  that  the  ad- 
vantage would  lie  with  our  trade.  The  other  school 
thought  the  whole  plan  unworkable  and  unprofitable, 
and  foresaw  that  it  would  destroy  any  attempt  to 
organize  peace  on  a  basis  of  equity  and  goodwill. 
The  former  school  meant  to  persevere  in  the  plan 
at  all  costs.  The  latter  school  hoped  that  it  would 
prove  to  be  an  extravagance  of  our  war  temper, 
which  would  be  gradually  forgotten  and  abandoned, 
as  its  difficulties  were  realized.  Neither  school  per- 
ceived the  part  which  the  scheme  might  play  in  the 
larger  strategy  of  the  settlement.  It  is  no  mere 
extravagance  ;  it  is  the  inevitable  statement  of  our 
sea-power.  It  is  because  our  naval  supremacy  makes 
our  combination  supreme  beyond  the  European 
Continent,  that  the  menace  of  the  plan  is  formidable. 
Unless  we  are  prepared  to  use  this  tremendous  threat 
in  a  conscious  and  reasoning  way,  we  shall  throw 
away  our  chief  weapon.  The  possibility  of  an  after- 
war  boycott  will  be,  at  the  moment  of  settlement, 
what  the  blockade  itself  has  been  during  the  war. 
An  effective  use  of  it  depends,  however,  on  our 
readiness  to  give  it  up. 

The  question  whether  on  any  terms  whatever  we 
are  prepared  to  abandon  the  Paris  Resolutions  has 


30  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

not  yet  been  faced  by  the  Allies.  It  is  still  uncertain 
whether  the  boycott  is  for  us  a  substantive  war-aim 
directed  to  the  permanent  strangulation  of  the 
enemy's  trade,  or  whether  we,  also,  desire  a  peace  of 
conciliation,  and  conceive  economic  pressure  only  as 
a  means  of  obtaining  the  necessary  guarantees.  To 
the  question  what  these  guarantees  are,  our  answer  is 
not  yet  decided  or  unanimous.  On  the  restoration 
of  the  conquered  territories  by  the  enemy  we  are 
all  agreed.  On  the  assertion  of  the  rights  of 
nationalities  we  agree  in  principle,  but  not  in  detail. 
Since  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into  our  combina- 
tion, the  public  opinion  of  the  Entente  has  tended 
to  lay  increasing  stress  upon  a  guarantee  of  a  novel 
kind,  peculiarly  difficult  to  enforce.  This  new  demand 
is  that  Germany  shall,  in  some  form,  reconstruct  her 
Constitution  upon  a  Western  democratic  model.  The 
instinct  behind  this  demand  is  sound.  A  great 
Power,  which  persists  in  maintaining  a  peculiar,  and 
to  our  thinking,  archaic  form  of  government,  will 
always  find  itself  an  object  of  suspicion  to  its  neigh- 
bours. The  effort  of  other  peoples  to  understand 
its  public  life  is  baffled  by  these  unfamiliar  and  com- 
plex institutions,  and  the  impulse  of  fraternity  is 
checked,  when  sovereign  peoples  cannot  meet  on 
equal  terms.  We  have,  moreover,  the  admission 
of  leading  German  Conservatives  that  the  structure  of 
the  Prussian  Monarchy,  with  its  curious  survival  of 
personal  rule  and  its  old-world  limitations  upon  the 
power  of  the  people,  is  an  organization  consciously 
devised  and  deliberately  retained,  because,  in  a  dan- 
gerous world,  it  is  supposed  to  make  for  military 
strength.  It  was  not  mere  ill-will  which  led  to  the 
well-meaning,  if  ignorant,  hope  that  a  German  revo- 
lution might  follow  the  Russian  upheaval.  There 
was  beneath  that  hope  the  resolve  at  once  to  make  a 
lasting  and  fraternal  peace  with  the  insurgent  Ger- 
man people.  The  hope  was  vain,  for  the  simple 


FROM   FORCE   TO   CONFERENCE        31 

reason  that  the  German  people  have  no  such 
grievance  against  the  Hohenzollerns  as  the  Russians 
had  against  the  Romanoffs.  The  Prussian  House, 
with  all  its  faults,  stands  at  the  head  of  an  honest  and 
capable  civil  service,  which  has  given  its  people 
a  large  measure  of  civil  liberty,  a  remarkable  system 
of  social  legislation,  the  boon  of  a  high  standard 
of  public  education,  and  a  steadily  rising  level  of 
prosperity.  It  is  only  the  cruder  minds  among  us 
which  have  harboured  the  idea  of  dictating  to  the 
Germans,  as  a  condition  of  peace,  a  change  in  their 
Constitution.  We  all  hope  for  it,  but  a  too  frequent, 
a  too  dictatorial,  a  too  official  expression  of  our 
wish  is  likely  to  produce  the  effect  we  least  desire, 
and  to  retard  the  process  of  internal  development. 
No  great  people  ever  did  or  ever  will  change  its 
institutions  to  please  an  enemy.  That  is  an  axiom 
which  most  Englishmen  understand,  but  Americans, 
brought  up  in  an  atmosphere  remote  from  the 
nationalism  of  our  continent,  are  slow  to  fathom  our 
European  pride.  If  we  set  out  to  enforce  democracy, 
we  shall  drive  the  whole  German  people  to  rally 
round  its  military  chiefs  in  the  resolve  to  resist 
foreign  dictation. 

The  constitution  of  the  German  Empire  is  in  point 
of  fact  a  more  complex  and  much  less  "  autocratic  " 
system  than  popular  opinion  in  the  Allied  countries 
supposes.  The  Kaiser's  habit  of  talking  like  a 
mediaeval  Emperor,  especially  before  the  "  personal 
rule"  crisis  of  1908,  when  Prince  Billow  insisted 
that  the  Chancellor  should  revise  his  utterances 
before  they  were  made  public,  was  partly  to  blame, 
and  it  is  seldom  realized  that  his  power  is  severely 
limited  by  the  Federal  Council  (Bundesrat).  On 
this  Council  of  the  Governments  of  the  federated 
States,  Prussia,  though  she  has  the  presidency,  pos- 
sesses only  a  minority  of  votes  (17  out  of  58).  The 
general  control  of  the  Emperor  and  his  Chancellor 


32  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

over  foreign  policy  is  limited  by  one  important 
provision.  Except  in  case  of  invasion,  the  consent 
of  the  Bundesrat  is  required  for  a  declaration  of 
war.  To  this  Council  belongs  the  official  initiative 
in  preparing  legislation.  The  chief  opposition  to  the 
adoption  of  the  Western  principle  of  the  responsibility 
of  ministers  to  Parliament  seems  to  come  from  the 
relatively  Liberal  South  German  States,  and  that 
is  a  proof  that  they  value  their  power  in  the  Bundes- 
rat and  see  in  it  a  real  check  upon  the  Prussian 
monarchy.  Federal  constitutions  are  notoriously 
difficult  to  amend.  There  manifestly  is,  however, 
a  growing  sense  in  Germany  that  the  plan  by  which 
the  Emperor  may  nominate  an  almost  unknown 
bureaucrat  to  the  immense  powers  of  the  Chancellor's 
office,  without  even  consulting  the  Reichstag's 
party  leaders,  is  unworthy  of  the  nation's  dignity. 
It  is  just  so,  as  Herr  Friedrich  Naumann  remarked 
when  Dr.  Michaelis  was  appointed,  that  an  official 
is  sent  from  Berlin  to  govern  an  African  colony. 
The  transformation  of  German  political  life  has 
undoubtedly  begun.  Early  in  the  war  the  late 
Chancellor  announced  that  there  must  be  "a  new 
orientation  "  at  its  close.  Public  opinion  is  insisting 
on,  a  prompter  re-adjustment.  The  whole  fabric 
of  authority  in  the  Prussian  State  rested  on  its 
notorious  Three- Class  franchise,  a  system  of  voting 
which  has  hitherto  given  the  Conservatives  in  its 
Diet  an  unassailable  majority.  The  Kaiser's  rescript 
of  Easter,  1917,  with  the  significant  supplement, 
which  promises  before  the  next  election  a  measure 
of  equal,  direct,  and  universal  suffrage,  and  the 
reform  of  the  Upper  House,  in  itself  ensures  the 
eventual  democratization  of  Prussia.  The  spirit 
which  we  call  "  Prussian  militarism  "  owed  its 
power  in  the  State  to  the  supremacy  of  the  Prussian 
squire  and  the  Prussian  capitalist  in  the  Diet.  The 
reform  of  the  franchise  means  its  overthrow.  Other 


FROM    FORCE   TO    CONFERENCE         33 

changes,  which  seem  to  be  imminent,  foreshadow 
the  removal  of  the  chief  grievances  of  the  non- 
German  population.  On  Alsace-Lorraine  there  is 
talk  of  conferring  the  full  status  of  an  equally  privi- 
leged self-governing  State  of  the  federal  Empire. 
The  initial  steps  have  been  taken  by  the  Government 
for  repealing  the  more  .oppressive  clauses  of  the 
Language  Ordinance,  which  restricted  the  use  of 
the  Polish,  French,  and  Danish  languages,  and  also 
to  erase  from  the  Statute-book  the  worst  features 
of  the  Act  which  provided  for  the  expropriation  of 
Polish  landowners  in  Prussian  Poland.  It  was 
these  four  things,  the  Prussian  franchise,  the  sub- 
ordinate status  of  Alsace,  the  illiberal  Language 
Ordinance,  and  the  Polish  Colonization  Law,  which 
had  stood  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  as  the  concrete 
expressions  of  Prussian  reaction.  No  less  interest- 
ing is  the  success  of  the  Reichstag  in  winning  for 
itself  a  measure  of  preventive  control  over  the  main 
lines  of  German  foreign  policy.  It  shares  this  con- 
trol in  the  new  "  Free  Commission  "  with  the 
Bundesrat,  but  the  leaders  of  its  chief  parties  will 
sit  down  at  the  council  table  with  the  votes  of  its 
majority  in  their  pockets.  They  will  be  privy  to 
contemplated  acts  of  policy  before  they  are  irrepar- 
ably completed,  and  the  Chancellor  will  be  informed 
authoritatively  in  advance  what  view  the  Reichstag 
is  likely  to  take  of  them.  The  comparative  im- 
potence of  the  Reichstag  during  the  greater  part  of 
its  careeer  was  due  much  less  to  the  defects  of  its 
constitution  than  to  the  political  immaturity  of  its 
parties.  It  rests  on  manhood  suffrage,  and  it  is 
armed  with  ample  powers  which  would  always  have 
enabled  it  to  enforce  its  will,  if  it  had  ever  had  a 
decided,  collective  will  of  its  own.  It  has  the  power 
of  the  purse,  the  right  to  refuse  supplies.  If  it  had 
refused  vital  supplies  (as  happened  in  Prince  Billow's 
time),  the  Kaiser  might  dissolve  it,  but  if  the  hostile 

4 


34  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

majority  had  come  back  strengthened  from  the 
general  election  (as  on  that  occasion  it  did  not),  its 
demands  must  have  been  met.  On  fundamental 
issues,  however,  it  never  chose  to  assert  itself.  It 
did,  however,  modify  budgets,  alter  or  refuse 
taxes,  and  amend  or  reject  Bills,  with  considerable 
freedom,  and  often  with  little  regard  to  the 
convenience  of  Governments.  Up  till  1900,  for 
example,  it  had  steadily  refused,  in  spite  of  the  in- 
sistence of  successive  Ministers,  to  assent  to  any 
substantial  increase  of  the  navy.  The  Chancellor 
is  not  the  leader  of  the  Majority,  but  his  chief  duty 
is,  none  the  less,  to  secure  a  majority  for  his  policy 
in  the  Reichstag,  and  he  is  usually  obliged  to  bargain 
with  its  groups.  Its  comparative  impotence,  in  spite 
of  this  strong  strategical  position,  was  due  to  the 
inability  of  these  groups  to  combine  for  the  purpose 
of  giving  a  decisive,  constructive  direction  to  policy. 
They  allowed  themselves  to  be  managed,  and  bar- 
tered their  votes  for  detailed  concessions.  The  chief 
reason  why  no  progressive  coalition  was  ever  formed 
before  the  v,rar  was  that  the  Socialists,  the  largest 
party  in  the  House,  adhered  to  a  revolutionary 
strategy  of  isolation.  The  chief  reason  why  such  a 
coalition  has  come  into  being  during  the  war  is 
that  the  "  Majority  "  Socialists  are  now  following 
"  reformist  "  tactics  and  have  become  the  driving 
force  in  a  powerful  Socialist-Radical-Centre  com- 
bination. There  is  now  a  moderately  progressive 
majority,  which  has  some  coherence.  It  made  itself, 
instead  of  waiting  for1  a  Chancellor  to  combine  it,  and 
it  has  shown  signs  of  a  real  resolve  to  impose  its 
will.  Therein  lies  the  real  hope  of  constitutional 
change  in  Germany  upon  the  lines  of  a  natural  his- 
torical development.  Our  public  opinion  wonders 
that  it  moves  no  faster.  The  miracle  is  that  in  spite 
of  the  censorship,  in  spite  of  the  party  truce,  in  spite 
of  the  absence  of  the  German  youth  in  the  trenches,. 


FROM   FORCE   TO    CONFERENCE         35 

it  has  already  advanced  so  far.  The  faster  and  the 
surer  it  moves,  the  better  will  be  the  hope  for  the 
world's  peace.  A  Germany  that  has  adapted  herself 
to  the  democratic  ideal  will  enter  more  sincerely  into 
the  Society  of  Nations,  and  without  this  adaptation 
she  may,  indeed,  be  admitted,  but  will  hardly  be 
welcomed.  The  first  general  election  after  peace 
is  likely  to  complete  her  evolution. 

The  relation  of  democracy  to  peace  is  a  general 
problem.  It  is  true  that  the  masses  of  modern 
European  nations  seldom  desire  war  spontaneously. 
The  cynic  might  answer  that  this  is  only  because 
they  do  not  spontaneously  think  about  foreign  affairs 
at  all.  Their  passions  are  too  often  at  the  mercy 
of  the  demagogue  and  the  less  responsible  press. 
Democracy  is  as  yet  only  an  ideal.  It  nowhere 
effectively  exists,  nor  can  it  exist  effectively  while 
the  general  level  of  education  is  low,  and  interested 
wealth  is  potent  in  the  making  and  organization 
of  opinion.  Even  the  more  advanced  democracies 
allow  the  management  of  foreign  affairs  to  be  centred 
in  a  few  hands,  whose  doings  are  veiled  in  semi- 
secrecy.  Within  a  few  days  of  his  own  appeal 
to  Germany  to  adopt  democracy,  Mr.  Balfour  made 
in  the  House  of  Commons  an  unqualified  defence 
of  secret  diplomacy,  deprecated  public  debates  in 
Parliament,  and  resisted  the  creation  of  a  foreign- 
affairs  committee  of  the  House.  The  secret  treaties 
which  define  the  Allied  war-aims  are  as  crude  a 
denial  of  democracy  as  the  similar  proceedings  of 
the  Central  Powers.  Our  national  thinking  on  this 
question  is  partial  and  half-hearted.  The  same 
people  who  will  make  "  no  peace  with  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  "  were  content  to  live  in  alliance  with  the 
Romanoffs.  Are  Japan  and  Roumania  democracies? 
One  recalls  the  retort  of  Fox  to  Burke  in  a  similar 
controversy  :  "  Make  peace  with  no  man  of  whose 
good  conduct  you  are  not  satisfied,  but  make  an 


36  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

alliance  with  any  man  no  matter  how  profligate 
or  faithless  he  may  be."  If  democracy  is  to  be  one 
of  the  guarantees  on  which  we  insist  for  the  future, 
we  must  secure  it  by  general  undertakings,  which 
will  assure  us  all  that  in  their  graver  acts  of  policy 
the  Governments  have  their  peoples  behind  them. 
One  of  these  general  undertakings  might  be  a  uni- 
versal pledge  that  a  declaration  of  war  requires  the 
consent  of  Parliament.  Another  might  be  the  stipu- 
lation that  the  treaty  constituting  a  League  of 
Nations  must  be  ratified  by  all  the  Parliaments,  and 
even  by  a  referendum  of  the  peoples. 

We  come  much  nearer  to  the  essential  guarantees 
of  an  enduring  peace  in  the  proposals  of  the  Pope 
and  the  answers  (to  them  of  the  Central  Powers. 
Austria  has  accepted  without  qualification  the  prin- 
ciple of  obligatory  arbitration,  with  its  corollary  of 
general  disarmament.  Germany,  with  almost  iden- 
tical language,  makes  an  obscure  reservation  about 
her  "  vital  interests/'  That  phrase  may  be  a  harm- 
less expression  of  diplomatic  caution,  but  it  may 
conceal  a  qualification  which  would  render  worth- 
less any  undertaking  to  refej-  future  disputes  to 
the  processes  of  conciliation.  While  this  phrase 
must  put  us  on  our  guard,  the  whole  tone  of  these 
two  documents  suggests  a  revolution  in  German 
thinking.1  Mommsen's  phrase  that  the  first  Hague 

1  It  is  not  a  sudden  evolution.  Compare  with  these  notes  the 
earlier  declarations  of  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  (November  9, 
1916)  :— 

"  When,  after  the  termination  of  the  war,  the  world  will  fully 
recognize  its  horrible  devastation  of  blood  and  treasure,  then  through 
all  mankind  will  go  the  cry  for  peaceful  agreements  and  under- 
standing which  will  prevent,  as  far  as  is  humanly  possible,  the  return 
of  such  an  immense  catastrophe.  This  cry  will  be  so  strong  and  so 
justified  that  it  must  lead  to  a  result.  Germany  will  honourably  co- 
operate in  investigating  every  attempt  to  find  a  practical  solution  and 
collaborate  towards  its  possible  realization  ;  and  that  all  the  more  if, 
as  we  confidently  expect,  the  war  produces  political  conditions  which 


FROM   FORCE   TO    CONFERENCE         37 

Conference  was  "  a  misprint  in  the  history  of 
civilization  "  had  summed  ;up  the  thinking  of  the 
German  ruling  classes  about  arbitration.  Their 
attitude  towards  disarmament  was  conveyed  in  the 
German  veto  on  any  discussion  of  the  subject  at 
the  Second  Hague  Conference.  The  refusal  of  the 
Central  Powers  up  to  the  eleventh  hour  of  the  crisis 
of  1914  to  admit  any  mediation  between  Austria  and 
Serbia,  was  their  most  fatal  contribution  to  the 
making  of  the  world- war.  What  was  "  Prussian 
militarism,"  save  the  reliance  on  armed  force  and 
the  rejection  of  all  the  expedients  of  Conference? 
The  accent  is  changed  to-day.  If  we  can  trust  the 
sincerity  of  these  Notes,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  "  Prussian  militarism  "  lies  discarded  and  re- 
nounced amid  the  ruin  it  has  made.  A  Government 
which  is  prepared  to  disarm,  commits  itself  by  this 
single  concession  to  a  complete  revision  of  its 
policies  and  methods.  The  renunciation  of  force 
must  bring  with  it  a  change,  gradual  perhaps  but 
complete,  in  the  entire  habits  of  thought  of  the 
Prussian  ruling  caste.1  Men  will  no  longer  think 
in  terms  of  force  when  they  have  dropped  their 
weapons. 

will  do  justice  to  the  free  development  of  all  nations,  small  as  well  as 
great.  ,  .  .  The  first  condition  for  the  development  of  international 
relations  by  means  of  an  arbitration  court  and  the  peaceful  concilia- 
tion of  conflicting  antagonisms  would  be  that  henceforth  no  agressive 
coalitions  should  be  formed." 

1  The  problem  of  disarmament  is  the  most  complex  of  these  which 
confront  us,  and  I  have  not  ventured  to  discuss  it  in  detail  in  this 
book.  The  Pope  appears  to  contemplate  a  reform  which  would  have 
seemed  impossibly  bold  and  Utopian  before  this  war.  He  suggests, 
the  reduction  of  armies  everywhere  to  the  level  strictly  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  internal  order.  Cardinal  Gasparri  has 
explained  that  he  means  by  this  the  general  abolition  of  conscription. 
If  this  means  the  creation  everywhere  of  small  professional  armies, 
highly  trained,  and  equipped  with  all  the  latest  devilries,  this 
expedient  anight  be  a  potent  reinforcement  of  political  and  economic 


38  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

The  guarantees  which  must  be  exchanged,  before 
the  world  can  abandon  the  system  of  force  for  the 
system  of  conference,  require  exacting  and  sceptical 
study.  There  can  be  no  sound  construction  with- 
out ruthless  and  negative  criticism.  Disarmament, 
arbitration,  democracy,  each  of  these  may  be  an 
element  in  the  system  that  we  are  seeking  to  create. 
They  !are  not  enough.  It  must  provide  for  change  no 
less  than  security.  It  must  lay  the  foundations  of 
economic  peace.  If  it  rests  on  treaties,  it  must 
furnish  sanctions  for  their  loyal  observance.  From 
Belgium  to  Armenia  it  must  end  the  reign  of  force. 

reaction.  These  professional  armies  would  be  everywhere  a  Pretorian 
guard  at  the  service  of  the  dynasties,  the  ruling  castes,  and  of  capital. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  substitute  is  to  be  a  citizen  militia,  on  the 
lines  sketched  by  Jaures  in  UArmtt  Xouvclle,  then  indeed  we  shall 
have  "  made  democracy  secure."  The  period  of  compulsory  training 
might  be  limited  by  general  consent  to  six  months.  A  drastic  reduc- 
tion might  be  negotiated  in  the  total  war-like  expenditure  of  all  states. 
The  difficulty  in  any  general  agreement  of  denning  terms  and 
securing  fair  dealing,  given  the  varying  circumstances  of  the  Powers, 
is  notorious.  The  future  of  naval  warfare  is,  moreover,  uncertain. 
Do  capital  ships  retain  their  old  utility?  Are  not  mine-fields  and 
coast  defences,  as  the  immunity  of  the  Germans  in  Flanders  suggests, 
sufficient  protection  against  invasion  ?  There  are,  however,  two 
factors  which  may  ease  the  problem.  Our  own  success  in  im- 
provising a  great  army  goes  to  show  that  unremitting  preparation  in 
peace  is  less  necessary  than  had  been  supposed.  Further,  every 
Power  will  be  financially  exhausted,  and  the  entire  adult  population 
is  fully  trained.  It  might  be  easy  to  agree  provisionally  to  a  total 
suspense  of  all  new  armaments  for  a  term  of  years— no  building  of 
capital  ships,  complete  demobilization,  calling  up  only  of  the  young 
recruits  for  six  months'  training  as  they  reach  the  military  age.  A 
suspense  of  this  kind  is  probable  even  without  agreements.  If  ii 
could  be  enforced  generally  for  five  or  even  for  ten  years,  we  should 
all  be  able  to  study  the  question  in  the  interval,  and  to  approach  some 
permanent  solution,  with  the  aid  of  the  lesson  of  this  war,  but  freed 
from  its  distracting  passions. 


CHAPTER    II 
AMERICA  AND    THE    LEAGUE   OF    PEACE 

No  history  is  so  dreary  as  the  annals  of  a 
venerable  hope.  It  is  the  new  ideals  that  allure 
us.  In  spite  of  the  mutation  and  complication 
which  we  call  progress,  men  tend  to  believe  that 
the  thing  which  was  will  be,  that  the  thing  which 
in  vain  has  struggled  to  become  fact  must  remain 
a  dream  for  ever.  The  idea  of  a  League  of 
Perpetual  Peace  has  a  life  of  three  centuries 
behind  it.  The  Due  De  Sully  laboured  to  bring 
it  about.  William  Penn  and  the  Abbe"  de  Saint- 
Pierre,  Rousseau  and  Kant  employed  their  genius 
to  keep  it  alive.  Saints  and  philosophers  were  not 
its  only  votaries.  It  fired  the  ambition  of  Henry 
«  of  Navarre,  and  for  a  moment  amused  Louis 
Napoleon  ;  in  his  work  at  The  Hague  the  Tsar 
Nicholas  was  but  reviving  in  a  timid  form  the 
much  bolder  inspiration  of  his  ancestor,  Alexander  I. 
The  most  elaborate  draft  of  this  scheme  has  lain 
for  two  centuries  on  the  library  shelves,  and  Europe 
with  a  punctual  cynicism  has  twice  celebrated  by 
a  universal  war  the  centenary  of  Saint -Pierre's 
"  Perpetual  Peace."  This  ideal  has  had  too  long 
a  history.  It  must  be  some  new  fact,  some  fresh 
departure,  some  shattering  of  traditions,  which  will 
give  it  life  again. 

The  new  fact  is  before  us.  It  comes  from  the 
New  World,  and  it  implies  the  breaking  of  the  most 
obstinate  tradition  in  politics.  If  President  Wilson, 


39 


40  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

when  he  addressed  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
at  Washington  (May  27,  1916)  had  been  content 
to  make  an  academic  speech  in  favour  of  the 
processes  of  arbitration  and  mediation,  we  should 
have  listened  with  a  fatigued  and  languid  attention. 
Persuasive  and  cultured  orators  have  exhausted  that 
theme  in  all  the  languages  of  civilization.  Rousseau 
was  more  eloquent  and  Kant  more  acute.  On  the 
merits  of  the  question  Mr.  Wilson  said  nothing 
new  :  there  is  nothing  new  to  say.  He  made  a  new 
fact  by  shattering  once  and  for  all  the  tradition 
of  American  isolation.  Since  Washington  warned 
his  countrymen  against  "  entangling  alliances/'  and 
President  Monroe  formulated  his  "  Doctrine,"  the 
principle  that  the  United  States  must  hold  aloof 
from  the  politics  of  the  Old  World  has  reigned 
as  an  unquestioned  dogma.  It  was  more  than  a 
preference  and  an  instinct.  It  was  the  condition 
on  which  Americans  hoped  to  purchase  the  immunity 
of  their  own  Continent  from  the  ambitions  of 
European  dynasties  and  the  invasions  of  European 
armies.  The  Doctrine  was  in  the  first  instance  a 
warning  addressed  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  which 
threatened  to  carry  into  Latin  America  on  behalf 
of  Imperial  Spain  its  principle  of  legitimate 
authority  and  its  habit  of  intervention.  It  survived 
to  hold  at  arm's  length  the  colonial  aspirations  of 
restless  Powers.  The  United  States  did  not  meddle 
in  Europe,  primarily  because  it  would  not  allow 
Europe  to  meddle  in  America.  The  doctrine  of 
isolation  had  come  to  be  much  more  than  a  maxim 
of  statecraft.  It  seemed  to  guarantee  to  North 
America  for  all  time  a  peculiar  civilization  of  her 
own,  based  on  a  security  unknown  to  the  peoples 
of  Europe.  The  Republic  stood,  when  our  war 
broke  out,  on  the  Atlantic  shore,  and  watched  our 
agony  as  the  landsman  in  Lucretius  watched  the 
shipwreck  at  sea.  The  typical  American  mind  is 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      41 

not  content  to  disapprove  of  war  ;  it  barely  under- 
stands it.  In  the  profound  peace  of  its  unassailable 
continent,  the  belief  in  the  validity  of  moral 
judgments  and  the  confidence  in  the  processes 
of  rational  conference  have  acquired  such  an 
ascendancy,  that  even  able  men  seem  unable  to 
interpret  our  international  life,  dominated  as  it  is 
by  the  ideas  of  force  and  power.  It  is  a  new 
human  type  which  is  evolving  in  this  melting-pot 
of  races,  without  the  old  formative  influences  of 
nationalism  and  militarism.  It  lives  virtually  without 
an  army,  and  prizes  above  all  its  other  advantages 
the  security  which  permits  it  to  escape  the  barracks 
and  the  taxes  of  Europe.  Mr.  Wilson's  phrase, 
"  too  proud  to  fight,"  which  stirred  some  of  us  to 
an  unpleasant  mirth,  was  the  apt  expression  of  this 
spirit. 

From  this  aloofness,  a  policy  not  merely  of 
self-interest  and  calculation,  but  of  sentiment  and 
morals,  Mr.  Wilson  is  prepared  to  step  down.  He 
has  offered,  not  merely  his  services  to  assist  Europe 
to  form  a  League  of  Peace,  but  the  power  of  the 
United  States  to  back  the  authority  of  such  a 
League.  His  speech  was  a  deliberate  and  explicit 
pledge,  that  if  a  League  is  formed  among  the 
nations  to  conduct  their  common  affairs  by 
conference,  conciliation,  and  arbitration,  the  United 
States  will  take  her  place  in  the  League,  and  use 
her  economic  and  military  resources  against  any 
Power  which  makes  war  without  submitting  its 
cause  to  one  of  these  processes.  He  has  boldly 
adopted  the  idea  of  using  "  coercion  "  in  "  the 
service  of  common  order,  common  justice,  and 
common  peace."  It  was  a  declaration,  in  words 
that  consciously  echoed  the  old  Stoic  maxim,  that 
nothing  which  concerns  humanity  can  be  foreign 
to  any  civilized  people.  '  What  affects  mankind 
is  inevitably  our  affair."  It  means  that  hence- 


42  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

forward  to  be  neutral  when  wrong  and  aggression 
are  suffered  by  any  nation  is  a  dereliction  of  duty. 
That  is  not  a  new  idea  in  the  world,  but  those 
who  preached  it  have  hitherto  been  dismissed  by 
"  all  the  right-minded  "  as  Quixotes  and  Crusaders. 
Revolutionary  France  became  an  armed  missionary 
of  liberty  in  Europe,  but  only  after  her  own 
existence  as  a  republic  had  been  threatened  by  a 
coalition  of  kings.  For  her  own  defence  she  carried 
the  torch  into  their  inflammable  palaces.  The  Holy 
Alliance  in  its  turn  stood  for  a  cosmopolitan  ideal 
of  reaction,,  but  it  too  was  based  on  a  conception 
of  self-defence  ;  its  sovereigns,  when  they  bound 
themselves  to  assail  revolution,  were  bent  on  protect- 
ing their  own  rights.  More  than  once  in  our 
own  history  we  have  approached  a  cosmopolitan 
conception  of  national  duty,  when  we  sought  to  give 
an  idealistic  interpretation  to  the  principle  of  the 
Balance  of  Power.  When  once  we  have  embarked 
upon  a  continental  war,  we  profess  with  an  entire 
sincerity  that  we  are  fighting  for  the  liberties  of 
other  peoples,  but  the  decisive  consideration  for  us 
is  inevitably  and  naturally,  that  if  we  did  not  50 
fight,  our  own  liberties  and  our  own  interests  would 
be  threatened  by  the  dominant  Power.  This  self- 
regarding  consideration  was  only  faintly  present  to 
the  American  mind  when  Mr.  Wilson  made  his  offer 
in  1916  to  back  a  League  of  Nations  with  the 
forces  of  the  Continent  which  elected  him  as  its 
spokesman.  It  was  not  for  him  the  decisive  motive, 
when  in  1917  he  translated  his  offer  into  action, 
and  entered  the  world- war  to  "  make  democracy 
secure."  His  work  has  been  to  instill  into  an 
isolated  and  pacific  democracy  the  ideal  of  inter- 
national duty.  The  new  .fact  in  the  world's 
history  is  that  for  the  first  time  a  Great  Power 
with  a  formidable  Navy,  a  population  from  which 
vast  armies  might  be  raised,  and  an  economic  and 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      43 

financial  strength  which  might  alone  be  decisive  in 
any  future  conflict,  is  prepared  to  stake  its  own 
peace,  not  'merely  to  guarantee  its  own  interests, 
nor  to  further  the  partisan  aims  of  its  allies,  but 
to  make  an  end  in  the  world  of  the  possibility  of 
prosperous  aggression.  Whatever  may  be  its  fate 
as  a  constructive  proposal,  this  American  offer 
makes  an  epoch  in  the  world's  moral  evolution. 
Ambition  and  fear  have  masqueraded  before  now 
in  an  international  disguise,  but  the  disinterested 
advocacy  of  a  cosmopolitan  idea  of  duty  has  been 
left  to  academic  moralists  and  to  Socialists.  At 
length  a  Great  Power,  Jhitherto  of  all  Powers 
the  most  isolated  and  .self-centred,  has  adopted 
this  idea  as  the  (permanent  foundation  of  its 
policy . 

The  scheme  adopted  by  Mr.  Taft's  League  to 
Enforce  Peace,  which  President  Wilson  was 
addressing  at  Washington,  proposes  to  unite  all 
civilized  nations  in  a  League  bound  by  treaty  to 
settle  all  disputes  which  arise  among  them  by 
peaceable  means.  Like  most  kindred  societies,  it 
divides  disputes  into  two  classes  : — 

(a)  Those  which  may  best  be  settled  by  legal  process  through  an 
International  Court  ; 

(b)  Those  larger  issues  ''  affecting  the  honour  and  vital  interests  " 
of  a  nation  which  have  usually  been  excepted  from  arbitration  treaties 
and  clearly  do  not  admit  of  settlement  by  legal  methods,  since  they 
belong  to  the  domain  of  policy  in   which   no  fixed  principles  are 
universally  recognized. 

The  older  pacifism  had  built  its  faith  exclusively 
on  arbitration.  Efforts  to  persuade  Governments  to 
pledge  themselves  in  all  disputes  to  obligatory  arbi- 
tration, were  usually  met  by  the  fatal  objection  : 
that  "  questions  of  honour  and  vital  interest  "  must 
be  excluded.  There  was  no  way  out  of  this  difficulty, 
.and  the  fault  did  not  lie  altogether  with  Govern- 


44  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

ments.  Pacifists  were  slow  to  realize  that  arbitration, 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  reference  of  a  dispute  to 
a  court  of  law,  is  not  an  expedient  which  can  be 
universally  applied.  The  new  movement  proposes 
a  new  classification.  Some  disputes  are  unsuitable 
for  judicial  settlement,  not  because  they  touch  a 
nation's  honour  or  vital  interests,  but  because  they 
cannot  be  settled  by  reference  to  any  accepted  legal 
principle.  They  are  political  questions,  which  may 
be  settled  by  adjustment  or  compromise,  or  by  refer- 
ence to  some  broad  conception  of  the  common  good. 
A  mediator  acting  by  the  light  of  common  sense 
rather  than  on  legal  principles,  or  a  Council  of 
Conciliation  which  will  bring  together  the  disinter- 
ested opinion  of  neutrals,  .is  the  proper  instrument 
for  the  settlement  of  these  disputes. 

The  four  articles  in  which  the  League  summarizes 
its   programme  are   as   follows  : — 

1.  All  justiciable  questions  arising  between  the  signatory   Powers 
not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall,  subject  to  the  limitations  of  treaties, 
be  submitted  to  a  judicial  Tribunal  for  hearing  and  judgment,  both 
upon  the  merits  and  upon  any  issue  as  to  its  jurisdiction,  of  the  question. 

2.  All   other  questions  arising    between   the   signatories,  and  not 
settled  by  negotiation,  shall  be  submitted  to  a  Council  of  Conciliation 
for  hearing,  consideration,  and  recommendation. 

3.  The   signatory  Powers    shall    jointly  use   forthwith    both   their 
economic  and  military  forces  against  any  one  of  their  number  that 
goes   to  war,  or  commits  acts  of  hostility  against  another  of  the 
signatories  before  any  question  arising  shall  be   submitted  as  pro- 
vided in  the  foregoing. 

4.  Conferences  between  the  signatory  Powers  shall  be  held  from 
time  to  time  to  formulate  and  codify  rules  of  international  law  which, 
unless  some  signatory  shall  signify  its  dissent  within  a  stated  period, 
shall  thereafter    govern   in    the  decisions    of  the  judicial   Tribunal 
mentioned  in  Article  i. 

It  is  a  simple  scheme,  differing  only  in  details 
from  that  of  the  kindred  English  committee,  and 
much  less  elaborate  than  the  Fabian  Society's  model. 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      45 

But  the  root  idea  of  all  these  schemes  is  the  sarue.1 
They  all  suppose  a  voluntary  union  of  all  or  most 
of  the  civilized  States  of  the  world.  They  all  dis- 
tinguish between  the  spheres  of  judicial  settlement 
and  conciliation.  They  all  declare  that  where 
diplomacy  has  failed  one  or  other  of  these  pro- 
cesses shall  be  applied.  They  all  prescribe  coercive 
action  by  the  member  States  against  another  which 
fails  to  resort  to  one  of  these  processes.  They 
are  all  content  to  leave  optional  the  further  applica- 
tion of  coercive  action  if  a  State  refuses  to  carry 
out  the  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Con- 
ciliation. They  all  rely  in  such  cases  on  the  effect 
of  delay,  public  discussion,  and  the  authority  of 
an  impartial  finding  to  make  war  morally  difficult, 
if  not  impossible.  The  crux  of  the  problem  of 
peace  is  for  them  to  secure  a  reference  to  some 
disinterested  authority. 

Mr.  Wilson,  in  his  speech  at  Washington,  gave 
a  somewhat  wider  scope  to  the  idea  of  a  League 
of  Peace.  He  laid  down,  like  a  thinker  bred  in 
the  tradition  of  natural  rights,  these  fundamental 
principles  : — 

1.  That  every  people  has  the  right  to  choose  the  sovereignty  under 
which  they  shall  live. 

2.  That  the  small  States  of  the  world  have  the  right  to  enjoy  the 
same  respect  for  their  sovereignty  and  for  their  territorial  integrity 
that  the  great  and  powerful  nations  expect  and  insist  upon. 

3.  That  the  world  has  the  right  to  be  free  from  every  disturbance  to 
its  peace  that  has  its  origin  in  aggression  and  disregard  of  the  right* 
of  peoples  and  nations. 


1  The  programme  of  the  British  "  League  of  Nations  Society  "  in- 
cludes this  additional  article  : — 

That  the  States  which  are  members  of  the  League  shall  make 
provision  for  mutual  defence,  diplomatic,  economic,  or  military,  in  the 
event  of  any  of  them  being  attacked  by  a  State,  not  a  member  of  the 
League,  which  refuses  to  submit  the  case  to  an  appropriate  Tribunal 
.or  Council. 


46  A    LEAGUE    OF  NATIONS 

These  are  broad  principles,  and  this  method  of 
approaching  the  problem  of  peace  has  many 
advantages  over  the  narrower  statement  of  Mr. 
Taft's  League.  The  question  of  machinery,  im- 
portant as  it  is,  is  really  secondary.  The  world's 
peace  depends  in  the  end  on  the  recognition  of 
these  great  principles,  and,  perhaps,  of  one  or  two 
more.  To  nationality,  the  equality  of  States,  and 
the  responsibility  of  all  for  the  prevention  of  aggres- 
sion Mr.  Wilson  afterwards  added,  in  his  final 
summary,  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  He  declared 
that  the  United  States  would  aim  in  the  settlement 
of  this  war  at  the  creation  of 

a  universal  association  of  nations  to  maintain  inviolate  the  security  of 
the  highways  of  the  seas  for  the  common  unhindered  use  of  all  the 
nations  of  the  world,  and  to  prevent  any  war  begun  either  contrary  to 
treaty  covenants  or  without  warning  and  full  submission  of  the  cause 
to  the  opinion  of  the  world — a  virtual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity 
and  political  independence. 

The  purely  pacifist  basis  of  the  idea  has  here 
broadened  out  into  the  conception  of  an  inter- 
national charter  of  right. 

A  sceptical  student  of  affairs  may  admit  the  moral 
value  of  this  American  initiative,  and  yet  retain 
his  doubts  about  its  practical  efficacy.  The 
sceptic's  case  against  any  league  of  peace  shall  be 
fully  and  ruthlessly  stated  as  we  proceed.  Mean- 
while let  us  note  that  if  the  scheme  can  be  made 
to  work  by  any  power  of  wisdom  and  goodwill, 
the  inclusion  in  it  of  the  United  States  immensely 
improves  its  chances  of  success.  What  might  have 
been  too  difficult  without  this  unexpected  aid  may 
now  be  feasible.  That  is  the  new  fact.  America 
has  become  a  belligerent,  but  in  the  future  working 
of  the  League  she  may  none  the  less  play  the  part 
of  a  'mediator.  She  is  too  strong  and  secure  to  dread 
the  resentment  of  any  of  the  disputants,  as  the 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      47 

weak  European  neutrals  must  do.  She  has,  more- 
over, in  her  composite  population  spokesmen  who* 
can  present  the  case  of  all  the  parties  to  a  quarrel,, 
and  visit  the  action  of  the  Republic's  chiefs  with 
their  displeasure  if  it  should  be  partial.  So  far 
from  regretting  that  the  German -Americans  have 
influence,  we  should  rejoice  that  they  can  gain  a 
hearing  for  their  Fatherland.  America  can  do  no 
service  to  Europe  if  she  becomes  permanently  a 
partisan,  and  allows  her  opinion  and  her  actions 
to  be  governed  by  an  instinctive  sympathy  based 
on  the  kinship  of  the  majority  of  her  population 
with  ours.  We  must  learn,  if  we  look  to  a  world 
based  on  rational  conference  and  even-handed 
justice,  to  consider  what  guarantees  any  scheme 
offers  to  our  enemy  as  well  as  to  ourselves.  It  is 
of  little  use  that  we  should  trust  a  mediator  or  a 
Council,  if  he  distrusts  them. 

A  League  of  Peace  must  answer  two  tests  :  Can 
it  be  so  composed  that  in  normal  times  it  will 
assure  to  all  its  members  such  a  prospect  of  fair 
decisions  in  disputes,  and  such  a  chance  of  effect- 
ing reasonable  changes  in  the  world  when  they 
are  due,  that  war  will  be  unnecessary?  Secondly, 
can  it  be  so  composed  that  there  will  be  in  every 
probable  contingency  an  available  superiority  of 
military  and  naval  strength  at  the  command  of 
the  League,  if  any  member  of  it  should  resort  to 
aggression  ? 

A  league  which  cannot  satisfy  both  these  tests 
is  doomed  to  failure — if,  indeed,  it  could  ever  come 
into  being.  The  chief  difficulty  in  the  way  of 
the  creation  of  any  effective  concert  or  conference 
in  Europe  is  notoriously  the  sharp  division  of  the 
Great  Powers  into  two  groups  of  allies.  So  long 
as  these  groups  are  held  together  by  the  principle 
of  mutual  support,  so  long  as  they  come  to  a 
conference  (to  use  the  Kaiser's  illuminating  phrase) 


48  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

like  "  brilliant  seconds  to  the  duelling -ground," 
there  can  be  no  real  mediation  and  no  honest 
handling  of  any  question  on  its  merits.  "  My  ally, 
right  or  wrong,"  is  the  negation  of  any  international 
ideal.  That  was  our  difficulty  before  the  war,  and 
it  is  likely  to  be  much  graver  after  it.  Into  this 
system  of  close  partnerships  and  unyielding  enmities 
the  United  States  will  enter,  disinterested  and  un- 
committed. We  need  not  ascribe  to  her  more  than 
the  European  average  of  political  virtue,  but  in 
none  of  the  racial,  strategic,  or  colonial  questions 
which  are  likely  to  divide  the  European  Powers 
has  she  any  interest  or  concern.  Beyond  the 
American  continent  her  only  interests  are  the  open 
door  to  trade,  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  the 
maintenance  of  peace.  She  has  no  ally,  and  she 
will  have  none.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  kinship  and 
common  ethical  ideals  link  her  closely  to  us,  her 
reading  of  maritime  right  separates  her  politically 
from  us,  as  her  detestation  of  militarism  separates 
her  emotionally  from  Germany.  One  may  doubt 
whether,  if  the  group  system  continued  to  prevail  in 
Europe  as  sharply  as  in  the  past,  a  single  Great 
Power  could  by  its  casting  vote  preserve  harmony 
and  avert  strife.  That  would  mean  dn  the  long  run 
a  kind  of  moral  dictatorship,  which  would  be  re- 
sented ;  Europe  would  grow  tired  of  the  American 
Aristides.  But  in  the  first  stages  of  the  experiment 
it  is  indispensable  that  some  Power  remote  from  the 
territorial  disputes  of  Europe  should  assume  leader- 
ship. 

But  what  if  the  League  broke  up?  What  would 
happen  if  a  Great  Power,  or,  worse  still,  a  group 
of  Powers,  defied  its  authority,  and  made  war  with- 
out first  submitting  its  case  to  conference,  concilia- 
tion, or  arbitration  ?  It  may  be  said  that  in  this 
event  we  should  simply  be  in  our  present  position, 
and  certainly  in  no  worse  position.  That  is  rxot 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      49 

a  convincing  answer.  The  plain  fact  must  be  faced 
that  pacific  Powers,  who  went  trustfully  and  loyally 
into  a  League  of  Peace  and  then  found  that  a 
disloyal  Power  or  group  of  Powers  had  enjoyed 
the  security  which  it  gave  them  only  in  order  at 
a  favourable  moment  to  break  the  peace,  might 
be  in  a  much  worse  position  materially  than  if 
they  had  remained  in  their  isolation  and  kept  to 
the  old  ways.  For  unless  the  League  were  a  cold 
formality,  which  no  one  regarded  seriously,  it  would 
in  countless  ways  influence  the  demeanour  and 
preparations  of  loyal  Powers.  No  one  is  going 
to  disarm  literally,  because  a  League  of  Peace  has 
been  created  ;  but  if  the  League  means  anything, 
there  will  be  less  zeal  and  less  extravagance  in 
armaments  than  there  would  be  under  an  armed 
peace.  It  is  possible  that  alliances  may  subsist, 
but  in  the  effort  to  be  just  and  reasonable,  and 
to  "  give  the  League  a  fair  chance,"  alliances  would 
tend  to  become  less  strict,  less  exclusive,  less 
exacting,  and  if  the  need  of  them  suddenly  came, 
they  might  be  found  wanting.  A  League  of  Peace 
would  necessarily  mean  the  abandonment  of  such 
a  hostile  policy  in  commerce  as  the  Paris  Resolu- 
tions contemplate,  with  the  result  that  the  aggressor 
might  enter  the  fray  richer,  more  prosperous,  and 
better  equipped  than  he  would  have  been  if  other 
Powers  had  boycotted  his  trade.  Finally,  if  the 
League  had  survived  for  a  term  of  years,  and  had 
settled  a  number  of  claims  or  disputed  points  in 
international  law,  it  is  possible  that  on  the  balance 
the  enemy  might  have  won,  by  this  process  of 
conciliation,  many  considerable  advantages  which 
we  might  be  pleased  to  concede  to  him  if  he  were 
a  trustworthy  and  loyal  friend,  but  which  we  should 
regret  too  late  if  he  were  to  break  his  bond.  These 
are  real  objections  to  any  League  of  Peace.  They 
present  us  with  a  familiar  dilerrtma.  If,  on  the- 

5 


50  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

one  hand,  we  adopt  a  harsh  policy  of  precaution 
and  distrust,  if  we  aim  at  denying  to  our  adversary 
even  reasonable  expansion  and  liberty  to  trade,  he 
will  certainly,  sooner  or  later,  justify  our  fears, 
and,  spurred  by  a  just  resentment,  renew  the  war. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  decide  to  treat  him 
as  a  friend,  rely  on  his  word,  and  trust  his  loyalty, 
he  may  disappoint  our  politic  confidence  and  one 
day  fall  upon  us  unawares.  The  first  policy  is 
the  narrow  folly  of  the  worldling,  and  the  second 
the  generous  folly  of  the  idealist.  The  policy  of 
distrust  is  by  far  the  crasser  folly  of  the  two,  for 
it  means  certain  catastrophe.  The  policy  of  trust 
might  be  splendidly  vindicated,  but  it  is  unques- 
tionably a  gamble  with  human  nature. 

If  the  worst  should  happen,  if  some  Power  or 
Powers  should  break  away  from  the  League  and 
threaten  aggression,  could  the  United  States  redress 
the  balance,  and  make  good  to  the  loyal  Powers 
by  its  aid  what  they  might  have  lost  by  their  own 
previous  moderation  ?  Unless  this  question  is 
answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  League  will  not 
be  formed,  or  if  it  is  formed,  it  will  be  a  meaning- 
less decoration,  a  plaster  ornament  which  will  fail 
to  disguise  the  sinister  old  structure  of  the  armed 
peace.  In  plain  words,  would  the  United  States 
have  the  will  and  the  power,  once  the  League  was 
formed,  to  oppose  aggression  so  firmly  as  to  make 
it  unprofitable?  To  this  question  Mr.  Wilson  has 
given  a  dramatic  answer  by  his  entry  into  the  world- 
war.  When  Germany  announced  her  intention  of 
resuming  her  unrestricted  submarine  campaign,  two 
courses  were  open  to  the  United  States.  Some 
measure  of  defence  was  inevitable,  but  she  mig,ht 
with  honour  have  limited  her  defensive  operations 
to  certain  minor  measures  at  sea.  She  might  have 
armed  her  own  ships,  patrolled  the  sea  routes,  and 
seized  the  German  vessels  in  her  ports,  without 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      51 

making  common  cause  with  the  Entente.  That  was 
the  policy  which  some  able  Americans  recommended, 
and  it  would  have  been  in  keeping  with  her  tradi- 
tions. On  this  plan  she  acted  a  century  ago,  in  our 
last  world-war,  when  revolutionary  France  molested 
her  commerce  at  sea.  She  then  contrived,  not  with- 
out some  use  of  force,  to  protect  her  own  merchants 
without  engaging  in  formal  war  with,  the  French 
Republic.  Mr.  Wilson  would  have  no  half  measures. 
He  declared  from  the  first  his  solidarity  with  the 
Entente,  and  placed  the  whole  resources  of  the  United 
States — money,  food,  ships  and  men — at  its  service. 
This  he  did,  not  because  Germany  had  been  guilty 
of  an  incidental  provocation  to  the  United  States,  but 
because  he  believed  that  the  common  interests  of 
civilization  demanded  the  defeat  of  an  aggressive 
Power.  By  his  choice  between  these  two  courses 
he  has  given  the  final  proof  by  action  that  the  isola- 
tion of  America  is  ended,  and  that  she  has  the  will 
with  the  power  to  back  a  League  of  Nations  with 
all  her  immeasurable  resources.  America,  however, 
has  not  become  an  interested  belligerent.  It  is 
significant  that  Mr.  Wilson  has  not  signed  the  Pact 
of  London,  which  binds  the  other  allies  to  make 
war  and  conclude  peace  in  common.  He  is  com- 
mitted to  assist  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  only  in 
so  far  as  they  aim  at  "  making  democracy  secure." 
He  is  no  party  to  any  of  the  secret  treaties  or 
informal  bargains  by  which  they  may  have  arranged 
among  themselves  to  divide  the  fruits  of  victory. 
He  is  free  to  bring  his  co-operation  to  an  en!d,  if 
a  stage  were  reached  in  which  the  war  was  being 
manifestly  prolonged  for  interested  and  Imperialist 
ends.  He  is  free  at  the  settlement  to  oppose  such 
purposes.  An  ally  who  seeks  some  material  gain 
for  itself  is  commonly  obliged  to  assent  to  the 
pursuit  of  similar  ends  by  its  associates.  If  we 
want  to  keep  Mesopotamia,  we  cannot  object  to 


52  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

an  Italian  claim  to  Smyrna.  The  Entente  is  an 
old-world  alliance,  bound  by  bargains  and  mutually 
balanced  claims.  To  purchase  the  military  support 
of  some  of  its  members,  we  were  obliged  to  consent 
to  some  arrangements  against  our  better  judgment. 
America  is  immune  from  these  necessities.  For 
herself  she  seeks  no  material  gain.  She  is  a  free, 
and  may  be  a  critical,  partner.  She  has  entered 
the  war,  but  she  has  kept  the  right  to  act  on  a 
disinterested  view  for  the  world's  good.  She  is 
no  longer  a  neutral,  but  she  has  not  become  a 
partisan.  Here  lies  the  answer  to  our  dilemma. 
A  policy  of  trust,  with  America  to  back  it,  ceases 
to  be  an  idealistic  folly. 

Inevitably,  we  look  at  this  question  from  our 
own  angle.  We  want  security  first  of  all  for  our- 
selves. But  we  shall  ruin  the  promise  of  this 
scheme  if  we  allow  ourselves  to  think  and  talk 
of  "  an  Anglo-Saxon  alliance."  The  States  are 
not  an  Anglo-Saxon  community,  and  the  more  we 
talk  in  this  strain  the  more  shall  we  antagonize 
the  German,  Irish,  and  Scandinavian  minorities,  who 
do  not  propose  to  give  up  to  Great  Britain  what 
was  meant  for  mankind.  The  American  tradition 
is  still  adamant  against  "  entangling  alliances,"  and 
Mr.  Wilson  has  been  careful  to  explain  that  what  he 
proposes  is  a  "  disentangling  alliance  " — a  League 
which  will  make  an  end  of  the  old  partisan  group- 
ings. The  United  States  will  help  us  in  so  far 
as  we  act  as  a  loyal  member  of  a  community  of 
nations  :  it  will  not  further  our  self-regarding 
purposes  against  our  rivals.  The  American  offer 
is  not  to  back  Britain  or  to  enter  a  permanent  and 
partisan  alliance  ;  it  is  to  use  the  power  of  a  con- 
tinent against  any  future  aggressor. 

The  offer  will  avail  to  found  a  League  of  Peace 
only  if  it  brings  confidence  in  equal  degree  to 
all  its  members.  Absurd  as  it  may  seem  to 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      53 

us,  the  risk  to  the  German  'mind  will  be  that 
Britain  might  not  be  loyal,  that  'she  might  not  in 
every  issue  consent  to  a  process  of  conciliation, 
and  might  not  always  accept  the  award  of  a  Court 
or  the  recommendation  of  a  Council.  We  must 
consent  to  smother  our  natural  indignation  and 
examine  this  hypothesis.  Unless  the  League  can 
reassure  Germany,  there  can  be  no  League  of  Peace  ; 
there  could  only  be  an  anti -German  alliance  of 
the  old-world  type.  The  German  would  at  once 
give  to  his  doubts  a  concrete  form.  '  The  League," 
he  would  say,  "  involves  presumably  some  limita- 
tion of  armaments  ;  at  any  rate,  it  precludes  a 
really  challenging  and  resolute  attempt  on  ;my  part 
to  build  a  navy  against  Britain.  While  the  League 
works  well  I  am  secure,  and  I  save  my  money. 
But  a  moment  arrives,  ten  years  hence,  when  some 
capital  issue  of  colonial  or  economic  policy  brings 
me  into  conflict  with  Britain.  She  refuses  to  carry 
the  case  before  the  Council  of  Conciliation,  or  else 
(what  is  more  probable)  she  does  go  before  it  ; 
but  when  the  decision  turns  against  her,  refuses 
to  give  it  effect.  What  am  I  to  do  then?  I  have 
so  far  trusted  the  League  that  I  have  agreed  to 
keep  my  navy  within  moderate  limits.  I  have 
allowed  England  to  retain  her  supremacy  at  sea. 
I  have  lost  ten  years'  naval  building,  and  I  am 
now  forced  in  consequence  to  bow  to  England's 
will,  though  the  opinion  of  impartial  judges  is  in 
my  favour.  The  League  from  my  standpoint  is 
simply  a  proposal  to  stereotype  England's  naval 
supremacy,  and  with  it  her  power  to  veto  every  claim 
and  expectation  that  I  may  reasonably  cherish  out- 
side the  Continent  of  Europe.  In  such  a  case  I 
could  deal  with  France  or  Russia,  if  they  defied  the 
League,  and  need  ask  for  no  one's  help.  But  I 
am  powerless  against  the  British  Empire.  If  I 
go  to  war  with  England,  however  just  my  cause^ 


54  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

she  will  blockade  me  and  seize  my  colonies,  and 
all  I  can  do  is  to  sink  a  few  of  her  ships  and 
harry  her  towns  with  my  Zeppelins.  There  must 
be  some  guarantee  of  equal  treatment  before  I 
enter  Utopia."  As  the  world  stood  before  Mr. 
Wilson's  offer,  that  would  have  been  the  German's 
answer  to  any  proposal  for  a  League  of  Peace. 
Convinced  that  he  was  acting  wisely,  he  would  go 
on  building  warships.  We  should  then  denounce 
him  as  the  one  obstinate  reactionary  force  in  Europe 
and  the  one  obstacle  to  the  world's  peace.  We 
should  feel  so  sure  of  our  own  integrity  that  we 
should  regard  his  wish  for  material  guarantees  of 
our  loyalty  as  a  wanton  insult,  concealing  the  worst 
designs.  If  the  German  reminded  us  that  we  re- 
fused in  1899  to  go  to  arbitration  in  our  quarrel 
with  Mr.  Kruger,  we  should  reply  that  there  were  in 
this  case  the  usual  "  exceptional  "  reasons.  The 
new  fact  has  its  bearing  on  this  difficulty.  America 
is  already  a  great  naval  Power,  and  she  now  aspires 
to  the  second  place.  If  she  believed  that  Germany 
had  been  wronged,  if  the  issue  were  substantial, 
and  our  conduct  were  really  "  aggressive,"  her 
weight,  if  we  were  ill-advised  enough  to  press  a 
bad  case  to  a  quarrel,  would  presumably  be  thrown 
into  the  German  scale,  and  our  ability  to  make  an 
oppressive  use  of  our  naval  supremacy  would  then 
be  at  an  end.  An  extreme  instance  of  this  kind 
is  indeed  almost  unthinkable.  Our  cousinly  feeling 
to  America  is  so  strong  and  our  respect  for  her 
opinion  so  real,  that  we  are  never  likely  to  risk  a 
conflict  with  her,  apart  even  from  the  fact  that 
in  this  case  the  naval  and  economic  odds  might 
be  fairly  even. 

The  American  Navy  is  therefore,  in  the  last 
resort,  exactly  the  material  guarantee  which  Germany 
has  the  right  to  ask  for  as  an  assurance  against 
the  abuse  of  our  superiority  at  sea.  It  is  an  ideal 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      55 

form  of  guarantee,  for  we  on  our  side  know  very 
well  that  an  American -German  combination  against 
us  is  unthinkable,  unless  we  were  grossly  and  un- 
deniably in  the  wrong.  That  imaginary  case  would 
never  arise,  not  because  we  are  too  virtuous  to 
abuse  our  power,  but  because  we  have  too  much 
sense  for  realities  to  act  in  a  way  that  would  com- 
bine such  formidable  forces  against  us.  That,  if 
the  imaginary  German  in  this  argument  were 
sincere,  would  suffice  to  reassure  him.  This 
balancing  of  future  combinations  on  land  and  sea 
is  a  gross  and  repugnant  exercise  of  the  fancy. 
Diplomacy  is  rarely  so  crude  as  this.  America's 
power  in  the  League  would  rest  broadly  on  the  new 
fact  of  her  readiness  to  intervene  against  the 
aggressor  and  the  lawbreaker.  No  one  doubts  her 
ability  to  wield  great  power.  What  has  been  in 
doubt  was  her  willingness  to  use  it.  Her  conversion 
to  the  doctrine  of  international  duty  brings  the 
League  of  Peace  among  workaday  realities. 

Before  we  examine  the  grave  objections  to  any 
League  of  Peace,  or  consider  the  conditions  in  which 
it  might  be  realized,  let  us  note  here  that  it  meets 
the  two  chief  difficulties  in  the  way  of  any  restora- 
tion of  normal  intercourse  in  Europe  which  con- 
fronted us  in  the  last  chapter.  These  were  (i) 
the  natural  doubt,  suggested  by  her  conduct  towards 
Belgium,  whether  Germany  could  be  trusted  to  keep 
a  treaty,  and  (2)  the  still  more  paralysing  doubt 
whether  her  public  opinion,  which  regards  this  war 
as  "  defensive  "  on  her  part,  can  ever  be  a  reliable 
element  in  a  League  whose  main  purpose  is  to 
prevent  aggression.  The  object-lesson  of  Belgium 
must  inevitably  destroy,  while  our  generation  retains 
its  vivid  memory  of  these  years,  any  unsupported 
faith  in  Germany's  respect  for  her  own  pledges. 
There  has  been  in  modern  times  no  case  of  treaty- 
breaking  so  gross  as  this.  It  was  aggravated  by 


'56  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  innocence  of  the  victim,  whose  vow  of  perpetual 
neutrality  made  her  a  vestal  virgin,  entitled,  if  her 
weakness  did  not  sufficiently  plead  for  her,  to  claim 
the  chivalry  of  Europe.  The  breach  of  a  plain 
treaty  shattered  the  fabric  of  public  law  in  Europe  : 
the  needless  brutality  which  disgraced  the  execution 
of  an  ill  deed  added  to  the  account  its  tale  of 
murdered  lives,  broken  families,  and  ruined  homes. 
Jt  is  fair  to  remember,  however,  that  there  is 
no  similar  instance  of  the  violation  of  treaties  by 
the  German  Empire  during  the  forty -four  years  of 
peace  which  preceded  this  war  ;  nor  should  we 
forget  that  some  instance  of  the  disregard  of  its 
pledged  word  or  of-  treaty  obligations  (though  none 
.so  gross)  can  be  alleged  in  modern  times  against 
.all  of  the  Great  Powers.  The  problem  of  good 
•faith  in  international  affairs  is  a  common  one,  and 
it  depends  partly  on  a  general  raising  of  the  level 
•of  international  morality,  partly  on  the  reform  of 
diplomatic  procedure,  and  partly  on  the  provision 
of  external  sanctions  against  treaty -breaking.  Our 
experience  in  1914  taught  us  that  for  this  last 
purpose  our  influence  was  limited.  It  failed  to 
save  Belgium,  for  we  could  not  concentrate  on  that 
single  issue.  We  were  bound  also  by  honour  and 
interest  to  France  and  Russia.  We  were  part  of 
a  complicated  continental  system,  with  interests  and 
associations  wider  than  the  single  issue  of  Belgium. 
In  the  much  simpler  conditions  that  prevailed  in 
1870,  when  we  stood  aloof  from  European  affairs, 
Mr.  Gladstone  made  our  neutrality  in  the  Franco - 
Prussian  War  dependent  on  the  single  condition 
that  Belgian  territory  should  be  respected  by  both 
sides.  By  this  concentration  he  succeeded  in  saving 
her  from  violation.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  relation- 
ship to  France  (to  mention  no  other  reason)  forbade 
him  to  repeat  Mr.  Gladstone's  tactics.  The  special 
advantage  of  the  entry  of  the,  United  States  into. 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      57 

a  system  of  guarantees  is  that  she  would  come  in 
uncommitted,,  without  allies,  and  without  local 
interests  of  her  own.  She  could  act  in  every 
question  of  an  imperilled  treaty  as  Mr.  Gladstone 
acted  in  1870.  Her  whole  weight  would  be  avail- 
able against  the  potential  lawbreaker,  and  her  action 
would  turn  (as  ours  could  not  and  did  not)  solely 
on  the  question  whether  the  treaty  was  broken  or 
observed.  It  is  not  enough  that  a  guarantor  will 
certainly  resort  to  hostile  action  if  a  treaty  is 
broken  :  the  Power  which  meditates  the  breach  must 
also  be  sure  that  the  guarantor  will  not  acf  against 
him  (for  other  reasons)  if  the  treaty  is  observed. 
A  European  Power  can  rarely  specialize  in  this 
way.  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  is, 
and  will  probably  remain,  outside  our  system  of 
continental  interests  and  commitments.  That  it  is 
morally  impartial  is  important,  that  it  has  no  interest 
which  must  drag  it  into  a  mere  struggle  for  a 
Balance  of  Power  or  the  possession  of  territory 
and  strategical  points  is  much  more  important. 
When  it  promises  its  adhesion  to  a  League  of 
Peace,  all  its  members  will  know  that  America  can 
afford  to  be  the  guardian,  not  merely  of  this  or 
that  State  or  of  this  or  other  interest  but  of  the 
idea  of  right  itself.  If  any  Power  threatened  to 
make  war  without  resorting  to  the  procedure  of 
the  League  of  Peace,  its  European  neighbours  might 
be  perplexed,  each  of  them,  by  a  whole  variety 
of  conflicting  calculations,  and  some  of  them  might 
be  tempted  to  take  sides  at  the  prompting  of  con- 
siderations wholly  irrelevant  to  the  question  of 
formal  right.  The  United  States  alone  could 
certainly  afford  to  take  its  stand  on  the  constitution 
of  the  League,  and  on  that  basis  only.  In  an  hour 
of  crisis  there  will  be  one  Great  Power  which  will 
certainly  say  :  '  This  mobilization,  these  threats  of 
war,  this  hurling  of  menaces  and  ultimata  are 


58  A    LEAGUE"   OF    NATIONS 

a  breach  of  our  agreement,  an  offence  against 
civilization,  and  a  clear  instance  of  aggression.  To 
us  beyond  the  Atlantic  the  rights  and  wrongs,  the 
grievances  and  hopes  which  have  induced  you  to 
adopt  this  behaviour  are  of  no  interest.  For  us 
the  only  vital  fact  is  that  you  are  threatening  war 
before  you  have  resorted  to  the  processes  of  con- 
ciliation. Desist  from  these  threats,  demobilize 
your  armies,  and  await  the  deliberations  of  the 
Council.  If  you  refuse  to  observe  the  constitution 
of  the  League,  if  you  persist  in  these  appeals  to 
force,  then,  however  good  your  case,  you  are  for 
us  the  aggressor,  and  our  fleet,  our  army,  and  our 
finance  will  be  used  against  you."  President 
Wilson's  speeches  are,  in  effect,  an  offer  to  guarantee 
a  League  of  Peace  and  to  back  international  treaties 
by  the  promise  that  America  will  in  the  last  resort 
intervene  against  the  aggressor  arid  the  treaty  - 
breaker.  In  other  words,  she  stands  security  for 
such  treaties  in  the  future.  Her  intervention  is  a 
new  fact,  a  guarantee  of  a  kind  with  which  the 
past  was  unacquainted.  We  need  place  no  implicit 
trust  in  Germany's  good  faith,  but  with  the  certainty 
that  America's  power  would  be  added  to  the  forces 
that  opposed  her,  if  she  should  refuse  to  adopt  the 
procedure  of  conciliation,  it  would  no  longer  be 
necessary  to  question  the  value  of  Germany's  signa- 
ture to  the  constitution  of  a  League  of  Peace.  No 
Power  will  resort  to  aggression  if  it  must  by  so 
doing  raise  invincible  odds  against  itself. 

It  is  indispensable  that  any  League  of  Peace 
should  have  behind  it  the  external  sanction  of  a 
force  strong  enough  to  repress  a  recalcitrant  Power. 
But  the  world's  case  would  be  nearly  hopeless  if 
the  League  had  to  rely  mainly  on  measures  of 
coercion.  Unless  there  is  a  general  will  to  peace, 
unless  there  is,  at  least  in  all  the  more  advanced 
and  powerful  nations  of  Europe,  a  spirit  which 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      59 

abhors  and  condemns  aggression,  they  would  labour 
in   vain   who   sought   to   build  a   League   of   Peace. 
I   believe,   for   my   part,   that   such  a  temper  exists, 
that  it  has  been  infinitely  strengthened  by  this  war, 
that    it    has    existed    for    a    generation    at    least    in 
Western    Europe,   and   even    that    it    existed    in    the 
minds    of   the   majority   of   the    German   people   on 
the    very    eve    of    this    war.      On    the    last    Sunday 
of  peace  the  German  Socialists  held  in  every  large 
town     of     the     Empire     impressive     demonstrations 
against  war.     They  number  one-third  of  the  German 
electorate,  and  in  these  manifestations  they  seemed 
to  have  with  them  the  good  sense  and  the  goodwill 
of  a  great  part  of  the  middle-classes.      How  came 
it    that    a    week    later    these    same    Socialists,    with 
heavy  hearts  perhaps,  but  still  with  an  unquestioning 
obedience,     donned     their     uniforms     and    marched 
obediently  to  Belgium  or  the  Eastern  frontier  ?    No 
one  doubts  their  sincerity  :    every  country  presented 
the   same   spectacle.      Some   of  the   most   vehement 
orators    among   the    Socialist    and    Radical    leaders 
and     Members     of     Parliament     who     protested     in 
Trafalgar     Square     on     the     first     Sunday     of     war 
(August    2nd)    against    our   entry   into   the    conflict 
in     association     with     Tsardom,     were     addressing- 
recruiting    meetings   themselves   a    few   weeks   later, 
or     volunteering     for     the     front.       Few     men     in 
any    country,    even    when    they   are    accustomed    as 
Socialists    to    the    discomfort    of    belonging    to    an 
unpopular  minority,  keep  their  cool,  critical  temper 
when  the  rhythm  of  a  nation's  feet  on  the  march  is 
in    their  ears,   and    each   hour   brings   news    of   the 
enemy's  hostile  acts.      A  man  may  think  that  there 
is  much  to  censure  and  more  to  regret  in  the  past 
conduct  of  his  own  country's   diplomacy,   but  when 
the  enemy  is  across  the  frontier  the  first  duty  will 
always  seem  to  be  to  drive  back  the  invader.     The 
German  General  Staff   (or  some  of  its  subordinates), 


60  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

by  exaggerating  or  ante-dating  the  news  that 
the  Cossacks  were  across  the  East  Prussian 
frontier,  and  by  deliberately  inventing  the  news 
that  French  aeroplanes  had  dropped  bombs  on 
Nuremburg,  aroused  this  primitive  defensive 
instinct,  even  before  war  had  begun.  A  man  might 
think  the  Invasion  of  Belgium  a  crime,  but  the 
Russian  advance  had  none  the  less  to  be  met.  Even 
if  a  German  thought  that  the  chief  blame  for  the 
outbreak  of  war  lay  with  his  own  Government,  the 
danger  brought  about  by  its  fault  created  the  need 
of  defence,  and  for  some  months  East  Prussia  was 
actually  overrun.  The  facile  emotions  of  war-time 
presently  gave  even  in  Germany  an  ideal  meaning 
to  the  war,  and  the  German  Socialists  talked  of 
destroying  the  Russian  autocracy  and  liberating 
Finns,  Poles,  and  Ukrainians,  exactly  as  we  talked 
about  destroying  Prussian  militarism  and  liberating 
Alsatians  and  South  Slavs.  The  details  of  the 
negotiations  that  preceded  the  war  were  imperfectly 
known,  and  it  was  easy  in  a  heated  atmosphere  to 
ignore  half  the  relevant  facts  and  to  over-emphasize 
the  rest.  To  be  sure,  it  was  Austria  which  first 
declared  war  on  Serbia,  and  Germany  which  first 
declared  war  on  Russia.  But  grave  as  such  a 
responsibility  must  always  be,  the  mere  fact  that 
a  Government  has  taken  the  last  fatal  step  by 
sending  an  ultimatum  or  declaring  war  does  not 
always  prove  that  it  is  morally  the  aggressor. 
Neutrals  did  not  so  judge  the  action  of  Mr.  Kruger 
in  1899,  though  he  was  technically  the  first  to 
declare  war.  Our  public  opinion  sided  with  Japan 
in  her  war  with  Russia,  though  she  not  only  struck 
the  first  blow,  but  struck  It  without  a  declaration 
of  war.  The  German  view  that  Russia  was  guilty 
of  the  prior  aggression  because  she  first  ordered 
a  general  mobilization,  is  not  in  the  actual  circum- 
stances a  complete  defence  of  German  policy,  but 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      61 

theoretically  it  is  reasonable  to  contend  that  in 
some  circumstances  a  mobilization  might  convict 
the  Power  which  ordered  it  of  aggressive  designs. 
"  Aggression,"  in  short,  is  a  moral  idea  so  equivocal, 
and  so  difficult  to  define,  tha,t  in  a  complicated  crisis 
no  democracy  can  be  trusted  to  apply  it  with 
certainty.  A  Power  which  puts  forward  unwarranted 
and  oppressive  pretensions  is  aggressive,  though  it 
may  be  slow  to  strike  and  correct  in  its  diplomatic 
procedure.  A  Power  whose  case  is  morally  sound 
may  be  "  aggressive,"  if  it  presses  it  in  a  provoca- 
tive way  and  wantonly  forces  war.  To  mobilize 
troops  on  your  adversary's  frontier  may  be  "  aggres- 
sive "  in  the  grave  sense  that  it  first  complicates 
and  degrades  the  negotiations  by  what  is,  in 
effect,  a  threat  of  force.  It  may  be  a  justifiable 
measure  of  precaution,  if  your  adversary's  attitude 
is  disquieting,  and  he  happens  to  be  able  to  mobilize 
much  more  rapidly  than  yourself.  The  difficulty 
of  deciding  who  is  the  aggressor  is  sometimes  so 
great,  that  even  in  its  judgment  of  wars  long  past 
the  public  opinion  of  a  neutral  nation  wavers  and 
transfers  the  blame.  Our  fathers,  on  the  whole, 
regarded  Louis  Napoleon  as  the  aggressor  in  1870  : 
in  recent  years  the  tendency  has  been  to  throw 
the  chief  discredit  upon  Bismarck.  If  even  neutrals 
err  in  their  judgments  of  past  events  in  which 
their  own  country  was  not  directly  concerned,  can 
we  marvel  at  the  fallibility  and  sophistication  of 
interested  contemporary  opinion  ? 

The  unwelcome  conclusion  presents  itself,  that 
the  general  moral  condemnation  of  aggression  is 
worthless  as  a  deterrent  or  preventive  of  war.  When 
war  does  break  out,  the  public  opinion  of  each 
belligerent  nation  can  always  persuade  itself  that 
the  war  was  "  forced  upon  "  it,  and  that  it  is  in 
a  state  of  legitimate  defence.  A  statesman  may 
dread  the  retrospective  verdict  of  his  country  if 


62  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  war  should  be  costly  and  unsuccessful,  but  even 
this  verdict  will  not  fall  sharply  or  harshly  if  the 
country  in  the  early  days  of  the  war  has  worked 
itself  into  the  belief  that  it  could  not  have  been 
avoided.  Indeed,  in  that  case  the  success  of  the 
enemy  increases  the  presumption  that  he  willed  the 
war  and  skilfully  chose  his  time.  No  historian 
of  civilization  would  hesitate  to  say  that  the  attitude 
towards  war  has  everywhere  changed  since  the 
eighteenth  century,  though  every  country  may  still 
have  its  reactionary  caste  or  party.  There  was 
no  real  shame  in  the  eighteenth  century"*  over  an 
act  of  aggression,  provided  that  it  prospered,  and 
wars  were  frankly  waged  by  all  maritime  peoples 
for  commercial  ends.  Swift  and  Voltaire  in  their 
humanitarian  attitude  were  far  in  advance  of  their 
age.  The  relative  chivalry  and  the  surprising 
absence  of  hatred  in  the  eighteenth -century  wars 
meant  that  the  aristocracy  on  either  side  was 
employed  in  a  congenial  if  dangerous  sport,  and 
bore  the  enemy  no  ill-will  for  providing  it  with 
the  occasion  for  adventure,  promotion,  and  glory. 
The  rampant  hatreds  of  our  war  are  a  consequence 
of  the  ascendancy  which  the  habit  of  moral 
judgment  has  won  over  our  minds.  It  is  because 
every  nation  in  arms  regards  war  as  an  evil  (as 
the  old  aristocratic  and  professional  armies  did  not) 
that  we  all  hate  the  enemy  whom  we  regard  as  its 
cause.  The  paradoxical  effect  of  the  prevalence 
of  a  general  condemnation  of  war  from  the 
humanitarian,  Christian,  or  Socialist  standpoints, 
would  seem  to  be,  as  the  world  is  constituted  to-day, 
not  to  prevent  war,  but  to  make  it,  when  it  comes, 
less  chivalrous,  less  merciful,  and  more  brutalizing. 
Must  we  conclude,  then,  that  modern  morality  will 
always  be  impotent  to  prevent  a  war  of  aggression  ? 
We  need  not  pause  to  point  out  that  the  secret 
conduct  of  negotiations,  and  the  practice,  which 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      63 

obtains  no  less  in  Britain  than  in  Germany,  of 
postponing  any  discussion  of  the  issue,  or  any 
publication  of  the  dispatches,  until  the  irreparable 
step  has  been  taken,  will  alone  suffice  to  frustrate 
the  influence  even  of  a  resolutely  pacific  democracy. 
But  to  assume  that  every  nation  would  judge  fairly 
in  its  own  case,  if  it  had  all  the  documents  in  good 
time  before  it,  is  to  take  an  excessively  sanguine 
view  of  human  nature.  There  might  in  the  blame- 
worthy country  be  more  division  of  opinion  than 
at  present,  but  the  mass  mind  is  nowhere  formed 
as  yet  for  difficult  feats  of  historical  criticism.  The 
only  hope  of  "  mobilizing  "  public  opinion  with 
1  any  effect  against  an  imminent  war  is  to  provide 
|  it  with  some  test  of  "  aggression  "  much  simpler 
\  than  is  available  at  present.  That  is  the  great 
merit  of  the  conception  which  underlies  the  League 
of  Peace.  Its  procedure  provides  a  uniform  and 
mechanical  test.  The  democracy  need  no  longer 
dispute  over  the  merits  of  the  question,  nor  speculate 
on  the  motives  of  the  adversary.  The  only  relevant 
question  for  it,  is  whether  its  Government  has  kept 
its  pledge  to  refer  every  dispute  which  baffles  the 
ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy  to  the  arbitrament 
of  a  standing  Tribunal  or  Council  of  Conciliation. 
No  Western  democracy  is  so  simple  that  it  cannot 
apply  that  test,  and  none  so  prejudiced  that  it  would 
not  apply  it.  A  sceptic  may  point  out  that  Sir 
Edward  Grey  did  propose  an  informal  conference 
on  the  eve  of  this  war,  which  would  have 
interposed  the  mediation  of  neutrals  between  Austria 
and  Russia. *  The  Chancellor's  delay  in  accepting 
this  expedient,  which  history  may  regard  as  the 
heaviest  count  against  him,  does  not  seem  (if 
it  was  generally  known)  to  have  disturbed  public 
opinion  in  Germany.  But  it  is  one  thing  to  reject 
mediation  if  the  procedure  and  the  Council  must 
be  improvized,  if  you  have  no  security  that  in  a 


64  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

like  case  in  the  future  the  advantages  of  this 
method  will  be  open  to  yourself,  if  further  you 
doubt  whether  the  proposed  Council  can  possibly 
be  impartial,1  and  quite  another  matter  to  reject 
conciliation  if  you  and  your  adversary  are  alike 
bound  by  treaty  to  resort  to  it,  if  the  Council 
is  so  composed  that  impartiality  may  be  hoped  for, 
if,  finally,  it  is  a  standing  institution  which  has 
proved  its  utility  in  other  cases.  To  have  accepted 
mediation  in  1914  would  have  been  for  a  German 
Chancellor  a  notable  act  of  grace  :  to  refuse  it 
if  a  League  of  Peace  is  constituted,  would  be  a 
startling  act  of  perfidy.  It  requires  no  excessive 
exercise  of  faith  to  assume  that  public  opinion,  if 
all  the  Great  Powers  were  pledged  to  adopt  this 
pacific  procedure  before  resorting  to  arms,  would 
be  in  each  country  sufficiently  enlightened  to  insist 
upon  it,  and  to  condemn  as  the  aggressor  the 
statesman  who  broke  the  compact. 

There  remains  another  form  of  guarantee  on  which 
the  democracies  of  Europe  will  do  well  to  insist. 
The  League  must  be  built  up  on  drastic  pledges 
which  seriously  fetter  the  action  of  Governments. 
Never  to  resort  to  arms  until  the  resources  of  con- 
ciliation are  exhausted  ;  always  to  come  to  the  aid 
of  a  State  threatened  by  lawless  aggression  :  these 
are  far-reaching  promises.  No  Government  ought 
to  give  them  without  the  full  assent  of  its  own 
people  :  no  nation  would  trust  the  word  of  other 
Governments,  unless  their  peoples  stood  behind  them. 
An  ephemeral  Cabinet,  which  may  be  replaced  by 
another  of  wholly  different  views,  is  not  a  body 
competent  to  pledge  a  people  to  undertakings  so 
large.  The  French  Socialist  Party  in  the  valuable 
commentary  on  the  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations, 

1  The  prevailing  view  among  Germans  was  that  three  of  the  four 
"  disinterested  "  Powers — Britain,  France,  and  Italy — were  already 
biased  against  Austria,  and  only  one  (Germany)  friendly. 


AMERICA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE      65 

which  it  submitted  to  the  Bureau  of  the  Stockholm 
Conference,  made  a  proposal  which  deserves  to  be 
added  to  the  common  programme.  It  urged  that 
as  a  matter  of  obligation,  the  Treaty  in  which  each 
State  adheres  to  the  League  of  Nations  must  be 
ratified  by  the  Parliament  of  each  State,  and  further, 
that  it  shall  then  be  submitted  to  a  referendum 
of  the  whole  body  of  citizens.  Only  when  it  has 
been  sanctioned  by  these  two  votes  will  it  be  com- 
pleted. There  are  two  advantages  in  this  proposal. 
In  the  first  place  its  adoption  would  warn  our  states- 
men that  it  will  be  folly  to  contemplate  a  settle- 
ment which  revolts  the  conscience  of  any  people, 
a  settlement  which  would  be  signed,  as  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  was  signed  by  France  in  1871,  only 
under  duress  and  without  inward  assent.  In  the 
second  place  the  adoption  of  this  proposal  would 
give  us  the  indispensable  assurance  that  in  adhering 
to  the  League  of  Nations,  the  peoples  stand  behind 
their  Governments.  A  referendum  of  this  kind  would 
be  more  than  a  mere  vote  :  it  would  be  a  solemn 
league  and  covenant,  a  pledge  from  all  the  peoples 
of  the  civilized  world  that  the  Treaty  which  they 
had  approved  should  be  observed,  in  letter  and 
spirit.  Mr.  Wilson  has  asked  that  the  word  of  the 
rulers  of  Germany,  if  it  is  to  be  "a  guarantee  of 
anything  that  is  to  endure,"  shall  be  "  explicitly 
supported  by  such  conclusive  evidence  of  the  will 
and  purpose  of  the  German  people  themselves,  as 
the  other  peoples  of  the  world  would  be  justified  in 
accepting."  We  should  all  prefer  the  guarantee 
of  peoples  to  the  unsupported  word  of  Governments. 
The  ratification  of  a  freshly  elected  Parliament,  and 
if  need  be,  a  referendum  of  the  whole  people,  would 
give  us  that  evidence  of  the  will  and  purpose  of 
all  the  peoples  which  we  have  the  right  to  demand. 
Further  chapters  will  consider  the  many  difficulties 
which  will  in  practice  confront  a  League  of  Peace. 

6 


66  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

We  shall  find  them  only  too  real  and  only  too 
formidable.  It  requires  for  its  realization  con- 
ditions which  exact  from  European  statesmanship  a 
high  and  difficult  level  of  wisdom.  But  in  this 
preliminary  statement  of  the  idea  we  have  found 
the  two  essentials  for  the  fortunate  conduct  of  a 
League.  The  promised  adhesion  of  America  pro- 
vides not  merely  for  an  impartial  and  uncommitted 
element  in  its  councils,  but  also  for  a  powerful 
external  sanction  for  the  observance  of  its  constitu- 
tion and  the  fulfilment  of  treaties.  The  simple  and 
almost  mechanical  test  which  it  furnishes  for  the 
judgment  of  "  aggression  "  promises  for  the  first 
time  in  history  to  arm  the  moral  conscience  of 
civilized  opinion  in  the  service  of  peace. 


CHAPTER    III 
ON   PEACE  AND  CHANGE 

These  two  methods  of  settling  international  disputes,  the  method  of 
negotiation  and  the  method  of  war,  I  ask  you  to  consider  in  the  light 
of  this  struggle.  Do  we  not  see  the  disaster  of  the  war  method 
conclusively  shown  ?  How  much  better  would  have  been  a  Con- 
ference, or  The  Hague,  in  1914,  than  what  has  happened  since. 
Industry  and  commerce  dislocated :  the  burdens  of  life  heavily 
increased  ;  millions  of  men  slain,  maimed,  blinded  ;  international 
hatreds  deepened  and  intensified  ;  the  very  fabric  of  civilization 
menaced — these  form  the  war  method.  The  Conference  we  pro- 
posed— or  The  Hague,  proposed  by  the  Tsar — would  have  settled  the 
quarrel  in  a  little  time — I  think  a  Conference  would  have  settled  it  in 
a  week — and  all  these  calamities  would  have  been  averted.  More- 
over, a  thing  of  vast  importance,  we  should  have  advanced  a  long  way 
in  laying  the  permanent  foundations  for  international  peace. — Sir 
EDWARD  GREY,  in  his  interview  in  the  Chicago  Daily  News,  May  15, 
1916. 

IN  these  forcible  and  simple  sentences  Viscount 
Grey  has  said  what  every  civilized  man  and  woman 
must  have  thought  throughout  the  months  and  years 
of  this  war.  History  will  say,  as  it  cannot  say  of 
our  forefathers  in  earlier  wars,  that  Europe  knew 
in  advance  into  what  horror  it  was  rushing,  that 
the  way  of  escape  was  offered,  that  it  was  closed 
against  the  conscience  and  desire  of  the  many,  by 
the  evil  will  of  the  few.  That  offer  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  of  mediation  by  conference  during  those  fate- 
ful days  when  he  strove  so  unweariedly  for  peace 
will  justly  be  counted  a  glory  in  our  national 
records.  It  is  well  that  we  should  approach  the 


68  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

question  of  conference  and  the  League  of  Peace 
in  this  mood  of  conviction.  On  behalf  of  an 
innovation  so  momentous,  involving  as  it  does  the 
overthrow  or  transmutation  of  the  most  powerful 
forces  in  human  relations,  we  have  need  to  enlist 
all  our  hopes.  It  is  hard  even  to  reject  the  services 
of  an  illusion  which  offers  to  serve  in  their  ranks. 
Why,  then,  was  it  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pro- 
posal of  a  conference  failed  to  avert  war  in  the 
Serbian  crisis  of  July  1914?  Some  readers  will 
dismiss  this  question  with  the  simple  answer 
that  Austria  was  resolved  to  crush  Serbia  by 
force  of  arms  and  that  Germany  was  bent  on 
imposing  her  will  on  Europe.  There  is  too  much 
truth  in  that  simple  answer,  but  it  is  not  the  whole 
truth.  Austria  after  her  first  precipitate  haste  to 
attack  Serbia  did,  in  fact,  at  the  Chancellor's  sugges- 
tion, renew  negotiations  with  Russia,  and  whatever 
must  be  said  of  some  German  soldiers,  diplomatists, 
and  courtiers,  one  does  not  from  a  candid  study 
of  the  documents  form  the  impression  that  the 
Chancellor  himself  desired  war.  It  must  also  be 
said  that  the  dominant  trend  of  thinking  in 
Germany  during  the  last  generation  has  empha- 
sized the  narrowly  nationalist  standpoint  in  politics 
and  morals,  and  has  viewed  with  cold  scepticism 
all  the  larger  developments  of  internationalism. 
This  came  partly  from  pure  Conservatism,  and  the 
Chancellor  probably  felt  in  his  inner  mind  the  same 
instinctive  dislike  of  the  idea  of  conference  that 
Castlereagh,  Wellington,  and  Canning  felt,  a  century 
ago,  for  the  "  mysticism  "  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
The  "  Areopagus  "  is  not  a  Conservative  principle, 
and  Canning's  notion  of  "a  wholesome  state  of 
things  "  in  Europe — "  Every  nation  for  itself  and 
God  for  us  all  "—has  been  that  of  every  German 
Chancellor  from  Bismarck  to  Bethmann-Hollweg. 
Behind  this  honest,  short-sighted,  slow-moving  Con- 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  69 

servatism  lay,  however,  the  more  sinister  calcula- 
tion that  Germany  by  her  efficient  and  ever -ready 
war  machine  could,  preferably  by  threats,  but  if 
necessary  by  deeds,  secure  more  for  herself  than 
she  could  hope  to  gain  by  conference.  Finally, 
we  must  reckon  with  the  tendency  of  conferences, 
holy  alliances,  and  leagues  of  peace  to  aim  at  a 
static  peace,  to  avoid  disturbing  changes,  to  patch 
and  compromise  and  evade  sharp  issues.  To  satis- 
fied Powers  this  will  seem  an  adequate  way  of 
handling  the  world's  problems.  It  will  not  meet 
the  ambitions  of  any  restless  Power  or  any  aggrieved 
nationality  which  has  set  its  mind  on  radical 
changes.  That  is,  perhaps,  the  ultimate  and  in- 
clusive reason  why  the  German  mind  looks  coldly 
on  the  idea  of  an  Areopagus.  To  us  empire  is 
possession.  To  the  Germans  it  is  struggle  and 
growth.  We  count  the  gifts  of  the  past  :  they 
dream  of  the  acquisitions  of  the  future. 

It  is  easy  to  accept  Viscount  Grey's  belief  that 
his  expedient  of  a  conference  or  the  Tsar's  pro- 
posal of  arbitration  might  have  averted  war.  But 
a  conference  which  might  have  "  settled  the  quarrel 
in  a  week  "  could  have  had  only  a  very  limited 
scope.  If  the  real  issue  had  been  to  decide  what 
guarantees,  consistent  with  her  independence,  Serbia 
could  give  to  Austria  against  the  hatching  of 
murderous  plots  and  the  fostering  of  disruptive 
movements  on  her  soil,  a » conference  might  well 
have  '•  settled  the  quarrel  in  a  week."  If  the  real 
issue  was  the  question  of  fact,  how  far  some  Serbian 
officials  may  have  been  guilty  of  complicity  in  the 
Serajevo  murder,  the  Hague  Tribunal  was  the  proper 
authority  to  investigate  it.  Indeed,  if  this  had  been 
all,  one  interview  between  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
and  the  Serbian  Premier,  if  there  had  been  good- 
will, would  have  sufficed  to  settle  it.  But  no  one, 
even  before  the  progress  of  the  war  had  uncovered 


70  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

all  its  hidden  causes,  was  so  near-sighted  as  to 
suppose  that  it  really  turned  merely  on  the  question 
whether  an  Austrian  assessor  was  to  sit  on  the  bench 
when  Serbian  conspirators  were  tried.  Even  if  we 
confine  our  view  entirely  to  the  East,  and  leave 
out  of  account  the  Western  and  colonial  questions 
which  would  infallibly  be  raised  by  a  general  war, 
the  issue  was  as  broad  and  as  complicated  as  any 
which  has  ever  set  great  empires  at  strife.  The 
issue,  as  it  appeared  to  the  chief  antagonists,  was 
simply  the  mastery  of  the  East.  "  Austria's 
action,"  said  M.  Sazonoff,1  "  was  in  reality  directed 
against  Russia.  She  aimed  at  overthrowing  the 
present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  and  establishing 
her  own  hegemony  there."  "  If  the  Serbs,"  argues 
the  German  White  Book,  "  continued,  with  the  aid 
of  Russia  and  France  to  menace  the  existence  of 
Austria -Hungary,  the  gradual  collapse  of  Austria 
and  the  subjection  of  all  the  Slavs  under  one 
Russian  sceptre  would  be  the  consequence,  thus 
making  untenable  the  position  of  the  Teutonic  race 
in  Central  Europe."  Each  of  these  statements 
extracts  from  a  perilous  crisis  the  utmost  menace 
that  was  latent  in  it.  It  may  be  said  with  truth 
that  it  is  exactly  at  the  moment  when  each  side 
accuses  the  other  of  aiming  at  hegemony  for  itself 
and  the  destruction  of  its  rivals  that  the  services 
of  neutral  mediators  are  of  most  avail.  The  cold 
neutral  who  insists  on  disregarding  these  large  and 
vague  alarms,  and  addresses  himself  in  a  matter- 
of-fact  way  to  the  one  narrow  cause  of  conflict 
which  cannot  be  evaded,  may  render  to  peace  the 
immediate  service  of  averting  war.  But  how  much 
of  this  larger  issue  could  any  mediating  confer- 
ence "have  settled  and  for  how  long  would  war 
have  been  avoided  by  the  burial  of  the  memory 
of  Sarajevo  ?  The  tension  between  Germany  and 
1  British  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  No.  17. 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  71 

Russia  had  been  acute  since  the  whole  Eastern 
question  was  raised  by  the  Balkan  wars.  Both 
empires  were  marching  consciously,  with  vast  and 
rapid  increases  in  their  armaments,  towards  a  trial 
of  strength,  and  in  their  public  discussions  the  ablesr 
writers  on  both  sides  had  virtually  declared  the 
"  inevitable  war  "  some  weeks  before  the  Archduke's 
murder.1  This  big  issue  of  the  mastery  of  the 
East  had  several  aspects.  Let  us  glance  at  them 
very  briefly  one  by  one* 

i .  Austria  stood  in  danger  of  disruption  and 
collapse  from  the  South  Slav  movement.  The 
Serbs  did  not  disguise  their  ambition  of  one  day 
uniting  the  whole  of  the  south-eastern  region  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy,  with  its  Serb,  Croat,  and 
Slovene  populations,  under  the  leadership  of  Bel- 
grade. Their  military  success  in  the  Balkan  wars 
gave  them  confidence  that  they  would  one  day  be 
able  to  repeat  on  behalf  of  the  Serb  race  the  role 
which  the  little  kingdom  of  Piedmont  had  played 
on  behalf  of  Italy  when  it  too  was  under  Austrian 
rule — with  a  Russian  Tsar  to  help  Serbia  as  Louis 
Napoleon  helped  Piedmont.  So  openly  were  such 
designs  proclaimed  that  the  clever  daily  news- 
paper of  the  military  party  in  Belgrade  was  actually 
named  the  Piemonte.  The  Russian  Panslavists 
encouraged  these  ambitions,  and  M.  Hartwig,  the 
Russian  Minister  in  Belgrade,  created  the  Balkan 
League  in  1912,  not  merely  to  destroy  Turkey  but 
with  the  ultimate  design,  which  is  hinted  even  in 
the  published  treaty  of  alliance,  of  one  day  using 
the  Serbo -Bulgarian  combination  in  a  war  against 
Austria.3  Efforts  had  lately  been  made  by  Russian 

1  Especially  in  the  illuminating  controversy  between  Professor 
Mitrofanoff ,  the  Russian  historian,  in  the  "  Preussische  Jahrbiicher  " 
and  its  editor,  Professor  Hans  Delbriick  (June  1914  ;  see  p.  145). 

*  For  the  text  of  the  treaty  see  Guechoff,  "  L' Alliance  Balkanique  ' 
(Hachette).  For  a  brief  but  clear  confirmation  of  the  above  statement 


7.2  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

diplomacy  to  reconstruct  the  Balkan  League. 
Panslavist  propaganda,  conducted  by  Orthodox 
priests  on  behalf  of  Russian  patriotic  organizations, 
was  meanwhile  attempting  to  undermine  the  loyalty 
to  Austria  of  the  Ruthenians  of  Galicia.1 

Austria  felt  that  she  must  assert  herself  if  she 
meant  to  survive,  and  the  only  way  to  do  it,  in 
her  view,  was  to  prove  that  Russia,  when  it  came 
to  the  point,  would  not  dare  to  protect  Serbia. 
Russia  had  in  the  past  often  recognized  that  Serbia 
is  naturally  within  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influ- 
ence (notably  in  the  understandings  of  1897  and 
1903).  There  must  be  a  return  to  that  salutary 
arrangement.  Failing  this,  Austria  would  sooner 
or  later  go  to  pieces,  and  Germany  would  be  left 
without  an  ally.  Some  show  of  force  (so  ran  the 
reasoning  of  the  Central  Powers)  was  necessary. 
It  was  useless  to  try  to  conciliate  the  Serbs.  Indeed, 
their  party  of  violence  had  murdered  the  Arch- 
duke, who  was  notoriously  friendly  to  the  Slavs, 

as  to  the  real  objects  of  Russian  policy  in  the  Balkans  in  1912  I  would 
refer  the  reader  to  Prof.  Paul  Miliukoff' s  article  in  the  Retch  (July  25, 
1916)  on  the  policy  of  M.  Sazonoff,  the  late  Foreign  Minister  of  Russia. 
Professor  Miliukoff  is  not  merely  the  leader  of  the  Russian  Liberals 
in  the  Duma  and  a  distinguished  historian  ;  he  is  also  one  of  the  first 
authorities  in  Europe  on  Balkan  affairs.  He  writes  as  a  personal-friend 
and  admirer  of  M.  Sazonoff.  Here  is  the  essential  passage  : — 

"Sazonoff,  receiving  in  heritage  a  situation  thus  complicated,  formed 
a  new  resource — an  alliance  of  the  Balkan  States  which  finally  blocked 
the  path  of  Austria  to  the  South.  First  of  all  Sazonoff,  who  prepared 
the  alliance  against  Atistria-Hungary,  did  not  realize  in  time  that  it 
would  automatically  turn  against  Turkey,  and,  together  with  the  rest 
of  Europe,  was  taken  unawares  by  the  Turkish  War." 

I  am  able  to  confirm  this  statement,  'as  the  result  of  independent 
conversations  in  1913  with  both  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  diplomatists. 
The  plan  of  campaign  was  that  the  Balkan  Alliance  should  be  used 
first  against  Austria  and  afterwards  against  Turkey.  The  impatience 
of  the  Balkan  statesmen  upset  Russian  plans. 

1  See  Steed,  "  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy." 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  73 

because  his  scheme  of  creating  a  great  autonomous 
united  Serbo-Croat  province  within  the  Dual 
Monarchy  would  have  been  fatal  to  their  national 
ambitions. 

2.  The  Serbian  and  Russian  case  against  Austria 
has  been  rendered  familiar  by  a  multitude  of  per- 
suasive   pens     in    all     the     allied     countries.      The 
Austrian  design  to  crush  Serbia,  it  can  be  shown,  is 
of  long  standing.      It  dates  from    1908  and  Count 
Aerenthal's  lawless  annexation   of   Bosnia,   and   was 
renewed  in  the  threat  of  armed  intervention  in  1913. 
It    disdained    no    methods    to    discredit    the    Serbs, 
and  stooped  even  to  official  forgery  and  hired  false 
witness.       Who     would     trust     even     documentary 
evidence    of    the    complicity    of    Belgrade    in    the 
Serajevo   plot,   if   the   Austrian  police   and   Austrian 
Foreign    Office    had    compiled    it  ?      The   plight    of 
the    Croats    under    Magyar     oppression     had    been 
steadily    worsening   for   a   number    of  years,    and    it 
was  plain  that  the  growth  of  a  new  spirit  of  unity 
and    hope    among    Croats,    Serbs,    and    Slovenes    in 
the  Dual  Monarchy  only   excited  the  spirit  of  sus- 
picion   and    tyranny    in    the    narrow    oligarchy    of 
Budapest.      The    murdered    Archduke,    to    be    sure, 
had   more   liberal   views,    but    would   he    ever   have 
enjoyed  power?      Even   he,   under  Jesuit   influence, 
favoured  the   Catholic  against  the   Orthodox  Slavs. 
A     genuinely     liberal     solution     in     the     Hapsburg 
"  police  State  "  seemed  hopeless.     Austria,  in  short, 
as  a  brilliant  English  writer  has  put  it,  "  craved  the 
knife." 

3.  With  this  Austro -Serbian  question  was  closely 
bound  up  the  future  of  Turkey.      Roumania,  under 
a   Hohenzollern  King,   was   the  ally  of  the   Central 
Powers.     Bulgaria,  under  King  Ferdinand,  marched, 
on  the  whole,   with  Austria.      Serbia,  alone   in  the 
Balkans,    stood    in   the   path   of  a    German -Austrian 
domination  of  the  East.      From  the  Russian  stand- 


74  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

point  the  question  of  the  Straits  was  becoming 
urgent.1  Russia  could  not  much  longer  postpone 
raising  it  :  on  a  free  egress  for  her  warships  from 
the  Black  Sea  she  meant  one  day  to  insist.  But 
meanwhile  Germany  was  in  a  fair  way  to  settling 
the  question  in  her  own  favour.  The  arrival  of 
General  Liman  von  Sanders  in  Turkey,  at  the  head 
of  a  military  mission  charged  with  executive  powers 
in  the  winter  of  1913-14,  seemed  to  mean  that 
Constantinople  was  becoming  a  German  and  not  a 
Russian  city.  The  two  great  strategical  routes 
which  dominate  the  East — Berlin -Bagdad  and 
Bosphorus -Dardanelles — cross  at  Constantinople,  and 
already  the  Germans  were  establishing  themselves 
there  with  the  eager  complicity  of  Enver  Pasha 
and  the  Young  Turks.  If  Serbia  should  be  brought 
within  the  Austrian  sphere  by  the  failure  of  Russian 
support,  the  fate  of  the  Near  East  was  settled. 
The  Germans,  on  their  side,  saw  in  the  hereditary 
Russian  claim  to  Constantinople  the  negation  of 

1  The  diplomatic  history  of  the  Straits  question  in  recent  years  is 
much  in  need  of  illumination.  For  a  number  of  years,  said  Dr. 
Spahn,  the  leader  of  the  Centre,  in  the  Reichstag  (Times,  October  16, 
1916)  the  Central  Empires  had  been  willing  to  settle  the  Straits 
question  with  Russia.  It  has  been  stated  that  in  his  preliminary 
conversations  with  Count  Aerenthal,  M.  Isvolsky,  on  the  eve  of  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia,  obtained  Austria's  consent  to  the  opening  of  the 
Straits  to  Russian  warships.  What  was  the  British  attitude  then  ? 
Later,  when  M.  Tcharikoff  was  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constanti- 
nople, he  pursued  a  Turcophil  policy,  and  made,  according  to  some 
authorities,  considerable  progress  in  inducing  the  Young  Turks  to 
consent  to  the  opening  of  the  Straits,  but  on  the  mischievous  con- 
dition that  Turkish  authority  over  Crete  should  be  confirmed.  He 
was  suddenly  recalled,  and  the  statement  has  been  made  that  this  was 
done  at  the  instance  of  France,  which  feared  our  displeasure  if  the 
question  of  the  Straits  were  raised.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  possible  that 
our  objection  was  rather  to  the  Cretan  arrangement.  The  failure  to 
reach  a  peaceable  settlement  of  this  question  between  1908  and  1914 
was  one  of  the  root  causes  of  the  war,  but  it  is  impossible  to  decide 
where  the  responsibility  lies.  See  Reventlow,  pp.  358,  359,  441,  and 
"  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East "  by  a  Diplomatist,  p.  161. 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  75 

their  economic  schemes  of  rail  way -building,  irriga- 
tion, mining,  oil  development,  and  the  like,  in 
Anatolia  and  Mesopotamia,  and  they  suspected  that 
the  Entente  Powers  entertained  definite  plans  for 
the  eventual  partition  of  Asiatic  Turkey  into  spheres 
of  influence,  without  according  even  a  share  to 
Germany.  The  last  occasion  on  which  this  pro- 
posal is  said  to  have  been  put  forward  was  during 
the  Balkan  War.1  Thus  their  economic  future  was 
indirectly  at  stake  in  this  question  of  the  Serajevo 
murders.  The  Russians  were  beginning  to  say  that 
the  road  to  Constantinople  lay  through  Berlin.  The 
Germans  perceived  as  clearly  that  the  road  to 
Constantinople  lay  through  Belgrade. 

It  requires  a  robust  faith  to  believe  that  much  of 
this  conflict  of  vital  interests  would  have  been  settled 
if  a  conference  had  averted  war  over  the  Serajevo 
murders.  It  might  with  ease  have  found  a  formula 
to  define  the  kind  and  degree  of  reparation  due 
from  Serbia.  But  the  Austrian  and  Turkish  problems 
would  have  been  no  nearer  to  a  settlement. 

Any  radical  and  final  solution  of  the  Austrian 
problem  would  have  involved  a  revolutionary 
departure  from  the  practice  and  usage  of  the 
Powers.  The  South-Slav  question  (to  confine  our- 
selves to  that)  admitted  of  two  solutions.  The  Dual 
Monarchy  might  have  been  reconstructed  on  a 
federalist  or  "  trialist  "  basis,  with  all  its  Serbs, 
Croats,  and  Slovenes  united  in  an  autonomous  pro- 
vince or  subordinate  kingdom,  under  the  Hapsburg 
crown.  That  solution,  to  be  quite  logical  and  final, 
would  have  involved,  in  some  form  or  degree,  at 
least  by  an  alliance  and  a  customs  union,  the  total 
or  partial  absorption  of  the  Serbian  and  Montenegrin 
kingdoms.  The  other  solution  would  have  been  to 
lop  off  from  Austria  the  whole  of  her  Serb  and  Croat 

1  See    Reventlow,    "  Deutschlands    Auswartige    Politik,"    p.    322. 
Rohrbach,  "Der  Deutsche  Gedanke,"  pp.  155,  162. 


7 6  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

provinces,  and  to  unite  them  with  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro. Either  solution  would  have  resulted  in  the 
union  of  the  Serbo-Croat  race,  with  every  guarantee 
for  its  own  native  culture  and  its  self-government. 
The  former  solution  would  have  brought  a  great 
access  of  strength  to  the  Central  Empires,  the 
second,  a  great  weakening.  It  is  safe  to  say  that 
no  Congress  would  have  considered  either  solution 
for  one  moment,  save  at  the  end  of  a  decisive  war. 
No  Great  Power  would  consent  to  submit  its  in- 
ternal reconstruction  to  the  decision  of  a  Concert. 
Against  the  cession  of  the  South -Slav  provinces 
Austria  and  Germany  would  have  fought  to  the 
bitter  end.  The  absorption  of  Serbia  (in  default  of 
heavy  compensations)  would  have  been  resisted  by 
Russia  no  less  stubbornly.  A  Congress  dare  not 
have  touched  the  South -Slav  question. 

If  this  conclusion  be  sound,  we  have  reached  what 
looks  at  this  stage  like  a  fatal  obstacle  to  any  League 
of  Peace.  There  are  many  questions,  some  of  them 
large  questions,  which  might  have  been  settled  in 
the  Europe  of  1914  by  the  method  of  conference 
and  conciliation.  The  problem  of  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits  may  have  been  one  of  them.  But 
no  cautious  and  experienced  statesman  would  have 
ventured  to  assert  that  in  1914  any  question  of 
nationality  which  required  either  a  drastic  inter- 
ference with  the  Constitution  of  a  Great  Power  or 
a  considerable  diminution  of  its  European  territories 
(save  perhaps  by  exchange)  could  have  been  settled 
by  conference  without  war.  One  illustration  is 
enough,  but  it  would  be  easy  to  multiply  cases. 
Poland,  Alsace,  and  Finland  at  once  present  them- 
selves among  those  problems  of  nationality  which  no 
one  could  have  raised  in  1914  without  precipitating 
war.  The  conception  of  the  sovereign  State  stood 
in  the  way.  No  European  Power  above  the  level  of 
a  Balkan  State  would  have  consented  to  accept  from 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  77 

any  Congress  or  Conference,  save  as  the  result  of  a 
war  which  had  exhausted  its  powers  of  resistance, 
an  order  'which  required  it  either  to  alter  its  Constitu- 
tion or  to  surrender  an  integral  part  of  its  home 
territory.  Nor  was  the  attachment  of  the  Liberal 
Powers  to  this  tradition  less  decided  than  that  of  the 
Central  Empires.  Let  us  ask  ourselves  candidly 
what  our  answer  would  have  been  if  Spain,  greatly 
daring,  or  backed  by  some  first-class  Power,  had 
ventured  to  raise  the  question  of  Gibraltar,  and 
invited  us  (after  an  angry  controversy)  to  submit  our 
ownership  of  the  Rock  and  our  control  of  the 
Straits  to  the  decision  of  a  neutral  Council  ?  The 
world  was  not  ready  in  1914  for  any  decision  of 
such  issues  by  means  other  than  force.  All  the 
great  territorial  changes  of  last  century  came  about 
as  the  sequels  of  war,  and  no  one  seriously  hoped 
that  further  changes  in  Europe  could  come  in  any 
other  way.  The  desire  for  these  great  organic 
changes  none  the  less  existed.  It  burned  fiercely 
as  an  aspiration  in  some  crushed  or  divided  races  : 
it  surged  as  an  ambition  in  some  great  empires. 
We  have  realized  during  this  war  how  fierce  and 
fundamental  some  of  these  passions  were  :  we  look 
back  on  the  last  generation  as  a  time  when  all  these 
nationalist  explosives  were  accumulated,  awaiting  the 
match.  Everywhere  in  Europe  there  were  races  or 
parties  in  both  of  its  camps  who  were  forced  year 
by  year  to  say  to  themselves,  "  The  solution  of  the 
problem  which  is  vital  to  our  personal  happiness  and 
dignity  must  await  the  next  war."  The  diplomacy 
of  the  Continent  was,  in  fact,  a  struggle  between  the 
conservatism  of  the  sober  or  satisfied  elements,  who 
desired  no  change,  and  the  radicalism  of  the  .wronged 
or  ambitious  elements,  who  cherished  the  suppressed 
wish  for  change  by  war.  With  all  its  goodwill,  with 
all  its  humane  horror  of  war,  the  diplomacy  which 
was  driven  to  a  continual  support  of  the  status  quo 


7 8  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

shares  the  responsibility  for  war  with  the  restless 
elements  which  made  it.  Our  English  habit  of  pro- 
nouncing moral  judgments  is  apt  to  lead  us  into  a 
diagnosis  of  war  and  its  causes  which  errs  by  its 
inadequate  simplicity.  We  shall  not  find  our  way 
out  while  we  are  content  to  spend  our  whole  minds 
in  denouncing  Prussian  militarism.  No  words  are 
too  harsh  for  it,  but  when  all  our  words  are  spoken, 
the  fact  remains  that  the  European  system  as  it 
existed  in  1914  provided  no  means  by  which  large 
and  necessary  changes  could  be  compassed  without 
war.  There  lay  the  root  of  all  militarism.  Let  us 
glance  at  a  question  in  which  our  passions  are  not 
involved.  Who  was  to  blame  for  the  war  of  the 
Balkan  Allies  in  1912  against  Turkey  ?  The  Turks, 
who  made  Macedonia  a  chaos  of  misery  and  oppres- 
sion ?  The  Balkan  Allies,  who  deliberately  and  with 
foresight  planned  the  war  and  drew  the  sword  ? 
Both  were  to  blame,  if  we  must  speak  of  blame — a 
silly  habit  that  darkens  understanding.  But  behind 
them  both  was  the  Concert,  which  had  steadily  set 
its  face  against  any  radical  and  adequate  solution 
of  this  question.  It  is  idle  to  blame  even  the 
Concert,  in  the  sense  of  passing  moral  judgments 
upon  it.  The  statesmen  who  did  nothing,  or  did 
too  little,  were  often  called  upon  to  resist  fanatical 
and  aggressive  cliques,  and  their  decision  to  allow 
the  wrong  to  fester,  so  far  from  implying  callousness, 
may  have  meant,  on  the  contrary,  a  humane  shrink- 
ing from  any  step  which  might  involve  Europe  'in 
war.  Their  prudence,  however,  had  its  reserves  and 
its  limitations.  They  did  not,  they  could  not, 
renounce  the  hope  of  change.  But  since  change 
must  mean  war,  they  armed  and  formed  their 
alliances  for  the  moment  when  it  should  come. 
Each  side  professed  in  these  preparations  a  purely 
defensive  aim,  and  in  a  sense  the  profession  may 
•have  been  sincere.  But  each  side  knew  that  a 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  79 

fortunate  war  would  enable  it  to  achieve  the  change 
which  without  war  was  unthinkable. 

A  survey  of  the  sub-conscious  mind  of  Europe 
on  the  eve  of  the  catastrophe  would  have  revealed 
everywhere  these  suppressed  wishes  for  war.  They 
were  never  avowed.  They  rarely  emerged  above 
the  threshold  of  publicity.  Good  men  fought  them 
down,  and  prudent  men  concealed  them.  But  like 
the  "  suppressed  wishes  "  which  Freud's  school  has 
taught  us  to  trace  in  the  mental  life  of  the 
individual,  they  coloured  the  dreams  of  many  of 
the  nations,  and  while  they  made  no  war,  they 
subtly  and  unconsciously  ruined  peace.  In  crisis 
after  crisis,  when  some  decision  had  to  be  taken 
on  a  question  seemingly  irrelevant,  the  suppressed 
wish  did  its  silent  work,  and  the  nation  deviated 
a  little  from  the  course  that  might  have  led  to 
lasting  peace,  and  swerved  a  little  into  the  course 
which  eventually  led  to  war.  How  promptly  these 
suppressed  wishes  proclaimed  themselves  when  at 
length  war  broke  out  !  When  the  German 
Chancellor  in  his  proposals  for  our  neutrality  l 
pledged  himself  not  to  annex  French  territory,  but 
added  candidly  that  he  could  not  give  the  same 
undertaking  about  French  colonies,  who  could  fail 
to  read  the  suppressed  wish  ?  Russian  Pan -Slavism, 
the  French  demand  for  revanche,  Italian,  Serbian, 
and  Bulgarian  irredentism  discovered  themselves 
with  equal  candour.  One  may  say  of  these  aspira- 
tions, that  while  morals  or  prudence  had  restrained 
most  of  them  for  a  generation  or  more  from  any 
declaration  of  war,  all  and  each  of  them  had  been 
strong  enough  to  cause  the  rivalry  in  armaments 
and  the  search  for  allies  which  had  divided  Europe 
into  two  camps  and  made  our  armed  peace.  In 
no  case  is  defence  and  fear  a  sufficient  explanation. 
Turn  even  to  the  most  pacific  and  democratic  of 

1  British  White  Paper,  No.  85. 


8o  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

all  the  belligerent  Powers,  the  Power  which  played 
the  least  active  part  in  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
One  may  say  with  conviction  that  in  spite  of 
an  influential  "  nationalist  "  tendency,  the  French 
Republic  would  never,  without  fresh  provocation, 
havs  declared  war  on  Germany  to  recover  the  lost 
provinces.  But  with  the  same  decision  one  must 
say  that  it  was  not  merely  the  need  of  defence, 
but  also  the  desire  to  retake  Alsace-Lorraine,  which 
caused  her  to  ally  herself  with  Russia  and  to 
connect  herself  with  Britain.  That  desire  worked, 
though  it  made  no  war,  and  it  worked  in  crisis 
after  crisis  to  render  the  dualism  in  Europe  more 
acute.  Even  the  German  Government,  despite  the 
militarist  tradition  around  it,  had  too  much  regard 
for  the  public  opinion  of  its  own  people  and 
the  rest  of  the  world  to  declare  war  frankly  in 
order  to  acquire  colonies.  It  let  the  Morocco 
question  pass  without  war,  and  awaited  another 
occasion  on  which  it  could  point  to  Serbian 
murders  and  Pan-Slavist  schemes,  to  turn  aside 
the  condemnation  which  even  its  own  people  would 
have  passed  on  an  avowedly  Imperialist  war.  None 
of  these  aspirations  was  wrong  in  itself  :  some  of 
them  voiced  a  sharp  cry  for  justice.  We  may 
think  the  German  desire  for  expansion  dangerous 
and  inexpedient,  but  we  who  have  acquired  (thanks 
to  our  naval  supremacy)  one-fourth  of  the  inhabited 
earth  cannot  as  a  people  say  that  it  is  immoral  to 
cherish  such  ambitions.  Of  these  many  suppressed 
wishes  it  was  only  two,  the  German  wish  for 
economic  or  <  colonial  expansion  and  the  Serbian 
wish  for  racial  unity,  which  actively  and  obviously 
made  this  war.  But  all  these  suppressed  wishes 
played  their  part  in  making  a  durable  peace 
impossible.  There  was  in  Europe  a  cause  of  war 
broader  and  more  potent  than  Prussian  militarism, 
the  system  or  want  of  system  which  forbade  organic 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  81 

change  without  war.  One  may  give  it  another 
name.  It  was  the  anarchic  and  individualistic 
tradition  of  the  sovereign  State,  which  regarded  all 
interference  from  outside  or  from  above  as  an 
intolerable  infringement  of  its  natural  right  of 
independence. 

The  historic  conception  of  a  League  of  Peace 
took  no  account  whatever  of  the  world's  need  of 
change,  growth,  and  readjustment.  It  seemed, 
indeed,  to  be  a  provision  against  the  very  possibility 
of  change.  The  Christian  sovereigns,  who  were 
to  form  the  Confederation  sketched  by  the  Abbe 
de  Saint-Pierre,  based  their  League  upon  a  mutual 
guarantee,  for  all  time,  of  all  the  States  which  they 
actually  possessed.  The  map  of  Europe  would  have 
been  fixed  for  ever  by  such  an  arrangement,  and 
neither  by  revolution  nor  by  conquest  could  any 
change  have  occurred  in  the  distribution  of  territory. 
That  could  have  come  about  only  by  marriage  or 
inheritance.  Poland  'would  have  been  saved,  but 
there  could  have  been  no  united  Germany,  no  Italy, 
no  Belgium,  and  no  Norway.  Such  a  concep- 
tion was  natural  in  the  early  eighteenth  century, 
when  countries  were  still  only  the  estates  of  princes, 
and  peoples  were  merely  their  subjects.  Even 
then  it  provoked  from  Leibnitz  the  retort  that 
perpetual  peace  "  is  a  motto  suitable  only  for 
a  graveyard.  The  same  static  view  of  international 
existence  and  the  same  principle  of  legitimacy  were 
the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  the 
child  by  collateral  descent  of  the  Abbe  de  Saint- 
Pierre's  scheme,  on  which  the  Tsar  Alexander  had 
pondered  (in  Rousseau's  abstract)  during  his  ideal- 
istic youth.  The  tradition  of  a  static  peace  is 
deeply  rooted  even  in  contemporary  pacifist  thought, 
>and  it  may  ruin  the  effort  of  the  twentieth  century 
to  abolish  war,  as  it  ruined  the  Holy  Alliance. 
Pacifist  thinking  flourishes  above  all  in  countries 

7 


82  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

which  have  no  need  of  fundamental  change  in  their 
own  national  interest,  and  desire  above  all  things 
security.  Security  seen  from  such  an  angle  is  apt 
to  look  like  repose,  and  the  mere  absence  of  move- 
ment. A  facile  philosophy  is  readily  built  up  to 
suggest  that  the  factors  which  make  for  change 
are  either  sinister  or  unreal.  One  century  blames 
its  kings  and  priests  ;  the  next  curses  its  capitalists. 
Both  believe  that  democracies,  if  they  were  really 
self-governing,  would  never  go  to  war.  One 
thinker  traces  all  our  ills  to  secret  diplomacy, 
another  to  the  illusion  that  conquest  can  enrich  a 
people.  There  js  truth,  inexhaustible  truth,  in  all 
these  indictments,  whether  of  the  vanity  of  kings, 
the  greed  of  capitalists,  or  the  devious  ways  of 
a  secret  statecraft.  But  none  of  these  diagnoses 
takes  account  of  the  fact  thaf:  change  is  necessary 
in  the  world's  structure,  and  that  the  pretensions  of 
the  sovereign  State  in  its  present  conception  are 
a  fatal  obstacle  to  fundamental  change. 

The  national  changes  are  the  most  baffling  of 
all,  and  we  dare  not  assume  that  we  can  foresee 
all  that  may  ever  be  necessary.  Forgotten  races 
come  to  consciousness.  Did  not  Kinglake  pass 
through .  Bulgaria  without  realizing  that  a  Bulgarian 
race  existed  ?  Ten  or  twenty  years  ago  who  took 
account  of  Slovacks  and  Slovenes  ?  Backward  races 
leap,  by  industrial  and  educational  development, 
into  the  position  to  claim  their  rights.  Sundered 
races  discover  their  affinity.  Ten  years  ago,  though 
every  student  understood  the  identity  of  Croats  and 
Serbs,  few  practical  politicians  believed  that  they 
would  surmount  their  religious  and  cultural  differ- 
ences, to  embrace  a  single  racial  aspiration. 
Emigration,  as  the  decades  pass,  may  make  for 
our  children  racial  problems  as  grievous  as  these 
older  European  perplexities.  It  would  be  rash  to 
say  that  there  can  ever  be  a  final  solution  of  the 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  83 

problem  of  nationality.  The  economic  and  colonial 
problems  which  give  rise  to  war  are  even  more 
obviously  incapable  of  permanent  solution.  The 
decay  of  an  ancient  Asiatic  Empire,  the  bankruptcy 
of  a  semi -civilized  State,  the  discovery  overseas 
of  a  new  source  of  some  raw  material  in  great 
demand,  the  invention  of  a  new  industrial  process 
— all  of  these  may  at  any  moment  call  for  some 
readjustment  of  the  kind  that  often  leads  to  war. 
The  Old  World  went  out  conquering  for  gold.  Iron 
ore  and  petrol  may  be  to-day  the  raw  materials 
of  war.  Who  knows  over  what  rare  mineral  the 
syndicated  industries  of  Europe  and  America  may 
dispute  a  generation  hence?  Life  is  change,  and 
a  League  of  Peace  that  aimed  at  preserving  peace 
by  forbidding  change  would  be  a  tyranny  as 
oppressive  as  any  Napoleonic  dictatorship.  New 
adjustments  of  frontiers  to  meet  the  real  facts  of 
nationality,  or,  failing  these,  changes  within  the 
Constitution  of  composite  Empires,  redistribution 
of  colonial  possessions  or  spheres  of  influence,  the 
requirements  of  new  trade  routes,  the  'equitable 
apportionment  of  raw  materials,  access  for  growing 
industries  to  new  markets — all  of  these  problems 
shift  with  the  world's  growth,  call  for^  periodic 
change,  and  will  make  war  if  change  should  be 
denied.  The  peril  of  our  future  is  that  while  the 
need  for  change  is  instinctively  grasped  by  some 
peoples  as  the  fundamental  fact  of  world-politics,  to 
perceive  it  costs  others  a  difficult  effort  of  thought. 
We  have  no  unredeemed  kinsmen  ;  we  own  more  soil 
than  we  can  till.  America  moves  securely  within  the 
closed  frame  of  her  own  vast  continent.  Pacifist 
thought  flourishes  readily  among  us.  But  there 
were  no  pacifists  in  Serbia,  and  few  in  Germany 
outside  the  Socialist  ranks.  We  must  cease  to 
attribute  this  difference  to  original  sin.  It  depends 
on  the  varying  urgency  of  the  need  which  each 


84  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

people  experienced  for  fundamental  change.  Unless 
we  can  make  our  League  a  possible  instrument  of 
fundamental  change,  it  will  rally  the  satisfied  Powers 
and  repel  the  peoples  which  cherish  an  ambition 
or  suffer  from  a  wrong.  Our  inevitably  static 
conception  of  the  world  must  learn  to  find  a  place 
for  these  restless  forces  which  are  bent  on  change. 
Unless  these  forces  can  see  in  the  League  of 
Peace  a  hopeful  means  of  effecting  needful  change, 
they  will  see  in  it  only  a  barrier  to  their  growth, 
and  the  pulse  of  life  within  them  will  drive  them 
first  to  armaments  and  then  to  war.  Our  problem 
is  not  merely  moral  ;  it  is  biological.  Granted 
that  all  war  involves  an  element  of  "  aggression  " 
which  the  moralist  must  condemn  :  it  is  no  less 
important  to  recognize  that  it  involves  a  need  of 
change  which  the  statesman  must  satisfy.  The 
failure  to  see  the  need  for  change  as  the  central 
fact  in  world-politics  may  well  prevent  the  formation 
of  a  League,  and  wreck  it,  if  it  should  be  formed. 
To  the  "  have-nots  "  among  the  nations,  the 
proletarian  nationalities  and  the  parvenu  Powers,  it 
will  present  itself  as  a  League  of  all  the  "  haves," 
to  keep,  to  hold,  to  stereotype  things  as  they  are. 
Glance  at  the  brief  definitions  of  the  ideal  which 
have  been  given  by  Mr.  Asquith,  Viscount  Grey, 
and  President  Wilson.  Admirable  and  eloquent  as 
they  all  are,  they  all  of  them  conceive  the  functions 
of  the  League  as  negative.  It  is  to  prevent  action 
in  others  ;  it  will  itself  act  only  to  repress.  It  is 
to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  evil  will.  It  is 
to  stop  aggression.  Nowhere  is  there  any  stress 
on  its  resolve  to  do  anything  to  render  the  world 
more  tolerable  for  those  who  otherwise  might  be 
tempted  to  rebel.  Such  language  is  natural  in  the 
midst  of  war.  The  terrific  fact  in  all  our  minds 
is  that  a  tremendous  act  of  aggression  has  been 
committed.  The  progress  which  the  idea  of  a 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  85 

League  has  made  is  simply  a  reaction  against  this 
act.      We  want  simply  to  prevent  its  repetition. 

In  this  mood  we  lapse  too  easily  into  the 
conception  of  a  static  and  changeless  peace.  It 
is  significant  that  some  of  the  authors  who  have 
done  the  most  notable  service  to  advance  the  idea 
of  a  League  in  Britain  and  America  express  the 
opinion  that  ultimately  all  matters  of  controversy 
among  nations  may  be  settled  by  judicial  process, 
though  most  of  them  recognize  that  at  present  we 
must  rely  very  largely  on  councils  of  conciliation. 
This  may  seem  to  be  a  remote  and  unimportant 
detail  of  procedure.  But  it  reveals  very  clearly 
the  belief  that  the  need  of  large  changes  will 
diminish  and  can  be  eliminated.  It  suggests  the 
analogy  of  a  kingdom  with  a  Constitution  so  fixed 
and  a  Statute  Book  so  complete,  that  it  could  be 
ruled  entirely  by  its  magistrates,  administering  its 
existing  laws,  without  the  need  of  a  Parliament 
or  an  Executive.  This  is  to  banish  all  thought 
of  evolution  and  growth.  It  is  to  assume  that 
no  new  ideas  will  arise  to  give  fresh  shape  to 
international  relations.  It  is  to  repress  all  move- 
ments of  the  will  outside  each  national  frontier. 
So  far  from  representing  an  international  idea  and 
a  Society  of  Nations,  debating  with  each  other, 
influencing  each  other,  and  deciding  together  great 
issues  for  the  common  good,  it  seems  to  picture 
a  condition  of  isolation,  in  which  nations  touch 
one  another  only  as  litigants  before  a  supreme 
Court.  The  climax  of  this  way  of  thinking  is 
to  be  found  in  the  suggestion  that  the  cure  for 
war  is  to  be  sought  in  the  boredom  which  will 
overtake  us  all  when  international  affairs  are 
involved  in  the  intricacies  of  a  quiet,  tedious,  and 
quasi-legal  procedure.  This  mode  of  thought 
represents  the  extreme  and  timorous  reaction  from 
war.  It  offers  us  a  purely  negative  conception  of 


86  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

peace,  which  may  for  the  moment,  drab  and  dull 
as  it  is,  appeal  to  minds  sated  with  the  violent 
colours  of  war.  In  the  long  run  humanity  will 
ask  for  something  more  positive  and  interesting, 
for  something  that  gives  scope  to  the  creative 
and  shaping  will,  that  brings  together  in  the 
stimulating  shock  of  contention,  in  debate  if  not 
on  stricken  fields,  the  diverse  temperaments,  the 
mutually  complementary  political  ideals  of  civilized 
nations.  A  peace  rich  in  this  conception  of  co- 
operation will  aim  at  international  changes  more 
daring,  more  constructive,  more  interesting  than  the 
elementary  ambitions  of  war-time.  We  shall  end 
by  eliminating  from  our  vocabulary  the  word 
"  dispute,"  and  regard  the  debates  between  nations 
over  the  conduct  of  our  common  affairs,  not  as 
dangers  to  be  dreaded,  concealed,  and  avoided,  but 
as  the  promise  and  medium  of  hopeful  and  stimulat- 
ing change.  That  will  be  a  slow  development. 
There  is  risk  in  attempting  to  think  and  construct 
too  fast.  But  let  us  realize  the  still  graver  risk 
of  defining  peace  and  its  organization  in  static  and 
negative  terms.  To  do  that  is  to  leave  still 
fermenting  in  the  dark  places  of  the  European  mind 
its  many  suppressed  wishes  for  war.  The  psychic 
healer  who  would  cure  mankind  Of  these  wishes 
will  not  attempt  the  vain  task  of  repressing  them. 
He  will  bid  them  to  be  conscious  and  vocal.  He 
will  summon  them  into  international  publicity,  and 
endeavour  to  transmute  them  into  open  and 
honourable  demands  for  change,  addressed  to  the 
reasonable  goodwill  of  a  Society  of  Nations,  which 
can,  when  it  is  convinced  of  their  urgency  and 
justice,  proceed  to  give  them,  effect. 


This    general    argument    has    carried    us    beyond 
the  limited  but  vital   question  which  confronted  us 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  87 

when  we  asked  whether  a  European  Congress  or 
Council  could  have  settled  the  South  Slav  question. 
The  obstacle  to  any  settlement  seemed  to  be  the 
traditional  refusal  of  the  sovereign  State,  and 
especially  of  the  Great  Power,  to  allow  any  inter- 
ference with  its  internal  questions,  or  to  contem- 
plate, save  after  war,  any  surrender  of  his  home 
territories.  In  consequence  of  this  tradition,  loyal 
and  pacific  statesmen  had  eliminated  from  the  scope 
of  diplomacy  any  consideration  of  problems  which 
could  be  solved  only  in  one  of  these  two  ways. 
Will  a  League  of  Peace  be  more  daring?  We 
have  advanced  an  argument  to  show  that  it  must 
be  prepared  to  be  very  much  more  daring  and 
more  radical,  if  it  intends  by  peaceful  means  to  keep 
the  world's  structure  adjusted  to  the  recurrent  need 
of  change.  But  will  it,  in  fact,  be  more  daring? 
It  is  probable  that  the  very  experience  of  this  war 
will  make  us  all  Conservatives  in  such  matters. 
While  the  war  lasts  it  is  part  of  our  fighting  case 
to  make  the  most  of  all  these  issues  of  nationality, 
and  to  urge  its  prosecution  to  the  bitter  end,  lest 
our  victory  should  fail  to  provide  for  the  radical 
settlement  of  arty  of  these  questions.  When  peace 
returns,  the  contrary  mood  will  set  in,  and  to  any 
one  who  points  out  that  the  Slovenes  have  been 
forgotten  or  the  Macedonians  wronged,  public 
opinion  will  oppose  a  massive  indifference  which 
will  turn,  if  he  persists,  to  anger  and  impatience. 
The  very  mention  of  a  neglected  nationality  will 
ring  to  our  ears  like  a  proposal  to  begin  once 
more  the  slaughter  of  men  by  millions.  This  mood 
may  last  for  a  generation,  and  it  is  probable  that 
if  any  national  question  which  might  arouse 
European  strife  should  be  brought  before  the  League, 
its  Council  would  tend  to  offer  a  timid  and  com- 
promising solution,  which  might  none  the  less  have 
value  if  it  eased  the  strain  without  provoking  deter- 


88  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

mined  resistance.  It  is  even  more  probable  that, 
however  wise  the  recommendations  of  the  Council 
might  be,  there  would  be  little  disposition  on  the 
part  of  the  Great  Powers  to  take  any  action  what- 
ever to  enforce  them,  unless,  perhaps,  it  were  clear 
to  all  of  them  that  only  by  prompt  action  could  a 
devastating  war  be  avoided.  Much,  no  doubt,,  would 
depend  on  the  standing  and  associations  of  the 
State  against  which  action  was  required.  The 
tendency  of  the  cruder  public  opinion  in  both  camps 
would  be  to  declare  that  it  was  monstrous  that  the 
Council  should  dare  to  address  even  a  recommenda- 
tion to  an  ally  ;  while  'if  the  offender  were  in  the 
other  camp  the  same  voices  would  sound  the  clarion 
and  summon  the  whole  civilized  world  to  coerce 
him.  It  will  only  be  slowly,  as  the  memories  of 
this  conflict  fade,  that  an  approach  to  impartiality 
will  be  possible.  The  responsibility  of  the  United 
States  at  this  early  stage  will  be  heavy,  and  many 
a  long  year  will  pass  before  the  League  could 
venture  to  use  pressure,  even  moral  pressure,  against 
one  of  the  more  important  victors  in  this  war. 
For  that  reason  the  defeated  Powers  will  be  very 
chary  of  joining  the  League,  and  very  slow  to 
believe  that  they  may  hope  for  justice  from  it. 
The  idea  of  the  League  requires  for  its  smooth 
working,  firstly,  the  loosening,  if  not  the  abolition, 
of  partial  alliances  among  its  members,  and, 
secondly,  some  diminution  of  the  arrogance  and 
self-sufficiency  which  inflate  our  notion  of  the 
sovereign  State. 

This  admission  may  seem  to  some  a  reason  for 
postponing  any  attempt  to  create  the  League  until 
a  number  of  years  have  passed.  That  counsel  may 
be  disguised  to  look  like  wisdom.  But  those  who 
advance  it  must  be  prepared  to  show  how,  without 
the  League,  we  may  hope  for  a  withering  of  the 
idea  of  force,  how  in  default  of  it  alliances  are 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  89 

likely  to  decay,  how  without  any  attempt  to  build 
up  international  institutions  the  sovereign  State  can 
begin  to  lose  its  repellent  individualism.  Within  the 
League  all  these  developments  will  go  forward.  We 
must  begin,  as  best  we  may,  realizing  the  handi- 
caps of  our  disastrous  past  and  aware  of  the  in- 
ordinate difficulties  of  our  task.  If  we  refuse  to 
create  the  League  now  because  we  doubt  our  ability 
to  overcome  these  moral  obstacles,  we  are  refusing 
to  adopt  the  principle  of  conference  which  our  own 
statesmen  have  proclaimed.  Some  principle  we  must 
follow,  and  the  alternative  to  conference  is  strife 
and  armaments,  boycotts  and  force.  Security 
is  the  overmastering  need,  and  the  Power  which 
will  not  seek  it  or  cannot  find  it  in  a  League  of 
Peace,  will  inevitably  work  for  it  by  the  disastrous 
methods  of  the  past.  It  will  bend  its  resources 
and  its  statesmanship  to  two  ends — the  strengthen- 
ing of  itself  so  that  its  defensive  forces  are  over- 
whelming, and  the  weakening  of  the  enemy  so  that 
any  attack  from  him  may  be  disregarded.  Seen 
from  the  other  side,  this  process  means  that  the 
Power  in  question  is  making  itself  so  strong  that 
it  might  attack  with  impunity,  while  its  rival  must 
lack  the  means  for  defence.  Absorbed  in  such 
fears  and  precautions,  Europe  could  make  no 
advance  to  a  League.  The  favourable  moment  for 
proposing  it  would  never  come.  The  obvious  and 
natural  moment  to  begin  is  when  all  the  nations 
are  assembled  in  council  for  the  settlement  of  this 
war.  If  this  moment  is  neglected,  each  side  will 
see  in  this  neglect  a  fresh  reason  for  resuming, 
with  the  old  suspicions,  the  old  precautions. 

If  the  resistance,  inherent  in  the  tradition  of  the 
sovereign  State,  to  all  organic  changes  suggested 
or  imposed  from  without,  is  the  reason  which  ex- 
plained the  accumulation  of  so  many  causes  of 
war,  if,  further,  we  may  hope  only  for  the  very 


90  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

gradual  adoption  in  really-  vital  cases  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  international  regulation,  it  follows  that  we 
must  endeavour  in  the  settlement  which  precedes 
peace  to  effect  at  least  the  most  urgent  and  diffi- 
cult of  these  necessary  changes.  One  may  lay 
down  in  theory  the  most  drastic  principles  of 
nationality.  One  may  say,  as  President  Wilson  has 
said,  that  every  people  has  the  right  to  decide  for 
itself  under  which  State  it  will  live.  But  no  empire 
is  going  to  accept  that  principle,  if  at  all,  without 
safeguards  which  will  leave  it  the  smallest  possible 
range  of  application.  It  is  idle  to  imagine  that 
we  could  to-morrow  conclude  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  territorial  status  quo  as  it  existed  before 
the  war,  erect  our  League  of  Peace,  and  then 
through  its  Council  invite  Germany  to  test  the 
allegiance  of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  a 
plebiscite.  Entirely  reasonable  as  such  a  strategy 
would  be,  it  demands  too  prompt  a  departure  from 
the  ideas  of  the  past.  We  should  not  accept  it 
for  Ireland  or  Gibraltar,  nor  would  Russia  submit 
to  it  for  Finland.  Every  Power  will  expect  that 
the  settlement  shall  give  it  the  secure  possession  at 
least  of  its  European  territories  for  a  long  period 
to  come.  If  there  are  to  be  cessions  of  territory 
dependent  on  a  plebiscite,  they  must  be  defined 
precisely  in  the  terms  of  peace.  It  is  probable, 
indeed,  that  the  victors  will  ask  that  the  settlement 
of  territory  laid  down  in  the  treaty  of  peace  shall 
be  accepted  by  all  parties  as  a  final  regulation  of 
the  map  of  Europe.  If  they  are  disposed  to  adopt 
the  idea  of  a  League  of  Peace,  there  will  certainly 
be  a  tendency  on  their  part  to  regard  the  League 
as  a  Federation  pledged  to  maintain  the  settlement 
for  all  time.  They  will  probably  require  that  its 
terms  shall  be  embodied  in  the  basis  of  the  League's 
constitution.  The  utmost  which  those  who  realize 
that  some  scope  for  change  and  readjustment  is 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  91 

essential  to  permanent  peace,  may  hope  to  secure 
is  that  its  provisions  may  be  subject  to  review 
by  the  Council  of  the  League  after  a  long  term 
of  (say  twenty)  years.  The  balance  between  the 
dangers  and  advantages  of  a  settlement  which 
follows  war  is  hard  to  strike.  On  the  one  hand, 
one  may  say  that  there  were  demands  for  change 
in  Europe,  unattainable  without  war,  so  urgent  and 
necessary  that  permanent  peace  was  barely  think- 
able without  them.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
the  risk  that  the  victors  (whatever  principles  they 
profess)  will  think  chiefly  of  increasing  their  power 
and  weakening  the  enemy,  and  will  tend  to  regard 
the  League  simply  as  a  guarantee  of  their  conquests. 
A  peace  without  annexations  is  the  formula  which 
would  lead  us  most  promptly  to  an  end  of  the 
carnage.  But  a  peace  without  some  territorial 
changes  would  leave  us  in  the  grip  of  many  of  the 
acuter  problems  which  made  this  war. 

Can  we  find,  with  the  League  of  Peace  as  our 
guiding  principle,  a  clue  through  these  difficulties  ? 
It  is  obvious  that  our  answer  to  nearly  every  ques- 
tion which  confronts  us  will  differ  with  our  faith 
in  the  possibility  and  efficacy  of  a  regulated  inter- 
nationalism. If  there  is  to  be  no  League,  then  it 
is  reasonable  to  say  that  national  questions  admit 
only  of  the  trenchant  solution  by  annexation  or 
partition.  If  a  League  exists,  it  may  provide  us 
with  a  super -national  authority  which  can  act  as  a 
court  of  appeal  for  imperilled  nationalities  within 
larger  empires.  In  that  event  the  war  may  stop 
short  of  a  point  at  which  these  composite  empires 
can  be  "  broken  up."  Again,  if  there  is  no  League, 
it  is  inevitable  that  Powers  bent  on  achieving  security, 
should  press  their  efforts  to  obtain  territory  of 
strategical  value  to  themselves,  even  at  the  cost 
of  overriding  nationality  and  prolonging  the 
struggle.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  believe 


92  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

in  the  attainment  of  security  through  a  League, 
we  shall  see  in  these  strategical  aims  attempts  to 
reach  it  by  obsolete  means  as  superfluous  as  they 
are  mischievous.  The  decision  of  some  economic 
and  colonial  questions  turns  no  less  clearly  on  the 
same  pivot.  If  our  only  hope  of  security  lay  in 
weakening  the  enemy  and  in  keeping  him  weak, 
then  clearly  the  policy  of  boycotting  his  trade, 
cutting  off  his  supplies  of  raw  material,  and  destroy- 
ing his  enterprises  overseas  would  deserve  careful 
consideration.  If  we  look  to  a  League,  however, 
as  the  guarantee  of  the  future,  and  wish  to  include 
him  within  it  as  a  loyal  and  willing  member,  then 
to  play  with  such  proposals  as  these  would  be 
suicidal.  Evidently  the  settlement  of  the  war  and 
the  future  of  the  League  are  inextricably  bound 
up  together.  A  weak  settlement  which  shirked  any 
of  the  graver  issues  in  the  war  might  compromise 
the  whole  future  of  the  League  by  burdening  it 
with  problems  which  are  far  too  heavy  a  weight 
for  any  new  institution  to  carry  during  the  experi- 
mental years.  The  next  generation  will  have  grown 
up,  if  schools  and  the  Press  do  their  duty,  with 
some  sense  of  loyalty  and  veneration  towards  the 
new  super -national  structure.  Only  when  this  con- 
fidence and  fidelity  exist  as  a  real  spiritual  force 
behind  the  League,  will  it  dare  to  propose  solutions 
of  difficult  problems  which  call  for  large  sacrifices 
from  powerful  nations.  It  is  easy  to  exaggerate 
the  uses  of  war  as  a  means  of  bringing'  about  terri- 
torial changes.  One  may  dictate  them,  if  one  has 
the  force  to  do  it,  bu,t  a  nation  shrinks  especially 
from  the  cession  of  territory  at  the  settlement,  be- 
cause it  may  look  like  an  admission  of  defeat.  For 
the  solution  of  some  questions  of  nationality  in 
Europe  we  may  have  to  trust  to  the  slow  operation 
of  mental  changes  which  the  creation  of  a  Society 
of  Nations  will  set  in  motion.  Why  is  it  that  every 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  93 

Power  instinctively,  at  any  time,  resists  a  cession 
of  territory,  even  when  the  task  of  policing  it  is 
thankless  and  burdensome?  The  reason  is  partly 
sentimental  :  it  might  lead  to  a  diminution  of 
prestige.  But  there  are  two  reasons,  which  in  the 
present  condition  of  Europe  are  perfectly  rational. 
A  loss  of  territory  involves  two  things — a  diminution 
of  the  man-power  available  for  the  military  machine, 
and  a  probable  shrinkage  of  markets.  Reluctant 
conscripts  do  not  make  the  best  military  material 
and  are  always  a  source  of  anxiety,  but  they  are 
indisputably  of  some  military  value.  Austria,  for 
example,  has  relied  largely  on  her  Slav  regiments 
in  the  campaign  against  Italy,  and  the  Prussian 
Poles  fought  well  against  Russia.  Moreover,  even 
if  such  troops  are  not  of  much  use  to  oneself,  one 
does  not  want  to  hand  them  over  to  a  possible 
enemy  for  his  service.  Again,  it  is,  to-day,  only 
in  one's  own  territories  that  one  can  be  always  sure 
of  an  unimpeded  market  for  one's  goods,  of  free 
access  to  raw  materials,  and  of  an  open  door  for 
capital  enterprises.  Every  advance  towards  the 
organization  of  economic  peace,  every  step  towards 
the  restriction  of  militarism,  tends  to  invalidate  these 
two  objections  to  the  surrender  of  territory.  If  the 
whole  world  were  to  disarm  and  establish  free  trade 
at  the  close  of  this  war,  it  is  possible  that  we  should 
still  resist  the  creation  of  an  Irish  Republic,  that 
the  Russians  would  assert  their  suzerainty  over  Fin- 
land, and  that  Germans  would  dislike  the  idea  of 
surrendering  Alsace  and  Posen.  Habits  of  thoughts 
may  persist  long  after  their  rational  grounds  have 
disappeared.  We  may  however  anticipate  with  con- 
fidence that  every  advance  towards  international 
organization,  every  decline  in  military  and  economic 
nationalism,  will  tend  in  the  future  to  ease  such] 
transfers  of  territory  and  allegiance  as  may  be  neces- 
sary. A  League  of  Nations,  with  its  two  indispens- 


94  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

able  conditions,  disarmament  and  economic  peace, 
is  the  key  to  the  problem  of  change,  not  merely 
because  it  will  provide  the  organization  which  can 
devise,  promote,  and  enforce  necessary  changes  as 
they  become  due,  but  also  because  its  whole  tendency 
will  be  to  remove  the  grounds,  only  too  valid  to-day, 
which  cause  the  sovereign  national  State  to  resist 
territorial  change. 

The  idea  of  a  League  must  be  our  guide  in 
steering  the  difficult  course  between  a  weak 
settlement  which  might  leave  old  discords  rank- 
ling, and  a  violent  settlement  that  would  in- 
ftict  new  wounds.  It  is  a  single  organic 
problem  which  we  have  to  solve,  and  both  sides 
of  it  may  be  compromised  unless  it  is  considered 
as  a  unity.  No  civilized  man  will  hesitate  in  his 
choice  of  the  principle  of  a  settlement  if  a  League 
of  Peace  is  indeec}  attainable.  Only  a  savage 
would  sacrifice  the  future  of  mankind  to  the  present 
moment,  or  condemn  his  children  to  peril  for  the 
crude  emotional  pleasure  of  a  glorious  triumph,  or 
the  still  cruder  material  gains  of  trade  boycotts  and 
indemnities.  If  the  League  is  attainable,  its  interests 
must  be  the  guide  and  pilot  alike  of  our  policy  in 
war  and  of  our  statesmanship  at  the  settlement. 
How  to  found  the  League,  how  to  ease  its  working 
during  the  first  anxious  generation,  how  to  bring 
within  it  every  Power  which  might  be  strong  enough 
to  wreck  it — these  are  questions  which  transcend  all 
the  details  of  frontiers,  indemnities,  and  tariffs.  It 
is  not  enough  to  see  that  they  transcend  them.  They 
must  be  made  to  include  them.  Every  demand 
and  proposal  must  face  the  test  whether  it  will 
,  ease  or  compromise  the  creation  of  the  League. 
v  Two  positions  are  intellectually  respectable.  It 
is  reasonable  (though  it  may  be  false)  to  say  that  3, 
League  of  Peace  is  a  vain  dream  :  in  that  case  safety 
depends  on  our  being  now  and  always  the  stronger. 


ON    PEACE    AND    CHANGE  95 

It  is  reasonable  (though  again  it  may  be  false)  to 
say  that  a  League  of  Peace  is  possible,  and  so 
desirable  that  every  other  consideration  must  be 
subordinated  to  it.  The  position  which  is  weak 
and  inconsequent  is  the  attempt  to  mix  a  settlement 
by  force- with  a  League  based  on  conference.  But 
it  is  this  third  and  intermediate  position  which  so 
far  predominates  in  the  current  discussions  of  writers 
and  orators  in  Allied  countries.  After  crushing 
the  enemy  in  the  field,  cutting  his  Empire  in  pieces, 
confiscating  his  fleet,  accumulating  punishments  on 
his  head,  annexing  straits,  and  snatching  colonies, 
these  writers  will  add  the  -cheerful  conclusion  "  and 
of  course  we  hope  to-morrow,  though  not  to-day, 
for  a  League  of  Nations,  and  the  enthronement  of 
right."  By  such  means  we  cannot  prepare  the 
League  of  Peace.  Even  among  moderate  writers, 
after  a  programme  which  may  be  wise  and  far- 
seeing,  the  suggestion  of  a  League  of  Peace  some- 
times appears  as  an  afterthought  or  a  fortieth  article. 
It  must  be  less  or  more  than  this.  If  it  matters  so 
little  that  one  may  wade  through  blood  for  three 
or  four  years  without  regard  to  it,  annex,  divide, 
and  restore  without  speaking  of  it,  it  is  hardly  worth 
the  pains  which  it  will  cost  us.  If  it  matters  pro- 
foundly, then  it  matters  all  the  time,  and  it  must 
guide  us  in  all  we  do.  Our  Utopians  are  not 
Utopian  enough.  They  do  not  themselves  realize 
how  great  a:  transformation  they  are  proposing. 
From  force  to  conference,  from  armaments  to  reason, 
from  monopoly  to  free  intercourse,  from  rival 
alliances  to  a  society  of  nations,  from  the  sovereign 
State  to  the  federal  league,  from  exclusive  national- 
ism to  international  solidarity — it  means  the  re- 
shaping of  all  our  diplomatic  traditions  and  the 
broadening  of  patriotism  itself.  The  experienced 
and  sceptical  mind  turns  from  the  adventure  in 
despair  :  it  at  least  thinks  clearly  in  its  pessimism. 


96  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

The  hopeless  leader  is  the  man  who  would  tinge 
his  vengeance  and  his  caution  with  a  little  idealism, 
the  man  whose  perorations  are  a  wordy  picture  of 
the  luminous  future  which  all  his  acts  will  deny. 
We  must  choose  our  end  and  with  the  end  the  means 
that  fit  it. 


CHAPTER    IV 
PROBLEMS  OF  NATIONALITY 

THE  difficulty  of  any  honest  discussion  of  European 
problems  of  nationality  during  the  war  is  that  they 
have  become  inextricably  confused  with  the  wholly 
different  problem  of  weakening  the  enemy.  It  may 
be  proper  to  pursue  the  design  of  achieving  security 
by  taking  from  the  enemy  the  non -German  races, 
who  by  their  numbers,  their  aptitudes,  and  their 
wealth  serve  to  swell  his  military  and  economic 
power.  Our  adoption  of  this  aim  as  our  avowed 
policy  will  depend  partly  on  our  readiness  to  prolong 
the  war  indefinitely,  and  partly  on  our  despair  of 
reaching  security  by  other  means.  It  is  open  to  the 
obvious  objection  that  it  promises  more  than  it  is 
likely  to  yield  ;  for  the  enemy  so  weakened  may  in 
his  turn  despair  ,of  security  and  a  tolerable  future  for 
himself  and  proceed,  after  an  interval  for  recupera- 
tion, to  arm  and  intrigue  for  the  recovery  of  his  old 
power.  Certainly  that  will  be  the  result  unless  in 
the  meanwhile  the  world  moves  from  the  idea  of 
force  to  the  idea  of  conference.  A  settlement  which, 
by  numerous  annexations  and  the  violent  destruction 
of  ancient  institutions  like  the  Dual  Monarchy,  left 
on  the  mind  of  this  generation  and  the  next  the 
impression  that  armed  force  is  a  tremendous  instru- 
ment for  the  achievement  of  political  change  might 
not  be  the  best  preparation  for  an  era  of  peace.  The 
impression  which  we  presumably  wish  to  produce  in 
the  German  mind  is  that  aggression  does  not  pay. 
The  German  mind  may  not  draw  that  conclusion,  for 

8  97 


98  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

it  has  been  fighting  in  what  it  took  to  be  a  defensive 
war.  The  facts  might  suggest  a  different  moral — 
that  to  be  very  rich,  to  have  a  supreme  Navy,  to 
gather  many  allies  round  oneself  emphatically  does 
pay.  Permeated  with  the  idea  of  power,  the  German 
mind  works  under  the  influence  of  the  belief  that  in 
this  world  a  people  must  be  either  hammer  or  anvil. 
To  make  Germany  the  anvil  to  our  hammer  would 
not  disprove  this  reading  of  life.  On  the  contrary, 
it  would  confirm  it.  The  hope  of  the  future  depends 
on  the  decay  of  such  metaphors.  We  must  root  up 
the  assumption  that  Europe  is  necessarily  a  smithy. 
Our  present  ambition  is  to  hammer  such  Thor's 
strokes  on  the  passive  anvil  of  the  defeated  German 
body  as  never  yet  were  struck  in  this  world,  and 
then  to  lock  the  smithy  door  for  ever.  But  could 
we  reckon  on  keeping  the  key? 

Even  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  no  alternative 
to  the  policy  of  seeking  a  temporary  security  by 
weakening  the  enemy  in  the  settlement,  it  is  well 
to  make  clear  to  ourselves  that  our  original  schemes 
for  the  solution  of  the  European  problems  of  nation- 
ality had  other  aims  than  that  disinterested  purpose. 
We  knew  very  well  before  the  war  that  autocratic 
Russia  presented  problems  of  nationality  as  numerous 
as  those  of  the  Central  Empires,  and  more  productive 
of  individual  misery.  No  race  in  Central  Europe, 
though  many  of  them  suffered  grievous  wrongs,  was 
in  the  case  of  the  Russian  Jews,  to  whom  the  law 
denied  the  riglht  to  choose  their  residence  freely, 
to  use  the  national  schools  on  the  same  terms  as 
Christians,  and  to  enter  the  professions,  the  Civil 
Service  and  the  commissioned  ranks  of  the  army. 
No  race  in  Central  Europe  suffered  a  degree  of 
repression  comparable  to  that  which  the  "  Little 
Russians  "  (Ukrainians  or  Russian  Ruthenians)  en- 
dured, who  might  not  even  use  their  own  distinctive 
language  for  the  publication  of  a  book  of  fairy- 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY  99 

tales  for  children.  Nor  was  there  in  Central  Europe 
a  parallel  to  the  systematic  persecution  of  alien  or 
heterodox  creeds,  which  still  survived  in  Russia. 
If  we  shut  our  eyes  to  these  facts,  it  was  because 
our  aim  during  the  war  was  not  so  much  the  im- 
partial furtherance  of  tolerance  and  liberty,  as  the 
weakening  of  the  enemy.  In  the  midst  of  the  war 
an  event  has  occurred  which  dwarfs  the  war  itself 
by  its  immense  and  beneficent  promise.  No  change 
which  the  war  may  bring  about  can  equal  the  con- 
tribution of  the  Russian  Revolution  to  the  democratic 
progress  of  Europe.  It  is  no  "  little  nationality  " 
which  has  been  liberated,  but  the  greatest  population 
of  our  Continent.  Russia  has  been  annexed  to 
Western  Civilization,  and  has  done  for  herself  by 
one  energetic  upheaval,  what  the  rest  of  us  did  in 
the  slow  centuries  that  lay  between  the  Renaissance 
and  the  French  Revolution.  Without  this  event  a 
League  of  Nations  must  have  lacked  something  in 
its  moral  and  intellectual  harmony.  It  might  have 
been  a  League  of  Governments,  united  to  keep  the 
peace.  It  could  not  have  been  in  its  full  extent  a 
League  of  Peoples,  united  by  common  ideals  and 
liberties.  The  Revolution  has  at  one  stroke  removed 
from  our  minds  the  paralysing  knowledge  that  the 
worst  oppressor  of  subject  races  was  our  partner. 

How  in  detail  Russia  will  solve  her  bewildering! 
problem  of  nationalities  we  do  not  yet  know.  The 
degrading  system  of  inequalities  and  privileges  is 
already  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  Jews  are  free. 
The  Poles  are  assured  of  independence.  Finland 
enjoys  her  autonomy  once  more.  Letts,  Lithuanians, 
Ukrainians,  and  the  peoples  of  the  Caucasus  know 
that  their  languages  and  their  religions  are  now  as 
secure  as  their  political  rights.  The  danger,  indeed, 
is  that  the  momentary  weakness  of  the  Central 
Government,  acting  on  the  bitter  memories  of  the 
past,  has  encouraged  a  separatist  movement,  especi- 


ioo  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

ally  in  Finland  and  the  Ukraine.  The  centralized 
Empire  of  the  Tsars  has  been  dissolved,  and  the 
free  association  of  the  peoples  who  suffered  within 
it,  must  be  built  up  anew  by  statesmanship  under 
the  pressure  of  common  needs.  It  is  certain  that  a 
free  Russia  can  survive  only  as  a  federal  Republic, 
which  will  include  within  itself  several  communities 
enjoying  a  distinct  national  life  of  their  own. 

The  consequences  of  the  Russian  Revolution  will 
not  be  confined  to  Russia.  The  subtraction,  tem- 
porary or  permanent,  of  ^Russia's  power  from  the 
effective  striking  powers  of  the  Entente  has 
diminished  the  prospect  of  achieving  those  violent 
territorial  changes  in  Central  Europe  which  a  section 
of  our  public  opinion  desired.  Russia  is  no  longer 
willing,  even  if  she  were  able,  to  fight  for  the 
dismemberment  of  Austria- Hungary.  She  has  re- 
nounced Panslavism,  but  her  Revolution  promises 
to  effect  much  more  for  the  Austrian  Slavs  than  all 
her-  efforts  in  the  field.  It  has  in  the  first  place 
perceptibly  weakened  the  tie  which  bound  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy  to  Berlin.  Austria-Hungary  was 
fatally  bound  to  lean  on  Germany  as  an  ally,  only 
because  she  dreaded  the  hostile  assaults  and  the  dis- 
integrating manoeuvres  of  Panslavism.  That  danger 
is  gone,  and  Vienna  is  no  longer  bound  in  the  same 
degree  by  the  imperious  need  of  safety,  to  sub- 
ordinate her  whole  policy  to  German  inspiration. 
When  in  1905  Russia  made  her  first  abortive  move- 
ment towards  freedom,  the  reaction  in  Austria  was 
instantaneous  :  the  old  Emperor  conceded  manhood 
suffrage.  The  influence  of  the  successful  Revolution 
is  even  more  evident.  The  youngi  Emperor  Karl 
has  dismissed  the  men  who  made  the  war,  restored 
the  Parliament  of  Austria,  insisted  on  franchise 
reform  in  Hungary,  and  in  a  manifesto  which  had 
the  ring  of  sincerity,  has  proclaimed  his  belief  in 
"  democracy,"  and  his  resolve  to  make  Austria  a 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          101 

community  of  "  equally  privilege!,  rations'.*''  -The 
future  is  obscure,  and  no  prophet  would  dare  to 
predict  the  victory  of  these  new  moral  forces,  save 
after  a  difficult,  and  it  may  be  lengthy,  conflict, 
over  the  traditions  of  reaction,  the  fanaticism  of  all 
the  races,  both  oppressed  and  oppressors,  and  the 
entrenched  obstinacy  of  the  Magyars.  The  Russian 
Revolution,  none  the  less,  has  transformed  the  whole 
European  problem  of  nationality.  It  may  even  help 
us,  stirred  by  a  sense  of  shame,  to  hasten  the  solution 
of  the  Irish  question.  Nor  has  it  been  without  effect 
in  Germany.  Everywhere  the  example  of  Free 
Russia  is  achieving  what  the  arms  of  the  Autocracy 
could  never  have  brought  about.  It  is  liberalizing 
Europe.  The  case  for  a  violent  settlement  grows 
weaker  :  the  hope  of  a  real  change  in  men's  minds 
grows  brighter. 

ANTI -NATIONAL  CLAIMS. 

The  disentangling  of  motives  is  an  uncomfort- 
able exercise.  The  importance  of  it  in  this  instance 
is  that  if  we  deliberately  adopt  the  weakening  of 
the  enemy  by  annexations  and  dismemberment  as 
our  aim,  it  may  lead  us  in  some  important  instances 
to  solutions  which  gravely  infringe  the  principle 
of  nationality.  We  need  not  dwell  on  extravagances 
which,  have  been  advocated  only  in  a  part  of  the  Allied 
Press.  The  official  programme  involves,  however, 
some  serious  departures  from  the  principle  of  nation- 
ality. The  Russian  claim  to  Constantinople  was  one 
of  them,  the  French  designs  on  the  Left  Bank  of  the 
Rhine  are  another.  The  Italian  programme  aims 
primarily  at  securing  the  control,  for  strategical 
and  commercial  reasons,  of  both  shores  of  the 
Adriatic.  The  object  is  to  bring  about  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  Austrian  flag  from  the  waters 
of  the  Mediterranean,  and  more  especially  to  make 


102  A  -LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  Italian  Navy,  irrespective  of  its  quality,  supreme 
beyond  challenge  and  rivalry  in  the  Adriatic. 
Whether  even  from  the  narrow  strategical  £tand- 
point  this  is  a  wise  scheme  is  primarily  a  question 
for  the  Italians  themselves.  They  might  be  secure 
at  sea,  but  they  would  be  subject  on  land  to  the 
resentment  and  ultimately  to  the  military  pressure 
of  all  the  races — Germans,  Magyars,  and  Slavs — 
whom  they  were  excluding  from  the  sea.  Security 
at  sea  seems  a  doubtful  gain  at  the  cost  of  these 
new  perils  on  land.  One  may  doubt  whether  even 
an  arrangement  to  make  Trieste  and  Fiume  into 
free  ports  for  the  use  of  Central  Europe  would 
reconcile  these  people  to  the  loss  of  the  sea.  This 
Italian  strategical  claim  involves  a  flat  denial  of 
nationality.  The  Trentino  is,  of  course,  a  purely 
Italian  district,  and  there  can  be  no  objection  to  its 
union  with  Italy.  But  while  the  towns  of  Trieste  and 
Fiume  are  peopled  by  a  majority  of  Italians,  as  also 
are  parts  of  the  peninsula  of  Istria,  their  hinterland 
and  the  whole  province  of  Dalmatia  is  overwhelm- 
ingly Slav  (Slovene,  Croat,  and  Serb).1  Dalmatia 
contains  less  than  4  per  cent,  of  Italians,  yet  Italy 
claims  all  its  northern  half.  The  Slovene  popu- 
lation predominates  even  in  the  suburbs  of  Trieste, 
and  in  all  the  rural  districts  east  of  the  Isonzo. 
While  this  Italian  claim  is  questionable  as  strategy, 
and  egoistic  as  economics,  it  also  involves  a  gross 
overriding  of  national  rights. 

Farther  south  a  new  problem  arises  over  Albania. 
Italy  claims  the  port  of  Vallona.  The  Serbs  and 
Montenegrins  demand  Scutari,  Durazzo,  and  the 
whole  northern  half  of  the  country,  and  the  Greeks 
the  whole  southern  half.  The-  national  rights  of 
the  Albanians  were  stoutly  defended  in  1912  by 
Sir  Edward  Grey.  Backward  as  they  are  in  civi- 

1  See  Dr.  Seton-Watson,   "  The  Balkans,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic  " 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          103 

lization  and  politically  immature,  they  have  some 
qualities  which  other  Balkan  races  lack — a  sense 
of  honour,  truth,  and  personal  dignity  ;  they  often 
develop  high  intellectual  and  administrative  capacity 
so  soon  as  they  are  removed  from  the  depressing 
conditions  of  their  native  land,  and  there  is  no 
people  of  the  peninsula  which  wins  the  regard  of 
Europeans  who  have  lived  among  them  so  readily. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  they  live  on  several 
distinct  levels  of  civilization.  The  northern  moun- 
taineer clans  are  what  our  Scottish  Highlanders  in 
the  remoter  regions  were  hi  the  days  of  the  Stuarts, 
but  even  they  require  only  opportunity  to  become 
civilized  Europeans.  The  southern  Albanians 
(Tosks),  both  Moslems  and  Christians,  are  in  no 
respect  inferior  in  enlightenment  to  Greeks  or  Slavs 
reared  in  provincial  conditions.  Large  numbers 
of  them  have  lived  in  America,  where  they  retain 
their  nationality,  hoping  always  to  return  to  their 
Fatherland.  The  Albanian  race  was  slow  in 
acquiring  a  sense  of  its  political  identity,  but  in 
the  last  generation  many  devoted  men  laboured 
against  the  persecution  of  the  Turkish  State  and 
the  Greek  Church  to  reduce  their  peculiar  language 
(a  distinct  Indo-European  speech,  rather  nearer  to 
Latin  than  to  Greek)  to  writing,  and  to  spread  the 
use  of  it  as  a  vehicle  of  education.  They  may  not 
yet  be  ripe  for  independence,  without  a  preliminary 
period  of  foreign  guidance  and  education,  but  to 
deny  their  nationality  for  ever  by  partitioning  their 
'  country  among  Serbs,  Greeks,  and  Italians  would 
be  a  cruel  and  unworthy  sentence.  The  Serbs,  in 
particular,  are  their  hereditary  enemies  :  no  Balkan 
people  can  be  trusted  to  respect  the  language, 
religion,  landed  property,  and  political  rights  of 
another.  Albania,  as  defined  by  the  London  Con- 
ference of  1912,  was  already  a  remnant,  which 
had  lost  large  districts,  both  in  Epirus  and  in  Kos- 


.104  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

sovo,  peopled  by  a  majority  of  Albanians.  It  ought 
not  to  be  diminished  further.1  If  it  is  difficult  to 
restore  the  Albanian  Principality,  Italy  might  be 
named  as  its  protector  for  a  term  of  (say  twenty) 
years.  She  would  be  a  tolerant  mistress,  and  the 
only  risk  in  this  arrangement  would  be  that  she 
might  attempt  to  plant  colonies  of  her  own  people 
in  Albania— an  unjustifiable  course  in  a  poor  country 
whose  native  population  is  forced  to  emigrate  in 
great  numbers.  If  this  concession  were  made  to 
Italy  in  Albania,  she  might  be  the  less  reluctant 
to  abandon  her  claim  to  Dalmatia. 

It  is,  moreover,  only  the  principle  of  weakening 
the  enemy  (in  this  case  Bulgaria),  and  not  respect 
for  nationality,  which  could  prompt  the  Allies  to 
reconquer  Macedonia  for  the  Serbs.  In  the  autumn 
of  1915  the  Bulgarians  occupied  some  districts  to 
which  they  have  no  just  claim,  but  the  greater  part 
of  the  country  is  not  Serbian  by  race  or  language, 
and  it  is  emphatically,  even  fanatically,  Bulgarian 
by  allegiance  and  choice.  It  will  be  said,  and 
said  truly,  that  Bulgaria  has  deserved  no  considera- 
tion from  the  Allies.  Undoubtedly  a  heavy 
account  may  be  laid  at  King  Ferdinand's  door,  for 
he  shared  the  blame  with  the  military  parties  of 
Serbia  and  Greece  for  the  fratricidal  second  Balkan 
war.  Allied  opinion  is,  however,  too  ready  to  forget 
that  the  war  of  1913  broke  out  because  the  Serbs 
refused  to  give  effect  to  the  treaty  of  partition, 
which  assigned  the  greater  part  of  Macedonia  to 
the  Bulgars.  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that 

1  The  Greek  claim  to  Northern  Epirus  and  the  town  of  Koritsa 
(to  which  German}^  has  given  her  sanction)  has  no  sound  basis  in 
ethnography.  The  people  of  this  district  (which  I  have  visited)  are 
Albanians  by  race,  and  Albanian  is  their  home  language.  Among  the 
Orthodox  Christians  there  is  undoubtedly  a  large  pro-Greek  party. 
It  cannot  be  the  majority.  The  nationalist  Christians  and  the  Moslems 
together  outnumber  it. 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          105 

Russian  military  governors  and  diplomatists  were  at 
great    pains,    after    the    liberation    of    Bulgaria,    to 
obliterate  the  claim  of  gratitude  which  their  armies 
had     won       These    agents     of     Tsarist    policy    ex- 
pected that  a  liberated  Bulgaria  would  be  a  vassal 
dependency  of  the  Russian  Empire,  and  when  they 
realized  that  Bulgaria  meant  to  be  independent,  they 
acted  too  often  on  the  maxim  that  in  that  case  they 
would  prefer  that   she   should   be  small  and   weak. 
But  the  people  whom  we  have  to  consider  are  not 
primarily  the   Bulgarians   but  the   Macedonians.      It 
may    be    said    that    Bulgaria    is    "  ungrateful,"    and 
King     Ferdinand     an     "  adventurer  "  ;     does     that 
obliterate    the    national    claim    of    this    Macedonian 
population  ?      One  might  as  well  say  that  the  folly 
of   Louis    Napoleon   extinguished   the   rights  of   the 
people   of   Alsace-Lorraine.      I   will   not  attempt   to 
add    another    page    to    the    extensive    controversial 
literature    which    deals    with    the    ethnography   and 
history    of    Macedonia.       I    will    merely   record    my 
personal    testimony,    based    on    many    months   spent 
in  intimate  contact  with  the  peasantry  of  Monastir 
and  Ochrida  as  the  agent  of  a  British  Relief  Fund, 
after  their  rebellion  in   1903,  and  on  three  visits  to 
Macedonia  at  other  times.      These  peasants,  whose 
language    and    education    is    Bulgarian,    felt   them- 
selves  to   be   Bulgars,    and   there   was    no   suffering 
from    which    they    would    have    shrunk    to    become 
citizens  of  Bulgaria.      Many   of  their   villages   were 
prosperous,    and,    judged    by     Balkan    levels,     well 
educated.       Illiteracy    is    far    less    common   than    in 
Roumania    or    in    Serbia.      The    secondary   schools 
gave  a  fair  modern  education,  especially  in  natural 
science,    and   through   the   teaching   of  the   Russian 
language    opened    an    avenue    to    a    great    contem- 
porary   literature.  ,   These    young    students    eagerly 
read  any  books   of   Tolstoy   or   Tourguenieff   which 
they    could    obtain.       I    beg    the   reader   to    realize 


106  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

that  this  is  not  an  abject  or  degraded  population 
(save,  indeed,  in  villages  which  lived  directly  under 
Turkish  landlords).  It  thought  and  read  and  specu- 
lated, and  it  had  its  own  sharply  defined  ideals, 
which  it  expressed  in  ballads  and  songs.  Some 
writers  have  maintained  that  the  Bulgarian  aspira- 
tions of  this  Macedonian  population  were  imposed 
on  them  by  the  revolutionary  bands.  I  knew  some- 
thing of  the  structure  of  that  organization,  and  was 
in  a  position  to  hear  the  genuine  local  view  of  it. 
It  did  terrorize,  and  it  did  contain  some  grossly 
criminal  elements.  But  on  the  whole  idealism  and 
patriotism  predominated  in  it,  and  most  of  the 
peasants  looked  up  to  it  with  pride,  loyalty,  and 
hope.  It  did  not  create  their  Bui  gar  patriotism  : 
it  grew  out  of  it.  The  alternative  to  a  Bulgarian 
Macedonia  is  a  restoration  of  Serbian  rule.  The 
Serbs,  who  occupied  the  country  in  the  winter 
of  1912  and  held  it  till  the  winter  of  1915,  did 
nothing  to  win  the  regard  of  its  Bulgar  inhabitants. 
Their  rule  was  based  on  the  denial  of  all  political 
and  some  civil  rights,  under  a  peculiarly  drastic 
form  of  martial  law,  and  it  aimed,  by  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  Bulgarian  Church,  schools,  and  language, 
at  a  forcible  denationalization  of  the  people.1  The 
Serbian  tenure  of  this  country  cannot  claim  the 
prestige  of  long -established  fact.  It  had  lasted 
for  barely  three  years.  The  Entente,  moreover, 
in  its  offers  to  Bulgaria,  admitted  the  truth  about 
the  nationality  of  Macedonia  :  on  that  it  cannot 


1  For  a  full  description  of  the  misery  of  Macedonia  in  1913  see  the 
Report  of  the  Carnegie  Commission  (of  which  I  was  a  member). 
The  Report,  based  on  inquiries  on  the  spot,  is  signed,  among  others, 
by  Professor  Paul  Miliukoff,  the  leader  of  the  Liberals  in  the  Russian 
Duma,  and  by  M.  Justin  Godart,  a  member  of  the  present  French 
Ministry.  For  fuller  details  about  Macedonia  and  Albania  I  may 
refer  to  my  "  Macedonia  "  (Methuen,  1905),  or  for  a  brief  account  to 
"  The  War  and  the  Balkans  "  by  Noel  and  Charles  Buxton. 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          107 

honestly  go  back.  The  past  teaches  two  lessons. 
One  of  them  is  that  there  is  small  hope  of  happi- 
ness for  these  Macedonian  Bui  gars  under  alien  rule. 
The  other  is  that  there  is  little  prospect  of  tran- 
quillity in  the  Balkans  while  its  frontiers  violate 
nationality. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The  principle  of  weakening  the  Central  Empires 
and  their  Eastern  allies  coincides  only  partially  and 
by  chance  with  the  dictates  of  the  principle  of 
nationality.  It  ignored  half  the  problem,  and  in 
some  grave  instances  it  promises  to  lead  to  an 
iniquitous  violation  of  nationality.  It  has  other 
inconveniences.  The  maximum  Allied  programme 
contemplated  the  dismemberment  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  Its  more  consistent  exponents  allow  the 
union  of  the  German  provinces  of  Austria  with  the 
German  Empire.  Western  Galicia  was  to  be  re- 
united, together  with  German  Posen,  to  a  more 
or  less  autonomous  Poland  under  Russian  rule,  and 
Eastern  Galicia  to  be  merged  in  Russia  proper. 
Bohemia  and  a  diminished  Hungary  become  inde- 
pendent kingdoms.  To  remedy  the  strategic  isola- 
tion of  land-locked  Bohemia  it  is  proposed  by  no 
less  an  authority  than, Professor  Miliukoff,  to  connect 
it  with  an  Adriatic  port,  by  means  of  a  "  corridor," 
100  kilometres  broad  by  200  long,  which  is  to  be 
cut  through  territory  inhabited  at  present  solely  by 
German  Austrians.  Transylvania  with  its  large 
Magyar  and  German  minority,  the  Banat  (largely 
Serbian)  and  a  part  of  Bulgaria  axe  to  be 
annexed  to  Roumania.  The  Trentino  and  the 
Adriatic  coast  (including  much  Slav  country)  are 
Italy's  share.  The  rest  of  the  South  Slav  lands 
are  to  be  united  to  Serbia.  It  is  easy  to  draft 
such  a  programme  on  the  map,  though  there  are 


loS  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

some  competing  claims  to  satisfy.  But  a  young 
State  asks  for  something  more  than  frontiers.  It 
wants  internal  harmony,  external  peace,  and  some 
outlet  for  its  trade.  Conceive  the  case  of  Bohemia. 
Without  a  port,  wedged  between  two  vast  military 
Powers,  it  must  somehow  so  arrange  its  tariffs 
and  its  alliances  that  it  could  live  and  trade.  Lean- 
ing on  Russia  for  military  protection,  it  must  adopt 
the  Paris  Resolutions  and  join  in  the  trade  war 
against  Germany.  The  result  might  be  beggary. 
Hungary  would  be  in  a  still  worse  case,  for  it  is 
racially  isolated.  It  is  easy  to  denounce  Austria- 
Hungary  as  a  "  ramshackle  Empire  "  and  to  call 
for  its  dismemberment,  but  the  more  one  contem- 
plates the  strange  fact  of  the  union  of  these  many 
races  in  one  political  unit,  the  more  one  is 
driven  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  solid  and 
natural  reason  for  their  combination.  The  reason 
is  geographical  and  economic.  This  big  conti- 
nental region  is  ill-provided  with  ports.  For  ocean 
traffic  there  are  only  Trieste  and  Fiume,  and  for 
local  traffic  the  Danube.  National  independence 
is  a  spiritual  luxury,  but  access  to  the  sea  is  an 
economic  necessity.  The  ultimate  reason  for  the 
existence  and  survival  of  Austria-Hungary  prob- 
ably was  that,  whatever  were  its  political  demerits, 
it  was  an  economic  system  which  enabled  its  mingled 
races  to  trade  freely  over  its  rivers,  railways,  and 
roads,  and  preserved  for  Germans,  Magyars,  and 
Slavs  alike  the  common  use  of  Trieste  and  Fiume. 
The  abler  advocates  of  the  policy  of  dismember- 
ment realize  the  difficulty  which  confronts  them. 
Mr.  Toynbee,  after  destroying  an  Empire  which 
took  some  blood  and  brains  in  the  making,  pro- 
ceeds to  create  a  new  Austria,  composed  on  an 
original  recipe.  He  calls  it  a  Balkan  Confedera- 
tion, and  it  is  to  include  a  diminished  Hungary, 
an  enlarged  Roumania,  a  great  Serbia,  with  Bulgaria, 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          109 

Albania,  and  Greece .  It  is  to  be  based  on  a  customs 
union,  and  to  evolve  towards  a  defensive  alliance. 
The  United  States  of  Europe  is  a  less  Utopian 
idea.  Soaked  with  their  mutual  blood,  poisoned 
by  accumulated  hatreds,  each  busy  in  the  task  of 
oppressing  conquered  fragments  of  the  others*  popu- 
lation, these  States,  on  their  primitive  level  of  morals 
and  culture,  will  forgive  the  past  less  easily  than 
France  and  Germany.  Britain  and  Germany  will 
fall  more  readily  upon  each  other's  necks.  More- 
over, if  Italy  takes  Trieste  and  Fiume,  and  Russia 
Constantinople,  the  motive  and  incentive  to  union 
is  gone,  for  the  Balkan  States  can  no  longer  share 
these  ports.  Austria -Hungary  has  the  merit  of 
existing.  One  cannot  make  a  substitute  at  will. 
The  "  independence  "  promised  to  these  little  nations 
would  be  at  best  illusory.  These  little  States  would 
be  *  forced,  as  they  always  have  been,  to  oscillate 
between  the  German  and  Russian  systems.  Nothing 
would  be  changed  in  principle,  and  independence 
would  still  be  for  them  an  unattainable  ideal,  though 
their  fate  would  now  depend  more  on  Russia  and 
less  on  Germany.  And  what  of  their  internal 
harmony?  Most  of  these  national  States  would 
include  an  "  Ulster."  There  is  in  Bohemia  a 
German  minority  which  amounts  to  35  per  cent,  of 
the  population  (the  Irish  Ulster  is  only  a  quarter 
of  the  whole),  and  it  has  the  superiority  in  wealth 
and  education.  In  the  whole  province  of  Posen, 
part  of  which  must  be  restored  to  Poland,  if  its 
three  sundered  fragments  are  to  be  reunited,  the 
Germans  form  a  considerable  minority.  A  just 
and  skilful  redrawing  of  frontiers  might  somewhat 
reduce  the  numbers  of  the  German  (minority  in 
the  case  of  Bohemia  and  Posen.  But  if  Roumania 
is  to  expand  at  the  expense  of  Austria -Hungary, 
there  is  no  means  of  avoiding  the  subjection  of  a 
high  percentage  of  Magyars  and  Germans  to  foreign 


Iio  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

rule.  If  Transylvania  alone  were  annexed  to 
Roumania,  the  proportion  of  Roumanians  in  the 
new  province  would  stand  as  high  as  55  per  cent. 
But  King  Ferdinand's  proclamation  lays  claim  to 
a  much  wider  area,  bounded  by  •'•*  the  line  of  the 
Theiss."  There  is  no  conceivable  justification  for 
this  claim,  unless  it  be  that  the  River  Theiss  was 
the  boundary  of  Roman  Dacia.  So  far  as  I  can 
ascertain  from  a  careful  study  of  the  statistics,  there 
are  barely  40  per  cent,  of  Roumanians  in  this 
large  area.  Three  of  the  counties  on  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  Theiss,  which  it  is  apparently  pro- 
posed to  include,  contain  98  or  99  per  cent,  of 
Magyars.1  This  is  an  anti -national  claim,  and  the 
destinies  of  any  alien  population  in  Roumania  must 
be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  fate  which  has 
befallen  the  Jews  of  Roumania,  who  are  denied 
citizenship  and  forbidden  to  own  land,  but  are  none 
the  less  conscripted  in  the  army,  and  of  the  Bulgar 
farmers  of  the  recently  annexed  Dobrudja,  who  have 
endured,  not  merely  the  suppression  of  their  national 
churches  and  schools  but  in  many  cases  the  loss 
of  their  lands.  A  secret  treaty,  moreover,  assigned 
to  Roumania  a  large  slice  of  Bulgaria  including 
the  port  of  Varna.  The  negotiations  with  Roumania 
were  left  apparently  to  Russia,  and  she  may  have 
allowed  Roumania  to  make  excessive  claims  at  the 
expense  of  Magyars,  Germans,  and  Bulgars,  because 
she  herself  refused  to  surrender  the  Roumanian 
province  of  Bessarabia.  The  drawing  of  frontiers, 
in  short,  is  the  least  part  of  the  solution  of  the 
problem  of  nationality.  The  language  difficulty, 
for  example,  in  Bohemia  would  only  have  entered 
on  a  new  phase,  and  what  would  happen  when  the 

1  The  statistics  for  the  Theiss  area  can  be  given  only  approximately. 
The  Hungarian  census  figures  are  given  by  counties,  but  since  the 
Theiss  cuts  two  of  these  counties  in  half,  one  can  only  guess  from  the 
map  how  much  of  the  population  lies  on  either  side  of  the  river. 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          1 1 1 

Czech  majority  conscribed  the  German  youth  to 
serve  in  an  army  which  would  fight  (if  it  ever  had 
to  fight)  against  Germany,  and  obliged  the  German 
manufacturers  to  boycott  German  trade?  Each  of 
these  little  States  would  reproduce  in  little  the 
hatreds  and  confusions  of  Europe.  Our  continental 
strife  would  simmer  within  them  as  a  provincial 
civil  war.  There  might  be  migrations  of  minorities 
fleeing  from  the  new  conditions,  as  there  were  in 
the  Balkans  in  1913,  but  a  tough  rearguard  would 
remain  (as,  on  the  whole,  the  Bulgars  remained 
in  Serbian  Macedonia),  hoping  for  the  next  war 
and  redress.  The  dismemberment  of  Austria  would 
not  conjure  racial  strife.  It  xvould  alter  nothing 
fundamentally,  save  the  balance  of  military  power. 
Tolerance  alone  can  solve  these  problems  of 
nationality,  and  the  principle  of  weakening  the 
enemy  and  keeping  him  weak  cannot  make  for 
tolerance.  In  these  expedients  there  is  no  promise 
of  a  happier  Europe. 

These  problems  of  nationality  move  in  a  vicious 
circle.  Europe  will  never  have  peace  as  a  con- 
tinent so  long  as  racial  strife  distracts  certain  mixed 
_a_reas  within  it,  and  scatters  its  contagion  beyond 
their  frontiers  to  the  greater  masses  of  the  kindred 
races  which  live  outside  them.  That  is  the  half 
of  the  truth  on  which  we  have  all  been  dwelling 
during  the  war.  It  is  equally  true,  however,  that 
racial  peace  is  impossible  within  these  areas  so  long 
as  the  antagonism  between  the  greater  masses  con- 
tinues. One  may  say  that  Teutons  and  Slavs 
as  a  whole  will  never  be  at  peace  while  Germans 
and  Czechs  are  at  each  other's  throats  in  Bohemia. 
But  it  is  just  as  true  to  say  that  Germans  and 
Czechs  will  go  on  struggling  in  Bohemia  so  long 
as  Teutons  and  Slavs,  organized  as  Great  Powers 
with  their  centres  at  Berlin  and  Petrograd,  con- 
front each  other  with  their  armaments  and  their 


H2  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

rivalries  in  world  policy.  The  local  cause  of  strife 
and  the  general  cause  act  and  react  on  each  other 
with  alternate  stimulation.  Slavs  and  Teutons  might 
have  lived  at  peace  if  they  had  not  happened  to 
dovetail  and  penetrate  geographically  into  each 
other.  Czechs  and  Germans  might  have  found  a 
modus  vivendi  long  ago  in  Bohemia  if  neither  of 
them  had  been  influenced  by  the  larger  rivalry, 
outside  them.  This  vicious  circle  could  best  be 
seen  in  all  its  elementary  simplicity  in  Turkey  under 
the  old  regime.  The  Balkan  States  were  never 
at  peace  with  each  other  or  with  Turkey,  because 
they  were  a  sounding-board  for  the  local  strife  in 
Macedonia.  The  local  strife  in  Macedonia  never 
came  to  a  pause,  partly  because  the  Balkan  States 
pulled  the  strings,  and  partly  because  the  local  races 
looked  to  them  for  support.  The  practical  con- 
clusion is  as  easy  to  state  as  it  is  difficult  to  realize. 
Peace  in  Europe  cannot  be  achieved  merely  by  a 
settlement  of  the  national  problems — the  various 
"  Ulsters  "  stand  in  the  way.  Nor  can  the  national 
problems  be  solved  so  long  as  there  is  the  strife 
of  "  Powers  "  in  Europe.  It  would  be  cjuite  easy, 
if  our  victory  were  sufficiently  complete,  to  make 
the  German  element  the  "  under -dog  "  in  all  these 
mixed  areas — Alsace,  Bohemia,  Posen,  and  Transyl- 
vania— but  the  consequence  would  only  be  a  new 
phase  of  the  dual  struggle,  *  the  local  strife  of  the 
races,  and  the  continental  strife  of  the  Powers.  Our 
problem,  in  short,  cannot  be  solved  merely  by 
annexations  and  redistributions  of  territory,  and  it 
might  by  these  means  be  aggravated.  If  our  dream 
is  durable  peace,  we  must  somehow  contrive  both 
to  reconcile  the  Powers  and  to  compose  the  strife 
of  the  races.  We  come  back,  therefore,  from  this 
summary  survey  of  the  question  of  nationality  to 
the  other  question  of  the  League  of  Peace.  If 
we  mean  to  settle  nationality,  the  principle  of 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY         113 

weakening  the  enemy  is  no  help  :  it  may  even  be 
a  hindrance  to  our  best  intentions.  The  tolerance, 
the  easing  of  the  hostile  tension  which  will  enable 
majority  and  minority  to  live  together  in  mixed 
areas,  will  hardly  be  attained  until  the  two  stocks 
to  which  they  belong,  organized  as  •*•'•  Powers,"  have 
eliminated  force  from  their  relationship.  If  pur 
aim  is  a  general  conciliation,  it  follows  that  the 
settlement  of  nationality  must  be  fitted  into  the 
framework  of  a  League  of  Peace.  Some  methods 
and  schemes  of  settlement  which  might  seem  natural 
and  almost  inevitable,  if  we  could  solve  the  question 
of  nationality  without  regard  to  the  future  relations  of 
the  Powers,  may  seem  questionable  when  we  realize 
that  these  mixed  areas  in  their  tranquillity  or  strife 
are  likely  to  reflect  the  general  condition  of  Europe. 
The  plan  of  settling  questions  of  nationality  by 
the  trenchant  methods  of  cession  and  annexation 
has  its  attraction.  It  sounds  final  :  it  seems  to 
make  clean  work.  We  have  seen,  however, .  that 
in  the  mixed  areas  there  is  no  possibility  of  clean 
work.  There  will  always  be  a  minority,  often  a 
considerable  minority,  for  whose  rights  some  pro- 
vision must  be  made.  In  some  degree  every  thinker, 
however  ardent  his  nationalism,  who  really  faces  this 
difficulty,  is  obliged  to  have  recourse  at  some  stage 
to  internationalism.  There  must  be  some  system 
of  guarantees  and  safeguards  by  which  an  inter- 
national organization  of  Europe  will  watch  lover 
the  rights  of  these  minorities.  That  is  to  say, 
however  complete  our  victory,  however  free  iour 
redrawing  of  the  map  of  Europe  may  be,  we  must 
still,  even  for  this  limited  problem  of  nationality, 
have  recourse  to  some  Concert  or  League  of 
Peace.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  "some  Concert." 
It  must  be  an  organization  much  more  vigilant  and 
effective  than  existed  in  the  past.  The  old  Concert 
was  liberal  with  its  stipulations,  and  they  remained 

9 


U4  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

dead  letters.  How  often  was  Turkey  enjoined  to 
introduce  autonomy  of  one  sort  or  another  in  Crete 
or  Macedonia  !  A  classical  instance  of  futility  is 
the  international  guarantee  of  the  rights  of  the 
Roumanian  Jews,  which  has  always  been  "  a  scrap 
of  paper."  Admittedly  we  need  such  safeguards, 
but  to  enforce  them  we  must  have  a  much  stronger 
and  more  harmonious  international  organization.  A 
reflection  and  a  query  follow  at  this  point.  If  we 
must,  even  for  the  sake  of  nationality,  bring  and 
keep  the  Powers  together  in  a  working  Concert 
or  League,  it  is  plain  that  we  must  avoid  in  the 
settlement  those  forceful  solutions  which  would  tend 
to  keep  them  apart.  The  query  is  this  :  If  in  any 
case  we  must  trust  to  a  Concert  to  protect; minorities, 
is  anything  gained  by  the  creation  of  many  new 
independent  States,  each  of  which  must  be,  to  some 
extent,  supervised  ?  The  two  points  tend  to  one 
concrete  question,  and  that  is,  whether  we  should 
really  do  better  for  nationality  and  peace  by  "  break- 
ing up  "  Austria -Hungary,  provided  we  could  secure 
its  reorganization  on  a  federal  basis.  One  need 
not  here  attempt  to  sketch  the  reconstruction  in 
detail.  The  chief  offenders  are  the  Magyars,  and 
the  main  point  to  secure  is  that  the  Croats,  Serbs, 
Slovacks,  and  Roumanians,  who  at  present  suffer 
from  their  tyranny,  should  manage  their  own  affairs, 
subject  only  to  the  Hapsburg  crown  and  a  Federal 
Parliament.  How  large  and  how  numerous  the 
units  should  be,  need  not  concern  us  here  :  there 
is  much  to  be  said  for  large  groupings — of  Czechs 
.with  Slovacks  in  the  north,  and  of  all  the  Serbo- 
Croats  in  the  south.  The  advantage  of  a  federal 
solution  is  that  it  would  throw  upon  the  central 
Government  and  Parliament  in  the  first  place  the 
duty  of  watching  over  the  interests  of  minorities. 
Vienna  would  see  that  the  Czechs  did  not  oppress 
the  Germans  in  Bohemia,  and  Budapest  would  be 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          115 

vigilant  for  the  Magyars  in  Transylvania.  One 
need  hardly  pause  to  point  out  that  such  a  solution 
would  abbreviate  the  war  immeasurably.  To  dis- 
member Austria  one  must  first  have  occupied  it, 
from  Prague  to  Semlin  and  from  Lemberg  to 
Trieste.  But  to  procure  from  the  Emperor  a 
solemn  declaration  made  to  Europe  of  his  inten- 
tion to  introduce  a  federal  Constitution  without 
delay  would  be  comparatively  easy.  In  Austria,  but 
not  yet  in  Hungary,  the  official  study  of  such  a 
Constitution  has  already  begun.  The  difference 
might  be  measured  in  millions  of  casualties,  and 
enough  has  been  said  to  suggest  that  the  easier 
solution  is  in  many  respects  the  better  solution. 
It  is  better  because  it  spares  us  some  nearly 
insoluble  problems — of  defence,  communications, 
tariffs,  and  national  rights.  It  is  better,  also,  because 
the  annihilation  of  Austria  would  mean  a  dictated 
as  opposed  to  a  negotiated  peace.  From  negotia- 
tion, from  conciliation,  from  an  adjustment  of 
interests  and  claims,  a  permanent  system  of  con- 
ference, a  League  of  Peace,  might  arise.  From 
war  to  the  bitter  end,  and  a  peace  based  only  on 
triumphant  force,  the  transition  to  conference  would 
demand  a  miracle.  The  League  of  Peace  might 
never  be  called  upon  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
concerns  of  a  Federal  Austria.  It  would  do  so 
only  in  the  last  resort  and  with  reluctance.  But 
if  the  settlement  on  which  the  League  is  based, 
includes  as  one  of  its  terms  this  declaration  to 
create  a  Federation,  it  clearly  would  be  within  the 
competence  of  the  League  to  interfere,  if  the 
declaration  were  not  carried  into  effect.  Some  right 
of  interference  in  such  extreme  cases  the  League 
must  reserve  to  itself.  Absolute  sovereignty  means 
irremediable  anarchy.  A  guarded  right  of  inter- 
ference, where  there  is  gross  and  clamant  wrong,  is 
the  civilized  alternative  to  war. 


1 1 6  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

The  problem  of  Austria- Hungary  is  so  compli- 
cated, that  even  after  the  principle  of  its  survival 
with  a  federal  constitution  has  been  accepted,  we 
are  still  confronted  by  pleas  for  the  exceptional  treat- 
ment of  certain  races.  Even  if  these  races,  it  will 
be  said,  are  assured  of  tolerant  treatment  within 
a  Federal  Austria,  the  fact  remains  that  they  desire 
to  be  united  to  the  greater  kindred  masses  outside 
it.  The  Poles,  Italians,  Roumanians,  Ruthenians 
and  South  Slavs  are  in  this  case.  The  Polish 
question  is  discussed  in  the  following  pages.  Trite 
Roumanian  claim  seems  to  me  the  weakest  of  these 
five,  because  (i)  their  majority  in  Transylvania  is 
only  a  bare  55  per  cent.,  (2)  the  Magyar  and 
German  minority  cannot  be  excluded  by  any  possible 
geographical  re -arrangement,  and  (3)  Roumania  it- 
self is  politically  and  socially  so  far  from  being  a 
model  State,  that  the  gain  from  transference  to  the 
Roumanians  is  doubtful.  Against  the  cession  of  the 
Italian  Trentino  to  Italy  there  are  no  strong  argu- 
ments, except  the  apparent  military  difficulty  at  the 
moment  of  imposing  it.  The  Ruthenians,  who  would 
undoubtedly  have  preferred  Austrian  to  Russian  rule 
before  the  Revolution,  may  possibly  now  desire  to 
join  an  autonomous  Ukrainian  ("  Little  Russian  ") 
State  within  a  federal  Russian  Republic. 

Two  solutions  of  the  South  Slav  question  would 
be  durable  and  satisfactory,  either  ( I )  the  creation 
of  a  wholly  independent  Serbo-Croat -Slovene  King- 
dom, uniting  the  entire  race,  or  (2)  the  inclusion  of 
the  whole  race,  not  excepting  the  people  of  the 
Serbian  and  Montenegrin  Kingdoms,  in  a  fully 
autonomous  "  trialist  "  South  Slav  State  under  the 
Hapsburg  Crown.  We  cannot  achieve  the  former 
solution  without  an  immense  prolongation  of  thq 
war  and  the  active  aid  of  Russia.  From  the  latter 
solution  we  are  debarred  by  a  sense  of  honour. 
iWe  should  be  perjured  and  disgraced,  if  we  made 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY         117, 

peace  without  restoring  Serbia  to  her  independence. 
This  claim  is  a  first  debt  upon  us,  like  that  of 
Belgium.  Honour  points  in  one  direction,  the 
interests  of  peace  and  of  the  whole  Serb  race  iii 
another.  For  if  the  Serb  race  is  divided  between 
Vienna  and  Belgrade,  it  is  doubtful  whether  either 
centre  will  acquiesce  permanently  in  an  unnatural 
partition.  Moreover,  the  people  of  the  much  more 
primitive  and  oriental  Belgrade  Kingdom  will  lose 
the  stimulus  of  contact  with  the  much  more  advanced 
and  occidental  Croats.  Here  is  a  possible  solution  : 
We  must  restore  the  Serbian  Kingdom  and  arrange 
for  the  reparation  of  the  damage  it  has  suffered. 
It  must  cede  the  *••  uncontested  zone  "  of  Macedonia 
to  Bulgaria.  By  way  of  compensation  it  must 
acquire  a  free  outlet  for  its  trade  in  an  Adriatic  port, 
and  free  railway  communication  with  it.  Thei 
simplest  way  of  attaining  this  end  would  be  ( i ) 
by  the  union  in  a  single  kingdom  or  close  federation 
of  Serbia  with  Montenegro,  and  (2)  by  the  cession  by 
Austria  of  the  narrow  strip  of  Montenegrin  coast, 
which  belongs  to  Austria  ;  Spizza  in  this  strip  is  a 
possible  port.  This  done,  let  us  say  to  the  Serbians, 
"  Our  debt  of  honour  is  now  discharged.  We  will 
see  that  this  treaty  is  rigidly  observed,  but  only  on 
condition  that  you  renounce  irredentism,  and  become 
a  good  neighbour  to  Austria."  On  these  terms  it 
is  possible  that  the  Serbs  might  prefer  some  form 
of  union  with  Austria  to  perpetual  isolation.  It 
might  even  be  agreed  that  within  some  stipulated 
term  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  a  referendum 
or  constituent  assembly  of  the  Serbs  of  the  Kingdom 
shall  freely  decide  on  any  offer  of  union  which! 
Austria  might  make  to  them. 

THE  POLISH  QUESTION.  . 

It  is  not  the  least  auspicious  consequence  of  the 
Russian    Revolution    that    it    has    relieved    us    from 


.118  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

the  duty  of  insisting  that  the  Independence  of  Poland 
must  be  restored.  The  Poles  have  suffered  in  this 
war,  from  the  alternate  devastations  of  both  sides, 
more  grievously  than  any  other  race,  and  starvation 
has  left  them  wondering  how  many  of  their  children 
will  survive  to  enjoy  the  brighter  future.  None 
the  less,  alone  of  all  the  races  which  entered  this 
war  submerged,  they  are  assured  by  both  sides  of 
liberation  at  its  end,  whatever  its  military  issue 
may  be.  The  long  historic  complicity  of  Russia 
and  Prussia  in  their  suppression  has  been  violently 
terminated,  and  nothing  can  now  prevent  their 
restoration  to  the  status  of  a  sovereign  people.  What 
is  at  issue  is  whether  this  restoration  shall  come 
about  on  the  niggardly  German,  or  the  generous 
Russian  scale.  The  Russian  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, with  a  dramatic  and  chivalrous  gesture,  has 
proclaimed  not  merely  the  independence,  but  thje 
reunion  of  the  Polish  people.  It  is  a  great  ideal, 
but  unless  the  will  of  the  Russian  people  should 
change,  and  with  it  the  whole  military  balance  on 
the  Eastern  Front,  we  must  assume  that  Russia  is 
not  disposed  to  prolong  the  war  in  order  to  realize 
it.  The  answer  of  the  Poles  themselves  must  be 
weighed  in  this  connection.  In  its  reply  to  the 
proclamation  of  the  Russian  Provisional  Government, 
the  Polish  Provisional  Council  rejected  its  invitation 
to  fight  for  the  full  restoration  of  a  United  Poland. 
Deliberating  in  Warsaw  with  the  German  armies 
in  overwhelming  force  around  it,  it  could  give  no 
other  answer.  Tnere  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
it  spoke  its  mind  with  sincerity,  when  it  went  on 
to  add  to  its  rejection  of  the  Russian  summons 
to  arms,  the  comment,  "It  is  not  a  long  war,  but 
peace  which  the  European  peoples,  who  are  bleeding 
from  their  wounds,  ardently  desire."  The  powerful 
Polish  Socialist  Party  issued  at  the  same  time  a 
still  more  emphatic  declaration,  in  which  it  implored 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          119 

the  peoples  of  Europe  not  to  prolong,  the  war  in 
order  to  complete  the  liberation  of  the  Poles.  In 
the  Austrian  Reichsrath,  it  was  the  Polish  "  Club  " 
which  took  the  initiative,  on  its  reassembly  in  May 
1917,  in  tabling  the  strongest  possible  resolution 
in  favour  of  an  immediate  peace.  Statements  made 
by  any  people  living  under  alien  military  rule  are 
subject  to  a  liberal  process  of  interpretation.  If 
the  Poles  of  Warsaw  and  Galicia  wished  the  war 
to  continue  until  Germany  is  defeated,  they  mani- 
festly could  not  say  so.  They  could,  however,  keep 
silence,  and  at  least  refrain  from  such  appeals  as 
these.  When  we  read  the  statement  of  American 
relief  agents,  that  as  a  result  of  the  Russian  and 
German  devastations  and  of  the  Allied  blockade, 
few  children  under  the  age  of  seven  are  left  alive 
in  certain  Polish  districts,  it  is  easy  to  believe  that 
the  Poles  prefer  an  early  peace  to  the  certainty, 
of  further  sufferings,  qualified  only  by  the 
problematical  chance  of  recovering  Posen. 

None  the  less  the  disadvantages  of  the  German 
scheme  for  Poland  are  not  to  be  lightly  dismissed. 
It  means  the  perpetuation  of  the  dismemberment 
of  this  race.  One  may  doubt  whether  there  can 
be  lasting  peace  in  Eastern  Europe  while  this  in- 
justice continues.  The  Galician  Poles  will  enjoy, 
indeed,  full  self-government  under  Austria,  and  the 
Prussian  Poles  are  promised  the  lightening  of  their 
heavy  burden.  But  the  instinct  for  reunion  will 
survive,  and  it  may  destroy  the  hope  of  harmony 
around  and  even  within  the  Polish  State.  A  sort 
of  compensation  is  suggested  to  Poland  :  she  may 
conceivably  secure  Lithuania.  The  satisfaction  of 
that  Imperialist  claim  would,  however,  injure  her 
future  relations  with  Russia,  and  it  would  burden 
her  own  prospects  with  a  difficult  internal  problem 
of  nationality.  The  gravest  disadvantage  of  all, 
is  that  whereas  the  Russian  Proclamation  promised 


120  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

that  a  Polish  Constituent  Assembly  should  freely, 
decide  the  form  of  the  future  Polish  State,  the 
German  proclamation  limited  the  choice  of  the  Poles, 
by  stipulating  that  Poland  shall  be  an  hereditary 
monarchy.  That  might  matter  little,  if  the  Poles 
were  free  to  choose  their  King,  but  it  is  probable 
that  Berlin  and  Vienna  intend  to  impose  upon  them 
as  their  sovereign  a  German  prince  or  an  Austrian 
archduke.  Behind  that  intention  stands  the  purpose 
to  make  the  Polish  Kingdom  a  subordinate  ally  or 
satellite  of  the  Central  Powers.  Its  German- 
or  Austrian  King  will  ensure  that  its  military, 
diplomatic,  and  commercial  policy  shall  be  subordi- 
nated to  the  interests  and  will  of  Berlin.  Independ- 
ence it  may  enjoy,  in  the  sense  that  it  will  be  free, 
as  it  has  not  for  a  century  been  free,  to  develop 
its  own  culture,  and  to  conduct  its  own  internal 
affairs,  but  in  all  its  dealings  with  the  outer  world 
it  will  obey  a  will  more  powerful  than  its  own. 

It  is  easy  to  state  the  ideal  alternative  to  this 
narrow  German  scheme.  We  should  wish  to  see 
Poland  not  only  independent,  but  reunited.  She 
should  be  free  to  choose  for  herself  her  own  form 
of  government,  whether  monarchy  or  republic.  She 
must,  by  the  guaranteed  use  of  Danzig  as  a  free 
port  and  of  the  waterway  of  the  Vistula,  acquire 
unhampered  economic  and  commercial  liberty.  She 
must  be  free  to  conduct  her  own  foreign  and  military 
policy  at  her  own  discretion,  to  ally  herself  with 
whom  she  pleases,  or  to  maintain  a  proud  isolation. 
That  is  independence,  and  nothing  less  than  this  is 
independence.  Let  us  ask  ourselves  honestly  whether 
this  is  what  we  really  intend,  and  whether  it  be  a 
practicable  ideal.  It  is  not  what  the  Russian  Pro- 
visional Government  intended.  In  its  historic  mani- 
festo (March  30,  1917)  it  revealed  its  expectations 
clearly.  "  Bound  to  Russia  by  a  free  military  union, 
the  Polish  State  will  be  a  solid  rampart  against 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY         121 

the  pressure  of  the  Central  Powers  against  the  Slav 
nations."  This  can  only  mean  that  Russia  stipulates, 
or  at  least  expects,  that  the  Polish  State  will  become 
its  military  ally.  The  modern  military  alliance  tends 
to  an  ever-increasing  intimacy.  It  cannot  be  merely, 
a  promise  to  fight  in  certain  eventualities.  The 
danger  must  be  warded  off  by  diplomatic  policy, 
military  preparations  and  economic  organization.  No 
more  as  the  ally  of  Russia  than  as  the  satellite 
of  Germany,  could  Poland  act  in  her  foreign  policy 
entirely  by  her  own  initiative.  Her  safety  would 
depend  on  Russian  protection,  and  she  would  have 
to  accommodate  her  policy  to  Russian  interests.  Her 
finance  would  depend  on  Paris,  London,  and  New 
York.  Her  tariffs  and  her  commercial  policy  would 
be  governed  by  the  Paris  Resolutions.  However 
much  she  might  wish  to  live  at  peace  with  her 
German  neighbours,  to  trade  with  them,  or  to  deal 
with  their  banks,  she  would  have  to  follow  the 
general  policy  of  the  Group  to  which  she  belonged, 
that  is  to  say  of  the  Group  which  at  the  end  of  the 
war  happens  to  occupy  her  territory.  Her  armies 
will  be  its  vanguard  :  her  custom-houses  will  be 
the  advanced  posts  in  its  tariff- wars.  The  Russian 
programme  is  more  liberal  and  more  generous  than 
the  German,  but  it  does  not  provide  for  the  reality 
of  Polish  independence.  Even  for  Russia  in  the 
first  fervour  of  her  revolutionary  faith,  Poland  is 
primarily  a  "  bulwark  "  against  German  pressure. 
Kant  said  that  men  ought  to  regard  each  other 
always  as  ends  and  never  as  means.  When  one 
people  thinks  of  another  as  a  "  bulwark,"  it  fails 
to  realize  this  moral  ideal.  We  must  face  the  fact 
that  the  moral  ideal  of  national  independence  is, 
in  the  full  sense,  unobtainable  under  the  armed 
peace  and  the  system  of  hostile  alliances.  Under  the 
imperious  dictates  of  safety,  we  must  all  scheme 
how  to  bend  small  nations  to  our  own  uses,  how 


122  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

to  employ  them  as  weapons  and  shields.  We  are 
compelled  to  think  in  these  military  terms.  For 
Europe  to-day  the  Polish  question  is  primarily  one 
of  bayonets.  Twenty  millions  of  Poles  mean  two 
million  bayonets  located  in  a  vital  strategical  position. 
Each  European  Group  thinks  chiefly,  and  is  bound 
to  think  chiefly,  of  the  means  by  which  it  may 
bring  these  bayonets  into  its  own  ranks. 

The  solution  of  the  problem  of  Polish  Independ- 
ence (and  for  that  matter  of  Belgian  or  Bulgarian 
independence)  depends  on  our  ability  at  the  settle- 
ment to  move  beyond  this  phase  of  military  calcu- 
lation. Under  the  system  of  the  Balance  of  Power 
and  allied  groups,  the  independence  of  small  States 
can  only  be  nominal.  It  will  be  real,  when  we 
have  substituted  conference  for  force,  and  co-opera- 
tion for  strife.  An  independent  Poland  is  possible 
only  within  a  League  of  Nations.  She  must  be 
free  to  look  to  east  and  to  west,  and  to  answer 
any  overtures  for  an  alliance,  with  the  bold  reply, 
"  My  obligations  are  to  all  my  fellow -members  of 
the  League.  My  armed  forces  are  at  the  disposal 
of  the  League  alone.  They  will  defend  impartially, 
my  eastern  or  my  western  neighbour,  if  either  of 
them  is  threatened  by  a  lawless  aggressor.  I 
expect  in  return  that  not  only  my  neighbours,  but 
also  distant  America  and  insular  Britain  will  rally 
to  my  support  if  my  liberties  should  be  threatened." 
The  small  State  which  is  to  enjoy  liberty  must  live 
in  a  world  organized  for  peace. 

When  we  turn  to  the  practical  consideration,  how 
rrruch  we  may  be  able  to  achieve  at  the  settlement 
to  ensure  the  reality  of  Polish  Independence,  the 
answer  must  clearly  be,  that  if  we  have  to  economize 
our  bargaining  power,  it  is  more  important  to  secure 
effective  independence  for  the  majority  of  the  Polish 
race,  than  to  insist  at  all  costs  on  reunion.  With  a 
League  of  Nations  once  firmly  created,  no  problem 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          123 

is  finally  closed,  and  a  secure  peace  may  bring  more 
rapidly  and  easily  than  we  imagine,  the  solution  of 
some  questions  which  war  has  left  unsettled.  Above 
all,  we  must  make  our  League.  We  must  place 
Poland  as  a  free  and  equal  member  within  it.  Our 
chief  insistence  should  be  that  the  Poles  shall  freely 
choose  their  own  form  of  government.  They  must 
have  their  free  port  at  Danzig.  It  may  be  that  our 
bargaining  power  will  not  extend  so  far  that  we  can 
insist  on  the  reunion  of  Posen  and  Galicia  with  the 
"  Congress-Kingdom  "  (Russian  Poland),  but  the 
League  will  exist  as  a  court  of  appeal,  if  Prussia 
should  fail  to  carry  out  her  own  promises  towards 
her  own  Poles.  A  compromise  on  these  lines  does 
not  imply  that  the  Poles  need  despair  of  their 
eventual  reunion.  On  the  contrary,  the  effect  of  the 
breaking  down  of  military  and  economic  chauvinism 
under  the  slow  intellectual  influence  of  a  League 
of  Nations,  must  be  to  diminish  the  resistance  to 
their  reunion.  As  militarism  declines  and  com- 
mercial liberty  advances,  the  grounds  of  resistance 
to  territorial  change  must  be  sensibly  weakened.  A 
generation  of  peace  may  bring  the  mental  change 
which  will  render  easy  the  solution  of  this  and 
similar  questions.1 

1  Though  it  conflicts  with  the  argument  of  these  pages,  it  is  well  to 
bear  in  inind,  as  a  possibility,  the  "  Austrian  "  solution  of  the  Polish 
question.  This  is  that  Russian  Poland  should  be  united  with  Galicia, 
to  form  a  third  kingdom,  equal  in  status  with  Austria  and  Hungary, 
under  the  Hapsburg  crown.  This  "personal  union"  would  not 
interfere  with  the  effective  internal  independence  of  the  Poles.  It 
would,  moreover,  partly  solve  the  question  of  re-union.  Unfortunately 
Germany,  before  consenting  to  this  relatively  good  solution,  would 
try  to  annex  a  large  northern  strip  of  Russian  Poland.  The  con- 
sequences to  the  Czechs,  who  would  thus  be  in  a  permanent  minority 
as  against  the  Germans  in  the  Austrian  Reichsrath,  would  also  be 
serious.  But  Bohemia  (with  Slovakia)  might  be  made  into  a  fourth 
kingdom  under  the  Hapsburgs.  If  this  "Austrian"  solution  of  the 
Polish  question  were  adopted,  other  territorial  changes  at  the  expense 
of  the  Hapsburgs  for  the  benefit  of  the  Italians,  Ruthenian?,  and  South 
Slavs  might  be  regarded  as  compensations. 


124  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

ALSACE  AND  THE  PLEBISCITE. 

The  most  obstinate  of  all  these  European  ques- 
tions of  nationality  remains,  in  Alsace-Lorraine. 
It  is  a  small  question  when  we  measure  it 
by  the  numbers  of  the  population  affected.  The 
"  lost  provinces  "  have  only  two  million  inhabi- 
tants, while  there  are  twenty  million  Poles, 
thirty  million  Ukrainians,  and  twelve  million  South' 
Slavs.  But  as  so  often  happens,  economics 
complicate  nationality.  Lorraine  is  the  richest 
source  of  iron-ore  in  Western  Europe,  and 
German  industry,  if  it  were  deprived  of  it  by 
cession,  and  cut  off  from  it  by  such  a  monopoly 
of  raw  materials  as  the  Paris  Resolutions  prescribe, 
would  find  its  production  seriously  hampered.  Iron 
and  steel  are  to  any  modern  people,  but  especially 
to  the  Germans,  as  indispensable  as  corn,  and  the 
two  proposals  taken  together — the  annexation  of 
the  Reichsland  and  the  economic  boycott — are 
a  tremendous  threat  to  German  prosperity.  The 
Paris  Resolutions  have  in  this  particular  enormously 
complicated  the  solution  of  the  European  problem 
of  nationality.  If  the  cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
involved  only  a  political  change  it  would  be  suffi- 
ciently difficult.  But  while  the  Paris  Programme 
stands  as  the  declared  policy  of  the  Entente,  every 
proposal  to  alter  frontiers  in  the  interests  of 
nationality  may  also  conceal  a  menace  of  economic 
disturbance  which  must  double  the  resistance  to 
any  transfer.  That  is  true  of  the  restoration  of 
German  Silesia  to  a  reconstituted  Poland,  but 
it  applies  especially  to  Alsace-Lorraine.  In  these 
provinces  Germans  have  sunk  their  capital  ;  local 
trade  has  linked  itself  by  the  close  German  organiza- 
tion of  syndicates  and  cartels  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Empire  ;  buying  and  selling  have  settled 
into  well-worn  channels  ;  the  cotton  mills  of  Upper 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          125 

Alsace  have  a  large  place  in  the  economy  of 
German  industry,  the  Saar  coal-field  and  the  Alsatian 
potash  beds  are  important,  but  above  all,  German 
industry  has  become  dependent  on  the  iron-ore  of 
Lorraine,  which  supplies  three-fourths  of  the  iron 
got  in  Germany.1  If  there  were  to  be  Free  Trade 
after  the  war  between  France  and  Germany,  the 
re-drawing  of  the  frontier  need  involve  little 
economic  disturbance.  Even  if  the  usual  system 
of  the  free  export  and  import  of  raw  materials 
which  has  hitherto  been  the  general  rule  among 
modern  States  were  to  prevail,  then,  in  spite  even 
of  a  high  tariff  on  manufactures,  the  Germans  could 
still  draw  their  iron-ore  from  Lorraine  in  time  of 
peace — as,  indeed,  they  used  to  draw  large  supplies 
before  the  war  from  the  French  part  of  this  big 
iron-field.  They  would  lose  it,  indeed,  in  time  of 
war,  but  that  restriction  might  be  a  guarantee  of 
peace.  Indeed,  the  more  they  are  dependent  ori 
foreign  supplies  of  essential  things,  the  less  likely 
are  they  to  go  to  war.  But  the  clause  in  the 
Paris  Programme  which  prescribes  a  monopoly  in 
"  natural  resources  "  for  the  benefit  of  Allies  means 
that  Germany  could  not  reckon,  if  she  surrendered 
Lorraine,  on  access  to  its  mineral  wealth.  By 
this  proposal  the  Entente  has  ensured  the 
maximum  resistance  of  Germany  to  its  more  ideal- 
istic programme,  and  if  a  moment  should  come 
when  she  might  be  willing  to  do  full  justice  to 
nationality,  she  would  still  be  compelled  to  resist 
us  to  save  the  future  of  her  industry.  Indeed,  as 
the  war  goes  on,  and  both  sides  betray  in  their 
controversial  publications  their  passionate  interest  in 
the  minerals  of  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  one  begins  to 
suspect  that  the  issue  of  nationality  is  altogether 
secondary  to  the  economic  conflict.  It  is  the 

1  See  a  paper  by  Professor  Gregory  on  "  Geology  and  Strategy," 
Contemporary  Review,  December  1915. 


126  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

ambition  of  the  German  industrialists,  for  whom 
the  notorious  Six  Economic  Unions  speak,  to 
acquire  the  whole  of  the  Lorraine  iron-field., 
together  with  the  coal-fields  of  Belgium.  They 
even  propose  to  expropriate  the  French  and  Belgian 
owners,  compensating  them  for  the  loss  of  their 
property  with  the  proceeds  of  an  indemnity  to 
be  imposed  on  France.  The  French  extremists, 
reckoning  that  they  can  lame  Germany  for  ever  by 
recovering  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  adding  to  them 
broad  districts  with  a  purely  German  history  and 
population,  are  no  whit  behind  them.  The  mineral 
riches  of  the  Saar  valley  have  tempted  them  to 
propose  the  annexation  to  France  of  districts  which 
were  not  French  before  1870.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  secret  treaty  concluded  early  in  1917 
between  President  Poincare  and  the  ex-Tsar,  in- 
cluded as  one  of  its  provisions  the  wrenching  from 
Germany  of  the  Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine,  in  order 
to  form,  against  the  will  of  its  purely  German  popu- 
lation, some  species  of  autonomous  buffer  State, 
which  would  serve  as  a  strategical  barrier  for 
Belgium  and  France.  The  explanation  of  the 
furious  assaults  on  Verdun  may  well  have  been 
that  Verdun  and  Metz  are  the  two  strategical 
keys  to  the  Lorraine  iron-field,  which  the  German 
extremists  were  bent  on  holding.  For  these  sordid 
gains  is  human  blood  poured  out.  Once  more,  we 
must  face  the  fact  that  the  problems  of  nationality 
cannot  be  solved  in  isolation.  If  we  dream  of 
any  League  of  Peace,  we  must  drop  this  Paris 
Programme  ;  in  the  act  of  dropping  it  we  shall 
have  made  a  fair  settlement  of  the  question  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  incomparably  easier. 

Even  without  this  economic  complication  the 
question  would  still  be  inordinately  difficult.  It 
has  held  so  long  the  central  place  in  European 
politics,  it  has  so  concentrated  the  passion  of  the 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          127 

French  and  the  stubbornness  of  the  Germans,  that 
it  has  become,  above  all  others  in  the  world,  a 
question  of  honour.  A  question  of  honour  may, 
be  defined  as  one  which  men  will  not  solve  by 
reason.  It  awaits  the  hand  of  force,  and  even 
when  it  slumbers  in  the  interludes  of  peace  it 
leads  to  the  accumulation  of  force.  The  transfer  of 
Alsace,  if  it  takes  place  without  a  plebiscite  and 
compensations,  will  mean  the  unqualified  victory  of 
France  and  the  unqualified  defeat  of  Germany. 
That  to  many  readers  will  seem  to  be  the  best  of 
all  reasons  for  insisting  on  it,  though  it  should 
mean  the  slaughter  of  more  men  than  there  are 
people  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  But  unluckily  the 
question  is  not  so  simple  as  our  wishes.  In  the 
first  place  the  French  feeling  about  the  provinces 
involves  something  more  than  the  sense  that  their 
inhabitants  have  been  wronged  :  a  leading  element 
in  it  was  always  the  natural  human  wish  to  w;ipe 
out  the  military  reverses  of  1870  which  so  deeply 
wounded  French  pride.  If  the  annexation  is 
reversed,  as  it  was  carried  out,  by  a  simple  applica- 
tion of  the  rights  of  the  stronger,  we  must  expect 
that  the  Germans  in  their  turn  will  suffer  from  the 
elementary  desire  for  their  "  revenge." 

A  mature  nation  of  grown-up  men  and  women 
might  in  time  live  down  such  boyish  emotions, 
if  there  were  no  real  wrongs  to  keep  alive  the 
sense  of  humiliation.  The  French  might  possibly 
have  outgrown  the  wish  for  "  revenge,"  if  the 
Germans  had  conceded  much  earlier  than  in  fact 
they  did  (1911)  a  large  measure  of  autonomy 
to  the  Reichsland,  and  if  the  autonomy,  when  it 
came  at  length,  had  been  somewhat  more  generous. 
Their  resentment  was  kept  alive  by  petty  efforts 
to  restrict  the  use  of  the  French  language,  and 
still  more  by  an  oppressive  passport  system  imposed 
on  travellers  from  France  with  a  view  to  checking 


128  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

military  espionage.  The  Reichsland  was  treated 
as  a  conquered  country,  not  so  much  because  it 
had  been  won  by  arms,  as  because  the  French 
would  never  relinquish  their  ambition  to  reconquer 
it.  There  was  a  moment  when  the  Kaiser, 
shortly  after  his  accession,  made  his  attempt  to 
conciliate  France.  Always  that  most  dangerous 
figure  in  history,  the  impulsive  romantic,  he  was 
then  passing  through  a  phase  of  youthful  and  self- 
confident  idealism.  He  talked  peace.  He  dismissed 
Bismarck.  He  promoted  social  legislation.  He 
gave  a  new  and  most  promising  development  to 
international  institutions  by  the  Berlin  Conference 
on  the  regulation  of  the  hours  and  conditions  of 
labour.  He  did  as  much  for  colonial  Free  Trade 
in  the  Berlin  Conference  0n  the  Congo  Question, 
and  he  was  one  of  the  promoters  of  the  Brussels 
Conference  on  the  Slave  Trade.  His  ambition 
seemed  to  be  to  lead  a  European  movement  towards 
internationalism  and  peace.  In  this  mood  he  paid 
special  court  to  the  French  delegates  who  attended 
the  Berlin  Labour  Conference.  Nor  did  he  confine 
himself  to  empty  courtesies  ;  he  introduced  a  milder 
passport  regime  in  Alsace.  His  next  move  l  was 
an  attempt  to  break  down  the  French  intellectual 
boycott  of  Germany,  by  a  special  effort  to  induce 
French  artists  to  exhibit  at  the  coming  Berlin 
Exhibition.  With  this  object,  his  mother,  the 
Empress  Frederick,  went  to  Paris,  ostensibly  to  visit 
French  studios,  really,  as  the  comments  of  the 
German  press  showed,  to  promote  a  social  and 
political  reconciliation.  Paris  gave  its  answer  with 
fury  and  decision.  There  were  hostile  crowds  in 
the  streets,  angry  articles  in  the  newspapers,  and 
at  mass  meetings  of  protest  orators  declared  that 
France  refused  a  reconciliation  with  "  the  gaoler 

1  For  all  these  facts  see   Debidour,   "  Histoire    Diplomatique  de 
1'Europe,"  vol.  iii.  pp.  165-8. 


PROBLEMS    OF,    NATIONALITY          129 

of  Alsace."  So  ended  a  well-meant  effort  for 
peace,  and  like  the  headstrong  and  emotional  man 
he  is,  the  Kaiser  allowed  his  anger  so  far  to  master 
him,  that  he  again  aggravated  the  lot  of  the 
Alsatians,  and  even  (it  is  said)  talked  of  mobilizing 
his  army  against  France.  Another  episode  is  worth 
our  attention.  Russia  proposed  during  the  Boer 
War  to  bring  together  the  chief  neutral  Powers 
to  mediate,  or,  if  necessary,  to  intervene  by  force. 
The  motive  may  have  been  rather  hostility  towards 
the  British  Empire  than  a  sincere  concern  for  a  little 
nationality  struggling  to  preserve  its  independence, 
for  the  United  States  had  already  offered  friendly, 
mediation  in  vain.  The  case  is  interesting,  if  we 
can  bring  ourselves  to  regard  it  from  the  outside, 
as  an  illustration  of  the  difficulty  of  creating  a 
league  of  neutrals  to  enforce  peace.  Here  was  a 
war  in  which  neutral  opinion  was  unanimous  in 
thinking  that  right  was  with  the  weaker  side.  It 
was  none  the  less  impossible  to  bring  about  inter- 
vention, and  the  reason  was  that  the  slumbering 
question  of  the  "  lost  provinces  "  made  co-opera- 
tion between  France  and  Germany  impossible. 
When  Russia  brought  her  proposal  to  Berlin,  Prince 
Biilow  suggested  that  if  the  three  Powers  were  to 
act  together,  they  must  give  each  other  a  mutual 
guarantee  for  the  preservation  of  their  European 
possessions.  That  condition  broke  up  the  proposed 
coalition — it  may  have  been  put  forward  by  Germany 
with  that  intention — since  France  would  not  give 
an  undertaking  which  would  have  involved  the 
renunciation  of  her  claim  to  Alsace-Lorraine.1  It 
may  be  for  us  a  matter  of  profound  satisfaction 
that  in  this  instance  the  French  desire  for  the 
revanche  rendered  the  solidarity  of  European 
opinion  ineffectual.  These  two  incidents  carry, 
however,  a  larger  moral.  If  Alsace-Lorraine  should 
1  See  Reventlow,  p.  147  ;  Debidour,  iii.  264. 
IO 


130  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

again  change  rulers  by  an  act  of  force,  it  is  dismally 
probable  that  the  future  will  repeat  the  past. 
Twenty  years  hence  some  pacific  French  President, 
weary  of  armaments  and  trade  boycotts,  may  attempt 
to  court  German  friendship,  only  to  be  rebuffed 
with  the  answer  that  no  reconciliation  is  possible 
while  a  German  race  is  held  under  French  rule. 
.When  the  next  war  threatens  us,  an  attempt  to 
improvise  a  coalition  to  enforce  peace  may  founder 
on  the  refusal,  this  time  of  a  German  Government, 
to  enter  a  league  with  a  France  that  holds  Alsace. 
The  capacities  of  this  perpeiuum  mobile  of  European 
strife  will  not  be  exhausted  in  this  war,  if  the 
Power  which  retains  Alsace  holds  it  by  the  right 
of  conquest. 

One  may  be  satisfied  that  the  population  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  almost  unanimously  opposed  in 
1871  to  the  German  annexation.  Thanks  to  its 
own  stubborn  and  gallant  temper,  and  even  more 
to  the  harshness  of  Prussian  rule,  it  remained, 
though  a  generation  went  by,  loyal  in  its  affection 
to  France.  But  Germans  will  repeat  that  85  per 
cent,  of  the  population  is  German  by  language 
and  race.  They  will  say  that  it  was  an  integral 
part  of  the  old  German  Empire,  until  the  conquests 
of  Louis  XIV  united  it  to  France.  They  will 
point  out  that  since  1870  there  has  been  a  consider- 
able immigration  of  Germans  into  these  provinces. 
They  may  say — and  there  is  a  good  deal  of  evidence, 
French,1  English,  and  Alsatian,  as  well  as  German, 
to  back  the  statement — that  the  younger  generation 
in  Alsace  on  the  eve  of  this  war  had  ceased  to 
desire  a  violent  solution,  that  it  accepted  annexation 
as  an  accomplished  fact,  and  asked  only  for  a  fuller 
measure  of  autonomy  and  an  equal  status  as  a 
member  of  the  German  Federal  Empire.  A  declara- 

1  See  especially-  Marcel  Sembat,  "  Faites  un  Roi,  sinon  faites  la 
Paix."     M.  Sembat  was  a  member  of  the  first  French  War-Cabinet. 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY         131 

tion  to  this  effect  was  addressed  a  few  months  before 
the  outbreak  of  this  war  by  the  Socialist  deputies 
of  the  Diet  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  French  people, 
and  to  this  declaration  other  Alsatian  parties  gave 
their  adherence.  There  is  another  fact  which  points 
in  the  same  direction.  The  first  elections  for  the 
German  Reichstag  which  were  held  in  1873  in 
Alsace-Lorraine,  resulted  in  the  return  by  all  its 
fifteen  constituencies  of  deputies  who  belonged  to 
the  uncompromising  Party  of  Protest.  For  a 
generation  this  party  kept  its  ascendancy,  refusing 
with  a  determination  that  recalls  the  Sinn  Fein  atti- 
tude, to  take  any  real  share  in  the  political  life  of 
Germany.  It  gradually  dwindled,  until  in  the  elec- 
tion of  1907  the  original  fifteen  had  dropped  to  two. 
The  younger  generation  had  found  mere  protest 
barren,  and  began  to  take  its  place  in  the  ranks 
of  one  German  party  or  another,  especially  in  those 
of  Social  Democracy.  Such  facts  as  these  may 
mean  only  that  Alsace  had  ceased  as  a  matter  of 
expediency  to  reckon  on  any  solution  of  her  question 
more  trenchant  than  full  autonomy  :  they  do  not 
authorize  us  to  conclude  that  autonomy  was  her  ideal. 
They  do,  however,  suggest  that  we  must  not  assume 
without  proof  that  because  the  fathers  protested 
against  annexation  in  1870,  the  sons  and  the  grand- 
sons demand  "  dis-annexation  "  in  1917.  As  a 
matter  of  political  principle,  no  democrat  can  sub- 
scribe to  the  view  which  M.  Ribot  has  put  bluntly, 
that  Alsace  is  the  "  property  "  of  France.  Alsace 
is,  or  ought  to  be,  the  property  of  the  Alsatians, 
who  must  be  free  to  dispose  of  themselves,  what- 
ever their  real  wish  may  be.  To  proclaim  the 
rights  of  property  as  the  key  to  the  problem  of 
nationality,  would  make  short  work  of  most  of  the 
claims  which  have  won  our  sympathy.  Even  in 
this  instance  the  German  Empire  has  the  older  legal 
claim,  while  the  Hapsburgs  can  show  a  perfect  title, 


132  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

by  all  the  laws  of  property,  to  the  Trentino.  Even 
Bosnia  on  this  principle  would  belong  not  to  the 
young  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  but  to  Turkey.  Theory 
apart,  the  simple  re-annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  France  will  cause  her  grave  embarrassments,  if 
she  is  ever  in  a  position  to  bring  it  about  without 
first  testing  the  will  of  its  people.  She  will  find 
that  a  large  part  of  the  working-class  population 
of  Alsace  speaks  no  French.  She  may  encounter, 
some  opposition  from  the  clerical  element  in 
Catholic  Upper  Alsace,  which  may  not  rally  willingly 
to  a  secular  Republic.  The  manufacturing  districts 
may  regret  the  change,  if  they  experience  a 
serious  disturbance  to  their  trade.  Exceptional 
measures  to  prevent  espionage  may  be  necessary 
against  German  travellers,  and  against  residents  of 
German  sympathies.  All  this,  added  to  the 
rancour  which  commonly  follows  defeat,  may 
prevent  Germans  from  writing  off  the  two  provinces 
as  a  final  loss,  and  they  in  turn  may  cherish  a 
sentiment  which  will  be  as  deadly  when  it  is  called 
Rache  as  it  was  when  we  knew  it  as  revanche. 

Is  political  wisdom  impotent  in  the  face  of  such 
a  situation  as  this  ?  It  is  only  because  Europe, 
influenced  by  the  spectacle  of  Prussian  success,  has 
itself  fallen  under  the  empire  of  Prussian  ideas  that 
the  solution  of  a  plebiscite  seems  difficult  or 
visionary.  Yet  one  may  say  of  it,  without  exaggera- 
tion, that  in  the  restless  and  eventful  decade  which 
preceded  the  final  triumph  of  Bismarck's  statecraft, 
it  was  the  accepted  method  for  effecting  transfers 
of  territory.  Louis  Napoleon  submitted  to  its  test 
before  he  finally  annexed  Savoy  to  France.  Italy, 
as  she  grew,  followed  the  same  principle.  There 
is,  however,  an  even  more  instructive  precedent. 
After  the  Austro -Prussian  War,  which  settled  the 
fate  of  Schleswig-Holstein  by  annexing  it  to  Prussia, 
Austria  proposed  and  Prussia  accepted  the  condi- 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          133 

tion  that  the  Danish  minority  should  not  be  incor- 
porated in  Prussia  against  its  will.  The  stipulation 
in  the  Treaty  of  Prague  (1866)  ran  "that  the 
people  of  the  northern  districts  of  Schleswig 
shall  be  ceded  to  Denmark,,  if  by  a  free  vote  they 
manifest  a  desire  for  union  with  that  country." 
That  clause  remained  a  dead  letter,  and  Denmark 
accepted  the  accomplished  fact.  It  ought  to 
be  revived  at  the  coming  settlement.  In  those 
days  even  the  Prussian  people  did  not  yet  accept 
the  Bismarckian  theory  of  conquest.  When  at  the 
same  time  Bismarck  was  engaged  in  incorporating 
Hanover,  Frankfort,  and  other  minor  German  States 
in  the  Prussian  system,  the  Lower  House  of  the 
Prussian  Diet  replied  to  his  proposal  of  direct 
annexation,  that  *'  mere  force  alone  now  no  longer 
suffices  as  a  basis  of  national  ownership  :  no  pro- 
fessor of  international  law  recognizes  it  as  giving 
title."  l  If  our  aim,  when  we  speak  of  defeating 
Prussian  militarism,  really  is  to  break  the  ascendancy 
of  Prussian  ideas,  we  shall  find  no  better  means  of 
demonstrating  the  return  of  Europe  to  a  more  liberal 
tradition,  than  by  reviving  the  principle  that  no 
population  shall  be  transferred  from  one  sovereignty 
to  another,  save  with  its  own  assent  recorded  in 
a  free  vote.  The  principle  is  French  in  its  origin, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  French  Republic 
will  be  less  liberal  than  the  French  Empire.  To 
its  lasting  honour  the  French  Socialist  Party  has 
now  proclaimed  the  referendum  as  its  expedient  for 
the  solution  of  this  question.  The  German  Minority 
Socialists  have  done  the  same  thing,  thereby  re- 
storing in  spirit  the  shattered  "  International."  The 
details  of  a  referendum  are  not  easy  to  determine. 
Obviously  it  must  be  taken  under  normal  conditions 
of  peace,  without  military  pressure.  Certainly  some 

1  Seignobos,      "  Political     History    of     Contemporary      Europe " 
(English  translation),  vol.  ii.  p.  472. 


134  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

impartial  body  must  preside  over  it,  fix  the  con- 
ditions and  watch  over  their  executive.  The  French 
Socialists  suggest  The  Hague  Tribunal.  It  is  harder 
to  determine  who  ought  to  vote.  Nearly  one-third 
of  the  original  population,  if  French  figures  may  be 
trusted,  migrated  at  the  annexation,  and  as  time 
went  on,  four  hundred  thousand  followed  them,  in 
order  to  avoid  military  service  in  the  German 
Army.  Most  of  them  are  now  settled  in  France, 
many  of  them  permanently.  For  them  the  question- 
able right  is  often  claimed  to  vote  in  any  Alsatian 
plebiscite,  though  only  the  youngest  of  them  would 
be  likely  to  return.  Their  places  in  Alsace  have 
been  taken  by  immigrant  Germans.  Ought  they 
to  vote  ?  Many  of  them  have  intermarried  with 
native  Alsatians  ;  such  mixed  marriages,  according 
to  the  German  census,  are  12^-  per  cent,  of  all  the 
marriages  in  Alsace.  Many,  if  not  most,  of  these 
immigrants  are  permanent  settlers.  We  fought  our 
war  against  the  Boers  to  assert  the  right  of  the 
44  Uitlander  "  to  a  share  in  deciding  the  destinies 
of  the  country  to  which  he  had  migrated.  These 
debates  show  that  both  Frenchmen  and  Germans 
realize  that  the  issue  of  a  plebiscite  is  uncertain, 
and  may  depend  on  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  one 
class  or  another  which  has  a  real  or  sentimental 
interest  in  the  issue.  These  delicate  questions  should 
be  left  to  the  decision  of  The  Hague  Tribunal  (if 
it  is  the  impartial  presiding  authority)  after  hearing 
the  arguments  of  all  the  interested  parties.  The 
question  to  be  placed  before  the  people  of  Alsace 
should  not  be  limited  to  the  two  simpler  solutions — 
re-annexation  to  France  or  full  autonomy  in  the 
German  Empire.  There  is  a  third  alternative  :  the 
creation  of  a  neutral  "  buffer  "  State,  which  ought, 
of  course,  to  enjoy  access  to  the  markets  of  its 
neighbours,  and  might  be  allowed  to  form  (if  they 
desired  it)  a  loose  confederate  union  with  Switzer- 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY         135 

land,  Luxemburg,  Belgium,  and  Holland.  That 
solution  might  be  the  easiest  of  all,  for  it  avoids 
even  the  appearance  of  conquest.  This  "  buffer  " 
State  would  separate  the  two  traditional  enemies, 
and  might  at  the  same  time  serve  to  reconcile  them. 
If  its  trade  enjoyed  special  advantages  in  the  German 
Empire  the  economic  difficulties  of  any  violent 
laceration  would  be  avoided.  The  Francophil 
emigres  might  return  :  the  German  immigrants  need 
not  depart.  The  people  of  Alsace  have  always 
had  a  strong  sense  of  local  independence.  This 
has  increased  in  the  last  generation,  so  much  so 
that  some  able  neutral  writers,  notably  Dr.  David 
Starr  Jordan,  maintain  that  their  real  wish  is  to 
be  neither  French,  nor  German,  but  Alsatian. 
France  is  a  liberal  but  a  highly  centralized  Republic, 
and  under  her  rule  this  sentiment  of  individuality 
would  find  little  scope.  Either  of  the  extreme 
solutions  would  be  unwelcome  to  a  large  minority. 
The  middle  course  of  neutralization  might  be,  to 
the  population  as  a  whole,  the  most  acceptable  of 
all.  The  creation  of  this  neutral  State,  under  the 
guardianship  of  the  League  of  Nations  would  lay 
the  coping-stone  on  its  structure.  It  would  end 
the  most  obstinate  feud  in  Europe  by  a  change 
which  would  leave  no  sense  of  wrong  behind  it. 
If  Germany  would  herself  propose  it,  she  would 
by  this  large-minded  act  end  her  moral  isolation 
in  Europe.  She  might  conceivably  agree  to  the 
neutralization  and  independence  of  the  whole  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  in  return  for  some  concessions  in 
Equatorial  Africa,  or  to  the  cession  to  France  of 
French-speaking  Lorraine  on  the  same  condition. 
She  would  certainly  consent  to  a  solution  by 
plebiscite  (which  she  thinks  (or  affects  to  think 
that  she  would  win)  much  earlier  in  the  war  than 
she  would  face  annexation  without  conditions.  In 
that  connection  it  is  essential  to  remember  that  the 


136  A    LEAGUE    OE    NATIONS 

attitude  of  Germany  to  this  and  every  other  un- 
palatable proposal,  will  be  influenced  by  the  whole 
character  of  the  proposed  settlement.  The  loss  of 
territory,  even  with  the  qualification  of  a  plebiscite, 
will  be  resisted  to  the  bitter  end,  if  it  is  combined 
with  a  harsh  colonial  readjustment,  with  the  closing 
of  Turkey  to  German  enterprise,  and  with  a  system 
of  boycotts  and  the  economic  war.  Even  some 
loss  of  territory  may  be  accepted  as  an  evil  that 
is  still  compatible  with  a  tolerable  future  if  the 
rest  of  the  settlement,  and  especially  its  economic 
chapters,  contain  no  menace  to  the  prosperity  and 
growth  of  a  peaceful  Germany.  This  question  must 
be  solved  if  Europe  is  to  have  peace.  The 
importance  of  insisting,  here  and  elsewhere,  on  a 
plebiscite  lies  in  this,  that  it  would  make  an  end 
of  the  rule  of  unqualified  force  in  Europe.  It 
must  be  an  honest  test  of  opinion.  It  must  be  held 
in  conditions  that  allow  free  public  discussion  in 
meetings  and  in  the  Press,  and  the  vote  ought  to 
be  taken  under  the  supervision  of  neutral  commis- 
sioners. If  a  substantial  majority  declared  its  will, 
no  movement  for  a  revanche  could  thrive  either 
in  France  or  in  Germany.  The  un teachable  military 
party  might  still  cherish  hopes  of  another  war.  But 
it  is  inconceivable  that  the  mass  of  either  nation 
should  countenance  any  party  or  any  leader  of 
opinion  who  proposed  to  disturb  the  world's  peace 
in  order  to  reverse  the  declared  will  of  a  people. 

NATIONALITY  AS  CULTURE. 

Public  opinion  in  all  the  Allied  countries  has 
been  fixed  so  firmly  on  the  settlement  of  national 
problems  by  territorial  change,  that  it  may  seem 
an  arrogance  to  suggest  that  in  this  respect  war 
has  driven  us  back  upon  the  more  primitive  and 
less  civilized  solution.  Before  the  war  the  trend 
of  liberal  thinking  about  nationality  was  moving 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          137 

in  the  opposite  direction.  We  saw  the  content- 
ment of  the  Boers  in  South  Africa  and  the  French 
in  Canada  with  a  settlement  .which  respected  their 
national  identity  and  culture  within  a  tolerant 
Empire.  Austria  (as  distinct  from  Hungary)  was 
evolving,  happily,  in  the  same  way  :  her  Poles 
were  contented  and  loyal,  and  even  the  Czechs  were 
inclining  to  rally  to  her.  She  had  managed,  when 
she  conceded  manhood  suffrage,  to  introduce  an 
ingenious  expedient  which  promised  to  prevent  racial 
conflicts  in  the  working  of  representative  institu- 
tions. She  created  for  the  Reichsrath,  distinct 
electoral  units,  confined  to  one  race,  and  of  these  two 
or  more  might  co -exist  in  the  same  area.  Within 
each  of  these  the  normal  political  struggle  between 
Socialists,  Clericals,  Agrarians,  and'  Liberals  went 
on  without  the  racial  complication.  Thus  in  a 
mixed  area  Germans  and  Czechs  voted  separately, 
each  returning  their  own  member,  who  stood  for  a 
solid  racial  constituency,  though  the  races  might  be 
living  intermingled.  The  result  was  to  wean  them 
in  some  degree  from  their  barren  racial  strife,  and  to 
turn  their  minds  to  the  more  constructive  questions 
which  interested  the  whole  community.  What  is 
the  essential  element  in  nationality  ?  Or,  rather,  does 
nationality  necessarily  include  the  State  idea,  and 
require  the  sovereign  control  of  a  definite  territory 
by  a  single  race  ?  Our  answer  on  the  eve  of  the 
war  inclined^.  I  think,  to  the  view  that  on  the  [ultimate 
analysis  the  essential  thing  in  nationality  is  not 
territory  but  culture.  A  race  which  nowhere  rules 
may  none  the  less  find  in  its  Church,  its  schools, 
and  in  the  cultivation  of  its  distinctive  spirit  in 
literature  and  art  a  corporate  life  which  can  keep 
its  national  consciousness  alive.  The  typical  Western 
mind  does  not  readily  adopt  this  idea,  and  for 
races  which  do  not  control  some  fatherland 
politically — the  Jews,  Armenians,  and  Parsers,  for 


138  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

example — we  feel  a  certain  pity.  When  one  has 
had  some  experience  of  the  East,  this  Western 
association  of  nationality  with  sovereignty  comes 
to  seem  less  inevitable.  Grouped  round  their 
Churches,  the  various  Christian  races  of  Turkey 
had  no  difficulty  in  preserving  their  nationality,  and 
perhaps  because  all  the  manifold  life  of  their  com- 
munity— its  Church,  its  schools,  its  charities,  and 
(of  late  years)  its  political  party  and  its  clubs — 
was  voluntary,  it  was  really  more  interesting  and 
intense  than  that  of  a  State  organization.  The 
national  temperament  and  the  national  idea  are  ex- 
pressed richly  and  vitally  in  the  peasant  art,  the 
ballads,  even  in  the  newspapers  and  the  party 
politics  of  the  Balkan  States  ;  but  they  do  not 
really  shape  the  organization  of  the  States  them- 
selves. They  all  based  their  Constitutions  on  Western 
models.  Nationality  does  not  in  the  East  need 
the  State  for  its  expression,  and  where  it  has  the 
State  it  seems  to  fail  to  mould  it  in  its  own  like- 
ness. One  may  have  an  elaborately  organized 
society  without  the  State.  The  essential  for 
nationality  is  that  it  should  be  wholly  free  to  culti- 
vate its  own  language,  to  worship  in  a  national 
or  "  autocephalous  "  Church,  to  express  itself  with 
entire  sincerity  and  without  external  restraint  in 
literature,  journalism,  and  the  arts,  to  maintain  its 
own  tradition  in  a  complete  educational  system 
under  its  own  management,  ranging  from  the  village 
school  to  the  University,  and,  finally,  to  associate 
with  full  liberty  in  parties,  clubs,  and  in  literary, 
commercial,  co-operative,  or  charitable  societies.  If 
it  has  all  this,  if  its  schools  receive  their  fair  share 
of  any  national  grant,  if  it  is  subject  to  no  legal 
disabilities  and  inequalities,  its  destinies  are  in  its 
own  hands,  its  culture  is  secure,  its  soul  is  its  own. 
With  this  minimum  even  a  highly  conscious 
nationality  may  lead  a  tolerable  existence.  It  is 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          139 

no  longer  "  an  oppressed  nationality,"  and  while  it 
may  regret,  and  we  may  regret  for  it,  that  it  lacks 
the  outward  symbols  and  power  of  nationhood,  the 
conditions  which  deny  it  these  good  things  may 
not  be  the  intolerance  of  other  peoples,  but  the 
confused  ethnography  and  the  difficult  geography 
of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  If  it  should  be 
able  to  acquire  autonomy  or  national  independence, 
it  would  presently  discover  that  its  new  status  made 
it  no  easier  than  before  to  solve  the  real  political 
problems  which  confront  every  modern  community 
—land  tenure  in  an  agricultural  State,  the  relations 
of  labour  and  capital  in  an  industrial  State — while 
it  brought  new  burdens  and  perplexities  over  arma- 
ments, tariffs,  and  communications. 

These  are  one-sided  reflections.  They  do  not 
alter  the  fact  that  on  the  whole  every  distinct 
European  race  does  desire  national  independence. 
But  this  line  of  thought  does  suggest  that  where 
we  would  not  or  dare  not  or  cannot  insist  on  terri- 
torial autonomy  or  independence,  there  is  a  certain 
minimum  standard  to  which  all  the  members  of 
a  League  of  Nations  will  be  expected  to  conform. 
It  will  be,  in  a  sense,  a  League  of  mutual  insurance, 
and,  to  use  a  homely  metaphor,  it  ought  not  in 
prudence  to  insure  any  rotten  or  inflammable 
structure.  It  has  the  right  to  insist  on  this  mini- 
mum, not  so  much  because  abstract  political  doctrine 
requires  it,  as  because  the  peace  of  Europe  demands 
it.  It  seems  indispensable  that  the  Powers  should 
adopt  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  or  in  the  Constitution 
of  the  League,  or  in  both,  some  general  declaration 
designed  to  secure  the  cultural  liberties  of  all  sub- 
ject nationalities.  It  would  require  skilful  drafting, 
but  some  such  formula  as  this  may  serve  meanwhile 
to  give  a  rough  idea  of  its  scope  : — 

The  signatory  Powers,  convinced  that  the  interests  of  peace  require 
the   free  cultural  development  of  all  the  races  of  Europe,  hereby 


140  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

declare  that  they  will  not  in  their  European  territories  impose  any 
political  or  civil  disabilities  on  the  ground  of  race  or  religion,  and 
further,  that  in  their  European  territories  they  will  accord  to  every 
race  reasonable  facilities  and  rights  for  the  use  of  its  language,  for 
the  development  of  schools  in  which  its  language  is  the  chief  medium 
of  instruction,  for  every  form  of  association  consistent  with  the  order 
of  the  State,  and  for  the  free  exercise  of  its  religion. 

If  every  Power  adopted  this  article,  it  could  not  be 
regarded  by  any  as  a  humiliation.  The  formula 
is  elastic  ;  but  while  it  would  allow  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  openly  [seditious  organizations,  and  would  per- 
mit a  composite  State  to  insist  that  its  official  language 
should  be  thoroughly  taught  in  all  schools,  it  would 
remove  such  elementary  wrongs  as  the  oppression  of 
the  Roumanian  Jews.  It  would  also  secure  the  rights 
of  racial  minorities  in  such  mixed  areas  as  Bohemia. 
Its  application  is  confined  to  Europe  so  as  to  avoid 
raising  difficult  colonial  questions.  A  Europe  based 
on  this  minimum  might  not  be  an  ideal,  but  it 
would  be  a  habitable  Continent.  The  effect  of 
such  a  clause  would  be  felt  gradually  but  surely. 
A  reactionary  Government  would  try  to  ignore  it. 
But  the  setting  of  a  standard  which  the  Government 
had  itself  adopted  would  be  no  small  gain.  The 
opposition  at  home  would  appeal  to  it.  Critics 
abroad  would  make  a  polemical  use  of  it.  Friendly 
Governments,  dreading  an  international  scandal, 
might  in  grave  cases  remind  the  defaulter  of  his 
obligations.  In  the  last  resort,  if  domestic  opposi- 
tion, foreign  criticism,  and  friendly  remonstrance 
had  all  failed,  if  the  oppression  were  gross  enough 
to  cause  European  unrest,  and  so  notorious  as  to 
overcome  the  habitual  inertia  of  diplomacy,  some 
member  of  the  League  would  be  entitled  to  bring 
the  case  before  the  League's  Council  of  Conciliation. 
The  traditional  school  of  jurists  and  diplomatists 
will  object  that  this  is  to  propose  an  intolerable  viola- 
tion of  sovereignty.  That  may  be  true.  Sovereignty, 


PROBLEMS    OF    NATIONALITY          141 

in  the  old  absolute  sense  of  the  word,  is  the  very 
principle  of  anarchy,  and  no  reading  of  it  which 
in  the  last  resort  forbids  the  intervention  of  the 
collective  conscience  to  redress  gross  wrongs  to 
nationality,  can  on  a  long  view  be  consistent  with 
European  peace.  To  forbid  intervention  to-day  is 
to  invite  war  to-morrow. 

THE  MAP  OF  POLAND. 

An  ethnographical  map  of  Poland,  for  which  I  am  indebted  to 
the  Polish  Information  Committee,  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  this 
book.  The  percentages  of  the  Polish  population  indicated  on  it 
were  compiled  with  the  utmost  care,  but  the  data  may  be 
insufficient  for  absolute  accuracy.  Later  figures  give  for  Posen 
75  instead  of  62  per  cent.,  for  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  89  instead 
of  92  per  cent.,  and  for  the  district  of  Kholm  39  instead  of  57  per 
cent.  I  do  not  feel  competent  to  discuss  in  detail  what  the 
frontiers  of  an  independent  Poland  ought  to  be.  Some  portions  of 
the  race  must  probably  be  sacrificed.  It  is  not  possible  to  include 
the  Poles  of  West  Prussia,  since  this  would  cut  the  two  portions  of 
Prussia  in  half.  The  Masurian  Poles  of  East  Prussia,  who  are  Protes- 
tants, are  for  the  most  part  Germanized.  A  moderate  war-settle- 
ment will  probably  exclude  Lithuania  from  the  Polish  Kingdom,  and 
in  spite  of  the  long  association  of  the  two  races  in  history,  the 
doctrine  of  nationality  will  insist  rather  on  the  liberation  of  the  Poles 
than  on  the  restoration  of  their  kingdom  in  its  ancient  limits.  I  have 
not  discussed  the  Baltic  Provinces,  for  Russia  will  certainly  insist  on 
retaining  them.  The  German  element  is  too  small  to  justify  a  claim 
based  on  nationality.  The  native  Letts  (ethnologically  the  same 
people  as  the  Catholic  Lithuanians),  in  spite  of  their  Lutheran  religion 
and  German  culture,  would  certainly  prefer  Russian  to  German  rule. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  ROADS  OF  THE  EAST 

A  LONG  war  is  apt  to  change  not  merely  the  mtoods 
of  the  combatants,  but  the  objects  for  which  they 
fight.  New  dangers  emerge  as  the  wrestling  nations 
sway  hither  and  thither  ;  new  problems  are  created 
by  the  entry  of  fresh  champions  to  the  lists  ;  diffi- 
cult tasks  are  discarded  and  compensations  for  their 
abandonment  are  sought  in  other  fields.  Above  all, 
the  constructive,  idealistic  purposes,  which  men 
emphasized  at  first  in  the  effort  to  reconcile  them- 
selves to  the  horrors  of  war,  fade  from  their  inner 
vision  ;  they  adjust  themselves  to  the  hatreds  of 
the  moment,  persuaded  that  these  hatreds  must 
govern  the  world  for  the  rest  of  their  lives.  The 
hope  of  any  permanent  international  organization 
grows  dim  while  we  submit  to  this  mood,  and  in  its 
absence  (since  we  must  somehow  solve  our 
problems)  the  cruder  methods  of  settlement  by 
partition  and  annexation  find  increasing  favour. 
There  is  a  risk  that  if  this  state  of  mind  endures, 
the  war,  which  was  hailed  as  a  war  of  liberation, 
may  degenerate  into  a  harsh  struggle  of  competing 
empires. 

The  competing  empires  had  a  clear  understanding 
of  their  war-aims  from  the  first  days  of  the  crisis 
of  1914,  and  for  long  before  it.  For  Russia  and 
Germany  the  chief  stake  in  the  combat  was  Turkey. 
Our  own  public  opinion,  preoccupied  with  Belgium, 

was  slow  to  perceive  this  fact.     It  began  to  dominate 

142 


THE   ROADS    OF,   THE    EAST  143 

our  thinking  only  when  Serbia  was  overrun.  It 
receded  again  when  the  Russian  Revolution  re- 
nounced the  purpose  proclaimed  by  Tsardom  of  an- 
nexing Constantinople.  When  the  annals  of  these 
years  come  to  be  written  there  will  be  in  them  no 
page  more  impressive  than  that  which  recounts  the 
brief  duel  between  M.  Miliukoff  and  the  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates.  The  Liberal 
Minister,  one  of  the  ablest  and  one  of  the  most 
deservedly  respected  statesmen  in  Russia,  stood  for 
the  old  technique  of  professional  diplomacy,  and  for 
a  policy  of  expansion  and  imperialism.  The 
"  Soviet  "  realized  that  democracy  is  incompatible 
with  secret  diplomacy,  and  an  enduring  peace  with 
a  policy  of  conquest.  In  the  capitals  of  the  older 
world,  the  mob  has  often  filled  the  streets  with  the 
echoing  catchwords  of  national  pride.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  history  pf  civilization,  a  populace  marched: 
under  the  banner  of  "  No  annexations."  Its  triumph 
has  made  one  of  the  strangest  and  one  of  the 
greatest  pages  in  European  history.  The  question 
of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  still  calls,  however, 
for  a  constructive  solution.  The  Imperialist  ten- 
dencies of  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  have  not  yet 
followed  Russia  in  renouncing  their  schemes  for  the 
dismemberment  of  Turkey,  and  these  aims  of  expan- 
sion and  strategy  are  defined  in  secret  treaties  which 
still  bind  the  Allies.  One  cannot  oppose  a  bare 
negative  to  these  ambitions.  The  economic  future 
of  Turkey  makes  a  problem,  even  if  the  design  is 
abandoned  of  settling  it  by  force.  Finally,  these 
purposes  of  dismemberment  have  been  received  with 
a  certain  tolerance  by  public  opinion  in  the  West, 
because  the  abominable  cruelties  of  the  Young  Turks 
towards  the  Armenians,  and  the  apparent  arrest  of 
their  once  promising  movement  of  reform,  have 
reminded  us  once  more  of  the  failure  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  to  adjust  itself  to  any  Western  conception 


144  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

of  humanity  and  liberty,  however  rudimentary.  Let 
us  inquire  whether  in  the  idea  of  a  League  of 
Nations  we  have  a  clue  to  the  solution  of  these 
Eastern  problems  of  strategy,  economics,  and 
humanity . 

I.  THE  HIGHWAY  OF  THE  STRAITS. 

The  significance  in  the  political  geography  fof 
the  world  of  the  two  narrow  straits  which  link 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean  has  become 
familiar  to  the  simplest  English  mother,  since  the 
lads  of  Dorset  and  Lancashire  died  in  vain  on  the 
Gallipoli  peninsula  to  cut  a  way  to  Constantinople. 
In  Russian  history  these  straits  recall  more  distant 
memories  and  older  dreams.  Since  the  days  of 
Peter  the  Great  Russian  statesmen  and  soldiers 
have  held  it  as  the  manifest  destiny  of  their 
Empire  that  it  should  one  day  acquire  Constan- 
tinople. Its  opponent  in  Europe  has  always  been 
the  Power  which  stood  behind  the  Turks  as  their 
protector.  In  that  part  Germany  to-day  is  the  suc- 
cessor of  Great  Britain.  The  chief  motive  which' 
had  always  influenced  the  more  realistic  sections 
of  Russian  opinion  was,  of  course,  that  the  Power 
which  holds  Constantinople  controls  the  Bosphorus 
and  the  Dardanelles,  and  with  them  the  highway 
of  the  sea  that  leads  to  Odessa  and  Batoum.  If 
this  Power  were  only  a  weak  Turkey,  standing- 
alone,  and  easily  overawed  by  the  superior  power 
of  Russia,  her  guardianship  of  the  Straits  might 
be  tolerated.  But  Turkey  in  modern  times  has 
never  been  left  to  stand  alone.  The  decisive 
fact  for  Russian  opinion  was  the  arrival  at  Con- 
stantinople, shortly  after  the  second  Balkan  ;War, 
of  General  Liman  von  Sanders  at  the  head  of  a 
large  military  mission,  charged  with  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  Turkish  Army.  The  [Russian  Press 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  145 

took  this  to  mean  (rightly,  as  it  turned  out)  that 
Turkey  had  in  a  military  sense  definitely  entered 
the  German  camp.  A  Turkish  control  of  the  Straits 
might  be  tolerated,  but  a  German  control  involved 
a  direct  negative  to  Russian  ambitions.  Nothing 
that  is  Turkish  is  permanent,  but  Germans  build 
solidly.  The  emphatic  diplomatic  protest  which 
Russia  entered  against  the  large  executive  powers 
entrusted  to  this  mission  (1913-14)  was  really  the 
overture  to  the  coming  world -war.  It  was  followed 
by  a  series  of  panics  and  crises  throughout  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1914.  The  extensive 
military  programme  of  Russia,  her  increased  peace 
effectives,  her  new  artillery,  and  her  strategical 
railways  were  held  to  point  to  a  plan  for  making 
war  somewhere  about  1916.  At  intervals  the 
German  Press  directed  its  attention  to  the  efforts 
of  Russian  diplomacy  to  reconstitute  the  Balkan 
League,  this  time  as  a  Slav  vanguard  against 
Austria.  In  the  midst  of  this  tension  a  controversy 
broke  out  in  the  influential  pages  of  the  Preussische 
Jahrbiicher  between  Professor  Mitrofanoff,  of  Petro- 
grad,  and  Professor  Hans  Delbriick,  its  editor.  The 
distinguished  Russian  historian  wrote  already  as 
though  war  were  imminent  and  almost  inevitable, 
and  his  thesis  was  that  Russia  must  control  the 
Straits,  and  that  unless  Germany  made  terms  with 
this  historical  ambition,  then  the  road  to  Constan- 
tinople would  lie  through  Berlin.1  Europe  was 

1  Professor  Mitrofanoff,  who  had  been  in  youth  a  student  under 
Professor  Delbriick  in  Berlin,  wrote  at  the  latter's  invitation  to  explain 
the  anti-German  tendency  in  Russia.  His  article,  which  appeared 
in  the  June  number,  opens  with  a  brilliant  historical  analysis  of  the 
causes,  social  and  political,  of  the  Russian  dislike  of  Germany  and 
Germans.  The  section  on  Turkey  concludes  with  the  sentence, 
"  It  is  now  clear  to  Russians  that  if  everything  remains  as  it  is  at 
present,  the  road  to  Constantinople  lies  through  Berlin."  There 
follow  some  confident  sentences  in  which  Germans  are  warned 
that  the  Russia  of  1914  is  a  much  stronger  Power,  in  the  military, 

II 


146  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

already  in  peril  of  war  on  the  eve  of  the  Serajevo 
murders,  and  the  issue  which  dominated  both  Russian 
and  German  opinion  was  the  question  of  Constan- 
tinople and  the  Straits.  When  Turkey  entered  the 
war  (as  was  indeed  inevitable)  on  the  side  of 
Germany,  Russia  arranged  her  claims  with  her 
Allies.  M.  Trepoff  has  told  us  that  in  March  1915 
Great  Britain  and  France  gave  their  full  consent 
to  a  Russian  annexation  of  Constantinople. 

It  is  not  easy  to  decide  how  far  this  ambition 
was  a  strategical  demand,  prosaic,  intelligible,  and 
eminently  natural,  and  how  far  it  sprang  from  senti- 

financial,  industrial,  and  political  senses  of  the  word,  than  the  Russia 
of  1904.  The  grievance  of  the  tariff  (soon  to  be  renewed)  is  touched 
upon.  "  If  we  fail  to  meet  with  a  disposition  to  understand  our  case 
and  make  concessions,  things  look  ugly  "  (so  ist  die  Sache  schlimm}. 
..."  We  have  no  desire  to  attack  Germany  ;  we  have  too  much 
admiration  for  German  civilization,  and  for  the  contributions  of  the 
German  people  to  the  world's  development,  to  wish  for  ourselves  an 
Attila's  victory."  (The  Germans  are  not  yet  the  Huns  !)  "  We  are  also 
fully  convinced  that  Germany  is  far  from  having  directly  aggressive 
tendencies  ;  but  we  feel  ourselves  on  all  sides  hampered  and  hemmed 
in  by  German  pressure,  on  our  flanks,  in  Turkey,  in  Sweden,  in 
Austria  :  we  meet  with  no  recognition  of  our  present  situation,  no 
reckoning  with  our  present  strength,  and  we  are  resolved  to  win 
for  ourselves  the  position  which  is  due  to  us.  ...  War  with  Germany 
would  be  a  misfortune,  but  one  cannot  escape  from  a  bitter  necessity, 
when  it  is  really  necessary." 

Soon  after  Professor  Mitrofanoff  had  addressed  this  startling 
warning  to  the  German  reading  public,  a  certain  Prince  Kotchubey, 
a  Marshal  of  the  Russian  nobility,  contributed  a  similar  article 
to  the  Paris  Correspondant  (June  26,  1914).  It  covers  much  the  same 
ground,  with  the  addition  of  an  exhortation  to  France  to  adopt  three 
years'  service  and  to  us  to  adopt  conscription,  and  the  usual  hint  that 
Russia,  failing  this  support,  may  after  all  enter  the  German  camp.  The 
chief  feature  of  this  article  is  an  assurance,  bluntly  phrased,  that  an 
attack  by  Russia  on  Germany  would  be  enormously  popular  in  Russia  : 
"  On  what  tremendous  forces  could  the  Russian  Government  rely 
if  one  day  the  Duma  were  to  compel  it  to  declare  war  on  Germany  !  " 
These  two  articles  were  written  in  time  of  peace,  before  the  Serajevo 
murders.  They  helped  to  confirm  the  German  belief  that  Russia  was 
preparing  for  an  aggressive  war. 


THE   ROADS    OF.  THE    EAST  147 

ment  and  romance.  The  foundations  of  Russian 
civilization  were  Eastern,  and  throughout  the  East 
Constantinople  has  always  been  regarded  as  the 
Imperial  City,  ;<  Tsarigrad,"  the  New  Rome,  the 
goal  of  conquerors,  and  the  centre  of  world  power. 
It  is,  moreover,  the  seat  of  the  (Ecumenical  Patriarch 
of  the  Orthodox  Church,  and  though  his  authority 
and  prestige  are  far  less  than  those  of  the  Pope  in 
the  more  centralized  Western  Church,  the  posses- 
sion of  his  seat  and  the  planting  of  the  Cross 
once  more  on  the  dome  of  St.  Sophia  would  mean 
more  to  the  Russian  Church  and  to  the  simpler 
sections  of  Russian  opinion  than  the  opening  of  the 
Straits.  A  diplomatist  would  state  the  case  for  the 
annexation  of  Constantinople  in  plain  prose.  The 
historical  pressure  of  Russia  towards  an  jce-free 
port  is  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  world -politics. 
It  carried  her  across  Siberia  to  Vladivostock  and 
Port  Arthur.  It  has  in  the  past  turned  her  atten- 
tion towards  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  it  has  made 
Sweden  deeply  anxious.  All  the  while  there  was 
an  ice -free  port  at  no  great  distance  from  Petro- 
grad,  Alexandrovsk,  waiting  only  the  building  of 
wharves  and  the  construction  of  a  railway.  The 
plans  for  its  construction  lay  for  years  in  the  official 
pigeon-holes,  and  were  brought  out  only  in  the  stress 
of  this  war.  But  an  empire  of  so  vast  an  extent 
needs  many  ports.  For  commercial  purposes,  of 
course,  in  time  of  peace  the  ports  of  the  Black 
Sea  are  always  open.  But  this  question  of  a  Russian 
port,  like  the  German  demand  for  "  the  freedom 
of  the  seas,"  has  reference,  not  to  peace  but  to 
war.  The  high  seas  are  perfectly  free  while  the 
world  is  at  peace,  and  so  is  the  sea  road  to  Odessa. 
The  Russian  grievance  is  primarily  this,  that  while 
the  Straits  are  always  open  in  time  of  peace  to 
the  merchantmen  of  all  nations,  the  Sultan  has  the 
right,  and  exercises  it,  to  dose  them  both  in  peace 


148  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

and  war  to  warships.  That  means  that  the  Russian 
Black  Sea  Fleet  is  confined  within  its  waters  as 
effectively  as  though  the  sea  were  an  inland  lake. 
During  the  Japanese  War,  for  example,  it  could 
not  sail  out  to  reinforce  the  Russian  squadron  in 
the  Far  East.  If  at  any  time  Russia  wishes  to 
-"-  show  her  flag  "  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  inter- 
vene in  some  Balkan  complication,  or  to  take  part 
in  those  international  naval  demonstrations  which 
were  common  during  the  reign  of  Abdul  Hamid, 
her  ships  must  sail  from  the  Baltic  ports  (closed 
during  part  of  the  winter)  and  pass  on  their  way 
through  the  narrow  straits  of  the  Sound,  Dover, 
and  Gibraltar.  This  restriction  on  the  movement 
of  her  ships  (and  therefore  of  her  armies)  is  a 
serious  limitation  to  the  immense  potential  military 
power  of  Russia.  It  means  that  she  cannot  act 
effectively  anywhere  to  the  west  of  her  own  terri- 
tory. It  has  made  her  primarily  an  Eastern  Power. 
She  could  not,  for  example,  in  this  war  bring  effec- 
tive succour  to  Serbia,  though  she,  and  not  the 
Western  Powers,  was  the  champion  on  whom  the 
Serbs  relied.  The  ability  to  use  the  Straits  freely 
in  war -time  would  mean,  in  short,  a  doubling  of 
Russia's  military  range  of  action,  and  her  entry 
by  a  new  road  into  the  European  system.  Such  an 
increase  of  power  would  be  felt,  of  course,  in  peace 
as  well  as  in  war,  for  in  diplomacy  the  reach  of 
a  Government's  arm  is  accurately  measured.  To 
this  primary  reason  for  the  acquisition  of  the  Straits 
some  others  must  be  added.  The  closing  of  them 
in  this  war  has  cut  off  Russian  exports  to  the 
detriment  of  her  credit,  and  excluded  military  sup- 
plies to  the  peril  of  her  armies.  Nor  are  the 
disadvantages  which  flow  from  the  Turkish  owner- 
ship of  the  Straits  entirely  limited  to  Russia's 
military  interests.  If  Turkey  is  herself  at  war, 
while  Russia  is  neutral,  and  Turkey  is  obliged  to 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  149 

defend  the  Straits  against  a  naval  attack,  she  may 
be  compelled  to  close  them1,  or  at  least  to  limit 
traffic.  That  happened  at  awkward  moments  during 
the  Turco -Italian  and  Balkan  Wars,  when  the  Italian 
and  Greek  fleets  threatened  the  Dardanelles.  Some 
vexatious  delay  resulted  in  the  export  of  the  Russian 
harvest. 

The  reasons  why  Russia  desired  to  control  the 
Straits  are  so  eminently  intelligible  that  we  need  not 
dwell  further  upon  them.  It  remains  only  to  add 
that  in  the  view  of  the  old  regime  no  control  would 
be  satisfactory  unless  Russia  were  physically  in 
possession  of  the  shores  of  the  Straits  themselves. 
That  involves,  of  course,  the  possession,  not  merely, 
of  Constantinople  but  of  some  territory  on  both  con- 
tinents. To  suggestions  that  the  control  of  the 
Straits  should  in  some  form  be  internationalized, 
the  official  Russian  answer  used  to;  be  that  Russia 
wanted  some  better  security  than  "  a  scrap  of  paper." 
She  would  feel  sure  that  the  Straits  would  always 
be  open  to  her  warships  only  when  her  own  guns 
commanded  them. 

War  is  a  state  of  absolute  partisanship,  and  the 
tendency,  while  it  lasts,  is  to  assume  that  every- 
thing which  an  ally  may  claim  is  a  proper  object 
to  pursue.  The  Revolution  has  released  us  from 
that  obligation,  and  opened  the  road  to  a  better 
solution.  If  the  world  is  to  be  freed  from  the 
reign  of  force,  we  must  school  our  minds  to 
abandon  the  habit  of  thinking  strategically.  We 
could  never  have  fitted  into  our  ideal  of  the 
future  Europe  this  Russian  claim  for  the  means 
to  exert  power  far  beyond  her  own  frontiers.  To 
bring  into  the  Mediterranean,  as  a  factor  in  its 
naval  and  military  balance,  a  Power  which  has 
neither  province  nor  colony  on  its  shores  would 
be  a  questionable  innovation.  The  real  bearing 
of  this  question  is  primarily  on  the  future  of  the 


150  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

Balkan  States.  Entrenched  at  Constantinople,  able 
to  strike  at  will  by  land  or  sea,  holding  the 
exit  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  sending  her  ships  freely 
into  the  ^Egean  and  the  Adriatic,  Russia  would  con- 
trol the  Balkan  peninsula,  and  dispose  at  her  pleasure 
of  the  destinies  of  its  people.  There  are  many 
reasons  which  explain  the  choice  of  Bulgaria  in 
joining  the  Central  Empires,  and  the  long -continued 
neutrality  of  Roumania  and  Greece,  but  among  the 
considerations  which  weighed  most  heavily  with  them 
all  was  their  reluctance  to  see  any  great  empire 
established  at  Constantinople.  Roumania  is  wholly 
dependent  on  the  Straits  for  her  commerce  with 
the  outer  world,  and,  though  Bulgaria  now  has  a 
worthless  and  isolated  port  on  the  ^£gean,  her  com- 
merce still  depends  entirely  on  Varna  and  Burgas, 
both  of  them  Black  Sea  ports.  Finally,  the  Turkish 
population  would  prefer  almost  any  other  foreign 
rule  to  that  of  its  hereditary  enemy. 

There  are  several  alternative  solutions  which 
would  give  to  Russia  the  free  use  of  the  Straits, 
to  which  she  is  entitled.  The  essential  point  is 
really,  not  that  Russia  should  possess  the  Straits 
but  that  Germany  should  not  dominate  them.  Sir 
Edwin  Pears  has  sketched  an  ideal  scheme — the 
creation  of  a  small  international  State,  guaranteed 
by  the  whole  Concert  of  Europe,  under  executive 
officers  nominated  by  it,  which  would  control  both 
shores  and  guarantee  a  free  passage  to  all  the  world. 
This  plan  would  guarantee  the  inhabitants  of 
Constantinople  against  any  form  of  foreign  rule 
which  might  aspire  to  denationalize  them,  and 
under  it  they  might  develop  to  the  full  their  own 
municipal  and  communal  institutions.  The  city 
might  become  with  security  and  freedom  of  trade 
the  great  centre  of  education  and  affairs  for 
the  Balkans  and  Anatolia,  the  intellectual  and 
commercial  capital  of  the  Near  East.  One  does 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  151 

not  readily  abandon  oneself  to  flattering1  dreams 
amid  this  war,  but  I  confess  that  a  vision  sometimes 
shapes  itself  in  my  mind  of  a  still  greater  future 
for  Constantinople.  When  the  League  of  Nations 
is  firmly  established,  it  must  acquire  some  social 
centre,  some  capital  which  will  impress  the  imagina- 
tion and  focus  the  intercourse  of  the  nations  which 
compose  it.  It  could  find  no  nobler  site  for 
its  capital  than  Constantinople,  and  the  imperial 
traditions  of  New  Rome  would  give  to  it  a 
glorious  foundation  in  the  past,  and  make  for  it 
a  claim  on  our  veneration.  Its  distance  from 
Western  Europe  may  seem  an  objection.  Western 
Europe  is,  however,  inclined  to  be  provincial,  but 
on  the  shores  of  the  Bosphorus  no  one  could  forget 
how  momentous  for  the  destinies  of  mankind  is 
the  recovery  of  the  East  for  civilization.  With 
one  of  the  smaller  Western  cities,  The  Hague,  for 
example,  as  its  site,  the  international  capital  might 
be  dwarf »_  "  by  Paris,  London,  and  Berlin.  Placed 
in  the  Near  East  it  would  swiftly  raise  the  whole 
level  of  East  -  European  culture.  It  must  be 
admitted,  however,  that  the  idea  of  an  international 
State  is  adventurous  and  difficult.  What  would 
happen  if  war  again  broke  out  among,  the  Great 
Powers  who  controlled  it  ?  Who  then  would  assure 
the  freedom  of  the  Straits  ?  For  this  reason  there 
is  everything  to  be  said  for  the  suggestion,  urged 
by  Mr.  Toynbee  and  others,  that  the  United  States 
of  America  should  be  entrusted,  as  the  mandatory 
of  the  League,  with  the  guardianship  of  Constanti- 
nople and  the  Straits.  It  has  no  material  or  political 
interests  in  this  part  of  the  world,  and  its  great 
educational  work  in  Turkey  has  already  won  the 
gratitude  and  confidence  of  all  the  Near  Eastern 
peoples . 

Unhappily,    this    plan,    by    far    the    best    of    all, 
might  require  for  its  realization  a  great  prolongation 


152  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

of  the  war,  for  it  presupposes  the  expulsion  of  the 
Turks.  It  is  possible,  however,  to  suggest  modi- 
fications of  it,  which  would  meet  the  legitimate 
requirements  of  Russia  without  presupposing  the 
annihilation  of  Turkey.  The  Turks  might  be  left 
in  undisturbed  possession  of  the  city  and  its  shores. 
They  would  be  required,  however,  to  demolish  all 
the  fortifications  of  the  Straits,  and  an  International 
Commission  would  be  charged  with  the  duty  of 
watching  over  them,  to  assure  at  all  times  their 
free  navigation,  in  war  as  in  peace,  for  merchant 
vessels  of  all  nationalities,  and  for  the  warships 
of  the  States  bordering  on  the  Black  Sea.  This 
Commission,  on  which  the  United  States  might  be 
largely  represented,  should  have  the  right  to  call 
upon  the  naval  or  military  forces  of  neutral 
Powers,  if  on  the  outbreak  of  war  force  should 
be  necessary  to  maintain  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty.  It  is  probable  that  Russia,  while  she  greatly 
values  the  right  of  free  exit  through  the  Straits  for 
her  own  warships,  is  no  less  anxious  to  possess 
the  right  to  close  them,  to  the  navies  of  other 
Powers.  That  also  might  be  provided  for  in 
the  treaty.  It  was,  indeed,  on  this  claim  to  ex- 
clude the  warships  of  other  Powers  that  M. 
Miliukoff  based  his  opposition  to  neutralization. 
In  other  words,  the  guardianship  of  the  Straits 
would  pass  from  the  Sultan  to  an  International 
Commission,  and  the  arrangement  might  be  more 
acceptable  to  Russia  if  this  Commission  were 
to  consist  only  of  the  representatives  of  States 
which  have  no  competing  interests  in  the  Near 
East.  By  this  plan,  or  by  some  variant  of  it, 
an  assured  access  to  the  seas  may  be  guaranteed 
to  Russia  in  a  way  which  would  not  menace 
the  political  liberties  of  the  Balkan  States,  the 
national  autonomy  of  the  population  of  Turkey 
and  Thrace,  or  the  freedom  of  the  world's  trade. 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  153 

It  is,  of  course,  an  indispensable  corollary  to  this 
plan  that  the  territory  bordering  the  Straits  must 
be  neutralized,  so  that  in  the  event  of  war  between 
Russia  and  Turkey  it  shall  not  be  a  legitimate 
field  for  warlike  operations.  Unless  the  world  is 
prepared  to  put  its  faith  in  such  "  scraps  of  paper," 
the  battle  over  the  rights  of  Belgium  will  have 
been  fought  in  vain. 

Our  attitude  towards  the  Straits  problem  will 
depend  in  the  last  resort  on  whether  we  believe 
that  the  future  of  Europe  must  resemble  its  past. 
If  we  believe,  with  Lord  Grey,  that  international 
questions  must  be  settled  by  "  conference  "  and 
"  negotiation,"  we  shall  have  listened  unmoved  to 
M.  Miliukoff's  argument.  If  we  want  to  have 
done  with  the  diplomacy  whose  success  is  measured 
by  the  reach  of  the  arm  behind  it,  the  main 
item  in  this  case  falls  to  the  ground.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  see  nothing  before  us  but  a 
dismal  prolongation  of  the  rivalry  for  a  balance 
of  power  and  a  balance  of  armaments,  the  struggle 
always  in  diplomacy  and  trade,  and  periodically 
in  war,  of  one  group  of  Powers  against  another, 
then,  on  one  condition,  we  shall  regret  the  dropping 
of  the  Russian  demand.  That  condition  is,  that  we 
are  quite  sure  that  the  present  grouping  will  persist, 
and  that  Russia  will  be  for  all  time  our  ally.  The 
answer  of  the  average  statesman  would  hesitate 
between  these  sharp  alternatives.  "  I  liope"  he 
would  say,  "  that  we  shall  manage  to  set  up  an 
Areopagus,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing.  I  am  all 
for  conference  and  negotiation.  But  I  don't  trust 
the  other  side.  I  must,  therefore,  strengthen  myself 
and  my  friends,  so  as  to  be  ready  for  every 
contingency.  I  shall,  accordingly,  build  fleets, 
fortify  straits,  and,  when  necessary,  annex  the  shores 
that  control  them,  but,  of  course,  I  hope  that  we 
shall  all  live  happily  ever  afterwards,  and  arbitrate 


154  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

before  we  fight."  That  is  the  attitude  which,  above 
all  others,  curses  life  with  a  duality  of  purpose, 
poisons  sincerity,  destroys  confidence,  and  arrests 
progress.  If  a  man  hopes  he  must  also  believe. 
If  he  intends  he  must  have  faith.  If  he  has  turned 
his  back  on  the  evil  past,  he  must  discard  its 
calculations.  The  probability  of  future  war  turns 
largely  on  the  expectations  of  mankind.  If  the 
world  believes  that  war  will  come,  the  belief  will 
realize  itself.  So  long  as  that  belief  dominates  us, 
our  actions  will  be  busied  with  all  the  preparations 
that  almost  fatally  make  war  —  the  armaments, 
and,  still  worse,  the  diplomatic  groupings.  Array 
Europe  in  two  hostile  groups,  and  it  is  idle  to  talk 
of  conference,  for  no  conference  could  meet  in  that 
mood  of  coolness  and  impartiality  from  which  alone 
a  just  settlement  of  any  conflict  can  result.  What 
makes  the  belief  of  mankind  in  such  a  case? 
Deeds  rather  than  words  make  it.  A  whole  library 
of  books,  by  all  the  Bernhardis  of  all  the  nations, 
would  have  done  less  to  create  the  belief  that  a 
future  war  is  inevitable,  than  the  insistence  of  Russia 
on  annexing  Constantinople  and  the  readiness  of 
the  Entente  to  back  her  claim  by  months  or  years 
of  warfare.  We  could  hardly  say  more  plainly 
that  all  the  talk  of  "  the  war  to  end  war  "  was 
nothing  but  self-deluding  rhetoric.  An  international 
solution  is  possible,  and  our  answer  is  that  we  have 
no  faith  in  "  scraps  of  paper."  That  would  be  an 
admission  that  the  war  had  been  fought  in  vain. 
If  we  desired  to  show  that  our  purpose  had  been 
achieved,  if  we  meant  boldly,  like  strong  men,  to 
imprint  our  will  upon  the  world's  history,  we  should 
take  the  exactly  opposite  course.  We  should  set 
up  our  "  scraps  of  paper  "  with  a  defiant  and 
gallant  gesture.  We  should  call  them  a  monument 
more  lasting  than  armour-plate.  We  should  give 
them  validity  by,  our  faith,  and  keep  our  arms, 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  155 

if  need  be,  to  defend  them.  A  coalition  which  acts 
on  this  principle  will  have  destroyed  the  belief  in 
the  next  inevitable  war,  and  by  so  doing  it  will 
have  made  the  intellectual  basis  of  an  enduring 
peace. 

II.    THE  ROAD  TO  BAGDAD. 

If  the  central  object  of  Tsardom  in  this  war  was  to 
open  for  itself  the;  naval  road  to  the  Mediterranean, 
the  Germans  are  no  less  bent  on  securing  for 
themselves  unhampered  military  access  to  Turkey. 
Russia's  interest  in  the  Straits  was  mainly  strategic, 
though  her  strategical  thinking  was  coloured  by 
sentiment.  German  policy,  on  the  other  hand, 
shows  the  characteristic  modern  combination  of 
strategy  with  economics.  Coming  very  late  into 
the  colonial  field,  and  unable  to  secure  for  herself 
any  sphere  capable  of  development  by  white  settlers, 
her  attention  since  the  opening  of  this  century  has 
turned  increasingly  to  Turkey.  Into  this  sphere, 
also,  her  traders  came  late,  and  found  it  occupied 
mainly  by  French  educational  and  financial  and 
British  commercial  influences.  They  enjoyed, 
however,  certain  advantages.  Prussian  soldiers, 
beginning  with  the  great  Von  Moltke  and  then  with 
Von  der  Goltz,  had  done  much  for  the  Turkish 
Army.  They  had  no  past  to  overcome  in  appealing 
to  Turkish  sympathies,  and  when  our  policy  after 
the  occupation  of  Egypt  became  definitely  anti- 
Turkish,  they  rapidly  acquired  a  predominant 
position  in  Constantinople.  It  was  won,  like  all 
their  achievements,  by  method,  intelligence,  and 
perseverance.  Their  great  ambassador,  Marschall 
von  Bieberstein,  worked  while  others  idled,  and  was 
friendly,  accessible,  helpful,  where  others  were  stiff, 
contemptuous,  and  indifferent.  The  Kaiser's  more 
theatrical  methods  of  proclaiming  himself  the  friend 
of  Islam  in  general  and  of  Abdul  Hamid  in  par- 


156  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

ticular  served  their  immediate  end.  From  all  the 
demonstrations,  reforms,  and  intrigues  that  centred 
round  Armenia,  Macedonia,  and  Crete,  German 
diplomacy  stood  aloof,  and  if  this  was  bad  political 
morals  it  was  also  good  business.  "  We  pursue 
in  Turkey  only  economic  ends,"  was  the  invariable 
answer  of  Baron  Marschall  to  any  attempt  to  enlist 
his  interest  in  such  questions.  The  answer  was 
true  as  a  statement  of  motive,  but  economics  cannot 
in  Turkey  be  divorced  from  politics.  The  exploita- 
tion of  a  backward  country  on  the  great  scale  of 
modern  capitalism  depends  far  more  upon  contracts, 
concessions,  and  loan  operations  than  upon  the  direct 
pushing  of  their  wares  by  private  merchants.  In 
Turkey,  as  in  China,  all  these  larger  operations  of 
finance  are  the  concern  of  diplomacy,  and  every 
alert  Embassy  persuades,  bribes,  negotiates,  or  even 
threatens  in  order  to  push  the  interests  of  its 
country's  financiers.  The  Germans  were  particularly 
successful  in  the  sale  of  their  armaments,  and  with 
the  final  granting  of  the  Bagdad  railway  concession 
in  1903,  they  became  economically  the  predominant 
Power  in  Turkey.  French  finance  still  held  by, 
far  the  larger  passive  stake  in  Turkey,  but  the  new, 
and  more  enterprising  power  was  the  Deutsche 
Bank.  This  position  was  not  won  without  careful 
political  nursing.  The  Young  Turks,  when  first 
they  made  their  revolution  (1908),  were  anxious 
to  conclude  a  defensive  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 
Their  overtures  were  coldly  received.  The  dispatch 
of  the  German  Military  Mission  to  Turkey,  after 
the  Balkan  wars,  meant  that  Enver  Bey's  pro- 
German  policy  had  prevailed  over  the  pro-French 
and  pro-British  inclinations  of  his  more  liberal 
colleagues,  and  shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
world- war  the  Turco -German  alliance,  already 
secretly  concluded,  became  the  decisive  fact  in  the 
Eastern  theatre  of  war. 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  157 

The  Bagdad  railway  was  not  originally  a  German 
scheme.  In  the  middle  years  of  last  century  certain 
Anglo-Indian  engineers  eagerly  promoted  the  idea 
of  a  railway  linking  the  Mediterranean  with  the 
Persian  Gulf.  It  was  to  have  run  from  Alexandretta 
by  an  easy  desert  route  to  Basra.  A  Parliamentary 
Commission  reported  in  its  favour,  and  the  Turks 
welcomed  the  scheme.  Capital,  however,  was  shy, 
and  after  our  occupation  of  Egypt,  which  gave  us 
control  of  the  Suez  Canal,  it  ceased  to  interest  us. 
Our  concern  in  it  had  been  purely  strategic,  for 
we  regarded  it  as  an  alternative  road  to  India. 
While  favouring  the  scheme,  the  Turks  had  always 
tried  to  induce  its  British  promoters  to  expand  it 
into  a  more  ambitious  project,  a  Constantinople- 
Bagdad  railway.1  From  the  Turkish  point  of  view 
this  railway  was  an  administrative  and  military 
necessity.  Railway-builders  who  considered  only 
the  needs  of  trade  would  not  have  been  attracted 
by  it.  The  denser  population  in  Turkey  is  to  be 
found  clustered  in  limited  areas  near  the  coast. 
There  was  everything  to  be  said  for  such  a  rail- 
way from  the  Turkish  standpoint,  but  much  less 
from  that  of  the  foreign  trader.  It  followed  that 
the  railway  could  be  built  only  under  the  usual 
Turkish  system  of  subsidized  profits,  by  a  kilometric 
guarantee,  and  as  always  happens  in  the  land  of 
baksheesh,  the  foreign  capitalist  drove  an  un- 
conscionable bargain.  The  railway  may  never  pay 
its  way,  but  its  promoters  have  none  the  less  secured 
a  rich  return  for  their  outlay.  They  reckon, 
also,  on  larger  and  more  legitimate  profits  from 
subsidiary  enterprises.  A  radlway  concession 
commonly  carries  with  it  the  expectation  that  other 
large  enterprises,  mines,  harbours,  and  the  like,  will 
be  conceded  to  the  same  group  of  capitalists.  The 
promoters  secured  from  the  first  a  monopoly  over 

1  See  David  Fraser,  "The  Short  Cut  to  India,"] p.  33. 


158  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  rich  oil-wells  of  Mesopotamia,  and  they  reckoned 
that  their  undertaking  would  serve  as  a  basis  for  a 
future  claim,  to  be  founded,  first,  upon  accomplished 
facts,  and,  finally,  perhaps,  on  treaty,  that  the  whole 
region  served  by  the  Bagdad  railway  is  a  German 
economic  sphere.  If  this  were  to  include  the 
irrigation  of  Mesopotamia,  it  would  be  probably 
the  most  valuable  privilege  still  open  in  any 
undeveloped  country.  It  was  this  indefinite 
possibility  of  extension  which  really  made  the 
Bagdad  railway  an  attractive  economic  opening  to 
German  enterprise.  Since  Germany  was  in  a  fair 
way  to  make  the  greater  part  of  Turkey  her 
economic  preserve,  she  had  an  imperative  interest 
in  maintaining  its  "  integrity  and  independence." 
Other  Powers  might  wish  to  partition  Turkey. 
Germany  wished  to  absorb  it  whole.  We  had  our- 
selves followed  the  same  logic  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century  ;  but  while  we  valued 
our  gallant  Turkish  allies  and  turned  a  blind  eye 
to  their  misdeeds,  we  were  too  busy  with  more 
promising  commercial  possibilities  elsewhere  to  con- 
centrate our  minds,  as  the  Germans  have  done,  on 
the  economic  exploitation  of  Turkey. 

The  sinister  aspect  of  the  Bagdad  railway  as  a 
strategical  line  has  been  amply  illustrated  in  the 
present  war.  It  means  two  things  strategically.  It 
is  first  of  all  the  Turkish  military  high-road,  essential 
to  any  development  of  Ottoman  power.  Turkey, 
however,  is  too  weak  to  stand  alone,  and  inevitably 
the  idea  of  the  line  has  expanded  until  every  German 
to-day  thinks  of  it  as  the  Berlin -Bagdad  connection. 
The  present  relationship  of  Germany  with  Turkey 
repeats  in  all  essentials  the  older  Anglo -Turkish 
tie.  Any  Power  which  comes  into  intimate  touch 
with  Turkey  is  forced  to  become  her  protector,  and 
the  protector  who  takes  risks  on  her  behalf  will 
naturally  wish  to  use  her  as  an  ally,  and  to  pay 


THE    ROADS     OF    THE    EAST          159 

himself  by  exploiting  her  undeveloped  economic 
resources.  The  risk  of  a  forcible  partition  of  Turkey 
has  been  real  for  the  best  part  of  a  century.  The 
Tsar  Nicholas  I  proposed  an  amicable  agreement  to 
partition  Turkey  on  the  eve  of  the  Crimean  War. 
The  Germans  believe  that  Nicholas  II  and 
Edward  VII  discussed  some  similar  scheme  at  Reval 
in  1908,  and  reached  an  understanding  about  jit.1 
That  plan  (which  had  some  existence  in  fact,  at 
least  as  a  scheme  of  reforms  to  be  imposed  on 
Turkey)  was  abandoned  when  the  Young  Turks  made 
their  revolution  to  escape  it.  The  Germans  allege 
that  it  was  revived  during  the  Balkan  War,  and  that 
it  took  the  shape  of  a  proposal  to  delimit  the 
"  economic  spheres  "  of  the  Powers  in  Turkey  on 
the  Persian  model.  Such  plans  were  undoubtedly 
in  the  minds  of  some  of  the  Allied  statesmen,  though 
there  was  probably  no  thought  of  attempting  to 
realize  them,  save  by  a  European  agreement.  They 
revived  when  the  war  broke  out  and  Turkey  became 
involved  in  it.  It  is  said  by  those  who  should  know, 
that  the  secret  compacts  of  the  Allies  contemplate 
a  partition  on  this  basis  :  Constantinople  goes  to 
Russia,  with  the  Armenian  provinces  as  a  vassal 
State  under  her  suzerainty  ;  Syria  up  to  the  Taurus, 
is  to  be  French  ;  Mesopotamia  and  Arabia,  British  ; 
and  the  coast  region  of  Asia  Minor,  with  Smyrna, 
Italian  ;  Palestine  may  be  internationalized.  The 
Entente  offered  the  greater  part  of  Asia  Minor, 
with  Smyrna,  to  Greece,  but  failing  her  acceptance, 
it  is  to  be  supposed  that  Turkey  may  be  allowed 
to  retain  so  much  of  Anatolia  as  the  other  Allies 
do  not  claim.  The  conception  of  a  Turkey 
protected,  developed,  and  strengthened  by  German 
influences  stood  opposed  to  these  ambitions  of  the 
Entente  Powers.  The  issue  jwas  simply  one  of  power, 

1  See    Reventlow,   "  Deutschlands    Auswartige   Politik,"    p.    322 
Rohrbach,  "  Der  Deutsche  Gedanke,"  pp.  155,  162. 


160  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

a  Machtfrage,  which  could  hardly  be  settled  without 
war.  It  was  "  the  Eastern  Question  "  which  dis- 
tracted the  lives  of  our  fathers  and  grandfathers,  with 
Russia  still  in  her  old  r61e,  and  Germany  filling  the 
traditional  part  of  Great  Britain. 

This  exchange  of  parts  between  Germany  and 
Britain  involved  a  disastrous  strategical  complication 
in  the  Balkans.  Our  command  of  the  seas  enables 
us  to  act  in  the  East  without  possessing'  a  continuous 
land  route.  It  suffices  for  our  purpose  that  we 
hold  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Cyprus,  and  Egypt.  Our 
statesmen  have  always  held  that  the  vital  interest  of 
our,  communications  justified  us  in  disregarding  in 
these  cases  the  doctrine  of  nationality.  Germany 
has  no  such  command  of  the  seas,  and  if  in  any 
conflict  over  Turkey  to  which  we  are  a  party,  she 
must  be  able  to  reach  Turkey,  the  only  route  open 
to  her  lies  by  land  across  the  Balkans.  An  inde- 
pendent and  hostile  Serbia  is  a  fatal  obstacle  to  any 
full  use  for  strategical  purposes  of  the  Berlin -Bag  dad 
line.  Once  more,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Straits,  the 
problem  is  not  commercial,  and  has  no  bearing 
whatever  on  Germany's  right  to  use  such  a  road 
freely  for  the  export  of  her  manufactures.  For  that 
purpose  the  line  was  always  open  to  her,  and,  in 
point  of  fact,  the  bulk  of  her  trade  has  always  gone, 
and  is  always  likely  to  go,  to  Turkey  by  sea.  What 
she  required  was  a  road,  or,  as  it  is  often  called, 
a  "  corridor,"  by  which  she  could  at  all  times  send 
troops  and  munitions  from  Berlin  to  Constantinople 
and  Bagdad.  Without  that  facility  she  could  neither 
protect  nor  dominate  Turkey.  It  was  not  necessary 
that  she  should  suppress  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  £s 
independent  States,  but  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
for  her  Eastern  policy  that  they  should  both  be  com- 
placent and  friendly  neutrals,  if  not  actual  allies. 
The  obstacle  of  a  hostile  Serbia  is  of  recent  date, 
and  did  not  exist  when  the  Bagdad  line  was  first 


THE    ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  161 

planned.  At  that  time  Serbia,  under  the  Obreno- 
vitch  dynasty,  was  a  nearly  negligible  factor  in 
Balkan  affairs,  the  satellite  of  Austria  and  the  friend 
of  Turkey.  It  is  a  grave  mistake  to  suppose  that 
Serbia  had  always  been  the  protege  of  Russia. 
Again  and  again,  and  for  lengthy  periods,  whenever 
it  suited  Vienna  and  Petrograd  to  come  to  an 
arrangement,  Serbia  was  explicitly  recognized  (e.g. 
in  the  pact  of  1897  and  probably  again  in  1903)  as 
within  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence.  It  is  too 
often  forgotten  that  Russia  actually  agreed  to  the 
Austrian  occupation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as 
the  price  of  Austrian  neutrality  during  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War.  The  change  began  with  the  murder 
of  the  Austrophil  King  Alexander  (1903)  and  the 
return  of  the  Russophil  Karageorgevitch  dynasty, 
and  it  was  completed  only  with  the  open  breach 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  which  Count  Aerenthal 
and  M.  Isvolsky  brought  about  in  1908.  From  that 
moment  Serbia  was  the  vanguard  of  Russian 
influence  in  the  Balkans,  an  isolated  outpost  thrown 
across  the  route  of  any  Austro -German  advance. 
The  German  motive  was  partly  the  desire  to 
strengthen  her  ally  Austria  against  the  South -Slav 
danger,  and  partly  the  wish  to  open  the  military  road 
to  Turkey.  That  object  has  for  the  moment  been 
attained  by  the  obliteration  of  Serbia  during  the 
swift  autumn  campaign  of  1915.  The  Berlin  - 
Bagdad  line  is  to-day  wholly  under  the  control  of 
the  Central  Empires.  Control  would  be  permanently 
attained  if,  as  the  result  of  this  war,  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria  remained  the  allies  of  the  Central  Powers, 
while  Serbia  was  either  annexed  to  Austria  or 
reduced  to  a  condition  of  vassalage.  So  long  as  an 
independent  Serbia  remains,  free  to  ally  herself  with 
the  Western  Powers  and  Russia,  the  Berlin -Bagdad 
line  does  not  exist  as  a  strategical  road.  The 
Serbian  question  is  the  key  to  the  mastery  of  the  East. 

12 


1 62  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

If  we  aim  in  this  war  at  a  settlement  which  will 
assure  permanent  peace,  it  follows  that  the  one  kind 
of  success  which  we  must  labour  to  prevent  is  a 
gain  based  solely  on  strategical  requirements.  The 
Berlin -Bagdad  idea  is  the  obverse  of  the  Russian 
Constantinople  idea,  and  both  of  them  are  based  on 
the  conception  of  a  Europe  still  dominated -by  force. 
It  follows  that  we  are  bound  in  policy,  as  we  are 
pledged  in  honour,  to  see  an  independent  Serbia 
restored.  With  the  restoration  of  Serbia,  the  strate- 
gical menace  of  the  Berlin -Bagdad  line  would  be 
destroyed,  and  it  would  become,  with  the  settlement 
of  the  world's  peace,  an  innocent  highway  of 
civilization. 

There  remains  the  further  question  whether  our 
opposition  to  the  strategical  idea  Berlin -Bagdad 
need  involve  us  in  a  denial  of  a  German  ambition 
to  lead  the  economic  development  of  Turkey.  A 
truly  independent  Turkey  cannot  exist  by  its  own 
strength  in  our  generation.  It  must  either  be  par- 
titioned or  controlled.  Partition  means  the  indefinite 
prolongation  of  the  war,  and  when  it  is  achieved, 
a  triumph  rather  for  Imperialism  than  for  freedom 
and  nationality.  The  Turks  themselves,  or  at  least 
their  dominant  party,  have  made  their  choice.  They 
have  placed  themselves  under  German  direction.  To 
disturb  that  choice,  if  we  are  resolved  upon  it,  we 
must  face  an  indefinite  destruction  of  the  best  man- 
hood of  Europe.  Is  the  end  desirable  in  itself?  No 
one  who  knew  the  mind  of  Germany  before  this  war 
can  doubt  that  her  ruling  class,  including  her 
financiers  and  industrialists,  drifted  into  the  attitude 
which  made  this  war  under  a  sense  of  thwarted 
economic  ambitions.  They  saw  the  greater  part  of 
the  world  that  is  capable  of  colonization  divided 
between  Britain,  France,  and  Russia.  With  an 
economic  development  immensely  more  advanced 
than  that  of  France  and  Russia,  conscious  of  great 


THE    ROADS    OF,   THE    EAST  163 

energies,  and  counting  their  growing  population,  they 
had  turned  restlessly  for  a  generation  hither  and 
thither  in  the  search  for  new  outlets,  spheres  to 
develop,  and  "places  in  the  sun."  They  saw  the 
great  empires  growing  bigger — Morocco  and  Persia 
were  the  last  object-lessons — while  the  combination 
among  the  three  World -Powers  had  seemed  for 
a  long  series  of  years  to  forbid  their  own  expansion. 
This  mood  undoubtedly  eased  the  sudden  plunge 
into  the  crime  of  this  war.  If  European  statesman- 
ship had  been  far -sighted,  it  would  have  realized 
that  a  nation  of  such  energies  and  power  must  sooner 
or  later  be  tempted  to  seize  a  field  for  those  energies 
corresponding  to  its  power.  There  were  two  ways 
of  averting  such  a  catastrophe.  If  all  the  Powers 
could  have  been  brought  to  treat  their  dependencies, 
not  as  estates  to  be  exploited  but  as  trusts  held  for 
the  world  and  the  native  inhabitants  ;  if  the  tariff 
walls  around  most  of  them  had  been  broken  down, 
and  the  opportunities  for  mining,  railway  construction, 
and  the  like  thrown  open  impartially  to  the  enter- 
prise of  all  nations,  then,  indeed,  the  Germans  would 
have  had  no  reason  to  desire,  still  less  to  conquer, 
exclusive  markets  and  spheres  for  themselves.  Fail- 
ing that  solution,  which  our  Empire  alone  had  ever 
approached,  and  only  then  in  part,  the  prudent  course 
would  have  been  to  further  the  moderate  realization 
of  German  economic  ambitions,  and  by  an  amicable 
arrangement  to  find  for  her  a  sphere  worthy  of  her 
energies  which  she  might  develop  as  her  own.  That 
was  at  two  periods  the  policy  of  British  statesman- 
ship, and  for  the  injury  to  European  concord  we  must 
look  to  the  long  interval  occupied  by  the  Morocco 
Question  (1904-11)  which  lay  between  them.  Lord 
Salisbury  facilitated  the  acquisition  of  the  German 
African  colonies  in  1886.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on 
the  very  eve  of  this  war,  had  all  but  completed  a 
treaty  wliich  would  have  met  the  German  claim  for 


1 64  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

the  chief  share  in  the  development  of  Turkey.  After 
a  decade  of  friction  and  jealousy  we  withdrew  all 
opposition  to  the  Bagdad  line,  and  took  precautions 
in  our  own  interest  only  where  it  will  approach  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Sir  Edward  Grey  even  went  so  far 
in  withdrawing  from  competition  with  Germany  that 
he  declined  as  a  matter  of  policy  to  press  for  con- 
cessions to  British  subjects  in  Turkey.1  The  struggle 
for  the  mastery  of  the  Near  East  lay  in  1914,  not 
between  Germany  and  Britain,  but  between  Germany 
and  Russia. 

The  war  has  destroyed  the  feeling  of  goodwill 
with  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  drafted  that  statesman- 
like arrangement  over  Turkey.  On  sober  grounds  of 
policy  there  is,  however,  as  much  to  be  said  for  it  as 
in  the  days  before  the  war.  We  know  better  than  we 
did  then  what  formidable  energies  are  latent  in  the 
German  people.  Now,  as  then,  the  chief  problem 
for  European  statesmanship  is  to  turn  those  energies 
into  a  harmless  and  productive  course.  Thwart 
them,  deny  them  their  outlet,  and  once  more  they 
may  overflow  in  a  destructive  flood  ;  prepare  their 
channel  for  them,  and  they  will  help  to  turn  the 
wheels  of  civilization.  The  natural  field  for 
German  expansion  lies  in  Turkey.  The  simplest 
solution  would  be  at  the  settlement  to  revert 
to  the  British  policy  of  1914,  and  tacitly  or 
explicitly  to  recognize  the  "  predominant  interests  " 
of  Germany  in  Turkey.  That  is,  of  course,  merely 
to  accept  an  accomplished  fact,  or,  rather,  to  refrain 
from  prolonging  the  war  until  the  fact  has  been 
altered.  The  Straits  must  be  opened  under  an  inter- 
national guarantee.  The  railroad  through  Serbia 
must  be  politically  under  Serbian  control  in  the  sense 
that  only  by  her  free  consent  may  it  be  used  for  the 
transit  of  troops  ;  it  might  be  well  to  arrange  that 
this  and  other  trunk  railways  and  ports  of  the  East 

*  See  his  speech  in  the  Foreign  Office  debate,  July  10,  1914. 


THE    ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  165 

should  be  subject,  like  the  waterway  of  the  Danube, 
to  an  International  Commission,  whose  duty  it  would 
be  to  ensure  equality  of  treatment  for  the  commerce 
of  all  nations  which  use  them.  There  must  be  no 
interference  with  the  existing  rights  (including  equal 
treatment  in  the  Customs -house)  of  other  foreigners 
in  Turkey.  But  with  these  reservations  the  Powers 
should  agree  not  to  interfere  with  the  economic  con- 
trol which  Germany  has  acquired  over  the  greater 
part  of  Turkey,  and  not  to  oppose  such  further 
schemes  of  railway  building,  mining,  or  irrigation  as 
the  enterprise  of  her  subjects  may  promote.1  The 
development  of  the  country  under  German  guides 
would  bring  great  material  gains  to  its  inhabitants, 
and  their  orderly,  if  too  rigid,  discipline  would  be  a 
prompt  cure  for  the  Turkish  habit  of  slovenly  and 
indolent  disorder.  The  absorption  of  German 
energies  in  this  fruitful  but  very  difficult  task  would 
in  itself  be  a  guarantee  for  the  world's  peace. 
Before  we  dismiss  this  remedy  for  a  destructive 
militarism,  let  us  ask  ourselves  in  all  candour  how 
long  we  should  have  kept  our  warships  in  home 
waters  and  our  Army  at  Aldershot,  if  we  had  lacked 

1  It  may  be  urged  that  the  claims  of  France  to  Syria  as  "  a  sphere 
of  influence"  should  be  enforced.  Economic  aims  must  be  weighed 
against  the  claims  of  nationality  in  Europe.  The  more  the  French 
urge  their  pretensions  to  Syria,  the  harder  will  it  be  for  them  to 
secure  Alsace-Lorraine.  Until  we  know  more  of  the  Arab  rising 
in  the  Holy  Cities,  it  seems  premature  to  raise  the  question  of  the 
Caliphate.  My  own  impression  is  that  we  exaggerate  its  importance. 
A  Sultan  under  German  influence  has  clearly  ceased  to  wield 
any  real  authority  outside  his  own  dominions  as  the  spiritual  and 
political  head  of  Islam.  On  the  other  hand,  to  set  up  an  Arab 
Caliph  who  would  appear  to  owe  his  position  to  British  protection 
would  be  (if  any  one  were  so  foolish  as  to  contemplate  it)  an  entirely 
delusive  success.  A  puppet  Caliph  is  a  useless  ally  to  any  Christian 
Power.  The  plain  fact  is  that  the  Caliphate  is  to-day,  morally,  an 
obsolete  institution,  and  could  only  be  revived  by  a  Moslem  prince 
who  possessed  the  reality  of  independence,  and  power  with  prestige. 


1 66  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  vast  estate  of  India  and  Africa,  Canada  and 
Australia,  in  which  the  energies  of  Empire -builders 
and  capitalists,  the  ambitions  of  Pro -Consuls,  and  the 
high  spirits  of  adventurous  youth  find  an  innocent 
outlet  and  a  beneficent  field  of  work  ? 


III.  THE  ROAD  TO  INDIA. 

11  By  the  exercise  of  cool  judgment  and  Christian 
charity,"  the  reader  may  say,  "  I  can  just  grasp 
your  argument  that  Germany  has,  not  indeed  a 
right  but  a  reasonable  claim  to  some  share  in  the 
work  of  developing  half -civilized  countries.  Three 
years  ago  the  idea  of  a  German  Turkey  might  not 
have  seemed  more  monstrous  to  the  world  than 
the  idea  of  a  British  India,  a  British  Egypt,  a 
French  North  Africa  and  Indo -China,  and  a  Russian 
Siberia  and  Central  Asia.  But  you  have  forgotten 
that  Mesopotamia  touches  the  Persian  Gulf,  and 
that  the  Bagdad  line  is  the  short  cut  to  India. 
If  you  allow  the  Germans  to  hold  that  line,  what 
security  have  you,  that  when  they  have  spent  a 
generation  in  recuperating  from  this  war  and  in 
drilling  the  Turks,  they  will  not  lead  a  Turco- 
German  army  to  the  conquest  of  India?"  There 
can  be  no  absolute  security  against  such  a  danger. 
At  various  periods  between  the  Battle  of  the  Nile 
and  the  Battle  of  Jutland  the  French,  the  Russians, 
and  the  Germans  (or  some  aggressive  elements 
among  each  of  them)  have  coveted  India.  There 
is  only  one  security,  which  would  be  nearly  absolute, 
the  contentment  of  the  people  of  India  with  our 
rule.  If  we  know  how  to  win  that  content- 
ment and  to  deepen  it  by  the  adaptation  of 
our  institutions  to  their  progress,  we  have  little 
to  fear  from  any  aggressive  empire.  There  are 
other  guarantees  (apart  from  the  moral  guarantee 
that  the  Germans  have  suffered  lessons  in  this  war 


THE    ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  167 

which  will  not  be  forgotten  for  a  generation), 
notably  distances,  deserts  and  mountains,  and  our 
command  of  the  seas. 

Let  us  consider  briefly  what  a  Turco-German 
attack  on  India,  with  Bagdad  and  Basra  for  its  land 
and  sea  bases,  would  involve.  Note  in  the  first 
place  that  such  an  attack  could  not  take  place  without 
the  aid,  or  at  least  the  very  friendly  neutrality,  of 
Russia.  If  the  Germans,  then,  are  going  to  march 
on  India,  they  can  do  it  only  with  Russian  goodwill, 
for  Russia  would  have  to  sit  complacently  neutral 
while  the  Turco-German  armies,  with  their  flank 
all  the  while  exposed  to  Russian  attack,  prepared 
their  advance  by  land  or  sea  or  both.  Without 
Russian  connivance  a  German  march  on  India  would 
be  a  mad  adventure. 

The  fear  of  an  invasion  of  India  from  Mesopo- 
tamia must  be  put  to  the  test  of  a  large-scale 
map.  There  are  3,000  miles  of  railway  from 
Berlin  to  Bagdad.  From  Bagdad  by  land  across 
Persia  there  are  1,300  miles  before  our  outer 
defences  could  be  reached  at  the  frontiers  of 
Beluchistan.  There  is  no  railway  along  the  Persian 
shore  ;  there  is  no  road,  and  the  country  is  a 
sparsely  peopled  desert,  arid,  torrid,  and  unhealthy. 
Or,  if  the  fear  is  of  attack  by  sea  from  Basra  or 
Koweit,  there  are  two  remarks  to  be  made.  In 
the  first  place,  the  naval  police  of  the  Gulf  must 
remain  in  our  hands,  and  with  it  some  guarantees 
for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Shat-el-Arab.  Koweit 
is  and  should  remain  a  British  Protectorate. 
Secondly,  the  Turkish  ports  could  not  be  made 
into  a  naval  base  without  long  preparation.  Such 
preparation  could  not  be  hidden,  and  it  would  be 
a  legitimate  occasion  for  protest  and  interference. 
The  naval  use  of  Basra,  a  port  accessible  only  to 
vessels  of  light  draught,  might,  if  necessary,  be 
forbidden  by  treaty.  If  the  treaty  were  broken, 


1 68  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

then  ours  would  be  the  right  to  strike  first.  At 
the  worst,  a  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  the 
Persian  Gulf  is  far  from  offering  a  favourable  base 
for  a  naval  attack  on  India.  The  shore  of  its 
narrow  entrance  is  in  our  recognized  sphere,  and 
its  ports  and  islands  are  at  the  disposal  of  our 
Navy.  The  Power  that  holds  Bunder  Abbas  and 
the  islands  could  close  the  Gulf  with  minefields 
without  so  much  as  exposing  its  fleet  to  attack. 
From  the  standpoint  of  strategy,  the  wiser  course, 
if  ever  India  has  to  be  defended  against  an  attack 
from  the  West,  is  not  to  expose  ourselves  far  from 
our  own  base,  whether  in  Mesopotamia  or  in  Persia, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  to  compel  the  enemy  to  attack 
us  as  far  from  his  own  base  as  possible,  and  to 
make  of  distance  and  desert,  obstacles  which  he, 
and  not  we,  must  overcome.  The  art  of  trench 
warfare  developed  in  this  war,  and  the  discovery 
that  defensive  lines  can  be  drawn  across  a  narrow 
sea  ought  to  leave  us  few  anxieties  about  our 
ability  at  need  to  close  the  Persian  Gulf  and  to 
defend  the  natural  mountain  frontiers  of  India.  Our 
dangers  would  begin  only  if  we  insisted  on  taking 
our  stand  in  the  plains  of  Mesopotamia  or  the 
deserts  of  Persia. 

Mesopotamia  has  a  long  military  history,  iand 
even  for  a  modern  Power  the  records  of  Babylon, 
Assyria,  and  Bagdad  are  full  of  instruction.  It 
was  always  easy  to  build  up  a  powerful  civiliza- 
tion between  the  two  rivers,  but  its  wealth  made 
it  a  dazzling  lure  to  all  its  poorer  neighbours,  and 
its  flat  plains  were  never  easy  to  defend.  Babylon 
and  Nineveh  were  forced  to  expand  and  to  become 
conquering  empires,  simply  because  they  could  find 
security  only  by  holding  the  distant  mountain  chains 
which  bar  the  roads  to  the  Garden  of  Eden.  If 
we  held  Mesopotamia — still  worse,  if  we  held  only 
its  lower  half — so  far  from  having  made  our  posi- 


THE    ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  169 

tion  in  the  East  secure,  we  should  merely  have 
acquired  new  frontiers  to  defend,  and  given  our- 
selves as  neighbours  Powers  with  a  greater  military 
organization  than  our  own.  The  case  for  the  per- 
manent adoption  of  conscription  would  be  immensely 
strengthened,  and  our  new  acquisition,  profitable 
to  a  few  financiers  and  contractors,  would  prove 
to  be  a  heavy  burden  to  the  masses  of  our  popula- 
tion. It  is  a  dangerous  policy  for  a  sea  Power 
to  plant  itself  on  distant  coasts  with  the  object 
of  barring  the  access  of  land  Powers  to  the  water. 
We  curse  the  folly  which  led  us  to  play  that  part 
against  Russia ;  let  us  not  adopt  it  towards 
Germany.  The  land  Power  in  such  a  case  will 
bend  its  mind  to  the  task  of  breaking  through, 
and  we  shall  find  that  we  must  meet  it  on  land 
with  a  great  army,  and  not  merely  on  sea.  It  is 
a  mad  military  logic  which  makes  the  defence  of 
India  a  pretext  for  extending  our  Empire  over  un- 
limited stretches  of  the  earth.  We  took  the  Cape, 
Gibraltar,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  and  South  Persia 
under  the  spur  of  that  strategical  argument.  We 
have  roads  enough  to  India. 

But  is  it  really  the  strategical  argument  which 
has  led  our  Imperialists  to  propose  to  themselves 
the  acquisition  of  Mesopotamia?  They  are  at  least 
well  aware  of  its  vast  potential  wealth.  Restore 
its  ancient  canals,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that 
its  deserts  would  soon  attract  a  population  and  pro- 
duce a  wealth  as  great  as  those  of  Egypt.  It 
is  the  granary  and  the  cotton -field  of  the  future. 
I  would  urge  no  moral  argument  against  its 
acquisition.  The  Ottoman  Empire  can  plead  no 
right  against  the  civilized  world  to  keep  this  garden 
for  all  time  a  wasted  and  disorderly  desert.  Its 
native  Arabs  and  Kurds  have  little  love  for  the 
Turks,  and  few  moralists  would  care  to  defend  the 
right  of  this  sparse  and  backward  population  to 


1 70  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

exclude  the  millions  who  might  live  by  tilling  the 
soil    which   they   neglect. 

It  is  idle  to  talk  of  building  up  in  Mesopotamia 
an  Arab  national  State  under  British  protection. 
The  population,  to  begin  with,  is  mixed,  including 
Persians,  Kurds,  Jews,  and  Syrian  Christians,  as  well 
as  Arabs.  It  is  certain  that  the  Arabs  do  not  wel- 
come lour  advent  :  they  opposed  it  hotly.  Their 
ideal  is  certainly  not  the  orderly  modern  dependency, 
dominated  by  vast  capital  enterprises,  which  we 
should  create.  Nor  could  the  Arab  character  of 
the  country  survive  for  long,  for  its  rapid  develop- 
ment "would  soon  promote  immigration,  and  the 
Indians,  whether  settlers  or  coolies,  would  soon  out- 
number the  Arabs.  This  romantic  devotion  to 
Arab  nationalism  (a  thing1  which  does  not  in 
any  Western  sense  exist)  is  a  very  thin  disguise 
for  the  economic  and  strategical  motives  which 
really  explain  our  interests  in  this  potentially 
wealthy  region.  Mesopotamia  must  be  reclaimed, 
and  will  be  reclaimed,  and  the  only  question 
is  whether  the  work  shall  be  done  by  British  or 
German  or  international  enterprise.  A  strong  argu- 
ment might  be  put  forward  for  an  attempt  to  set 
up  a  system  of  control  and  development  by  inter- 
national institutions.  Turkish  suzerainty  might  be 
retained,  and  might  even  again  become  effective, 
if  Turkey  should  in  the  interval  reform.  A  Com- 
mission might  be  named  by  the  League  of  Nations 
to  develop  this  rich  source  of  raw  materials  for  the 
good  of  its  inhabitants  and  the  benefit  of  the  world. 
It  is  worth  considering  whether  the  Armenians  might 
be  assisted  to  settle  here.  If  Indians  are  introduced, 
it  ought  to  be  as  free  settlers  and  not  as  indentured 
coolies.  The  share  of  the  capital  of  the  various 
Powers  in  the  work  of  development  must  be  adjusted 
equitably.  The  irrigation  contracts,  railway  and 
harbour  construction,  the  oil-wells  and  the  like 


THE    ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  171 

afford  ample  scope  for  a  reasonable  division  among 
British,  German,  and  other  contractors.  All  these 
enterprises  ought  to  be  treated  not  as  sources  of 
profit  for  foreigners,  but  as  the  means  of  civilizing 
and  building  up  the  whole  of  Turkey  :  every 
concession  ought  after  a  term  of  years  to  revert 
to  the  State.  This  sphere  of  work  must  not 
be  closed  to  our  present  enemies,  still  less  must 
it  be  monopolized  for  ourselves.  In  the  long 
run,  our  children  and  children's  children  will  have 
cause  to  regret  our  decision  if  we  should  insist 
on  adding  Mesopotamia  to  our  own  Empire.  An 
impartial  tribunal,  if  it  were  to  allot  the  still  un- 
appropriated "  places  in  the  sun,"  would  have  some 
regard  to  "  equality  of  opportunity  "  among  the 
Powers.  It  would  not  always  give  "  to  him  who 
hath."  It  would  remind  us  that  we  already  hold 
sway  over  a  fourth  of  the  inhabited  earth.  It 
would  ask  us  whether  with  Egypt  and  India  already 
in  our  possession,  we  need  another  great  dependency 
of  the  same  type.  Our  people  ;went  into  this  war 
with  a  disinterested  purpose.  History  will  judge 
us,  not  by  our  mind  as  we  went  in,  but  by  our 
hands  as  we  come  out.  A  nation  which  wages 
war  for  an  idea  must  come  out  of  it  with  empty 
hands.  Its  reward  must  be  the  triumph  of  the  idea. 
A  similar  strategic  problem,  crossed  with  a 
romantic  national  idea,  presents  itself  in  Palestine. 
The  younger  school  of  our  soldiers  insists  that 
Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal  will  never  be  secure,  if 
the  Turks,  with  the  Germans  behind  them,  are  left 
in  possession  of  the  Holy  Land.  The  older  school 
held,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  desert  of  Sinai  was 
the  best  protection  which  the  Canal  could  have. 
Strategical  arguments  are  always  apt  to  lead  to  an 
infinite  process.  Suppose  that  we  secure  Palestine  : 
it  would  have  a  northern  frontier.  To  make  this 
secure,  we  must  encourage  the  French  to  take  Syria, 


172  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

and  so,  step  by  step,  we  reach  the  total  dismember- 
ment of  Turkey.  There  is  no  finality  in  this  search 
for  security.  If  we  allow  it  to  lead  us  into  annexa- 
tions, we  cannot  resist  similar  claims  by  our  Allies. 
In  the  end  every  one  will  be  "  secure,"  except  the 
enemy  (who  by  hypothesis  has  been  defeated),  and 
his  "  insecurity  "  will  then  become  for  him  a  motive 
for  new  wars.  The  answer  to  all  these  arguments, 
whether  they  apply  to  Palestine  or  Constantinople, 
to  the  Adriatic  or  the  Rhine,  to  Mesopotamia  or 
to  Belgium,  is  that  security  in  the  future  must  be 
sought  not  by  material  guarantees  buf  by  the  cove- 
nanted co-operation  of  nations.  There  is  another 
reason  for  distrusting  these  confident  arguments 
which  promise  us  security  if  we  acquire  this  or  the 
other  frontier.  Who  can  foresee  the  developments 
in  the  next  twenty  years  of  aircraft  and  the  sub- 
marine? Invention  laughs  at  our  strategical  lock- 
smiths. 

While  we  must  resist  any  thought  of  turning 
Palestine  into  a  British  dependency,  the  idea  of 
promoting  Zionist  hopes  at  the  settlement  must  not 
be  lost  sight  of.  It  is  incomparably  more  important 
in  the  interest  of  the  Jews  to  secure  a  general  charter 
of  equal  rights  for  them,  than  to  promote  their  settle- 
ment in  the  Holy  Land.  But  these  two  purposes 
are  not  exclusive  and  both  deserve  attention.  The 
Zionist  claim  is  for  some  corner  of  the  earth  in  which 
they  may  build  up  a  self-governing  Jewish  society, 
where  they  may  develop  their  own  language,  their 
own  culture,  their  own  institutions,  overshadowed 
by  no  other  civilization.  Palestine  in  their  hands 
would  become  a  hearth  and  focus  of  national,  in- 
tellectual, and  religious  life,  for  this  people  scattered 
in  two  hemispheres.  Their  agricultural  colonies  have 
done  miraculously  well,  and  one  would  wish  to  make 
all  the  necessary  conditions  for  their  development. 
As  yet,  however,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 


THE    ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  173 

Jews  are  not  the  majority  in  Palestine.  The  least 
that  should  be  done  would  be  to  place  these  colonies 
under  the  special  fostering  protection  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  which  would  name  a  Commission  to 
promote  Jewish  immigration  and  to  watch  the 
interests  of  the  settlers.  Eventually,  as  the  Jewish 
population  increased,  a  Jewish  State  might  be 
created,  with  the  guarantee  of  the  League.  The 
intermediate  stage  would  be  to  make  it  an  area 
directly  administered  by  the  League.  The  objec- 
tions of  the  Turks  to  this  and  other  infringements 
of  their  sovereignty  would  yield  readily  to  united 
pressure,  if  it  were  accompanied  by  financial  com- 
pensations which  will  relieve  them  from  bankruptcy. 

IV.  THE  REFORM  OF  TURKEY. 

Strategy  and  economics  do  not  exhaust  the  long 
chapter  of  problems  which  Turkey  will  present  to 
the  world  at  the  Settlement.  Let  us  beware  of 
using  the  claims  of  humanity  as  a  thin  cloak  for 
Imperialism,  but  let  us  not  on  that  account  forget 
them.  The  Concert  of  Europe  was  throughout  last 
century  a  miserably  ineffective  instrument  of  reform. 
It  was  ruined  by  the  shifting  and  competing  am- 
bitions of  the  Great  Powers.  Undeterred  by  the 
comparative  failure  of  internationalism  in  the  past, 
we  are  proposing  to  give  it  everywhere  a  bolder 
extension.  In  Turkey  also  we  must  return  to  the 
principle  of  international  control  or  guidance,  striving 
only  to  make  it  more  disinterested,  more  harmonious, 
and  less  galling  to  the  Turks.  Russian  ambitions 
are  eliminated.  British  ambitions  have  no  need  of 
this  field.  If  the  general  idea  is  that  Turkey  as  a 
whole  shall  be  recognized  as  the  natural  sphere  of 
German  commercial  expansion,  it  follows  that  Ger- 
many should  be  allowed  to  lead  in  the  work  pf 
economic  development,  without,  however,  acquiring 
a  monopoly  or  excluding  the  influence  of  others. 


174  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

It  would  be  rash  to  sketch  any  detailed  scheme  at 
this  stage,  for  we  know  little  of  the  internal  life 
of  Turkey  during  these  years  of  war.  It  has  not 
all  been  retrograde  :  the  position  of  women,  for 
example,  has  immensely  improved,  and  the  Germans, 
in  their  own  interests,  have  done,  or  tried  to  do,  much 
for  the  development  of  agriculture.  Their  experts 
are  already  installed  in  the  various  ministries,  and 
this  innovation  may  be  permanent.  The  old  inter- 
national control  over  finance  will  probably  be 
revived,  and  might  be  extended.  German  influence 
may  be  trusted  to  do  its  work  ably  on  the  material 
side.  Whatever  scope  may  be  conceded  to  the 
Germans  in  Turkey,  the  general  scheme  of  European 
disarmament  must  be  applied  with  rigid  precautions 
to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  It  must  not  become  a 
German  military  auxiliary. 

The  special  function  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
of  international  as  distinct  from  German  control, 
would  naturally  be  to  watch  over  the  interests  of 
the  non-Turkish  races.  For  my  own  part  I  expect 
but  moderate  benefits  from  the  introduction  of 
parliamentary  institutions  :  a  generation  may  pass 
before  they  bear  fruit.  Nor  is  it  desirable  to  insist 
in  many  cases  on  the  creation  of  autonomous  areas. 
That  policy  always  looks  like  the  beginning  of 
dismemberment,  arouses  Turkish  suspicions,  promotes 
Imperialist  intrigues,  and  exposes  any  part  of  the 
favoured  race  which  may  be  left  outside  the  protected 
area  to  persecution.  The  key  to  reform  lies,  to  my 
thinking,  in  a  development  of  the  ancient  Turkish 
institution  of  the  "  Millet."  Every  nationality  in 
Turkey,  grouped  around  its  Church,  had  in  the 
past  its  own  extensive  and  comparatively  secure 
privileges,  especially  in  the  field  of  education.  If 
the  central  lay  synods  or  councils  of  the  nationalities 
could  be  democratized  somewhat  further,  they  would 
yield  a  representative  system  with  more  reality  and 


THE   ROADS    OF   THE    EAST  175 

promise  in  it  than  the  pseudo- occidental  parliament 
of  the  Young  Turks.  If  the  Arabs  of  Syria  and  the 
Kurds  were  recognized,  like  the  Greeks,  Armenians,, 
and  Jews  as  separate  "  Millets,"  their  national 
development  would  begin  on  a  secure  foundation. 
The  supreme  mistake  of  the  Young  Turks  was  to 
break  down  this  traditional  oriental  system  of  tolera- 
tion, instead  of  developing  it.  The  League  of 
Nations  might  well  take  over  the  work  of  the  old 
Concert,  by  nominating  a  small  expert  "  Com- 
mission of  Nationalities  "  to  evolve  and  watch  over  a 
plan  of  reform  on  this  basis.  Each  "  Millet  "  or 
nationality  would  have  its  own  elected  council 
to  administer  its  own  schools  and  communal  asso- 
ciations, to  present  its  grievances  to  the  Porte,  and 
to  consider  legislative  proposals.  Collectively  these 
councils  might  form  an  Ottoman  Senate.  This 
scheme  may  look  puzzling  and  unattractive  to  the 
Western  reader.  It  would  please  Greeks  and 
Armenians,  however,  and  it  would  not  alarm  the 
Turks,  as  any  plan  of  territorial  autonomy  will 
always  do . 

It  remains  to  consider  the  terrible  special  case  of 
the  Armenians.  Some  data  are  lacking.  HQW 
many,  after  the  last  unexampled  massacre,  are  left 
alive  ?  Can  Russia  be  induced  to  modify  her  formula 
of  "no  annexations  "  so  far  as  to  take  over  some 
part  at  least  of  the  Armenian  area?  The  real  diffi- 
culty is,  of  course,  that  even  before  the  massacre 
the  Armenians  were  a  scattered  minority.  In  none 
of  the  six  "  Armenian  Vilayets  "  (provinces)  were 
they  a  majority.  Their  numbers  are  now  so  much 
reduced  that  it  seems  futile  to  talk  of  reviving  the 
ancient  Armenian  State.  The  wiser  course  might 
be  to  promote  the  migration  of  the  survivors.  An 
International  Commission  might  be  set  up  which 
would  assess  the  value?  of  their  lands  and  properties 
as  it  stood  before  the  massacre,  pay  this  over  to 


17.6  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

those  who  remain  alive,  and  find  for  them  in  Turkey 
a  suitable  place  of  refuge,  expropriating  compul- 
sorily  with  full  compensation  the  Mussulman  in- 
habitants of  this  selected  area.  The  chosen  area 
must  be  large  enough  to  allow  for  the  natural  in- 
crease of  population,  and  it  must  be  situated  on  the 
coast  or  next  to  the  frontier  of  the  Russian  Caucasus 
so  as  to  ensure  European  protection.  This  area 
might  be  found  in  the  zone  occupied  by  the  Russians 
(Erzeroum,  Van,  and  Trebizond),  or  in  Mesopotamia, 
or  perhaps  in  "  Lesser  Armenia,"  round  Adana  and 
Mersina.  Whether  under  Russian  or  international 
control,  this  New  Armenia  must  be  wholly  withdrawn 
from  direct  Turkish  rule.  The  promotion  of  migra- 
tion, as  far  as  possible  by  direct  exchange  of  lands, 
under  international  auspices,  might  indeed  be  at- 
tempted generally,  and  on  a  large  scale,  especially 
in  the  Balkans,  as  a  means  of  curing,  without  need- 
less hardships,  the  desperate  mixture  of  races  which 
often  renders  a  just  partition  impossible. 

If  this  war  should  end,  as  other  wars  that  arose 
from  the  Eastern  question  have  ended,  without  the 
creation  pf  any  permanent  International  Society, 
these  proposals  would  be  hopelessly  inadequate. 
This  war  must  end,  however,  in  the  creation  of  an 
organism  which  can  work  steadily  upon  the  problem 
of  reform.  It  must  begin  by  eliminating  the  rivalries 
based  on  strategy  and  economics .  These  have  always 
been  the  disturbing  and  distorting  factors  in  the  past. 
The  Powers  never  dealt  sincerely  with  the  problem 
of  reform,  because  most  of  them  were  thinking  only 
of  their  military  and  commercial  interests.  To 
these  the  interests  both  of  the  Turks  and  of  the 
subject  races  were  heartlessly  sacrificed.  It  was 
not  so  much  intolerance  as  the  Turkish  dread  of 
European  Imperialism,  which  led  to  the  historic 
massacres  of  Bulgarians  and  Armenians.  They  were 
slaughtered,  not  so  much  because  they  were  Chris- 


THE    ROADS    OF,    THE    EAST          177, 

tians  as  because  they  were  the  partisans  and 
proteges  of  Powers  which  coveted  Turkish  lands. 
When  these  rivalries  have  been  satisfied  or  re- 
nounced, the  path  will  be  clear  to  the  disinterested 
work  which  humanity  demands  from  us  all  in 
Turkey. 


V, 


THE  FUTURE  OF  ALLIANCES 

IN  his  sketch  of  a  Christian  commonwealth  which 
should  ensure  perpetual  peace,  the  Abbe*  de  Saint  - 
Pierre  laid  it  down  as  an  axiom  that  no  partial 
league  would  or  could  be  formed  within  the  great 
Confederation.  This  stipulation  reminds  us  of  the 
deadly  sentence  in  which  Rousseau  damned  at  once 
the  scheme  and  the  contemporary  world.  There 
was,  he  said,  nothing  impossible  about  the  scheme, 
save  that  it  should  ever  be  adopted  by  princes. 
On  this  question  of  alliances  or  leagues  within  the 
great  alliance,  theory  and  reality  seem  to  stand  in 
the  sharpest  contradiction.  From  the  standpoint 
of  principle,  any  student  who  attempted  to  work 
out  the  plan  of  a  league  .of  peace  would  be  driven 
to  Saint -Pierre's  position  :  partial  alliances  within 
the  League  of  Nations  would  menace  it  with  dis- 
ruption. If  they  were  offensive,  they  would  imply, 
a  willingness  in  some  conditions  to  make  war  in 
spite  of  the  League.  If  they  were  defensive,  they 
would  imply  a  doubt  of  the  goodwill  of  other 
members,  and  also  of  the  League's  ability  to  carry 
out  the  general  obligation  of  mutual  defence  which 
is  its  foundation.  If  I  really  believe  that,  should 
I  be  attacked,  all  my  neighbours  will  rush  to  my 
defence,  I  shall  not  be  at  pains  to  bind  one  rather 
than  another  by  a  special  promise  to  defend  me. 
The  line,  moreover,  between  defensive  and 

offensive    alliances    is    notoriously    hard    to  draw. 

173 


THE    FUTURE    OF.   ALLIANCES         179 

From  the  moment  that  the  making  of  alliances 
began,  each  alliance  would  call  forth  its  counter- 
acting alliance,  and  the  League  would  be  what 
Europe  was  before  this  war,  an  uneasy  collection 
of  groups,  arming  and  intriguing  against  each  other, 
divided  by  mutual  suspicions  and  partisanships. 
Since  each  Power  must  care  first  of  all  for  its  own 
allies,  the  hope  that  conferences  or  Councils  of 
Conciliation  would  ever  render  an  impartial  or 
objective  decision  would  be  slight.  A  Power,  like 
the  United  States,  standing  outside  the  two  chief 
groups  might,  indeed,  mediate  between  them  ;  but 
that  responsibility  might  in  the  long  run  prove 
toos,  onerous,  and  the  Power  which  attempted  to 
take  this  duty  on  itself  might  come  to  be  regarded 
as  an  aspiring  dictator.  The  belief  that  the  system 
of  groups  might  by  creating  a  balance  in  Europe 
preserve  the  peace,  since  each  must  be  so  for- 
midable that  an  attack  would  always  be  risky,  was 
very  generally  held  on  the  eve  of  this  war.  It  was 
often  advanced  as  a  tenable  theory,  and  WSLS  put 
forward  by  official  and  inspired  writers  in  all 
countries  whenever  it  was  necessary  to  answer  the 
critics  of  the  system.  The  Balance  of  Power 
is  in  some  contexts  a  peculiarly  British  policy, 
but  it  was  adopted  universally  in  the  last  genera- 
tion. No  one  knows  what  exactly  are  the  terms 
of  the  Franco -Russian  Alliance  (contracted  in 
;i894),  but  the  most  authoritative  of  contemporary 
French  historians  states  that  it  is  a  pledge  to  give 
mutual  support  if  the  diplomatic  concert  had  failed 
"to  maintain  peace  and  the  European  balance."'1 
References  to  peace  and  the  Balance  of  Power 
became  commonplaces  in  royal  toasts.  Statesmen 
really  believed  in  the  salutary  effect  of  "  the  group  - 
ing  of  the  European  Powers,  whose  value  for  the 
preservation  of  the  Balance  of  Power  and  peace 

1  See  Debidour,  "  Histoire  Diplomatique,"  vol.  iii.  p.  193. 


i8o  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

is  proved."  '  It  is  generally  supposed  that  idealists 
have  a  monopoly  of  illusions.  Those  of  the  prac- 
tical man  are  as  fantastic,  and  they  are  commonly 
duller.  Need  one  point  out  to-day  why  a  Balance 
of  Power  is  always  a  precarious — nay,  an  impos- 
sible— expedient  for  the  preservation  of  peace  ?  No 
one  sincerely  wants  a  balance,  in  the  sense  of  an 
exact  equilibrium  of  forces.  Each  side  strives  to 
make  a  balance  favourable  to  itself.  No  Power 
or  group  of  Powers  was  ever  known  to  refuse  an 
accession  of  strength,  lest  thereby  it  should  disturb 
the  balance.  Calculation  of  the  balanced  forces 
does  not  suffice  to  prevent  war,  because  the  hope 
is  always  present  that  some  part  of  the  enemy's 
structure  of  alliances  will  break  down,  as  the  Italian 
and  Roumanian  outworks  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
did,  or  else  that  his  armaments  may  prove  to  be 
less  formidable  than  they  appear.  The  group  system 
seemed  to  prevent  some  wars.  Thus  it  is  known 
that  Germany  twice  vetoed  aggressive  action  by 
Austria  in  the  Balkans  during  the  crisis  of  1912-13. 
But  we  may  make  too  much  of  such  a  service. 
If  there  had  been  no  strong  ally  behind  Austria, 
she  would  not  have  dared  on  these  two  occasions 
even  to  dream  of  aggression  ;  nor  would  she  have 
ventured  on  her  Bosnian  coup  in  1908,  and,  above 
all,  she  would  not  have  challenged  Russia  by  her 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  in  1914.  A"  strong  Power 
cannot  always  veto  the  forward  policy  of  an  ally  ; 
if  it  invariably  did  so,  its  alliance  would  not  be 
in  request.  The  common  apology  for  alliances, 
that  they  are  always  defensive,  need  hardly  detain 
us.  In  modern  times  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
aggression  :  it  is  understood  that  every  war  is  for 
every  participant  in  it  defensive  in  motive.  Even 
the  alliance  contracted  by  the  Balkan  States  in  1912; 

1  From  the  official  communication  issued  after  the  meeting  of  the 
Tsar  and  the  Kaiser  in  July  1912  (Reventlovv,  p.  440). 


THE    FUTURE    OF   ALLIANCES         181 

for  the  dismemberment  of  European  Turkey  was 
based  on  a  treaty  which  was  in  form  purely  defen- 
sive. Defence  may  be  defined  as  the  movements 
of  one's  own  sword.  But  even  if  an  ally  feels 
in  his  own  inner  mind  that  his  partner  is  acting 
aggressively,  he  may  not  feel  free  to  leave  him 
to  his  fate.  The  consequences  of  allowing  one's 
ally  to  be  destroyed  might  be  fatal  to  oneself.  If, 
for  example,  Germany  had  said  in  1914  that  Austria 
was  behaving  aggressively,  and  had  refused  to  sup- 
port her  (at  one  moment  the  German  Chancellor 
did  threaten  to  use  such  pressure),  Austria  might 
have  drawn  back  ;  but  if  she  had  chosen  to  persist, 
Germany  could  hardly  have  remained  neutral,  for 
the  collapse  and  dismemberment  of  Austria  would 
have  left  Germany  isolated  and  weakened.  If  we 
had  chosen  to  think  (it  would  have  been  a 
grotesquely  perverse  view)  that  France  acted  aggres- 
sively in  1914,  could  we  have  afforded  to  remain 
neutral  to  the  end?  Some  of  the  considerations 
which  weighed  with  us  when  we  held  France  to 
be  innocent  of  aggressive  motives  would  have  been 
as  cogent  if  she  had  been  guilty — in  neither  case 
could  we  have  allowed  her  to  be  weakened 
beyond  a  certain  point  without  grave  danger  to 
ourselves.  The  Balance  of  Power  is  a  non-moral 
idea,  and  one  cannot  import  moral  conceptions  into 
it.  If  an  alliance  is  a  necessary  part  of  one's 
own  defensive  system,  it  follows  that  one  cannot 
allow  one's  ally  to  be  weakened,  whatever  one  may 
privately  think  of  his  conduct.  Of  the  system  of 
alliances  which  prevailed  in  Europe  before  this  war 
one  can  say  only  one  thing  with  complete  confi- 
dence :  it  made  it  certain  that  any  European  war 
must  be  a  universal  war.  Alliances,  moreover,  are 
open  to  all  the  grave  moral  objections  which  Tolstoy 
raised  against  oaths — the  objections  which  that  un- 
deservedly neglected  philosopher  Godwin  advanced 


1 82  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

against  all  promises.1  It  was  plain  to  us  all  that 
alliances  frustrated  the  Concert  since,  on  each  issue 
that  arose,  they  made  every  Power  in  advance  a 
fettered  and  committed  partisan.  They  would  make 
a  League  of  Peace  unworkable. 

If  this  theoretical  objection  to  alliances  be  sound, 
it  is  plain  that  the  League  of  Peace  lies  in  the 
dim  future,  if  it  is  even  there.  The  whole  trend 
of  our  thought  is  to  render  alliances  more  per- 
manent, more  intimate,  and  more  pervasive.  So 
far  from  proposing  to  dissolve  them  after  this  war, 
the  study  of  all  our  practical  statesmen  is  how 
we  may  deepen  and  extend  them1.  It  is  pro- 
posed to  carry  them  from  warfare  into  commerce. 
We  are  to  base  upon  them  our  tariffs,  our  shipping 
legislation,  our  whole  system  of  production  and 
exchange.  This  is  more  than  policy  :  it  answers 
to  a  deep  sense  of  comradeship.  Nations  which 
have  mingled  their  blood  in  one  trench  will  never 
hereafter  think  of  each  other  as  strangers.  This 
tendency  is  as  marked  on  the  other  side  as  it  is 
on  ours.  The  ideal  of  a  "-  Central  Europe  "  united 
for  war  and  trade  was  preached  with  lofty 
eloquence  and  glowing  sentiment  by  Dr.  Naumann 
long  before  our  own  programme  had  been  defined 
in  the  Paris  Resolutions.  If  the  Allies  impose 
terms  on  Germany,  they  will  have  to  maintain  their 
bond,  in  order  to  ensure  to  themselves  the  fruits 
of  their  victory.  If  they  acquire  territory,  their 
next  thought  will  be  how  best  to  defend  it.  The 
suggestion  that  we  should  dissolve  the  Alliance 

1  If  my  promise  contradicts  n?y  duty,  it  is  immoral  ;  if  it  agrees  with 
it,  it  teaches  me  to  do  that  from  a  precarious  and  temporary  motive 
which  ought  to  be  done  from  its  intrinsic  recommendations.  ...  By 
promising  we  bind  ourselves  to  learn  nothing  from  time,  to  make 
no  use  of  knowledge  to  be  acquired.  .  .  .  Promises  deprive  us  of  a 
full  use  of  our  understanding. — Political  Justice. 


THE    FUTURE   OF    ALLIANCES         183 

would  certainly  excite  to-day  in  most  men's  minds 
a  mingled  fear  and  indignation.  It  is  not  so  certain 
that  this  feeling  will  be  permanent.  Their  co- 
operation in  the  Crimea  was  far  from  leaving  a 
sense  of  mutual  trust  in  the  breasts  of  British  and 
French  statesmen  sixty  years  ago.  The  Allies  will 
all  be  heavily  in  our  debt,  and  the  relation  of 
debtor  and  creditor  is  rarely  the  happiest.  The 
working  out  of  the  Paris  Programme  will  demand 
from  every  one  a  continual  sacrifice  of  legitimate 
interests.  Large  coalitions  composed  of  partners 
whose  risks  and  services,  whose  development  and 
resources  are  markedly  unequal,  inevitably  develop 
jealousies  and  the  sense  of  imperilled  inde- 
pendence. The  current  Allied  view  of  the  hostile 
coalition  is  that  it  is  composed  of  a  bully  and  his 
vassals.  The  Germans  take  an  equally  unflattering 
view  of  our  own  combination.  These  are  the 
exaggerations  of  enmity  ;  but  it  is  true  that  every 
coalition  must  impose  unequal  burdens  and  require 
some  measure  of  subordination.  But  whatever  the 
future  of  alliances  may  be,  it  is  in  the  last  degree 
unlikely  that  Europe  will,  after  the  war,  dare  to 
dispense  with  them.  The  architect  of  a  League, 
of  Peace  who  set  out  with  the  axiom  that  alliances 
are  treason  to  the  League,  would  write  himself  down 
a  hopeless  doctrinaire.  If  alliances  are  to  be  shaped 
on  the  aggressive  lines  of  the  Paris  Programme, 
then  it  is  idle  to  speculate  about  any  League  of 
Peace.  But  alliances  may  survive  in  the  sense  that 
some  Powers  will  continue  to  shape  their  external 
policy  in  common,  and  to  concert  together  their 
means  of  defence.  Are  such  bonds  necessarily  a 
barrier  to  any  general  League  ? 

In  theory  any  alliance  within  a  League  is  at 
best  superfluous,  as  at  worst  it  must  be  subversive. 
Let  us  beware,  however,  lest  we  fall  victims  to 
theory.  The  same  individualist  reasoning  led 


.184  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

Rousseau  to  the  doctrine  that  any  association  of 
citizens  within  the  State  is  implicitly  treason  against 
it.  That  view  has  been  the  parent  of  much  oppres- 
sion from  the  days  of  the  French  Revolution  down- 
wards. An  international  League,  like  a  national 
State,  can  tolerate  many  associations  and  parties 
within  itself,  provided  there  be  loyalty  in  all  to 
the  conception  of  the  general  good  and  obedience 
to  the  general  will.  The  surest  way  to  destroy  this 
loyalty  or  to  prevent  its  growth  would  be  to  frown 
iupon  associations  which  have  an  historical  or 
emotional  meaning.  Within  our  League  there  must 
be  room  for  temporary  and  even  for  permanent 
groupings  among  States  which  have  a  common  past, 
which  pursue  identical  ends,  share  common  interests, 
and  are  conscious  of  close  affinity  in  race  or  civi- 
lization. If  we  must  admit  so  much,  is  it  possible 
in  practice  to  forbid  States  which  are  aware  of 
these  closer  bonds  and  habitually  act  in  accord- 
ance with  them,  to  express  their  unity  by  contract- 
ing military  obligations  towards  each  other  ?  In 
practice  such  alliances  will  imperil  the  League,  but 
if  we  must  take  the  view  that  they  would  utterly 
destroy  it,  then  it  seems  that  the  creation  of  the 
League  must  be  postponed.  To  postpone  it  may 
well  be  to  refuse  it  altogether,  for  if  once  the 
process  of  competitive  arming  starts  again,  aggra- 
vated by  the  trade  war,  Europe  will  not  move 
towards  the  League,  and  only  a  miracle  or  a 
revolution  would  bring  it  within  our  tgrasp. 

There  were  not  wanting,  in  the  past,  expedients 
by  which  the  Powers  sought  to  modify  the  apparent 
menace  of  their  hostile  confrontations.  Of  reassuring 
declarations  there  was  never  any  lack.  We  always 
maintained  that  while  the  Entente  Cordiale  implied 
a  special  intimacy  with  France  it  had  no  "  point  " 
against  Germany.  When,  however,  "  conversa- 
tions "  of  our  military  and  naval  representatives 


THE    FUTURE    OF   ALLIANCES         185 

were  followed  by  significant  changes  in  the  dis- 
positions of  the  two  fleets,  it  was  plain  that  while 
the  Entente  might  be  defensive  in  intention,  its 
defence  was  adjusted  to  the  assumption  ,  that 
Germany  was  the  common  enemy.  The  intimate 
links  between  the  German  and  Russian  Courts  were 
another  device  which  probably  did  achieve  much 
to  soften  political  and  military  rivalry,  but  the  ex- 
change of  telegrams  between  the  Kaiser  and  the 
Tsar  on  the  eve  of  this  war  showed  how  frail  a 
support  of  peace  such  personal  relations  must  always 
be  when  national  passions  are  aroused.  The  various 
interpenetrations  that  went  on  between  the  two 
systems  ought  to  have  lessened  their  latent 
antagonism,  but  the  general  effect  of  these  partial 
approaches  was  rarely  happy.  When  Italy  com- 
posed her  long  feud  with  France,  and  entered  into 
friendly  arrangements  with  her  in  Mediterranean 
questions,  the  German  comment  was  that  Italy  was 
being  "  debauched  "  from  her  alliance,  while  {he 
French  congratulated  themselves  that  they  were 
"  dislocating  "  the  Triple  Alliance.1  The  same 
moral  discomfort  followed  for  a  time  the  close 
approach  of  Russia,  under  M.  Sazonoff's  .guidance, 
to  Germany  in  the  Potsdam  agreement  of  1910. 
Our  own  attempts  to  reach  an  Anglo -German  under- 
standing in  1912  and  1913,  though  they  resulted 

1  Indeed,  the  equivocal  position  of  Italy  may  well  have  been  one 
of  the  reasons  which  led  the  German  Chancellor  to  dislike  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  proposal  of  mediation  by  the  four  neutral  Powers 
in  July  1914.  In  a  dispute  between  Russia  and  Austria,  it  seemed 
at  a  first  glance  that  Germany  and  Italy,  Great  Britain  and  France 
would  constitute  a  well-balanced  jury.  Two  of  the  four  were  allies 
of  Austria,  a  third  the  ally  and  the  fourth  the  close  friend  of  Russia. 
But  Italy  was  an  ally  only  in  name,  and  perhaps  the  least  likely  of  all 
the  four  Powers  to  adopt  an  attitude  friendly  to  Austria.  The  German 
Chancellor  may  possibly  have  thought  that  he  was  being  invited 
to  enter  a  council  in  which  the  voting  would  be  three  to  one 
against  him. 


1 86  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

in  real  good  feeling  and  in  a  comprehensive  set 
of  understandings  between  the  two  Governments, 
and  served  to  bridge  the  dangerous  Balkan  crisis, 
did  not  avail  to  improve  the  general  relations  of 
the  two  groups.  Franco -German,  and  eventually 
Russo-German,  relations  grew  in  1913  and  1914 
steadily  worse,  and  the  rivalry  in  land  armaments 
reached  a  phase  of  intolerable  menace. 

There  always  was  in  the  minds  of  our  statesmen 
a  sharp  distinction  between  an  entente  and  an 
alliance.  We  were  not  (after  the  close  of  the 
Morocco  episode)  bound  by  any  formal  treaty  to 
support  France  or  Russia.  None  the  less,  by  the 
general  trend  of  our  policy,  but  above  all  by 
the  contingent  military  and  naval  arrangements 
which  we  had  made  with  them,  we  had  led  them 
to  form  well-grounded  hopes  of  our  support,  while 
we  had  allowed  or  encouraged  France  an  the  dis- 
posal of  her  Fleet  to  act  on  these  hopes.  When 
the  crisis  came,  there  seemed  to  be  a  chance  that 
an  expert  diplomatist  might  make  use  of  the  un- 
certainty of  our  attitude  in  the  interests  of  peace. 
If  Germany  and  Austria  were  sure  that  we  should 
oppose  them  by  arms,  while  Russia  and  France  were 
left  in  doubt  whether  we  should  support  them,  each 
side  would  have  the  appropriate  motive  for 
moderation.  The  Foreign  Office  probably  aimed 
at  producing  these  two  distinct  impressions.  It 
would  have  been  an  almost  impossibly  difficult  feat, 
and  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  did  not  succeed.  France, 
if  we  may  judge  by  the  tone  of  President 
Poincare's  letter  to  the  King,  really  was  for  a  few 
days  in  painful  doubt,  but  she  was  not  formally 
a  principal  in  the  quarrel,  and  could  do  little  to 
avoid  it.  Russia,  on  the  one  hand,  did  by  some 
means  reach  the  conviction  that  she  could  rely  on 
our  naval  aid,  and  this  undoubtedly  strengthened 
her  attitude  at  the  critical  moment.  Germany,  on 


THE   FUTURE   OF   ALLIANCES         187. 

the  other  hand,  whether  because  her  Ambassador 
was  too  sanguine,  or  because  our  marked  friendli- 
ness since  1912  had  impressed  her  unduly,  or 
because  she  misread  the  national  character,  did  not 
believe  until  the  last  moment  that  we  would  fight. 
Her  surprise  and  fury,  when  at  last  she  realized 
the  truth,  do  not  authorize  any  criticism  of  our 
good  intentions,  but  they  do  suggest  that  the  loose, 
uncertain  tie  of  an  entente  has  grave  disad- 
vantages which  render  it  a  doubtful  instrument  of 
peace.  When  the  Germans  blamed  Sir  Edward 
Grey  for  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  they  implied 
that  if  they  had  realized  in  time  that  he  would 
fight  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France,  they 
would  and  could  have  avoided  the  war.  It  is 
from  their  standpoint  a  deadly  admission,  for  it 
convicts  them,  at  the  first  stages  of  the  crisis  of 
bullying.  At  the  risk  of  passing  moral  condem- 
nation on  themselves,  they  succeed  in  making  a 
technical  criticism  of  us.  The  loosely  knit 
entente  was  not,  as  things  turned  out,  an 
improvement  in  diplomatic  technique  on  the  old 
alliance.  It  may,  indeed,  have  been  adopted,  not 
because  our  Foreign  Office  supposed  that  it  was 
preferable  to  the  conventional  continental  defensive 
alliance,  but  because  public  opinion,  and  especially 
Liberal  opinion,  was  not  prepared  for  a  closer  tie 
even  with  France  and  did  not,  in  fact,  realize  how 
close  the  tie  had  become.  As  an  instrument  designed 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  the  entente  had  all 
the  disadvantages  of  an  alliance,  for  no  allianca 
could  have  dug  a  sharper  and  deeper  chasm  across 
Europe  than  that  which  the  creation  of  the  entente 
caused  from  1905  to  1911.  It  lacked,  however, 
the  one  advantage  of  an  alliance,  since  it  did  not 
so  surely  warn  the  enemy  that  he  would  have  to 
meet  united  forces.  An  open  alliance,  based  on 
a  published  and  clearly  drafted  treaty,  might,  in 


1 88  "A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

fact,  have  been  less  risky  than  a  vague  entente 
which  depended  for  its  interpretation  on  the  per- 
sonal relations  of  a  little  circle  of  Ministers  and 
Ambassadors . 

The  subtlest  method  of  depriving  an  alliance  of 
any  appearance  of  aggression  was  an  invention  of 
Bismarck's.  His  famous  Treaty  of  "  Re -insurance  " 
has  been  rather  generally  condemned,  but  it  is 
the  inevitable  fate  of  a  genius  who  wrought  much 
ill,  that  even  his  good  or  harmless  actions  are  likely 
to  be  harshly  judged.  The  case  has  more  than 
a  theoretical  interest  for  us,  because  it  throws  light 
on  the  working  of  the  German  official  mind  in 
1912,  when  the  Chancellor  proposed  a  similar 
arrangement  to  Lord  Haldane.  The  facts  are  these. 
In  1879,  immediately  after  the  Berlin  Congress, 
which  had  left  in  the  Russian  mind  a  deep  resent- 
ment against  Germany,  Bismarck  concluded  the 
alliance  with  Austria  which  gave  place  three  years 
later  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  It  was  a  purely 
defensive  alliance  ;  it  was  to  be  kept  secret  and 
to  come  into  force  only  if  Russia  should  attack 
Germany  or  Austria  ;  the  two  parties  in  concluding 
it  actually  recorded  in  its  text  their  hope  that 
it  would  never  be  necessary  to  invoke  it,  or  to 
publish  it.  In  1884  the  three  Emperors  met  at 
Skierniwice,  and  gave  each  other  an  undertaking 
that  they  would  observe  benevolent  neutrality  if 
any  of  them  should  be  attacked.  They  had  in  mind 
in  all  probability  the  chance  of  a  French  attack 
on  Germany  (the  Deroulede-Boulanger  movement 
had  just  begun),  or  of  a  British  attack  on  Russia. 
In  1887  this  pact  was  renewed  for  a  further 
period  of  three  years,  this  time  between  Germany 
and  Russia  alone,  though  the  Austrian  Emperor  was 
informed  of  it.  Once  more  Germany  and  Russia 
promised  benevolent  neutrality  towards  each  other 
if  either  of  them  should  be  attacked  by  a  third 


THE    FUTURE   OF    ALLIANCES         189 

Power.  At  this  time  Austro- Russian  relations  were 
strained,  owing  to  the  Bulgarian  Question,  and  when 
long  afterwards  the  treaty  became  known,  it  was 
commonly  held  that  Bismarck,  while  allying  himself 
to  Austria,  had  promised  Russia  his  neutrality 
specifically  in  case  of  an  Austrian  attack  on  Russia. 
But  would  Austria  ever  have  dreamed  of  attacking 
Russia  alone?  Even  had  she  done  so,  was 
Germany,  which  had  made  only  a  defensive  alliance 
with  her,  bound  in  any  way  to  countenance  her 
aggression?  It  is  really  more  probable,  as  Count 
Reventlow  argues,1  that  Bismarck  was  promising 
Russia  that  in  case  of  an  Anglo -^Russian  war  (always 
in  those  years  a  possibility)  he  would  remain  neutral, 
and  so  relieve  Russia  from  any  anxiety  about  her, 
European  frontier,  while  in  return  he  received  in 
effect  an  assurance  that  Russia  would  not  intervene 
for  her  own  profit  in  a  Franco- German  war. 
However  this  may  be,  the  Treaty  of  "  Re -insurance  " 
might  have  meant,  and  in  certain  conjunctions 
would  have  meant  when  read  in  connection  with 
the  Triple  Alliance,  that  Germany  would  defend 
Austria  if  Austria  were  attacked  by  Russia,  but 
would  show  benevolent  neutrality  to  Russia  if 
Austria  attacked  her.  Was  there  any  duplicity 
here?  Personally  I  cannot  see  it.  It  seems  to 
me  an  ingenious  way  of  underlining  the  defensive 
character  of  the  Austro-German  alliance.  "  So 
genuinely  defensive  is  it,"  said  Bismarck  in  effect 
to  the  Tsar,  "  that  I'll  be  your  friend  if  Austria 
attacks  you."  But  undoubtedly  the  arrangement 
was  felt  even  by  Germans  to  be  riskily  subtle,  while 
Austrians  considered  it  treacherous.  Certainly,  if 
an  alliance  means  "  my  ally  right  or  wrong,"  if 
it  is  a]  pledge  of  mutual  support  irrespective  of 
the  merits  of  the  case  or  the  conduct  of  the  ally, 
then  *-'  re -insurance  "  was  an  act  of  very  questionable 

1  "  Deutschlands  Auswartige  Politik,"  pp.  18-26. 


A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

faith.  If  diplomacy  always  includes  "  attack  "  when 
it  says  "  defence,"  then  certainly  the  treaty  was 
treacherous.  Count  Caprivi,  partly  because  he  was 
a  blunt  and  honest  man,  and  partly  because  he  was, 
on  the  whole,  pro-British  and  anti-Russian,  would 
not  have  renewed  it — even  if  the  Tsar  had  been 
willing.  Baron  Marschall  (as  Foreign  Minister) 
gave  in  the  Reichstag  this  interesting  retrospective 
explanation  :  "  In  a  critical  emergency  Germany 
would  have  had  to  settle  the  difficult  question 
whether  it  was  a  case  of  attack  OIT  defence,  and 
in  either  event  when  Austro-Russian  friction 
occurred,  would  have  been  under  the  unpleasant 
necessity  of  flinging  away  either  Russia's  friendship 
or  Austria's."  This  is  noteworthy  because  it  makes 
the  useful  admission  that  in  such  cases  it  is  not 
easy  to  discriminate  between  aggression  and 
defence. 

This  ambiguity  was  the  real  objection  to  Herr 
Bethmann-Hollweg's  attempt  to  revive  Bismarck's 
"  re  -insurance  "  device  in  1912.  The  facts  about 
Lord  Haldane's  mission  to  Berlin  are  much  more  fully 
known  to  us  than  those  relating  to  most  diplomatic 
episodes  of  the  kind,  and  there  is  no  appreciable 
difference  between  the  British  and  'German  official 
versions.1  If  the  German  proposal,  that  we  should 
pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality  if  war  should  be 
forced  upon  Germany,  had  been  read  in  the  light 
of  this  historical  Austro -German -Russian  precedent, 
it  might,  perhaps,  have  been  regarded  with  less 
suspicion.  It  was  not  a  new  device.  It  was 
a  return  to  an  old  Bismarckian  technique.  His 
intellect,  which  so  oddly  compounded  subtlety 
with  bluntness,  revelled  in  that  complex  triangular 
arrangement.  Bismarck  may  have  cared  nothing 
for  peace  in  the  abstract,  but  there  is  no 

1  For  the  former  see  our  newspapers  of  September  i,  1915,  and  for 
the  latter  our  newspapers  of  September  9,  1915. 


THE   FUTURE   OF    ALLIANCES         191 

doubt  whatever  that  he  desired  peace  between 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia.  His  method  of 
securing  it  was  to  tie  them  up  by  these  com- 
plicated treaties  which  made  aggression  on  the  part 
of  any  of  them  almost  unthinkable.  On  a  charitable 
view  of  German  policy  in  191 2,  Herr  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  aimed  at  a  similar  system  of  "  re-insurances  " 
in  the  still  more  elaborate  diplomatic  structure  of 
our  time .  ( I )  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  were 
bound  by  alliance  for  mutual  defence.  (2)  Russia 
and  France  were  similarly  bound  to  each  other. 
(3)  Great  Britain  was  to  promise  Germany  her 
benevolent  neutrality  if  she  should  be  "  forced  into 
war."  This  would  have  left  us  free  to  aid  France 
and  Russia  if  they  should  be  attacked.  Our  weight, 
therefore,  seemed  to  be  reserved  as  a  penalty  against 
aggression  ;  an  arrangement  which,  on  the  surface 
at  least,  promised  to  be  a  powerful  guarantee  for 
peace.  The  offer  was  refused.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
was  willing  to  declare  that  we  would  not  join  in 
any  act  or  pact  of  aggression  against  Germany, 
but  to  neutrality  he  would  not  bind  himself.  The 
reason  which  our  Government  gave  to  the  German 
Ambassador  was  (as  he  quoted  it)  that  it  "  did 
not  wish  to  jeopardize  friendly  relations  with  France 
and  Russia,"  and  "  could  not  incur  the  risk  of 
losing  French  friendship."  It  may  also  have  had 
another  entirely  legitimate  reason.  A  war  might 
begin  by  an  unprovoked  attack  by  Russia  or  France 
on  Germany,  and  end  with  an  equally  criminal 
attempt  by  Germany  to  crush  and  destroy  one  or 
both  of  these  Powers.  It  might  be  proper  that 
we  should  be  neutral  at  the  start,  but  we  might  be 
compelled  to  intervene  before  the  end.  In  that 
difficulty  there  lay  a  good  reason  for  rejecting  the 
German  formula.  The  reason  commonly  given — 
that  Germany  would  always  dishonestly  pretend  that 
a  war  had  been  "  forced  upon  her  " — is  hardly 


192  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

decisive.  We  should  have  been  the  judges  of  our 
own  conduct,  and  it  would  always  have  been  open 
to  us  to  say  in  any,  given  case  that  in  our  opinion 
war  was  not  "  forced  *'  on  Germany. 

These  two  experiments  in  reinsurance  are  proof 
enough  that  it  is  not  a  satisfactory  expedient.  The 
device,  however  honestly  meant,  is  too  subtle  to 
escape  misinterpretation.  It  is,  however,  a  concep- 
tion too  natural  to  be  dismissed  in  this  summary 
way.  It  evidently  was  in  Sir  Edward  Grey's  mind 
that  some  general  promise,  of  the  kind  which 
Germany  desired,  ought  to  be  given,  not  merely 
by  Great  Britain  to  Germany  but  by  the  whole 
Triple  Entente  to  the  whole  Triple  Alliance .  This  was 
apparently  what  he  meant  by  his  famous  "  Utopian 
proposal."  l  It  may  be  doubted,  however,  whether 
a  general  undertaking  by  all  the  Powers,  jointly  and 
singly,  to  avoid  aggression  or  aggressive  pacts 
would  have  any  practical  value  until  "  aggression  "  is 
defined,  and  further,  until  there  is  an  organization 
of  Europe  which  can  supply  a  simple  and  auto- 
matic test  to  distinguish  aggression  from  defence. 
Instead  of  thinking  that  Bismarck  and  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  were  treacherous,  the  historian  who  surveys 
these  two  tentative  approaches  will  say,  I  think,  that 
they  were  feeling  after  some  technical  expedient 
which  would  extract  the  sting  from  alliances,  and 
reconcile  the  system  of  mutual  defence  with  a 
measure  of  general  goodwill.  But  so  long  as 
the  terms  "  aggression  "  and  "  defence  "  retain 
their  fatal  ambiguity,  every  defensive  alliance  is 
potentially  aggressive,  and  every  pact  for  defence 

1  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved  and  the  present  crisis 
is  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavour  will  be  to  promote  some  arrange- 
ments to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be 
assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against 
her  or  her  Allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or 
separately  (British  White  Paper,  No.  101). 


THE   FUTURE   OF   ALLIANCES         193 

will    be    interpreted    by    the    Power    against    which 
it    is    directed   as   a   deliberate    menace. 

There  emerges  from  this  brief  study  of  the  efforts 
which  the  Powers  have  made  to  escape  the  risks 
of  the  system  of  alliances  an  inevitable  conclusion. 
The  penetration  of  one  system  by  a  member  of  the 
other  leads  only  to  suspicion  :  the  loose  structure 
of  an  entente  produces  dangerous  uncertainty  : 
"  re-insurance  "  is  not  in  practice  workable.  But  with 
the  conception  of  a  League  of  Peace  in  our  minds, 
it  may  be  possible  to  adapt  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
"  Utopian  proposal/'  so  that  if  defensive  alliances 
survive,  their  purely  defensive  intention  shall  no 
longer  be  equivocal.  Aggression  must  mean  in 
the  future  one  of  two  quite  definite  acts.  A  Power 
is  the  aggressor,  firstly  and  most  obviously,  if  it 
goes  to  war  or  becomes  involved  in  war  through 
its  own  refusal  to  conform  to  the  procedure  of  the 
League.  If  A  is  willing  to  arbitrate  or  to  state 
a  case  for  the  League's  Council  of  Conciliation, 
or  to  accept  any  similar  procedure  laid  down  by 
the  Council  of  the  League,  whereas  B  refuses  any 
of  these  methods  of  settlement,,  then  B  is  aggressor, 
and  it  will  be  idle  for  him  to  argue  that  war 
has  been  "  forced  upon  "  him.  In  the  second  place, 
it  is  equally  clear  that  if  the  International  Tribunal 
has  given  its  verdict,  or  the  Council  of  Concilia- 
tion issued  its  recommendation,  or  the  Concert  or 
Conference  of  the  Powers  laid  down  its  view,  andi 
war  still  results,  the  aggressor  is  the  State  which' 
becomes  involved  in  war  through  its  refusal  to 
adopt  the  verdict  or  recommendation  of  an  impartial 
body.  There  may  be  a  third  case,  if  both  parties 
to  a  dispute  refuse  conciliation,  or  if  both  reject 
the  findings  of  the  impartial  body.  This  third 
case  sometimes  occurs  in  Labour  disputes,  and  if 
the  League  of  Peace  is  weak,  and  passions  on  both 
sides  are  hot,  it  may  occur  in  international  disputes. 

14 


194  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

In  this  third  case  both  parties  are  aggressors,  and 
neither  is  entitled  to  the  respect  due  to  defence. 
The  problem  is  to  devise  some  general  formula 
which  will  cover  all  these  cases,  a  formula  which 
must  override  all  past  or  future  obligations  con- 
tracted in  partial  treaties  of  alliance.  A  special 
formula  repudiating  aggressive  designs  or  pacts  is 
hardly  necessary,  since  all  the  Powers  adhering  to 
the  League  will  have  bound  themselves  not  to  go 
to  war  without  submitting  to  the  procedure  (arbi- 
tration or  conciliation)  appointed  by  the  League. 
The  formula  governing  alliances  might  run  some- 
what as  follows  :— 

The  signatory  Powers  hereby  declare  that  in  no  case  will  they  give 
armed  support  to  any  Power,  notwithstanding  any  treaty  of  alliance 
or  any  understanding  which  they  may  have  contracted  or  may  here- 
after contract,  if  that  Power  has  declared  war  without  first  submitting 
to  the  procedure  appointed  by  the  League,  or  has  become  involved  in 
war  by  reason  of  its  failure  to  submit  to  this  procedure,  or  to  give 
effect  to  the  award  or  recommendation  of  a  Court  or  Council  of 
the  League. 

Such  a  formula  seems  an  indispensable  supple- 
ment to  the  general  pact  on  which  the  League  is 
based.  Without  it  the  survival  of  alliances  within 
the  League  would  render  it  helpless  when  any 
serious  crisis  arose.  With  such  a  formula;  if  it 
were  honestly  observed,  the  survival  of  alliances, 
though  it  would  always  be  a  source  of  anxiety 
and  a  cause  of  division,  need  not  destroy  the  utility 
of  the  League.  The  effect  of  this  formula  would 
be  that  an  innocent  and  loyal  Power  would  be 
able  to  reckon  on  the  support  of  allies.  A  disloyal 
and  aggressive  Power  would  be  isolated.  The 
whole  influence  and  pressure  of  allies  on  both  sides 
would  be  used  to  deter  a  partner  from  action  which1 
would  break  up  the  alliance.  If  it  should  happen 
that  both  parties  to  a  dispute  refused  to  submit 


THE    FUTURE   OF    ALLIANCES         195 

to  the  procedure  of  the  League,  or  to  give  effect 
to  an  award  or  recommendation,  the  effect  of  this 
clause  would  be  that  while  the  rest  of  the  civilized 
world  might  intervene  forcibly  to  prevent  or  arrest 
the  conflict,  neither  of  them  would  be  supported 
by  allies.  At  the  worst,  if  no  joint  intervention 
could  be  organized,  the  conflict  would  be  "  local- 
ized "  and  confined  to  the  two  disloyal  Powers. 
It  may  not  prove  to  be  easy  to  organize  the  League 
on  the  basis  of  an  undertaking  to  enforce  the 
awards  of  its  Courts  or  Councils.  A  Power  may 
be  willing  to  submit  its  case  to  conciliation,  but 
not  to  promise  in  advance  to  accept  the  finding' 
of  the  Council.  Similarly  the  League  as  a  whole 
may  be  willing  to  use  coercion  in  order  to  require 
a  Power  to  submit  to  conciliation,  but  it  would 
not  so  readily  agree  to  enforce  the  award.  But 
the  effect  of  this  proposed  clause  governing 
alliances  would  commonly  be  to  supply  a  certain 
automatic  sanction  to  any  finding  or  recommenda- 
tion of  the  League.  The  State  which  agreed  to 
give  effect  to  it  might  call  upon  its  allies  for 
support,  even  if  it  proposed  itself  to  take  up  arms 
to  enforce  the  award.  The  State  which  ignored 
or  repudiated  the  award  would  find  itself  isolated-. 
This  arrangement  in  most  cases  would  probably 
suffice  to  ensure  that  the  award  would  be 
respected . 

The  whole  conception  of  the  League  implies  a 
certain  general  average  of  good  faith  and  good- 
will. If  we  may  assume  this,  then  we  may  also 
claim  that  this  formula  for  the  regulation  of 
alliances  has  solved  our  problem  and  conciliated 
the  claims  of  theory  with  the  facts  of  reality. 
Theory  forbids  alliances  within  the  League.  Reality 
warns  us  that  defensive  alliances  may  survive  this 
war.  They  may  be  tolerated  (though  they  will  always 
cause  anxiety)  if  it  be  agreed  that  no  Power  is  in  a 


196  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

state  of  legitimate  defence,  or  is  entitled  to  invoke 
the  casus  fcederis,  unless  it  is  willing  to  submit 
its  case  to  some  process  of  conference  or  arbitra- 
tion, and  to  carry  out  the  findings  of  the  League's 
Councils  and  Courts. 

This  proposal,  one  may  add,  is  not  without  a 
precedent.  The  revised  version  of  our  Treaty  of 
Alliance  with  Japan,  which  was  adopted  in  1911, 
contained  a  provision  which  was  conceived  in  the 
spirit  of  this  formula.  It  stipulated  that  nothing  con- 
tained in  this  Agreement  should  entail  an  obligation  to 
go  to  war  with  a  third  Power,  which  had  concluded 
a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  either  of  the 
contracting  parties.  Diplomacy  can  by  such  ex- 
pedients minimize  the  danger  of  military  alliances . 
Their  survival  need  not  be  an  insuperable  barrier 
to  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations.  The  ideal 
at  which  we  should  eventually  aim,  and  towards 
which  we  should  work  is,  none  the  less,  that  no 
Government  should  be  tied  by  any  military  obligation 
save  that  which  binds  it  to  all  the  States  that  adhere 
to  the  League. 


CHAPTER    VII 
ON  SEA-POWER 

THE  questioning  mind  which  attempts  to  work  out 
the  transition  from  a  system1  of  force  to  a  systelm 
of  conference  in  the  relations  of  civilized  peoples 
encounters  on  the  threshold  a  difficulty  which  may 
well  seem  insuperable.  However  sincerely  the 
nations  may  turn  their  minds  towards  the  ideal 
of  an  equal  and  reasonable  intercourse,  the  fact 
remains  that  for  generations  to  come  these  nations 
will  possess  in  unequal  degrees  the  means  of  using 
force,  and  in  their  dealings  some  sense  of  this 
inequality  must  persist.  Confidence  will  come 
slowly  as  the  League  of  Peace  proves  its  efficacy. 
We  may  live  to  see  a  point  at  which  the  small 
State  will  maintain  its  rights  against  the  Great 
Powers,  thanks  to  the  vigilance  and  the  impartiality 
of  the  League,  as  boldly  and  successfully  as  a 
working-man,  when  his  trade  union  is  behind  him, 
will  defend  his  personal  rights  in  a  just  court  against 
a  wealthy  employer.  It  is  a  high  and  difficult  ideal, 
and  manifestly  the  ease  or  difficulty  with  which 
it  will  be  realized,  depends  partly  on  the  incalculable 
growth  of  moral  forces  and  the  slow  education  of 
the  international  mind,  partly,  also,  upon  the  measur- 
able physical  inequality  of  the  Powers.  The  League 
will  mean  nothing  at  all  unless  it  means  that  in 
some  measure  the  weaker  States  will  no  longer 
experience  a  sense  of  constriction  and  foreboding, 

or  think  a  calculating  modesty  incumbent  upon  them, 

197 


198  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

when  they  contemplate  the  power  of  their  greater 
neighbours.  It  will  contribute  to  this  end  if  the 
legend  of  the  invincible  military  might  of  Germany 
is  dissipated  by  the  war,  and  the  power  of  a  coalition 
proved  against  the  overgrown  strength  of  a  single 
empire.  But  in  some  measure  every  great  empire 
overshadows  its  neighbours.  One  must  have  known 
Swedes  and  Bulgarians  to  understand  what  thqy 
felt  when  they  looked  at  the  colossal  bulk  of  Russia. 
Even  Spaniards  had  and  still  have  (as  Senor  Maura 
has  reminded  us)  the  sense  that  Britain  and  France, 
the  two  Powers  which  by  their  sea  and  land  power 
and  by  their  financial  resources  might  dispose  of 
the  destinies  of  Spain,  have  not  treated  her  on 
a  footing  of  equality.  Equality,  in  fact,  there  is 
not,  and  cannot  be,  in  such  cases,  but  it  is  possible 
none  the  less  (especially  where  there  is  equality 
in  civilization,  though  not  in  power)  to  conduct 
negotiations  without  reference  to  this  disparity  of 
forces,  precisely  as  men  and  women  who  are  free 
from  vulgarity  deal  with  each  other  without  refer- 
ence to  their  inequality  in  wealth. 

The  concrete  problem  which  we  in  this  country 
have  to  face,  if  we  mean  to  promote  an  era  of 
equality  and  conference,  is  to  reconcile  with  it  our 
overwhelming  naval  supremacy.  It  is  probably  wise 
to  assume,  as  a  given  fact,  that  it  is  the  national 
will  at  any  cost  and  under  all  circumstances  to 
maintain  this  supremacy.  When  Mr.  Asquith  and 
Lord  Grey  spoke  of  abandoning  the  ancient  prin- 
ciple of  force  which  has  hitherto  ruled  the  world, 
they  probably  did  not  mean  that  they  would  be 
willing  to  enter  into  any  arrangement  which 
diminished  our  relative  superiority  at  sea.  To  a 
general  reduction  of  the  scale  of  armaments  they 
and  their  successors  would  doubtless  consent,  but 
always  on  the  understanding  that  it  recognized 
and  even  stereotyped  our  naval  supremacy.  For 


ON    SEA-POWER  199 

some  sacrifices  we  may  be  prepared,  when  the 
moment  comes  for  the  revision  of  the  law  of  the  seas, 
but  no  one  who  has  watched  public  opinion  during 
this  war  will  expect  a  British  Government  to  assent 
to  any  reading  of  international  law  which  gravely, 
impairs  the  value  of  a  fleet.  Nor  is  it  likely  that 
in  our  day,  however  we  may  apply  the  doctrine  of 
nationality  elsewhere,  we  shall  surrender  the  exclu- 
sive control  of  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  and  the 
Suez  Canal,  or  abandon  any  of  the  numerous  islands, 
coaling-stations,  or  other  territories  which  are  essen- 
tial to  our  purpose.  From  this  temper  we  shall 
not  be  moved  until  a  new  race  has  come  to  maturity, 
capable  of  the  generous  thought  that  it  is  a  greater 
deed  to  contribute  to  the  difficult  spiritual  adven- 
ture of  the  world's  concord  than  to  add  territory 
to  its  own  empire.  When  that  day  comes,  it  will 
be  easy  to  transfer  Gibraltar,  Malta,  and  Suez  to 
the  guardianship  of  an  international  Council.  Our 
faith  in  the  regulation  of  the  common  life  of  nations 
by  international  institutions  might  not  stand  that 
test  as  yet,  and  perhaps  it  would  be  extravagant 
to  demand  it.  We  ought  none  the  less  to  realize 
that  our  o»wn  hesitation  to  make  this  heavy  sacrifice 
will  react  formidably  on  the  minds  of  other  nations. 
The  authority  of  any  international  Council  will  be 
largely  fictitious,  and  the  confidence  which  it  in- 
spires will  be  limited,  until  we  can  bring  ourselves 
to  this  surrender.  There  may  be  a  general  hope 
that  the  new  order  will  be  solid  and  effective,  but 
this  hope  will  be  rather  the  inspiration  of  idealists 
than  a  belief  on  which  practical  statesmen  will 
venture  to  act.  The  world  will  hope  that  it  has 
entered  a  secure  era  of  rational  intercourse,  but 
it  will  not  dare  to  dispense  with  the  means  by 
which  Powers  sought,  under  the  old  regime,  to 
assure  their  safety.  Mankind  may  rejoice  that  a 
Court  is  sitting  somewhere  to  dispense  justice,  but 


200  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

every  one  will  still  think  it  prudent  to  carry  a 
"  six-shooter."  We  shall  live  in  the  familiar  tran- 
sitional stage  of  precarious  security  familiar  to  new 
and  unsettled  communities.  This  dangerous  and 
uncertain  phase  will  last  until  some  Power  steps 
out  of  the  vicious  circle  by  an  act  of  faith  which 
demonstrates  that  it  believes  in  the  new  international 
life,  and  will  stake  something  upon  its  belief.  Mean- 
while we  must  expect  to  hear  from  other  nations 
outside  the  immediate  circle  of  our  allies  the  com- 
ment that  our  *'  navalism  "  is  only  militarism  which 
has  suffered  a  sea-change.  We  shall  show  candour 
if  we  recognize  frankly  that  our  insistence  on  our 
supremacy  at  sea  is  a  handicap  to  the  creation 
and  development  of  a  League  of  Nations. 

At  this  point  an  objection  probably  shapes  itself 
in  the  reader's  mind,  as  it  does  in  my  own.  May 
we  not  say,  on  the  contrary,  that  with  our  sea- 
power  we  bring  the  greatest  possible  contribution 
to  an  international  League  ?  We  might  go  farther, 
and  say  that  without  it  such  a  League  would  be 
almost  unthinkable.  We  are  offering  in  effect,  if 
we  .unreservedly  join  the  League,  to  place  at  its 
disposal  a  supreme  Fleet,  served  by  a  nation  which 
inherits  a  unique  tradition  of  seamanship,  backed, 
not  merely  by  the  wealth  and  technical  skill  neces- 
sary to  a  great  navy,  but  by  all  the  strategical 
adjuncts  in  the  shape  of  vital  straits  and  bases 
which  are  necessary  for  its  effective  worldwide  use. 
The  range  of  action  of  a  purely  military  Power 
is  severely  limited  ;  its  pressure,  is  more  to  be 
dreaded  than  that  of  sea -power,  but  it  can  over- 
awe only  its  own  neighbours.  Sea -power  is  the 
type  of  mobility  and  can  strike  in  all  the  four 
quarters  of  the  earth.  By  enabling  the  leagued 
nations  to  impose  an  embargo  on  the  trade  and 
communications  of  a  disloyal  member  or  of  an 
aggressive  outsider,  our  Fleet  would  suffice  almost 


ON    SEA-POWER  201 

unaided  to  make  the  authority  of  the  League 
respected.  May  we  not  claim  that  we  are  endowing 
the  League  from  the  start  with  an  invaluable  force, 
and  turn  the  objection  to  our  naval  supremacy  by, 
claiming  that,  so  far  from  insisting  on  an  egoistic 
predominance,  we  shall  be  placing  our  unmatched 
resources  at  the  service  of  the  commonweal  of 
nations  ?  This  is  a  consoling  and  plausible  view 
to  take  of  a  claim  which  by  hostile  critics  is  some- 
times confused  with  a  pretension  to  worldwide 
dominion.  Nor  is  it  merely  a  self -deluding  view. 
The  League  could  not  be  formed  if  we  and  our 
Fleet  were  outside  it  ;  and  if  it  is  ever  necessary 
to  take  overt  action  against  a  powerful  lawbreaker 
to  vindicate  the  League's  authority,  unquestionably 
sea -power  is  an  instrument  which  has  in  general 
many  advantages  over  land -power.  It  can  -effect 
much  by  bloodless  pressure  :  an  embargo  is  com- 
monly a  less  cruel  measure  than  an  invasion. 

It  is  not  so  easy,  however,  to  argue  that  the 
League  will  more  easily  wield  its  authority,  if  it 
can  command  our  supreme  Navy,  than  if  it  could 
summon  three  or  four  great  and  approximately  equal 
fleets  to  its  service.  The  difficulties  which  may 
follow  from  a  very  unequal  distribution  of  force 
are  obvious.  The  most  obvious  of  all  is,  of  course, 
the  doubt,  which  may  seem'  less  extravagant  to 
others  than  it  does  to  us,  that  we  might  happen 
to  be  the  Power  which  did  not  choose  to  submit 
to  the  decisions  of  the  League.  Even  our  Fleet, 
however,  would  not  avail  to  protect  us  from  a 
kind  of  pressure  which  in  the  long  run  might  bei 
decisive,  for  if  we  had  all  or  most  of  the  world, 
against  us,  even  though  our  Navy  protected  us 
against  military  measures,  a  trade  boycott,  on  the 
lines  of  Napoleon's  continental  blockade,  might 
eventually  bring  us  to  terms.  But  the  objection  to 
the  predominance  of  one  Power  in  force  is  based, 


202  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

not  so  much  on  fanciful  calculations  of  what  might 
happen  if  the  actual   use   of   force  were   necessary, 
as   on  a  jealousy   of  the  excessive   influence   which 
a  Power  possessed  of  disproportionate  force  inevit- 
ably  acquires.      We   most   of   us  tend   to   think   of 
military  and  naval  power  as  a  force  which  slumbers 
inoperative    during    peace,    and    wakens    to   achieve 
the  ends  of  policy  only  when  war  is  declared.    That 
is  a  delusive  misconception.     Under  the  armed  peace 
the   big   guns,   though  they   were  never   fired,   kept 
up  a  muffled  obligate  to  the  conversations  of  diplo- 
macy.    Every  diplomatic  note  was  worth  the  number 
of  army  corps  and  battleships  which  its  author  com- 
manded, and  ambassadors  in  a  crisis,  as  they  went 
in  and  out  of  the  Chancelleries  of  the  Powers,  were 
simply    the    heralds    and    parlementaires    of    their 
armies.      While  statesmen  seemed  to  be  reasoning 
over   equities   and   rights   their   minds   were  all   the 
while  working  out  their  calculation  of  the  numbers, 
resources,   and   equipment   of   their   allies  ,or   oppo- 
nents.     From  this   obsession  by  the   idea  of  force 
in    its    crudest    form    the    League   may    deliver    us. 
But  in   a   subtler   form   the  dread  and   jealousy  of 
force  will  return  upon  us  even  within  the  League. 
It  may  not  interfere  at  all  with  the  legal  decision 
of  justiciable  disputes.      It  is  more  likely  to  disturb 
the  minds  of  delegates  sitting  in  a  Council  of  Con- 
ciliation.     It  will  work  most  surely  of  all  whenever 
the    Powers   meet   in   a    conference   which   may    be 
required    to    act    as    an    executive    of    the    League. 
If   it   is   necessary   to   take  decisions    which    cannot 
be   equally   welcome  to   all   the   Powers,   above  all, 
if  these  decisions  might  commit  the  Powers  to  action, 
it  will  be  impossible  to  eliminate  considerations  of 
force.      To   use   a    homely   illustration  :    every   one 
has  remarked  that  societies  and   committees  which 
depend    unduly    on    the    financial    support    of   some* 
individual    member    are    apt    to    be    dominated    by 


ON    SEA-POWER  203 

that  member.      His  colleagues  do  not  like  to  insist- 
on  a  policy  to   which  he   is  opposed,    for  it   would 
hardly    be    fair   to    expect    him   to    pay    for    it,    yet 
without  his  contributions  the  society  would  collapse  ; 
on    the    other    hand,    if    he    is    willing    to    pay    for 
some   line   of   action   about    which   the   majority   is 
not    enthusiastic,    the    tendency    of    a   weak    society 
will    usually    be    to    let    him  have    his    way.        The 
same    considerations    would    have    weight    within   a 
League   of   Nations.      No   Power   would   venture   to 
press  a  course  of  action  which  might  at  some  stage 
depend    on    effective    naval    or    economic    pressure, 
unless    Great   Britain   were   decidedly   favourable   to 
it.      The   knowledge,   moreover,   that   Great  Britain 
could    usually    take    effective    naval    action   Without 
troubling   to   ask   the   League   for   its   assent,   would 
commonly  dispose  most  of  the  Powers,  if  they  wished 
to  keep  the  League  together,  to  give  their  consent, 
reluctantly  and   grudgingly   perhaps,   to   the  course 
which    we    proposed.      This    is    perhaps   too    simpl;e 
a  presentation  of  the  difficulty,  but  it  may  serve  to 
illustrate    what    really    is    axiomatic,     that    in    any 
association  for  common  ends,  the  Power  which  com- 
mands   a   relatively   large    proportion    of   its    means 
of  action,   will   tend  to   dominate  its  policy.      It  is 
not   a   sufficient  answer   to   say  that   we   have   faith 
that    our    statesmen    would    use    this    preponderance 
modestly  and  for  the  common  good.      Unless  that 
conviction    were    shared    by    all    the   other    Powers, 
the    fear    might    formulate    itself    in   some   of   their 
minds   that   a  League   of   Peace   would   tend  to   be 
in    practice   the   political    counterpart    of   our   naval 
supremacy.      The   Germans,    with   their    overtrained 
habit  of  translating  all  human  relationship  into  terms 
of  force,  would  undoubtedly  &ay  that  if  Britain  were 
to  be  in  effect  the  Lord  High  Admiral  of  a  League 
of    Nations    she    would    thereby    achieve   a    wo  rid  - 
dictatorship.      Force    is    an    equivocal    gift    to    any 


204  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

League  of  Peace.  It  promises  to  arm  the  right, 
but  it  seems  to  create  an  ascendancy  for  the  Power 
which  brings  it. 

For  this  reason,  and  for  other  reasons  which 
are  equally  entitled  to  respect,  some  of  the  ablest 
and  sincerest  advocates  of  international  organiza- 
tion have  urged  that  internationalism  ought  not  to 
be  an  armed  doctrine,  and  that  the  League  ought 
not  to  contemplate  the  use  of  force  as  one  of  the 
regular  methods  by  which  it  proposes  to  make  its 
will  respected.  To  my  thinking,  this  line  of  thought 
is  more  helpful  to  the  League  than  the  opposite 
tendency.  The  muscular  pacifism  of  the  Roosevelt 
school,  which  delights  in  brandishing  a  "  big  stick," 
and  thinks  of  the  Great  Powers,  especially  the 
*•*•  Anglo-Saxon  "  Powers,  as  "  policemen  "  licensed 
by  Providence  to  act  as  special  constables  to  the 
universe,  would  wreck  any  League  in  a  single  speech. 
This  attitude  of  megalomania  is  the  characteristic 
form  which  militarism  has  assumed  in  a  Puritan 
atmosphere.  To  set  in  the  foreground  the  aspect 
of  the  League  as  organized  force  is  probably  the 
worst  mistake  which  its  friends  could  make.  The 
more  it  is  conceived  as  overwhelming  force  the 
greater  is  the  risk  that  it  will  inspire  dread  rather 
than  loyalty.  This  would  be  a  grave  risk  if  its 
force  were  supplied  by  several  nearly  equal  Powers  ; 
a  still  graver  danger  is  that  one  or  two  Powers 
may  be  forced  into  a  position  of  "  leadership," 
which  would  soon  be  called  "  dictatorship  "  by  the 
jealousy  of  others.  But  to  renounce  the  use  of 
force  in  extreme  cases  seems  equally  impossible. 
A  League  which  took  no  measures  against  brutal 
and  lawless  aggression  would  not  maintain  its  hold 
on  the  imagination  of  mankind.  It  would  be  for 
ever  calling  on  strong  and  weak  alike  to  give  up 
much  of  their  traditional  sovereignty,  yet  there  would 
be  no  compensation  for  this  sacrifice,  since  there 


ON    SEA -POWER  205 

would  be  no  certain  increase  of  security.  Unless 
the  League  will  itself,  after  due  patience  and  the 
use  of  all  the  milder  means  of  persuasion,  enforce 
in  very  grave  cases  the  changes  necessary  to  the 
world's  development,  there  can  be  no  decay  of 
militarism,  for  nations  will,  in  default  of  the 
League's  action,  be  driven  to  make  these  changes 
for  themselves.  It  may  be  that  the  compact  on 
which  the  League  is  based  should  rather  pledge  its 
members  to  meet  together  to  concert  common  action 
when  war  is  threatened,  or  the  findings  of  its  Council 
are  disregarded,  than  exact  from  them  in  advance 
a  promise  to  take  military  action.  Much,  and 
usually  enough,  will  be  gained  if  the  aggressive 
Power  can  be  isolated,  deprived  of  allies,  and  sub- 
jected to  a  general  boycott.  In  that  condition  he 
might  yield  without  the  use  of  any  military  measures 
at  all,  or  it  might  suffice  that  one  or  two  States 
(with  the  general  approval)  should  repell  his  aggres- 
sion or  right  his  victim.  The  first  definitely  hostile 
measure  of  the  League  (after  the  failure  of  friendly 
action)  might  normally  be  to  apply  economic 
pressure — ranging  from  prohibitive  tariffs  on  his 
exports  as  a  first  step,  up  to  complete  blockade, 
embargo  on  all  trade,  and  absolute  non -intercourse. 
But  this  economic  pressure  could  not  be  used 
effectively  unless  adequate  force  stood  mobilized  and 
ready  behind  it.  The  boycotted  Power,  if  he  had 
a  big  fleet  or  a  formidable  army,  would  treat  the 
boycott  as  an  act  of  war,  and  he  would  retaliate 
by  striking  at  the  more  vulnerable  members  of 
the  coalition  which  surrounded  him.  It  would  be 
unfair  to  ask  the  weaker  and  more  exposed  members 
of  the  League  to  join  in  economic  pressure  against 
a  strong  Power,  unless  the  League  had  its  fleets 
and  armies  ready  on  a  war  footing  to  protect  them. 
Economic  pressure  is  a  formidable  wieapon,  and 
humane  opinion  does  w,ell  to  lay  stress  on  it,  for 


206  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

it  may  coerce  a  brutal  Power  without  bloodshed 
or  devastation.  But  it  would  be  a  fatal  error  to 
regard  it  as  a  substitute  for  military  preparedness. 
An  armed  coalition  might  use  it  with  deadly  effect. 
An  unarmed  coalition  which  relied  on  boycott  alone 
would  dissolve  at  the  first  invitation  which  it 
addressed  to  the  neighbours  of  a  powerful  wrong- 
doer. 

The  true  way  of  escape  from  the  difficulty,  that 
a  League  which  may  sometimes  have  to  use  force 
will  be  dominated  by  its  more  powerful  members, 
lies,  to  my  thinking,  in  the  chance  that  it  may 
gradually  evolve  some  kind  of  federal  Parliament, 
though  it  might  have  but  a  consultative  voice,  which 
would  act  as  the  representative,  not  of  armed 
Powers  but  of  opinions  which  unite  civilized  peoples 
across  the  barriers  of  their  frontiers  (see  below, 
p.  319).  Wherever  Governments  deal  with  each 
other  it  will  be  hard  to  exclude  the  idea  of  force. 
When  Governments  vote  at  a  round  table  the  ballots 
which  they  drop  into  the  box  are  counters  repre- 
senting fleets  and  armies.  Though  it  must  retain 
the  eventual  right  to  the  use  of  force,  the  League's 
future  depends  on  its  ability  somehow  to  evolve 
a  corporate  personality  independent  of  the  Govern- 
ments which  adhere  to  it.  Though  it  must  have 
for  action  its  executive,  which  can  pledge  Govern- 
ments and  organize  their  powers,  it  must  strive 
by  its  councils  of  conciliation,  its  courts,  and  finally, 
perhaps,  when  time  has  somewhat  healed  our 
wounds,  by  its  Parliament,  to  rally  round  itself 
the  moral  force  of  opinion,  and  to  win  for  itself 
a  veneration  which  will  command  obedience. 

We  have  passed  too  lightly  over  the  various  pro- 
posals which  may  be  put  forward  to  mitigate  the 
political  dangers  inseparable  from  a  naval  supremacy 
vested  in  any  one  Power.  The  hopeful  line  of 


ON    SEA-POWER  207 

approach  is  in  a  revision  of  the  law  of  warfare 
at  sea.  The  reduction  of  armaments  does  not 
touch  the  question  of  the  use  and  abuse  of 
force.  That  we  shall  have  to  face  when  the  time 
of  settlement  comes,  and  the  demand  for  the  revision 
of  sea -law,  or  rather  for  its  re-creation,  will  come 
with  as  much  urgency  from  the  United  States  and 
from  neutrals  as  from  the  enemy.  It  would  be  an 
impertinence  for  a  writer  who  is  neither  a  lawyer 
nor  a  close  student  of  naval  history  to  attempt  any, 
detailed  inquiry  into  this  most  intricate  subject.  Nor 
is  there  yet  beyond  official  circles  any  adequate  know- 
ledge of  the  real  facts  about  the  war  at  sea.  Our 
policy  must  to  some  extent  be  guided  by  considera- 
tions of  which  the  layman  can  know  little  or  nothing 
— for  example,  by  the  probable  future  development  of 
the  submarine.  There  does,  however,  emerge  from 
the  Anglo-American  controversies  during  this  war  a 
broad  conflict  of  principle,  which  affects  the  whole 
conception  of  sea -warfare,  and  in  no  sense  depends 
on  the  view  which  competent  lawyers  may  take  of 
"  juridical  niceties." 

We  have  carried  in  this  war  our  claim  to  interfere 
with  enemy  trade,  and  incidentally  with  neutral  trade, 
far  beyond  anything  that  had  been  practised  as 
expedient  or  defended  as  legitimate  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It  would  be  pedantic 
to  inquire  how  far  these  extreme  measures — the  novel 
embargo  on  enemy  trade,  the  '*  black  list,"  the 
examination  of  neutral  mails,  and  the  '*  rationing  "  of 
the  smaller  neutral  nations,  whose  whole  commerce 
has  been  by  one  means  or  another  brought  under 
our  control — were  a  legitimate  extension  of  recog- 
nized principles.  We  defended  our  sharper  deviations 
from  acknowledged  rules  as  "  reprisals,"  justified 
by  the  grosser  excesses  of  the  enemy.  It  is  true  that 
our  measures  have  involved  no  inhumanity  to 
neutrals,  as  the  German  measures  do,  but  they  have 


208  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

involved  some  loss  to  neutral  commerce,  and  worst 
of  all,  an  offence  to  the  national  dignity  of  small 
but  highly  civilized  peoples.  They  have,  in  fact, 
caused  resentment  of  which  our  censored  press  has 
not  kept  us  adequately  informed.  It  is  probable  that 
we  should  not  have  ventured  to  go  so  far,  had 
not  the  enemy  by  his  barbarities  at  sea  put  himself 
out  of  court.  Whatever  the  view  of  impartial  jurists 
may  be,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  dominant  opinion  in 
this  country  will  be  willing  to  surrender  the  advan- 
tages which  this  extreme  exercise  of  sea -power  has 
seemed  to  bring  us.  Even  were  the  surrender  to  be 
made  for  some  equivalent,  the  precedent  of  this 
war  would  remain  in  the  national  memory,  and  the 
tendency  in  any  future  war  would  be  to  stretch 
definitions,  until  the  Navy  had  once  more  recovered 
its  maximum  power.  On  no  subject  is  our  public 
opinion  so  imperious  or  so  little  disposed  to  consider 
the  views  of  other  nations,  and  Mr.  Asquith's  con- 
temptuous reference  to  "  juridical  niceties  "  when 
he  spoke  of  neutral  rights  at  sea,  will  live  in  history 
as  a  sort  of  footnote  (in  very  small  print)  to  the 
German  Chancellor's  remark  about  "  scraps  of 
paper."  On  a  calm  review  of  tendencies  it  seems 
probable  that  this  extreme  development  of  naval 
power  against  commerce  is  part  of  an  inevitable 
social  evolution.  Commerce  is  becoming  more  than 
ever  a  function  of  the  organized  nation,  if  not  of 
the  State,  and  it  is  difficult  to-day  to  exempt  it  from 
the  operations  of  warfare  on  the  individualistic 
grounds  which  were  the  basis  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Manchester  school  and  its  American  forerunners. 

The  thesis  of  this  school  is,  in  brief,  that 
civilized  warfare  is  a  relation  of  hostility  between 
States  and  their  armed  forces.1  It  seeks  to  screen 


1  By  far  the  ablest  recent  statement  of  this  view  is  the  essay  by 
Mr  H.  Sidebotham  in  "  Toward  a  Lasting  Settlement."  My  own 
opinion  has  changed  in  some  degree  since  the  publication  of  "  The 
War  of  Steel  and  Gold." 


ON    SEA-POWER  209 

the  private  citizen  from  its  operations,  and  to  protect 
the  continuance  during  war  of  innocent  trade.  It 
maintains  that  enemy  ships  should  be  free  to  con- 
tinue their  commerce  to  and  from  neutral  ports  un- 
molested, provided  that  they  carry  no  contraband. 
It  would  leave  the  traffic  in  food  absolutely  free.  It 
is  extremely  jealous  of  the  whole  doctrine  of 
blockade,  and  inclines  to  allow  the  blockade  only 
of  fortified  places,  and  then  only  as  an  extension  at 
sea  of  siege  operations  on  land.  Needless  to  say, 
it  would  prohibit  all  those  interferences  with  enemy 
trade  through  neutral  ports  and  in  neutral  vessels 
on  which  the  success  of  our  embargo  has  depended. 
According  to  this  rigid  and  logical  doctrine,  the 
functions  of  a  navy  are  solely  to  combat  the  armed 
vessels  of  the  enemy,  to  stop  his  transports  and  mili- 
tary supplies,  and  on  occasion  to  play  its  part  in  the 
siege  of  his  naval  bases.  With  the  normal  pacific 
commerce  of  an  enemy,  with  the  export  of  manu- 
factures and  the  import  of  the  raw  materials  of 
civilian  industry,  with  the  supply  of  the  wants  of  his 
civil  population,  a  navy  must  not  interfere.  The 
part  which  remains  to  a  navy  is  still  large  though 
severely  limited.  It  will  keep  open  the  seas  for  the 
military  use  of  its  own  country,  and  deny  the  military 
use  of  them  to  the  enemy  :  above  all,  it  may  enable 
the  stronger  Power  to  seize  the  colonies  of  its 
opponent. 

The  debate  round  these  proposals  turned  in  the 
years  before  this  war  too  exclusively  on  the  right  to 
capture  the  enemy's  merchant  ships  at  sea.  But  even 
before  the  war  our  expert  opinion  had  weakened 
on  this  limited  issue.  Sir  Edward  Grey  indicated 
that  we  might  be  willing  to  abandon  capture  if  we 
had  satisfaction  for  our  reading  of  the  rights  and 
methods  of  a  modern  blockade.  The  -event  has 
shown  that  wireless  telegraphy  will  usually  enable 
the  enemy's  merchantmen  to  escape  capture  on  the 

15 


210  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

outbreak  of  war,  while  our  own  ships,  which  keep  the 
seas,  are  exposed  to  the  submarine  danger.  The 
real  question  of  the  future  turns  partly  on  the 
functions  of  the  submarine  in  commerce  destruction, 
but  chiefly  on  the  future  of  the  blockade,  expanded 
as  it  has  been  by  our  practice  into  a  general  embargo 
which  involves  no  close  besetting  of  the  enemy's 
coasts.  It  is  really  idle  to  insist  that  an  enemy's 
own  ships  shall  not  carry  his  trade,  if  his  cargoes 
may  travel  safely  in  neutral  vessels,  and  his  goods 
pass  freely  overland  in  and  out  of  neutral  ports.  The 
trifling  loss  inflicted  on  him  by  depriving  him  of  his 
profits  as  a  sea -carrier  (for  that  is  all  that  capture 
means  in  practice)  is  hardly  worth  considering,  if 
we  allow  neutrals  to  conduct  his  trade  for  him.  The 
issue  is  to-day  far  wider  than  the  limited  question  of 
capture.  The  real  choice  lies  between  two  clear 
principles,  of  which  one  insists  that  innocent  trade 
at  sea  ought  not  to  be  suspended  by  war,  while  the 
other  claims  the  right  by  every  means  consistent  with 
humanity  to  stop  every  form  and  outlet  of  the 
enemy's  commercial  activity. 

The  naval  policy  which  we  have  followed  in  this 
war  seems  at  a  first  glance  to  mark  a  reaction  :  it 
is  certainly  a  return  to  eighteenth -century  usage. 
The  stoppage  of  food  supplies  for  the  civilian  popu- 
lation adds  a  new  horror  to  war,  though  it  does  not 
in  principle  differ  from  the  traditional  siege.  In 
any  estimate  of  the  value  of  these  methods  some 
balancing  considerations  must  be  kept  in  mind.  Our 
own  shipping  has  suffered,  in  fact,  from  the  right  to 
capture  and  sink,  more  heavily  than  that  of  Ger- 
many, and  our  trade  will  be  handicapped  by  the 
scarcity  of  ships  when  peace  returns.  Germany, 
moreover,  will  certainly  take  steps,  which  may  be 
effectual,  to  make  herself  independent  of  foreign 
supplies  in  any  future  war,  partly,  by  developing  her 
agriculture  and  .partly,  perhaps,  as  Dr.  Naumann 


ON    SEA-POWER  211 

and  others  have  proposed,  by  the  creation  of  great 
permanent  national  stores  of  rubber,  copper,  petrol, 
and  other  indispensable  imported  articles,  with  the 
double  object  of  providing  against  a  blockade  and 
of  stabilizing  prices  in  time  of  peace.  If  we  con- 
template the  permanent  adoption  of  the  embargo 
as  the  basis  of  our  strategy,  we  must  face  the  fact 
that  not  every  war  in  which  we  might  be  engaged 
would  be  so  favourable  to  its  exercise  as  this  has 
been.  If  we  alone  had  been  engaged  in  war  with1 
Germany  alone,  an  embargo  would  have  been  wholly, 
impracticable.  We  could  not  have  stopped  her  over- 
land trade  to  and  from  Russia,  Austria,  and  France, 
and  no  Great  Power  would  have  allowed  us  to  put 
it  on  "rations."  It  is  probable  that  we  exaggerate 
the  gain  to  be  derived  from  stopping  an  enemy's 
external  trade.  In  great  measure,  in  such  a  war 
as  this,  exports,  at  least,  will  be  checked  auto- 
matically, because  the  male  population  is  under  arms. 
That  happened  in  France,  though  her  ports  were 
open.  If,  moreover,  a  nation  believes  (though  the 
belief  may  be  a  fanatical  exaggeration)  that  it  is 
really  fighting  for  its  life,  it  will  fight  as  long  as  it 
has  men  and  food  and  munitions,  and  will  not  be 
deterred  by  the  fear  of  financial  ruin.  The  im- 
portance of  the  economic  factor  varies,  of  course, 
with  the  character  of  each  State  ;  it  is  vital  to  us, 
and  a  little  less  serious  to  Germany,  while  it  matters 
least  of  all  to  Russia  and  the  Balkan  peoples.  None 
the  less,  the  force  of  the  argument  that  trade  is  a 
national  interest  which  cannot  be  exempted  from  the 
operations  of  war,  is  powerful  to-day  and  certain  to 
grow.  The  English  and  American  authors  of  the 
opposite  doctrine  visualized  war  as  a  struggle 
between  small  professional  armies,  whose  limited 
strife  did  not  suspend  the  normal  life  of  the  nation. 
They  were  usually  individualists,  who  regarded  trade 
as  the  private  concern  of  merchants,  and  their  view 


212  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

that  it  should  be  nearly  immune  from  interruption 
by  war,  was  part  of  their  general  doctrine  that  it 
should  be  nearly  free  from  interference  by  the  State. 
This  economic  individualism  no  longer  reflects  either 
the  actual  facts  of  trade  or  the  working  principles 
of  modern  States.  Industrial  efficiency  has  become 
a  prime  factor  in  military  success.  The  "  private  " 
merchant,  and  the  "  non-combatant  "  civilian  popu- 
lation, women  no  less  than  men,  contribute  to  the 
State's  power  of  endurance,  even  when  they  are  en- 
gaged in  "  innocent  "  trade.  It  is  a  commonplace 
that  credit,  exchange,  and  the  balance  of  trade  are 
vital  factors  in  victory.  It  seems  impossible  to  dis- 
regard these  notorious  facts,  and  to  urge  that  a 
State  which  has  the  physical  ability  to  stop  an 
enemy's  external  trade  can  be  expected  to  allow  him, 
by  pushing  his  commerce,  to  prolong  his  power  of 
resistance.  There  was,  I  think,  some  exaggeration 
in  the  argument  of  the  Manchester  school  that  a 
civilized  and  humane  age  ought  to  renounce  the 
predatory  practices  of  sea  warfare.  It  may  be  bar- 
barous to  confiscate  enemy  ships  and  enemy  goods 
captured  at  sea.  A  reform  in  the  sense  that  enemy 
ships  and  cargoes  may  be  stopped,  but  not  destroyed 
or  confiscated,  deserves  consideration.  But  the 
analogy  from  land  warfare  does  not  bear  the  weight 
which  some  exponents  of  this  view  have  laid  upon 
it.  No  army  will  allow  the  enemy  to  continue  his 
external  trade  by  land,  in  so  far  as  it  has  power  to 
stop  it.  A  naval  Power  affects  to-day  to  treat  the 
sea  as  an  occupied  territory,  and  in  this  war  we  have 
seen  a  development  of  mine -fields  at  sea  which 
resembles  the  permanent  entrenchments  on  land. 

So  long  as  we  consider  only  the  enemy  and  our 
relations  to  him,  these  extreme  developments  of 
sea -power  seem  inevitable  and  defensible.  Our 
moral,  legal,  and  political  difficulties  begin  when 
we  face  the  fact  that  every  .effective  restriction  on 


ON    SEA-POWER  213 

the  enemy's  trade  is  also  an  interference  with  the 
convenience  and  rights  of  neutrals.  When  we  say 
that  parts  of  the  high  seas  are  "  a  war  zone;/'  and 
treat  them  as  we  might  treat  occupied  territory, 
we  meet  at  once  with  the  counterclaim1  that  the 
seas  must  always  be  a  free  highway  for  all  the 
world.  Our  claim  to  lay  an  embargo  on  all  trade 
between  neutrals  and  enemies  is  thus  brought  into 
irreconcilable  contradiction  with  the  American 
doctrine  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas.  That 
doctrine  means  much  or  little,  but  at  the  least 
it  means  that  (blockade  apart)  neutral  flags  cover 
innocent  enemy  cargoes,  and  that  neutral  ships  may, 
trade  freely  in  everything  but  contraband  between 
two  neutral  ports.  It  matters  little  whether  our 
ingenious  stretching  of  the  ideas  of  blockade  and 
continuous  voyage  be  good  law  or  clever  sophistry. 
In  either  case  it  involves  an  injury  to  neutral 
interests  which  is  not  likely  to  be  tolerated  as  a 
permanent  method  of  warfare,  if  neutrals  should 
ever  have  the  power  with  the  motive  to  resist  it. 
This  extreme  use  of  sea -power  is  a  standing 
challenge  to  other  maritime  peoples  to  combine 
against  our  naval  supremacy. 

Our  moral  defence  of  these  practices  is,  none 
the  less,  impressive,  and  implies  a  half-developed 
principle  which  may  point  to  the  solution  of  the 
difficulty.  We  have  invited  neutrals  to  endure  the 
inconveniences  of  our  irregular  blockade,  because 
we  claimed  to  be  fighting  the  battle  of  civiliza- 
tion and  defending  principles  which  are  as  vital 
to  them  as  to  us.  There  has  been  no  determined 
protest  against  our  methods,  partly  because  the 
neutrals  lacked  the  necessary  sea -power  for  an  effec- 
tive resistance,  partly  because  their  increased  trade 
with  the  Entente  has  more  than  balanced  their  lost 
trade  with  the  enemy,  and  partly  because  they  recog- 
nize an  element  of  truth  in  our  claim  that  we  are 


214  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

fighting  for  civilization.  Long  before  the  entry  of 
the  United  States  into  the  war,  American  sympathy 
was,  on  the  whole,  overwhelmingly  with  Britain 
and  France  against  Germany  ;  but  it  made  large 
reservations  as  to  some  of  the  other  Allies  and 
their  purposes.  The  view  of  the  abler  and  cooler 
Americans,  while  they  were  still  neutrals,  might  per- 
haps be  summarized  as  follows  :  "  We  unhesitatingly 
prefer  the  British  and  French  conception  of  civiliza- 
tion to  the  German  conception,  and  therefore  we 
desire  the  victory  of  the  Entente  and  acquiesce  in  the 
inconvenience  to  which  it  has  subjected  our  trade. 
•We  mean,  however,  to  adhere  to  our  own  reading  of 
public  right  at  sea.  But  we  also  think  that  if  neutrals 
are  to  be  asked  to  submit  in  the  name  of  civiliza- 
tion to  such  losses,  they  ought  to  be  consulted. 
We  had  no  opportunity  of  giving  our  voice  before 
this  war  broke  out.  We  have  no  share  in  deter- 
mining either  the  duration  of  the  war  or  the  policy 
of  the  victors,  and  we  perceive  already,  in  the  threat 
of  a  permanent  trade  war,  the  danger  that  its  out- 
come may  imperil  some  of  the  principles  which 
in  our  view  are  vital  to  civilization.  If  civiliza- 
tion is  in  future  to  be  defended,  at  some  cost  to 
all  civilized  States,  the  effort  ought  from  first  to 
last  to  be  a  common  enterprise."  In  plain  words, 
if  there  are  to  be  wars  to  defend  civilization,  either 
all  civilized  States  must  take  part  in  them,  or  at 
least  they  must  give  their  mandate  to  those  who 
claim  to  be  their  champions.  If  civilization  is  really 
at  stake,  then  plainly  neutrality  is  a  dereliction  of 
duty.1  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  coalition  of  allies, 

1  Compare  these  two  sentences  from  President  Wilson's  "  accept- 
ance address  "  :  "  No  nation  can  any  longer  remain  neutral  as  against 
any  wilful  disturbance  of  the  peace  of  the  world.  The  nations  of  the 
world  must  unite  in  joint  guarantees  that  whatever  is  done  to  disturb 
the  whole  world's  life  must  first  be  tested  in  the  court  of  the  whole 
world's  opinion." 


ON    SEA-POWER  215 

some  liberal,  some  autocratic,  reinforced  by  calcu- 
lating partners  who  were  originally  in  the  other 
camp,  chooses  to  add  together  all  the  private 
interests  of  its  several  members,  it  must  not  assume 
that  these  interests  collectively  are  the  concern  of 
civilization,  or  expect  remote  neutrals  to  endure 
without  remonstrance  the  losses  and  humiliations 
incidental  to  its  war.  There  was  great  force  in 
the  adroit  appeal  which  Mr.  Arthur  Balfour 
addressed  to  the  United  States,  when  he  asked  it 
to  remember  that  if  it  insisted  on  disarming 
sea -power,  by  depriving  it  of  the  right  to  strike 
at  an  enemy's  trade,  it  was  on  the  whole  favour- 
ing the  land  arm  against  the  sea  arm  and 
strengthening  the  relative  power  of  militarism.  But 
we  certainly  cannot  with  sincerity  proceed  as  far 
as  this  unless  we  are  prepared  to  go  much  farther. 
It  is  too  high  a  claim  to  make  on  the  world  that 
it  should  leave  this  tremendous  weapon  of  sea- 
power  in  our  hands,  a  weapon  capable  of  destroy- 
ing the  trade  of  any  rival  and  ending  with  ease 
all  his  ambitions  or  achievements  overseas,  unless 
we  mean  to  offer  guarantees  that  we  shall  never 
use  it  for  egoistic  ends. 

We  shall  eventually,  if  we  follow  this  line  of 
thought  candidly,  come  in  sight  of  these  two 
conclusions  : — 

1 .  It  is  indecent,  and  may  in  the  long  run   be 
impossible,    in   any   war   undertaken    by   the   uncon- 
trolled will  of  a  single  State  in  pursuit  of  its  own 
national  interests,  however  legitimate  these  may  be, 
to    expect   neutrals   to   submit    to    the    onerous   and 
humiliating  infringements  of  their  sovereignty,  which 
are  necessary  to  the  effective  use  of  sea-power. 

2.  It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  expedient  for  civi- 
lization to  preserve  the  right   to   make  this   drastic 
use    of    sea-power,    provided    that    civilized    peoples 
as  a  whole  have  the  means  of  determining  whether 


21 6  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

any    given    war    is    really    waged    in   the    common 
interest. 

In  short,  the  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  pro- 
vides the  solution  of  a  problem  which  might 
otherwise  seem  insoluble.  Civilized  peoples  might 
agree  to  retain  the  embargo  on  enemy  trade  in 
its  most  drastic  form,  in  any  war  undertaken  with 
the  sanction  of  the  League,  against  an  enemy  who 
had  defied  its  principles.  Given  such  a  League, 
none  of  its  members  in  a  war  of  this  kind  has 
the  right  to  be  neutral.  All  of  them,  even  if  they 
do  not  aid  with  arms,  must  be  willing  at  least 
to  give  the  passive  assistance  involved  in  renouncing 
trade  with  a  Power  which  is  recognized  as  the 
enemy  of  the  whole  League.  We  abolish  the  diffi- 
culty of  respecting  neutral  rights  by  abolishing 
neutrality  itself.  In  other  words,  these  questionable 
methods,  of  which  the  embargo  is  the  full  expres- 
sion, must  be  forbidden  to  any  single  Power 
engaged  in  a  private  war  ;  an  embargo  may  be 
declared  only  by  the  authority  of  the  League  against 
some  enemy  who  by  rejecting  its  procedure  of 
conciliation  has  been  guilty  of  deliberate  aggres- 
sion. If,  on  the  other  hand,  private  wars  should 
break  out  without  the  intervention  of  the  League 
— in  a  case,  for  example,  where  neither  belligerent 
would  submit  to  its  good  offices — then  the  League 
would  insist  that  no  neutral  can  be  required  to 
suffer  loss  in  order  to  further  the  egoistic  aims 
of  either  belligerent,  and  it  would  collectively 
maintain  a  stiff  reading  of  neutral  rights.  A  war 
of  this  latter  kind,  so  far  from  being  of  any  con- 
ceivable service  to  civilization,  would  be  an  offence 
against  the  world's  order,  a  danger  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  League,  and  an  uncompensated 
nuisance  to  neutrals.  In  such  wars  the  whole 
society  of  neutrals,  acting  through  the  League, 
would  combine  to  uphold  "  the  freedom  of  the  seas," 


ON    SEA-POWER  217 

and  their  right  to  trade  with  belligerents,  subject 
only  to  the  prohibition  of  contraband  and  the 
blockade  of  fortified  places.  If  this  suggestion  is 
workable,  the  law  of  sea -warfare  must  be  revised 
under  the  auspices  of  the  League,  and  the  revision 
would  take  the  form  of  recognizing  three  distinct 
chapters  : — 

1.  Certain  provisions  of  humanity  (a  revised  Hague  Convention), 
applicable  to  all  wars. 

2.  A  stiff  definition  of  the  right  of  neutrals  to  trade  with  belligerents 
in  the  sense  of  Cobden's  doctrine,  with  articles  abolishing  capture  at 
sea,  freeing  food,  and  confining  blockade  to  fortresses.    This  chapter 
is  applicable  only  to  u  private  "  wars,  in  which  the   League  as  such 
is  disinterested. 

3.  The  embargo,  in  its  most  drastic  definition.     This  the  League 
alone  may  proclaim,  and  when  it  is  proclaimed,  every  member  of  the 
League  is  pledged  to  prohibit  and  prevent  all  trade  and  all  dealing 
with  an  enemy  whose  defiance  of  civilized  procedure  has  placed  him 
under  an  interdict. 

These  will  seem  to  the  English  reader  large  and 
hazardous  proposals.  They  involve  none  the  less 
the  highest  compliment  which  can  be  paid  to  a 
nation.  They  imply  a  belief  in  our  sincerity.  If 
we  defend  our  naval  supremacy  on  the  ground  that 
by  it  alone  can  a  League  of  Nations  be  armed 
for  the  defence  of  right,  if  we  justify  our  infliction 
of  injury  on  neutral  trade  on  the  ground  that  w!e 
are  defending  civilization,  these  limitations  on  our 
power  are  not  merely  what  we  should  be  prepared 
to  endure  ;  they  are  what  we  should  ourselves  invite. 
If  it  is  our  high  purpose  never  oursielves  to  refuse 
the  settlement  of  disputes  by  conference  and  con- 
ciliation, if  it  is  no  thought  of  furthering  our  egoistic 
ends  which  arms  and  launches  the  armadas  (that 
command  the  seas,  if  we  mean  to  dedicate  our 
strength  to  the  common  good  of  civilization,  there 
is  no  sacrifice  for  us  and  no  surrender  here.  Our 
sea -power  remains  intact  in  any  war  of  defence,  in 


218  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

any  war  of  right.  It  will  be  confined  to  bounds 
only  if  in  some  momentary  aberration  of  self- 
seeking,  we  should  in  the  pursuit  of  ends  that 
promise  no  good  to  the  world,  engage  in  war  with- 
out exhausting  the  resources  of  conciliation.  The 
proposal  is  put  forward  on  the  assumption  that  the 
enemy  on  his  side  subjects  his  formidable  land- 
power  to  like  restraints,  and  binds  himself  on  his 
side  to  enter  the  League  in  a  spirit  of  loyalty. 
Lord  Grey  has  hinted  that  we  may  be  prepared 
to  consider  the  restriction  of  our  naval  power  when 
Germany  in  her  turn  abandons  her  militarism.  These 
proposals  are  an  attempt  to  give  that  offer  a  con- 
crete shape.  Our  naval  supremacy  is  the  key  to 
the  future  of  the  League — nay,  to  the  future  of 
civilization.  If  we  mean  to  use  it  only  to  exclude 
our  rivals  from  colonial  expansion,  and  to  give 
its  sanction  to  the  prohibitions  and  boycotts  of  a 
trade  war,  if  for  these  ends  we  make  our  interests 
the  canons  of  sea-law,  then  it  is  the  most  potent  and 
the  most  pervading  of  all  forms  of  militarism,  and 
its  maintenance  will  be  the  negation  of  any  inter- 
national advance.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  will 
nail  the  flag  of  a  commonweal  to  our  masthead, 
and  renounce  the  use  of  oppressive  force  for  private 
ends,  the  League  is  made,  and  made  by  an  act 
of  faith. 


CHAPTER    VIII 
EMPIRE,  SEA-POWER,  AND  TRADE 

IT  has  been  suggested  that  our  example  will  count  for  nothing  because 
our  preponderant  naval  position  will  still  remain  unimpaired.  I  do 
not  believe  it.  The  sea-power  of  this  country  implies  no  challenge 
to  "any  single  State  or  group  of  States.  I  am  persuaded  that  through- 
out the  world  that  power  is  recognized  as  non-aggressive  and  innocent 
of  designs  against  the  independence,  the  commercial  freedom,  and 
the  legitimate  development  of  other  States,  and  that  it  is  therefore  a 
mistake  to  imagine  that  the  naval  Powers  will  be  disposed  to  regard 
our  position  on  the  sea  as  a  bar  to  any  proposal  for  the  arrest  of 
armaments  or  to  the  c.Uling  of  a  temporary  truce.  The  truth  appears 
to  me  to  lie  in  the  opposite  direction.  Our  known  adhesion  to  these 
two  dominant  principles— the  independence  of  nationalities  and  the 
freedom  of  trade — entitles  us  of  itself  to  claim  that  if  our  fleets  be 
invulnerable  they  carry  with  them  no  menace  across  the  waters  of 
the  world,  but  a  message  of  the  most  cordial  goodwill,  based  on  a 
belief  in  the  community  of  interests  between  the  nations,. — SIR  HENRY 
CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN,  in  the  Nation,  March  2,  1907. 

The  passage  which  stands  at  the  head  of  this 
chapter  expresses  with  clearness  and  eloquence  the 
view  which  the  better  elements  of  British  public 
opinion  hold,  and  for  long  have  held,  about  pur 
sea -power.  Though  the  writer  was  perhaps  the 
sincerest  and  the  most  enlightened  Liberal  of  our 
time,  his  words  might  stand  as  well  for  that  liner 
tradition  of  Conservatism  incarnated  by  Lord 
Salisbury  in  the  last  generation  and  by  Lord  Robert 
Cecil  in  our  own  day.  The  personality  of  tha 
man  lies  behind  the  words,  and  the  record  of  his 
policy  stands  for  a  proof  of  the  loyalty  and  straight- 
forwardness of  his  declaration.  It  is  a  familiar 


220  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

position,  but  just  because  it  has  woven  itself  inex- 
tricably into  all  our  thinking,  it  is  imperative  that 
we  should  make  clear  to  ourselves  exactly  (what 
it  implies.  It  starts  from  the  frank  admission  that 
we  possess,  and  intend  to  maintain,  "  our  prepon- 
derant naval  position."  Sir  Henry  Campbell  - 
Bannerman  in  this  appeal,  which  he  addressed 
to  the  world,  and  especially  to  Germany,  shortly 
before  the  second  Hague  Conference,  was  inviting 
our  rivals  to  enter  into  an  arrangement  with  us  for 
the  limitation  of  navies.  The  scale  of  building 
was  to  be  reduced  all  round  and  the  competition 
was  to  cease,  a  proposition  which  meant  that  our 
preponderance  or  supremacy  must  be  tacitly  recog- 
nized, and  that  other  Powers  should  abandon  the 
ambition  to  overtake  our  traditional  superiority  at 
sea,  or  to  lessen  the  disparity  in  strength  between 
their  navies  and  ours.  Look  at  that  proposition 
for  a  moment  with  continental  eyes,  and  it 
may  not  seem  that  its  acceptance  was  altogether 
so  easy  as  our  public  opinion  supposed.  Our  case 
for  the  maintenance  of  a  supreme  Fleet  in  the 
interests  of  defence  is  from  our  own  standpoint 
unanswerable.  A  land  Power  strengthens  itself 
against  definite  perils  :  it  can  be  attacked  only 
by  its  immediate  neighbours,  yet  even  a  land  Power 
aims  at  the  maximum  of  security  by  conscripting 
every  able-bodied  man.  An  island  nation  is  open 
to  attack  by  any  and  every  sea  Power  :  a  second- 
rate  fleet  to  it  is  useless,  and  the  only  possible  rule 
of  safety  for  it  is  to  build  against  "  any  reason- 
ably probable  combination  of  Powers."  We  can 
point  to  the  length  of  our  coastline,  to  the  im- 
portance of  our  commerce,  to  our  scattered  overseas 
possessions,  to  the  smallness  of  our  professional 
Army,  and  to  the  fate  which  would  overtake  us  if 
our  food  supply  were  cut  off  by  a  successful  blockade. 
Our  geographical  position  and  our  dependence  on 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      221 

overseas  commerce  obliged  us  to  create  our  naval 
preponderance,  and  until  the  world  has  changed, 
not  merely  its  laws  but  its  habits  of  thinking  will 
oblige  us  to  maintain  it.  The  argument  of  Sir 
Henry  Campbell -Bannerman  was  that,  in  spite  of 
this  preponderance  of  force,  our  character,  our 
policy,  and  our  record  ought  to  reassure  the  world 
as  to  its  use.  We  are  an  unaggressive  Power  : 
we  grudge  to  no  other  State  its  legitimate  expan- 
sion and  development  ;  we  respect  the  claims  to 
nationality  even  of  the  weakest  people  ;  we  shall 
never  use  our  Fleet  to  interfere  with  the  commercial 
freedom  of  others.  This  tremendous  instrument 
wakens  into  life  only  to  defend  our  good  right, 
and  while  no  other  State  attacks  us,  our  force 
slumbers,  vigilant  but  harmless. 

These  are  the  only  grounds  on  which  the  posses- 
sion by  one  Power  of  this  vast  potential  force  can 
be  rendered  tolerable  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 
It  is  the  whole  argument  of  this  book  that  we 
must  endeavour  to*  give  to  our  resolve  to  avoid 
aggression,  to  our  respect  for  nationality,  and  to 
a  generous  reading  of  commercial  freedom  some 
international  sanction  and  organization.  But  to  ask 
the  world,  without  any  binding  treaties  or  perma- 
nent declarations  from  us,  to  accept  our  character 
and  record  as  a  sufficient  guarantee  that  we  should 
never  abuse  our  supremacy  at  sea  was  to  make  a 
heavy  draft  on  our  moral  credit.  The  British  over- 
tures for  disarmament  failed  ;  and  from  Germany's 
refusal  in  1907  to  discuss  an  agreement  which 
must  have  stereotyped  our  supremacy  and  her  in- 
feriority at  sea  dates  the  first  deep  impression  among 
us  that  she  is,  and  for  long  has  been,  the  one 
incorrigibly  reactionary  element  in  Europe,  and  the 
chief,  if  not  the  only,  obstacle  to  international 
organization.  It  is  worth  while  to  inquire  what 
were  her  reasons  for  this  attitude. 


222  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

The  hostile  analysis  of  German  political  thought 
has  been  pursued  during  this  war  with  learning 
and  assiduity  by  multitudes  of  capable  writers.  It 
is  well  that  we  should  understand  what  the  school 
of  Treitschke  stood  for  in  morals  and  policy.  Its 
work  is  written  to-day  in  blood  and  fire  across 
a  continent,  and  its  memory  will  be  execrated  with 
an  ever -increasing  vehemence  as  the  sense  of 
international  solidarity  in  the  world  grows  at  the 
expense  of  national  egoism.  It  is  possible,  however, 
that  while  we  have  pursued  this  line  of  thought, 
we  have  not  sufficiently  considered  the  external  facts 
which  gave  this  Prussian  tradition  its  ascendancy 
in  Germany.  It  had  behind  it  a  disastrous  ipast 
of  weakness  and  disunion.  The  devastations  of 
the  Thirty  Years  War,  the  French  and  Russian 
invasions  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  the 
Napoleonic  conquests  explain  why  a  land  exposed 
to  powerful  neighbours  had  to  evolve  a  strong 
military  power.  The  provincialism  of  the  petty 
German  States  and  the  division  between  the  two 
creeds  are  the  reasons  why  a  race  with  only  a 
weak  sense  of  its  own  unity  had  to  realize  it  through 
the  mechanism  of  a  paternal  and  bureaucratic  State. 
In  our  own  day  the  comparative  failure  of  thej 
democratic  elements  in  Germany  to  overcome  the; 
Prussian  tradition  was  due  in  great  part  to  another 
factor — the  dissatisfaction  which  patriotic  Germans 
increasingly  felt  at  the  modest  part  which  their 
country  played  in  colonial  expansion.  They  were 
secure  at  last  in  Europe,  and  might  have  relaxed 
the  iron  discipline  of  the  armed  camp,  when  a 
new  motive  arose  to  keep  alive  the  mentality  of 
strife.  In  the  following  pages  I  propose  to  set 
forth,  as  fairly  as  I  can,  the  general  position  of 
German  Imperialism.  I  shall  draw  on  writers  of 
two  opposite  schools.  Count  Reventlow,  the  able 
but  fanatical  exponent  of  the  anti -British  policy  of 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE     223 

the  Tirpitz  faction,  represents  neither  the  German 
Foreign  Office  nor  the  German  masses,  but  in  an 
exaggerated  form  he  does  state  a  view  of  naval 
and  colonial  problems  which  was  widely  held.  His 
"  Deutschlands  Auswartige  Politik  "  was  in  its  first 
edition  a  careful  and  comparatively  sober  history 
of  German  foreign  policy  in  the  Kaiser's  reign.  In 
its  third  edition,  issued  during  the  war,  it  has 
become  less  honest,  less  objective,  and  in  some 
passages  merely  fantastic.  Dr.  Rohrbach  and  Dr. 
Naumann  represent  a  much  less  sinister  tendency, 
a  popular  democratic  Imperialism,  which  is  con- 
sistent with  a  frank  admiration  for  British  institu- 
tions and  a  critical  attitude  towards  the  Junker 
tradition.  I  shall  try  to  interpret  these  writers 
rather  by  summary  than  by  quotation,  and  I  will 
beg  the  reader  to  remember  that  in  many  of  the 
following  pages  I  am  not  speaking  in  my  own  person, 
but  am  deliberately  stating,  or  rather  reproducing, 
one  side  of  a  case.  The  immense  indictment  against 
German  policy  needs  no  further  repetition  in  our 
language,  but  some  understanding  of  the  continental 
attitude  towards  our  sea -power  is  essential  for  our 
own  future  guidance.  On  a  long  view,  over  wide 
spaces  of  time,  British  policy  towards  our  chief 
rivals  in  the  colonial  field  has  usually  in  the  end 
righted,  recovered,  and  vindicated  itself,  after 
periods  during  which  it  seemed  to  depart  from 
the  spirit  of  Sir  Henry  Campbell -Bannerman's 
declaration.  Our  dealings  first  with  France  and  then 
with  Germany  suggest  that  we  are  very  slow  to 
grasp  the  inevitable  feelings  of  a  land  Power  when 
confronted  with  our  supremacy  at  sea,  and  our  diplo- 
macy, though  in  both  instances,  after  a  weary 
struggle  of  armaments  and  some  near  approaches 
to  war,  it  ended  the  friction  with  a  generous 
arrangement,  is  apt  to  move  slowly  and  seems  to 
reach  with  difficulty  its  final  perception  of  the  real 


224-  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

issue.  That  issue  will  confront  us  once  more  at  the 
settlement.  A  review  of  the  reasons  which  led  Ger- 
many to  challenge  our  ascendancy  at  sea  has  there- 
fore a  direct  bearing  on  our  immediate  problem. 

Confronted  by  such  a  declaration  of  British 
policy  as  this  statement  by  Sir  Henry  Campbell- 
Bannerman,  a  German  critic  would  make  his  first 
point  by  reminding  us  that  our  policy  is  subject 
to  fluctuation.  If  he  were  honest  and  well-informed 
he  would  frankly  admit  its  sincerity,  but  for  how 
long,  he  would  ask,  will  such  counsels  guide  us? 
To  go  into  an  arrangement  with  a  great  naval 
Power  implies  something  a  little  more  than  a  belief 
that  this  Power  will  not  act  in  a  crudely  aggressive 
way.  Short  of  a  wanton  and  forcible  attack,  such 
a  Power  may  make  a  very  formidable  use  of  its 
strength.  The  claim,  for  example,  that  Britain 
respects  "  the  independence  of  nationalities  "  came 
a  little  oddly  in  1907  from  the  Power  which  in 
1902  had  annexed  the  Boer  Republics.  To  be 
sure,  Sir  Henry  Campbell -Bannerman  himself  nobly 
combated  that  wrong,  and  went  far  to  repair  it 
by  conceding  full  self-government.  The  fact 
remains  that  his  predecessors  suppressed  two 
civilized  independent  States,  and  achieved  their  end 
only  because  the  naval  force  which  they  wielded 
forbade  the  interference  of  other  Powers.  Nor 
does  the  case  stand  better  with  freedom  of  trade. 
Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  spoke  for  himself 
and  for  a  great  and  victorious  majority,  but  who 
could  feel  sure  that  the  tendencies  which  Mr. 
Chamberlain  represented  would  never,  by  the  normal 
swing  of  the  pendulum,  attain  to  Power?  If  "  Tariff 
Reform  "  should  triumph,  the  whole  meaning  of  our 
vast  overseas  Empire  would  be  changed.  The  self- 
governing  colonies  already  set  up  barriers  against 
German  trade,  but  India  and  the  tropical  colonies 
were  still  open.  Our  naval  supremacy  might  come 


EMPIRE,    SEA -POWER,    AND    TRADE     225 

to    mean   that   we   should   hold   these   vast   markets 
for  a   British   monopoly. 

One  simple  perception  of  a  physical  fact 
dominates  all  German  writing  about  sea-power, 
empire,  and  trade.  A  Power  which  possesses  an 
indisputable  mastery  of  the  seas  is  free  itself  to 
act  as  it  pleases  in  most  of  the  distant  regions 
of  the  earth,  and  can  defy  the  jealousy  or  the  moral 
disapprobation  of  its  rivals.  It  can  expand  at  will 
in  any  region  removed  from  the  direct  access  of 
a  rival  land  Power.  That  is  much.  But  further, 
it  can  control  and  prevent  the  expansion  of  other 
Powers.  It  was  by  the  operation  of  these  two 
principles  that  our  Empire  grew  up  in  the  eighteenth 
century  on  the  ruins  of  its  French  and  Dutch 
predecessors.  To-day,  not  only  can  we  continue 
to  expand  at  will  ;  we  can  veto  the  expansion  of 
any  continental  rival.  Captain  Mahan  did  much 
to  elucidate  this  connection  between  sea-power  and 
empire,  and  his  books  have  been  at  least  as 
influential  in  Germany  as  in  England.  This  war 
has  worked  out  this  theoretical  thesis  in  actual 
practice.  By  the  simple  fact  that  we  closed  the 
seas  against  reinforcements  and  supplies  from 
Germany,  we  have  been  able  at  our  ease  and  leisure 
to  occupy  all  the  German  colonies.  What  we  have 
done  in  this  case  we  might  also  have  done  in  a  war 
against  the  other  colonial  Powers,  France,  Italy, 
Holland,  and  Portugal.  We  could,  moreover,  have 
done  it  much  more  easily  in  a  single-handed  war 
than  in  this  struggle.  In  this  war  we  have  had 
to  divert  the  greater  part  of  our  resources  to  help 
France  and  Serbia  and  to  attack  Turkey.  Single- 
handed  against  any  other  colonial  Power,  our 
success  overseas  would  have  been  prompter.  The 
reader  may  dismiss  such  strategical  forecasts  as  a 
typical  instance  of  the  German  mania  for  thinking 
in  terms  of  force.  That  is  too  summary  a  dismissal. 

16 


226  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

We  may  feel  sure  that  we  shall  never  succumb  to 
the  temptation  to  use  our  sea-power  in  this  purely 
predatory  way.  The  fact  remains  that  it  gives  us 
in  all  our  dealings  with  colonial  rivals  a  tremendous 
leverage,  and  a  power  of  attack  which  is  balanced 
by  no  corresponding  vulnerability.  There  is  no 
disputing  the  plain  physical  fact  that  our  sea-power 
means  that  other  Powers  hold  their  colonies  at  our 
goodwill,  and  can  expand  only  with  our  goodwill. 
Our  sea-power  gives  us  the  physical  basis  for  a 
potential  ascendancy  which  might  be  nearly  absolute 
over  Africa,  over  all  the  richer  and  more  populous 
regions  of  Asia,  and  over  all  the  islands  of  the 
seas.  The  perception  of  this  physical  fact  has 
penetrated  all  German  political  thinking  in  our 
generation.  It  did  not  trouble  the  quiet,  unenter- 
prising nation  which  was  content  to  limit  its 
ambitions  to  its  home  territories.  It  gripped  and 
obsessed  the  nation  which  felt  itself  compelled  by 
the  growth  of  its  population  and  the  almost 
miraculous  expansion  of  its  trade  to  adventure  in 
a  wider  world,  to  embark  on  "  world-politics," 
and  to  become  itself,  like  its  older  rivals,  a 
"world-Power."  For  a  generation  after  1870 
Bismarck's  expression  that  Germany  was  "  gorged  " 
(saturiert)  held  true,  and  throughout  this  period 
the  Triple  Alliance,  with  the  Russian  "  re-insurance  " 
treaty  sufficed  to  guarantee  her  position  on  the 
Continent.  The  desire  for  overseas  expansion 
became  an  acknowledged  and  conscious  tendency 
shortly  before  the  Kaiser's  accession  (1888),  and 
it  was  dominant  by  the  end  of  the  century. 
Hitherto,  we  had  been  an  informal  and  semi- 
detached adherent  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  both 
Bismarck  and  Caprivi  regarded  our  Navy  as  a  kind 
of  supplement  or  completion  (Ergdnzung)  of  its 
forces.  When  Germany  aspired,  however,  to 
colonial  expansion,  a  choice  had  to  be  made.  She 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE     227, 

might  expand  by  our  permission  and  with  our  aid, 
taking  what  we  chose  to  assign  to  her  as  her  share  ; 
or  she  might  build  up  a  fleet,  and  make  her  own 
way  in  the  world.  The  reasons  which  governed 
her  choice  were  partly  sentimental  and  partly 
practical.  She  disliked  the  idea  of  being  beyond 
the  seas  a  satellite  in  some  sense  of  our  Empire — 
"  the  junior  partner  in  the  British  world-firm,"  in 
Naumann's  phrase.  She  dreaded,  moreover,  that 
we  should  exact  a  heavy  price  for  our  goodwill 
by  requiring  her  aid  in  a  policy  certainly  of  hostility 
and  possibly  of  war  against  Russia.  Something 
of  the  kind  seemed  to  be  in  our  minds,  for  the 
series  of  speeches  in  which  Mr.  Chamberlain  invited 
Germany  and  America  to  form  with  us  a  Pan- 
Teutonic  alliance  were  full  of  menace  and  ill- 
will  towards  France  and  Russia.  The  history  of 
this  period  is  not  yet  fully  disclosed.  We  know 
only  that  in  1901,  when  Germany  did  definitely 
offer  us  her  alliance,  we  no  longer  cared  to  accept 
it — probably  because  Germany  stipulated  that  it 
should  not  be  applicable  to  the  Far  East.1  The 
Kaiser  was  certainly  friendly  so  long  as  Queen 
Victoria  reigned.  On  two  occasions  at  this  time 
we  played  into  the  hands  of  the  school  of  which 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  came  (from  1897)  to  be  the 
determined  and  capable  leader.  We  replied  in  1896 
to  the  telegram  in  which  the  Kaiser  congratulated 
Mr.  Kruger  on  his  escape  from  Dr.  Jameson's 
freebooting  raid,  by  sending  out  the  "  Flying 
Squadron  "  to  cruise  at  large.  Our  intention, 
doubtless,  was  to  suggest  to  the  Germans  that 
it  was  idle  for  a  people  without  a  navy  to  dream 
of  interfering  even  with  such  a  lawless  outrage 
as  Dr.  Jameson's.  When  the  Boer  War  eventually 
fulfilled  the  promise  of  the  Jameson  raid,  the 
lesson  was  learned.  The  seizure  of  their  liner  the 
kx  See  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  Quarterly  Review,  October  1901.  \ 


228  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

Bundesrat  in  that  war  completed  the  education 
which  the  "  Flying  Squadron  "  had  begun.  Count 
Reventlow  is  not  always  a  trustworthy  historian  ;  but 
when  he  states  that  the  agitation  for  a  great  navy, 
of  which  he  was  the  chief  literary  spokesman,  could 
not  have  succeeded  without  these  two  object-lessons, 
he  is  probably  a  reliable  and  competent  witness.1 
The  whole  course,  first,  of  the  Boer,  and  then  of  the 
Russo-Japanese,  War  fixed  the  humiliating  impres- 
sion of  Germany's  impotence.  Germany  realized 
that  she  had  been  "  attempting  to  conduct  world- 
politics  with  insufficient  means."  That,  indeed,  is 
commonly  the  effect  of  the  spectacle  of  war  upon 
neutrals.  This  war  fostered  the  American  movement 
of  "  preparedness,"  and  led  to  an  increase  of  the 
American  Fleet.  By  the  same  process  of  thinking 
the  Boer  War  made  it  possible,  after  many  earlier 
failures,  for  the  Tirpitz  school  to  impose  the  first 
plan  of  a  great  navy  upon  the  Reichstag  (1900). 
We  have  gone  far  enough  into  the  origins  of 
the  Anglo -German  naval  rivalry  to  realize  that  the 
crucial  point  in  the  claim  which  Sir  Henry  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman  put  forward  on  behalf  of  our  sea- 
power  is  that  "  throughout  the  world  that  power 

1  We  continued  to  supply  object-lessons.  Shortly  after  his  fall 
(1905)  M.  Delcasse  divulged  to  the  Gatilois,  in  an  interview,  the 
fact  that  Lord  Lansdowne  had  promised  him  in  a  Moroccan  com- 
plication the  aid  of  the  British  Fleet.  The  Matin  and  M.  Jaures 
both  supplied  the  details  of  the  plan  a  few  weeks  later,  and  both 
claimed  ministerial  authority  for  their  statements.  The  plan  of 
campaign  included  a  landing  by  a  British  Expeditionary  Corps  in 
Schleswig  and  the  occupation  of  the  Kiel  Canal.  It  so  happened 
that  immediately  after  this  crisis,  for  the  first  time  since  the  Crimean 
War,  we  sent  the  Channel  Fleet  to  cruise  in  the  Baltic  (August  1905). 
It  visited  the  Danish  ports,  and  actually  (so  ran  the  German  reports) 
practised  landing  exercises  on  the  coast  of  Jutland.  This  was  a 
startlingly  dramatic  way  of  reminding  Germans  of  the  meaning 
of  our  naval  supremacy  (see  Reventlow,  pp.  263,  277-9).  Tne  reason 
for  it  was  presumably  the  Kaiser's  proposed  continental  coalition 
against  our  action  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      229 

is  recognized  as  ...  innocent  of  designs  against 
.  .  .  the  legitimate  development  of  other  States." 
Have  we,  as  the  greatest  of  colonial  Powers, 
watched  without  jealousy  the  attempts  of  younger 
rivals  to  build  up  modern  empires  overseas  ?  It 
is  not  easy  to  see  ourselves  as  others  see  us.  Our 
feeling  as  we  watched  the  growth  of  Russian  power 
in  Asia  before  1907,  or  of  the  French  colonial 
Empire  before  1904,  may  not  have  been  so  much 
jealousy  as  alarm.  Our  possessions  are  so  scattered 
that  it  is  difficult  for  any  rival  to  take  a  forward 
step  without  approaching  some  route  or  position 
that  seems  vital  to  our  safety.  We  were  sensitive 
when  a  rival  approached  the  Afghans  or  the  Boers 
or  bestrode  our  road  to  India.  Our  long  rivalry 
with  France  lasted  for  twenty  years  and  culmin- 
ated in  the  Fashoda  incident.  It  may  be  worth 
while  to  recall  the  impression  which  *  that  incident 
made  upon  Frenchmen.  M.  Debidour,1  in  his 
admirable  "  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  1'Europe  " 
(iii.  p.  67),  opens  his  narrative  thus  : — 

England,  which  had  long  been  the  first'colonial  Power  in  the  world, 
had  acquired  the  habit  of  watching  jealously  the  overseas  policy  of 
France,  and  was  disturbed  when  she  carried  her  flag  and  sought  to 
establish  her  dominion  both  in  Asia  and  in  Africa,  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  her  own  possessions.  When  she  saw  her,  so  soon  after  her  great 
disasters  of  1870  and  1871,  undertaking  and  carrying  out  methodically 
numerous  conquests,  which  might  permit  her  to  rival  her  own  power, 
she  naturally  made  no  attempt  to  conceal  her  alarm  and  her  annoy- 
ance. The  stolid  opposition  which  she  maintained  to  her  in  Tonkin, 
in  Madagascar,  and  in  the  interior  of  Africa,  during  the  last  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  was  one  of  the  most  singular  elements  in 
the  diplomatic  history  which  we  are  about  to  sketch. 


1  One  of  the  leading  French  historians  and  a  Professor  of  :the 
Sorbonne.  His  book  is  commended  by  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  as  a 
"  classic  "  and  has  been  "  crowned  "  by  the  Academy.  This  praise 
is  perhaps  too  high,  but  it  is  a  careful  and  laborious  book.  He 
is  a  warm  partisan  of  the  Entente  Cordiale,  and  wrote  or  completed 
this  section  of  his  work  during  this  war. 


230  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

The  details  which  follow  in  M.  Debidour's  record 
are  often  singular  and  sometimes  incredible.  They 
range  from  a  long  series  of  frontier  disputes  and 
boundary  questions  in  Africa,  through  incidents  in 
which  it  is  said  that  we  aided  savage  chiefs  with 
arms  against  France,  up  to  such  official  acts  of  un- 
friendliness as  our  refusal  at  the  time  of  France's 
disasters  in  Indo -China,  to  allow  her  ships  to  coal 
at  our  stations.  In  the  end,  as  M.  Debidour,  and, 
indeed,  all  Frenchmen  recognize,  Lord  Lansdowne 
brought  the  long  and  bitter  rivalry  to  its  close 
in  a  handsome  and  generous  settlement,  to  which 
Sir  Edward  Grey  adhered  with  scrupulous  and  un- 
flinching loyalty.  The  end  blots  out  the  record, 
but  the  moral  remains  that  for  the  future  we  should 
seek  in  our  dealings  with  colonial  rivals  rather 
to  avoid  such  episodes  than  to  repair  them.  For 
our  unfriendly  attitude  towards  French  colonial 
expansion  we  had,  of  course,  reasons  more  solid 
than  jealousy.  It  was  partly  retaliation  for  the 
opposition  of  France  to  our  permanent  occupation 
of  Egypt.  It  was  governed,  even  more,  by  the 
fact  that  the  guiding  principle  of  French  colonial 
policy  was  then,  and  still  is,  commercial  monopoly. 
Wherever  France  expands  our  merchants  know  only 
too  well  that  their  trade  is  doomed. 

Neither  of  these  reasons  can  be  advanced  to 
explain  the  repetition  of  the  same  phenomenon 
during  part  of  the  period  of  German  expansion.  We 
had  no  serious  political  quarrel  with  Germany  before 
1905,  and  even  then  we  were  not  principals  in 
the  Moroccan  affair,  but  merely  France's  second. 
The  commercial  policy  of  Germany  in  her  colonies 
is,  moreover,  as  enlightened  as  our  own.  Not  only 
is  there  no  tariff  preference  for  German  over  foreign 
goods,  but  the  administration  invariably  welcomes 
the  foreign  merchant.1  It  would  be  the  reverse 

*  Nothing    in   West  Africa    is    more    striking    than   the  attitude 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE     231 

of  the  truth  to  say  that  our  early  attitude  to  German 
expansion  was  unfriendly.  On  the  contrary,  Lord 
Salisbury  did  much  to  facilitate  it.  We  acquiesced 
in  it  in  East  and  West  Africa,  in  Samoa,  and  in 
Kiao-Chau.  Nevertheless,  we  seemed  to  be  anxious 
to  set  limits  to  it.  After  some  hesitations,  we 
withdrew  our  early  opposition  to  Germany's  estab- 
lishing herself  in  South-West  Africa,  but  we  would 
never  give  up  its  natural  harbour,  Walfisch  Bay, 
and  the  arrival  of  the  Germans  in  South  Africa 
was  the  signal  for  a  rapid  advance  of  British 
Imperialism,  first  in  Bechuanaland,  and  then  in 
Rhodesia,  with  the  manifest  object  of  preventing 
any  further  extension  of  the  German  sphere  in  the 
unoccupied  interior.  What  we  dreaded  was,  of 
course,  their  junction  with  the  Boers.  The  "lead- 
ing case,"  however,  in  this  chapter  of  our  history 
turns  on  the  ambition  of  the  Germans  to  acquire 
the  Portuguese  colony  of  Angola  and  the  northern 
part  of  Mozambique.  These  colonies  are  almost 
derelict  for  lack  of  enterprise,  capital,  and  orderly 
administration.  They  are  based,  moreover,  on  a 
system  of  scarcely  disguised  slavery  and  slave  - 
trading,  which  has  been  described  by  Mr.  Nevin- 
son,  and  denounced  in  the  plainest  language  by 
Lord  Cromer.  Portugal  was  in  a  condition  of 
chronic  insolvency,  and  sooner  or  later  must  have 
realized  her  assets.  In  1898  we  concluded,  or 
all  but  concluded,  a  bargain  with  Germany,  by 
which  we,  as  the  protector  or  "•  ally  "  of  Portugal 

adopted  by  the  several  colonizing  Powers  towards  commerce.  At 
present  Germany  is  easity  in  the  front  rank :  her  policy  towards 
business  men  is  the  most  enlightened  of  any  Power.  .  .  .  The  British 
merchant  knows  with  absolute  certainty  that  he  may  rely  on  receiv- 
ing a  warm  welcome  and  every  assistance  in  German  colonies.  He 
knows  too  that  none  will  be  given  a  preference  before  him  ("  Dawn 
in  Darkest  Africa,"  by  the  Rev.  John  H.  Harris  ;  Smith,  Elder  &  Co., 
1914). 


232  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

and  the  reversionary  heir  to  her  African  estates, 
agreed  to  facilitate  the  purchase  of  the  greater  part 
of  them  by  Germany.  Some  authorities  state  that 
a  secret  treaty  was  actually  signed  to  this  effect  in 
September  1898. l  Nothing  camle  of  it,  and  the 
reason  is  not  fully  known.  We  helped  Portugal 
out  of  her  financial  difficulties,  and  prevented  her 
selling  to  Germany  a  coaling-station  in  Madeira. 
With  King  Edward's  accession  a  definite  step  was 
taken  in  somewhat  dramatic  form,  which  was  inter- 
preted in  Germany  as  a  warning  that  we  had  ceased 
to  favour  her  colonial  expansion.  The  King's  first 
ceremonial  visit  abroad  was  to  Lisbon,  and  there,  in 
public  and  emphatic  words,  he  announced  that  the 
maintenance  intact  of  the  Portuguese  colonies  was 
the  object  of  his  best  wishes  and  endeavours.  The 
effect  on  German  opinion  was  considerable,2  and  it 
served  to  underline  what  was  already  guessed  re- 
garding the  King's  personal  relations  with  the 
German  Court.  The  Foreign  Office  still  followed 
for  a  time  a  pro -German  policy  in  the  unpopular 
Venezuelan  affair,  the  abortive  Chinese  Treaty,  and 
even  in  the  early  stages  of  the  Bagdad  negotia- 
tions. In  the  end  it  refused  the  overtures  of 
Germany  for  an  alliance.  Our  uneasiness  at  our 
isolation  among  the  Powers,  which  the  Boer  War  had 
taught  us  to  consider  rather  perilous  than  splendid, 
the  refusal  of  the  German  Government  to  enter 
into  any  alliance  which  might  involve  it  in  a  war 
with  Russia,  the  pro -French  leaning  of  our  Court,  the 
anti -German  tendency  of  some  of  our  commercial 
circles,  and  our  very  natural  alarm  at  the  progress 
of  German  naval  building,  all  combined  to  range  us 
definitely  in  1904  in  the  continental  system  and 
within  the  camp  opposed  to  Germany. 

1  See  Reventlow,  121  ;  Debidour,  iii.  263. 
a  Reventlow,  p.  199. 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE     233 

From  this  moment  until  the  end  of  the  Moroccan 
affair    in    1911    the    relationship    was    one   of   open 
antagonism,    and    it    turned    primarily    on    the    use 
of  our  sea -power  to  prevent  what  Germans  regarded 
as  their  "  legitimate  development."      A  full  survey 
of    the    Moroccan    period    would    involve    us    in    a 
lengthy   digression.      It  has  been  reviewed  by  Mr. 
E.    D.    Morel    with    equal    knowledge    and    courage 
("  Ten    Years    of    Secret    Diplomacy  "),    and    more 
briefly  by   Mr.   Lowes   Dickinson    ("  The   European 
Anarchy  ")  :   the  attitude  of  almost  the  whole  Liberal 
Press    in    England,    and    of    the    Socialist    Press    in 
France,  was,  throughout  it,  uneasy  and  critical.    The 
Germans    contrived    by    the    bad    manners    of   their 
diplomacy,  their  preference  for  dramatic  and  chal- 
lenging   strokes,    and    their    vulgar,    sabre-rattling, 
bullying  procedure  to  destroy  the  sympathy  to  which 
on    the    merits    of    the    case    they    had    some    title. 
It   is   fair   to   point   out,   however,  that   if   they   had 
really    been    bent    on    war   the    favourable    moment 
for  them  was   1905,  when  Russia  could  have  played 
no    part    and    France    was   admittedly    unready.       It 
is   interesting  to   find  that  a   "  realist  "   like   Count 
Reventlow  censures  his  Government  in  this  connec- 
tion   for    its    excessive    devotion    to    peace.      There 
was   much  to   regret   in   the   Anglo-French   conduct 
of    the    case — the    assumption,    for    example,    at   the 
start  that  we  had  the  right  without  consulting  other 
Powers  to  dispose  of  the  destinies  of  Morocco,  and 
the    reluctance    of    France    to    enter    a    conference. 
Worse  still  was  the  equivocal  honesty  which  pub- 
lished a  treaty  guaranteeing  the  independence  and 
integrity    of    Morocco,    while    secret    clauses    and   a 
secret     Franco -Spanish     treaty      provided     for     its 
eventual   partition.     Such   dealings  are   fair   neither 
to  the  nation  at  home,  nor  to  other  Powiers,  nor  to 
the    victim    nationality,    and    when    once    they    are 
divulged,    they    expose    every    subsequent    treaty    to 


234  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

similar  suspicions.1  When  at  length  the  Confer- 
ence met  at  Algeciras,  the  French,  British,  and 
Spanish  representatives  solemnly  negotiated  with  the 
Germans  for  a  species  of  international  regime  in 
Morocco,  knowing  all  the  while  that  they  had 
arranged  among  themselves  for  its  eventual  par- 
tition. The  Conference  over,  France,  disregarding 
the  spirit  of  its  decisions,  set  to  work  promptly  and 
efficiently  to  make  a  partition  of  Morocco  inevitable, 
and  she  achieved  it  in  the  brief  period  of  five 
years.  Did  the  German  Government  itself  wish 
to  make  Morocco,  in  whole  or  in  part,  a  German 
colony,  as  the  Pan-Germans  certainly  did?  Prob- 
ably it  did  not,  and  by  its  reserve  it  earned  the 
criticisms  of  the  Reventlow  school.  But  if  it  had 
done  so  (as  our  Foreign  Office  during  the  Agadir 
crisis  suspected),  would  there  have  been  anything 
monstrous  in  that  ?  Why  is  it  legitimate  for  France 
to  expand  and  a  capital  crime  in  Germany  to  wish 
to  expand?  We  were  ready,  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
in  his  Guildhall  speech  (1911)  told  the  Germans, 
with  a  menacing  publicity  worthy  of  the  Kaiser 
himself,  to  go  to  war  to  prevent  the  realiza- 
tion of  this  design.  Why?  Morocco  is  important 
for  two  reasons.  It  was  one  of  the  few  regions  of 
the  earth  still  unappropriated,  which  are  suitable 
for  white  settlement.  It  is  also  rich  in  iron-ore. 
Consider  the  two  claimants  (if  Germany  really  had 
been  a  claimant) .  France,  with  a  stationary  popu- 
lation, has  already  two  colonies  of  the  same  type 
(Algeria  and  Tunis),  while  Germany,  with  a  yearly 
increase  in  her  population  of  nearly  a  million,  has 
none.  France  exports  iron-ore  :  Germany  must 

1  Thus  we  find  Dr.  Rohrbach  speculating  as  to  what  are  the  secret 
clauses  in  the  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  of  1907.  What  was  in  the 
mind  of  the  Turks  when  in  September  1914  they  refused  the  Entente's 
guarantee  of  Turkish  integrity  and  independence  ?  They  may  have 
remembered  the  fate  of  Morocco  and  Persia. 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      235 

import.  The  real  concern  of  trie  German  Govern- 
ment, which  knew,  as  we  also  well  know,  the 
tendency  of  French  colonial  administration  to  com- 
mercial monopoly,  was  that  this  potentially  rich  area 
should  be  closed  to  her  merchants,  contractors,  and 
mining  prospectors.  What  angers,  suspicions  of 
"  encirclement,"  armaments,  and  threats  of  war  this 
sorry  quarrel  over  a  rich  field  for  speculative 
exploitation  caused  in  Europe  we  know  too  well  : 
the  present  war  is  in  some  sense  its  aftermath. 
Read  this  episode  in  connection  with  our  opposition 
to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  we  have  the  clue  to 
the  reasons  for  the  refusal  of  the  Germans  in  1907  to 
accept  as  final  the  existing  ratio  of  naval  strength. 
They  had  decided  to  arm  at  sea  because  they  wished 
to  expand  overseas.  They  realized,  in  the  Kaiser's 
phrase,  that  "  Empire  means  sea -power  and  sea- 
power  means  empire  (Reichsgewa.lt}"-  At  that 
moment,  with  their  experience  in  the  Angola 
bargain  fresh  in  their  minds,  and  the  Moroccan 
affair  still  unsettled,  a  hopeful  approach  to  the 
limitation  of  naval  armaments  demanded  negotia- 
tions of  a  much  larger  sccff)e  than  our  Govern- 
ment then  contemplated.  If  a  nation  is  arming 
for  a  definite  end,  there  is  only  one  pacific  way 
of  inducing  it  to  disarm,  and  that  is  to  offer  it  with 
goodwill  some  part  at  least  of  what  it  means  to 
attain  by  struggle.  The  problem,  in  other  words, 
was  to  offer  some  tangible  guarantee  that  our  naval 
supremacy,  if  the  Germans  would  acquiesce  in  it, 
should  not  be  used  to  thwart  their  legitimate 
expansion  or  to  limit  the  world's  area  of  commercial 
freedom. 

The  second  approach  of  our  diplomacy  to 
Germany  was  more  comprehensive  :  it  was  inspired 
by  a  man  who  understood  the  workings  of  the 
German  mind,  and  it  succeeded  in  creating  real 
goodwill  between  the  two  Governments.  Lord 


236  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

Haldane  in  these  negotiations  performed  a  notable 
service  to  his  country,  and  there  is  nothing  in  Lord 
Grey's  long  record  which  will  serve  him  better  with 
history  than  his  adoption  of  the  new  policy  which 
he  followed  from  the  end  of  1911  down  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.1  A  final  settlement  of  the 
naval  question  was  not  reached,  though  the  com- 
petition was  greatly  eased.  The  formidable 
personality  of  von  Tirpitz  (then,  as  later,  the 
Chancellor's  determined  opponent)  stood  in  the  way, 
and  it  was  impossible  for  us  to  accept  the  con- 
dition on  which  even  at  that  early  stage  it  might 
have  been  settled — a  "  re -insurance  "  treaty  based 
on  mutual  neutrality.  Our  reasonable  economic 
and  colonial  concessions  sufficed,  however,  to  change 
the  whole  atmosphere.  The  generous  terms  on 
which  the  Bagdad  Railway  question  was  finally 
settled  are  known  from  public  declarations  made 
by  both  sides.  The  conclusion  of  a  secret  agree- 
ment over  the  Portuguese  colonies,  which  apparently 
was  actually  initialed,  is  not  so  generally  known 
in  this  country.  It  seems  to  have  been  substan- 
tially a  repetition  of  the  abortive  bargain  of  1898, 
based  on  the  understanding  that  when  German 
capital  had  sufficiently  "  penetrated  "  these  colonies 
to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  claim,  we  would  facilitate 
their  purchase  by  Berlin.  Looking  back  upon  the 
past,  one  may  reflect  that  if  in  1904  it  had  been 
possible  to  conclude  an  arrangement  on  these  lines 
with  Germany,  our  happy  approach  to  France  need 
not  have  involved  the  sharpening  of  the  rivalry  in 

1  The  goodwill  of  the  German  Chancellor  and  of  Herr  von  Kiderlen- 
Waechter  deserves  equal  recognition.  Neither  of  them  (as  Count 
Reventlow  deplores,  pp.  386  and  456)  belonged  to  the  naval  school, 
and  their  policy  (according  to  this  hostile  witness)  was  based  on  the 
resolute  maintenance  of  peace,  an  approach  to  Russia,  an  approach 
to  Britain,  the  removal  of  the  Franco-German  friction,  and  German 
expansion  in  the  East. 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      237 

Europe.  If,  further,  at  any  time  between  1904 
and  1914  Russia  had  been  able  to  come  to  terms 
with  the  Central  Powers  over  the  freedom  of  the 
Turkish  Straits,  this  war  might  have  been  avoided. 
It  was  these  concrete  issues  which  underlay  the 
rivalry  of  the  two  groups  of  Powers.  But  in  1904 
we  were  in  no  mood  for  an  arrangement  with 
Germany,  and  the  Kaiser's  love  of  posing  in 
"  shining  armour  "  made  it  at  all  times  difficult. 
It  was  a  great  achievement  that,  in  spite  of  all 
the  moral  and  material  difficulties,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
did  contrive  in  1912  to  ease  and  even  to  end  the 
overseas  rivalry  between  the  two  Empires,  and  to 
this  we  may  point  with  confidence  as  a  proof  that 
our  policy  did  not  permanently  aim  at  using  our 
sea -power  to  check  the  expansion  of  others.  The 
significance  of  this  colonial  arrangement  for  our 
present  argument  is,  that  from  it  the  terms  emerge 
on  which  our  naval  supremacy  may  be  rendered 
tolerable  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  Sir  Henry 
Campbell -Bannerman  foresaw  what  these  condi- 
tions must  be.  It  remained  to  translate  his  declara- 
tion into  concrete  and  binding  undertakings.  A 
League  of  Nations,  if  it  is  to  use  and  sanction  our 
sea -power,  must  work  on  the  same  lines.  It  must 
offer  safeguards  against  aggression  and  assure 
nationality.  But  it  is  equally  imperative  that  it 
should  guarantee  freedom  of  trade  and  provide  for 
the  legitimate  expansion  of  growing  nations. 

The  reader  may  object  that  the  argument  of  this 
chapter  has  assumed  that  the  kind  of  Imperialism 
exemplified  in  the  German  ambition  to  lead  the 
economic  development  of  Turkey  and  to  administer 
Angola  is  "legitimate  expansion."  Why,  it  may 
be  asked,  if  Germans  may  freely  trade  with  our 
colonies  should  they  wish  to  have  colonies  of  their 
own?  That  is  a  two-edged  question.  We  might 
and  did  trade  freely  with  their  colonies  ;  why,  then, 


23 8  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

should  we  object  to  their  increase?  Even  if  we 
take  the  question  on  this  purely  material  level,  it 
cannot  be  dismissed  so  simply.  No  nation  has  any 
guarantee,  in  the  present  state  of  the  world,  that  any 
other  colonial  Power  will  continue  to  follow  an 
enlightened  policy  of  commercial  freedom.  There 
were  limits,  moreover,  to  the  enlightenment  of  the 
best  colonial  Powers.  The  trade  of  foreigners  in 
goods  might  be  encouraged,  but  on  the  whole  every 
Power  preferred  to  reserve  for  its  own  subjects  the 
big  opportunities  for  profit — "  political  "  concessions 
as  they  are  sometimes  called — railways,  telegraphs, 
harbour  works,  roads,  oil-wells,  and  mines.  It  is 
on  these  concessions  far  more  than  upon  the  mer- 
chants' trade  in  goods  that  the  politics  of  Imperialism 
turn  to-day.  The  flag  follows  these  capital  invest- 
ments, and  the  investments  follow  the  flag.  There 
is  more  involved  in  this  process  of  appropriating 
concession  areas  than  the  simple  desire  to  invest 
profitably  in  regions  where  labour  is  cheap  and  un- 
protected. There  is  the  desire  to  obtain  a  secure 
supply  of  raw  materials.  The  need  of  our  Navy  to 
obtain  a  supply  of  oil-fuel  which  would  always  be 
under  our  political  control,  goes  far  to  explain  the 
partition  of  Persia  and  our  appropriation  of  the  oil- 
bearing  southern  sphere.  The  need  of  the  German 
steel  industry  to  obtain  a  cheap  and  ample  supply  of 
iron-ore  underlay  the  Moroccan  question,  as  it  com- 
plicates the  problem  of  Lorraine.  But  in  peace,  at 
least,  the  reader  will  object,  the  Germans  could  always 
have  bought  iron -ore  from  a  French -Moroccan 
syndicate.  Yes,  at  the  French  price,  which  might 
in  some  circumstances  become  a  monopoly  price. 
They  would  naturally  have  preferred  to  eliminate 
middlemen's  profits,  and  to  avoid  the  risk  of  artificial 
prices  by  working  the  mines  themselves  through  a 
syndicate  representing  the  consumers.  If  there  is 
any  risk  of  the  adoption  of  the  Paris  Programme,  this 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      239 

question  of  raw  materials  will  dominate  the  whole 
politics  of  the  world,  for  rival  alliances  will  control 
these  natural  resources,  and  use  their  control  frankly 
and  avowedly  to  combat  the  economic  prosperity  of 
their  commercial  rivals  and  political  opponents.  The 
reader  may  object  that  even  this  real  difficulty  over 
raw  materials  is  not  a  decisive  reason  why  Germany 
should  insist  on  having  colonies  or  spheres  of  her 
own.  We  live  in  an  age  when  all  trade,  and 
especially  overseas  trade,  tends  to  be  managed  by 
syndicates,  trusts,  and  cartels.  There  seemed  before 
the  war  to  be  no  valid  reason  why  these  financial 
groups  should  be  exclusively  national.  If  Germany 
needs  iron -ore,  and  desires  to  have  some  control 
over  its  production,  why  should  not  a  Franco - 
German  or  international  syndicate  develop  the  mines 
of  Morocco,  and  ensure  a  fair  4istriDUtion  of  the 
product  to  the  various  national  industries  which  con- 
sume it  ?  That  probably  is  the  only  possible  formula 
for  the  equitable  solution  of  such  questions.  But  it 
encounters  grave  difficulties  in  practice.  A  conces- 
sion was  actually  given  by  the  colonial  administra- 
tion of  Algeria  to  a  Franco -German  syndicate  for 
the  working  of  the  rich  Ouenza  ore -field.  It  was 
revoked  by  the  Chamber  on  political  grounds. 
Arrangements  were  actually  made  for  the  association 
of  French,  German,  and  other  capital  in  the  working 
of  the  Moroccan  mines.  They  came  to  nothing  in 
circumstances  which  suggested  that  the  French 
Government  could  not  bring  itself  to  tolerate  German 
enterprise  in  Morocco.  These  unfortunate  essays  in 
co-operation  need  not  be  accepted  as  decisive  proofs 
that  it  must  always  fail.  But  they  do  suggest  that 
guarantees  for  good  faith  are  necessary.  On  paper 
a  colonial  Power  inspired  by  a  tradition  of  monopoly 
may  promise  an  open  door  to  the  foreign  trader  and 
to  the  foreign  capitalist  ;  it  may  even  refrain  from 
imposing  differential  tariffs.  But  in  a  hundred  ways 


240  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

an  administration  may  by  a  sedulous  attention  to  detail 
render  these  undertakings  of  no  effect.  Officials  who 
do  not  mean  to  welcome  foreigners  can,  in  colonies 
where  the  whole  administration  is  bureaucratic  and 
personal,  so  hamper  their  activities  as  to  render 
them  difficult  and  unprofitable.  The  French  Congo 
is  the  classical  instance  of  this  policy.  The  only 
safeguard  is  reciprocity  and  the  possibility  of  retalia- 
tion. Unless  Germany  is  somewhere  in  a  position 
to  say  to  France,  "  If  you  hamper  my  access  to  your 
colonial  raw  materials  and  markets,  I  shall  reply  by 
forbidding  mine  to  you,"  she  clearly  is  at  the  mercy 
of  a  competitor's  goodwill.  She  could  not,  in  fact, 
bargain  on  these  terms,  and  this  weakness  in  her 
position  drove  her  to  desire  colonies  and  spheres  of 
her  own.  The  adoption  of  a  policy  of  commercial 
freedom  by  all  the  colonial  Powers  ought  in  theory 
to  check  the  desire  for  empire,  but  a  too  unequal 
distribution  of  coveted  areas  is  an  obstacle  in  practice 
to  its  general  adoption.  If  each  of  the  chief  in- 
dustrial competitors  had  something  which  they  could 
deny  to  others,  the  exchange  of  opportunity  would 
come  about  by  the  natural  pressure  of  interests. 

The  economic  motives  were  in  Germany,  as  I 
believe  they  are  in  every  modern  community,  the 
chief  forces  which  drove  it  to  desire  expansion  over- 
seas. They  were  not  the  only  forces.  The  pressure 
of  a  rapidly  increasing  population  must  also  be 
taken  into  account.  The  figures  do  not  at  first  sight 
bear  out  this  argument.  The  mass  emigration  which 
was  so  marked  a  feature  of  German  social  life  in 
the  middle  decades  of  last  century  diminished  and 
almost  ceased  with  the  progress  of  German  industry. 
Before  the  foundation  of  the  Empire,  Germany  was 
a  poor  country,  with  a  low  standard  of  comfort  and 
an  urgent  problem  of  unemployment.  To-day  her 
industry  and  her  agriculture  can  together  absorb  all 
the  skilled  labour  of  her  growing  population,  and 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      241 

more  than  all  its  unskilled  labour.  There  is,  in  fact, 
a  contrary  process  at  work,  and  unskilled  labour, 
most  of  it  migratory,  .is  imported  from  Russian 
Poland  and  from  Italy.  None  the  less  the  problem 
of  emigration  is  acutely  felt.  It  is  not  usually  the 
artisan  or  the  peasant  who  goes  abroad  to  seek  his 
fortunes.  The  modern  phenomenon  is  an  immense 
exodus  of  educated  men  from  the  middle  classes, 
merchants,  clerks,  teachers,  expert  technicians, 
chemists,  and  metallurgists.  Germany  no  longer 
exports  labour  :  she  exports  brains.  It  is  a  more 
valuable  export,  and  rightly  or  wrongly  it  is  felt  to 
be  a  more  serious  loss.  It  is  an  inevitable  conse- 
quence of  a  worldwide  trade,  and  without  it  her 
commerce  could  not  be  developed  or  maintained. 
We  have  the  same  experience,  but  in  our  case  this 
exodus  is  directed  largely  to  British  colonies.  It 
involves  for  us  no  expatriation,  no  abrupt  passage 
to  an  alien  civilization,  no  sacrifice  of  patriotism. 
These  German  emigrants  have  a  hard  choice.  In 
their  African  colonies  they  cannot  make  a  per- 
manent home.  They  may  go  abroad  for  a  term  of 
years,  endure  exile,  make  a  competence  and  return  ; 
or  else  they  may  settle,  become  naturalized  subjects 
of  another  State,  and  rear  children  who  will  speak 
the  language  and  think  the  thoughts  of  another 
nation.  The  German  patriot  finds  small  consolation 
in  the  thought  that  his  country  in  this  way  adds  its 
quota  to  a  cosmopolitan  civilization  :  he  deplores 
the  loss  in  man-power  to  his  own  Fatherland.  There 
is  here  a  real  hardship  to  the  individual  and  a  real 
grievance  for  the  nation.  The  explanation  is  to 
be  sought,  of  course,  in  history.  Prussia  was  busy 
up  to  1870  in  creating  a  German  Empire  in  Europe, 
and  even  after  1870  Bismarck,  until  the  last  years 
of  his  long  career,  despised  overseas  expansion 
and  allowed  chance  after  chance  to  go  by.  When, 
however,  Germany  did  at  length  ardently  desire  it, 


242  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

she  found  obstacles  in  her  path,  first  in  South  Africa 
and  then  in  Morocco.  Some  Germans  complained 
of  the  unflinching  application  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  it  is  possible  that  the  establish- 
ment of  a  German  colony  in  South  America  would 
have  helped  to  ease  our  European  problems.  We 
do  not,  in  fact,  need  all  the  territory  we  have  appro- 
priated. Generations  will  pass  before  Canada  and 
Australia  are  fully  peopled.  Even  to-day  the  vast 
Northern  Territory  of  Australia,  which  Mr.  Hughes 
describes  as  "a  fertile  land  of  almost  illimitable 
potentialities,"  with  an  area  as  great  as  France, 
Germany,  and  Italy  put  together,  has  a  population  of 
only  1,182  Europeans.  The  retort  will  come  hotly 
that  Prussian  militarism  and  its  grasping  ways  for- 
bade not  only  us  but  our  colonists  and  the  Americans 
to  welcome  any  extension  of  German  power.  There 
is  a  vicious  circle  in  this  reasoning.  It  is  precisely 
this  opposition  to  German  expansion  which  in  our 
generation  has  perpetuated  Prussian  militarism.  It 
is  hard  to  suggest  a  way  out  of  this  difficulty  at  the 
moment,  but  a  step  will  be  gained  if  we  can  bring 
ourselves  to  understand  why  it  is  that  the  Germans, 
as  they  watch  the  free  expansion  of  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia,  in  illimitable  spaces,  feel  that  our  sea- 
power  throttles  and  confines  them. 

The  requirements  of  Germany's  growing  trade 
and  population  afford  explanation  enough  of  her 
desire  to  possess  an  overseas  empire.  There  are 
other  motives  at  work  which  it  is  not  so  easy  to 
estimate.  The  economic  motive  has  always  been 
the  pioneer  of  empire,  and  the  more  ideal  con- 
siderations make  themselves  felt  only  when  the 
primitive  hunger  for  land  or  trade  has  been  satis- 
fied. The  sentimental  or  idealistic  element  in 
German  Imperialism  may  not,  in  fact,  be  its  driving 
force — that  comes  from  the  industrialists  and  the 
financiers  who  think  m  terms  of  markets,  raw 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      243 

materials,  and  dividends — but  it  is  powerfully  at 
work  to  create  acquiescence  or  even  enthusiasm 
among  the  "  intellectuals/'  and  even  in  the  masses, 
who  are  not  conscious  of  a  direct  material 
interest  in  the  question.  Much  of  this  sentiment  is 
the  simple  and  intelligible  human  instinct  which 
enjoys  the  sense  or  even  the  illusion  of  wielding 
power.  Much  of  it  is  the  universal  megalomania 
of  our  species,  which  feels  that  its  personality  is 
enlarged  and  enriched,  when  it  can  contemplate  great 
territories  on  the  map  and  call  them  its  own.  It 
is  not  for  us  to  censure  this  tendency,  or  even  to 
smile  at  it.  With  all  our  enthusiasm  for  little 
nationalities,  we  have  taken  some  pains  not  to  be 
one  ourselves.  English  children  reared  in  slum 
dwellings  are  supposed  to  derive  some  emotional 
satisfaction  from  contemplating  on  the  schoolroom 
wall  the  map  of  the  Empire  on  which  the  sun 
never  sets.  It  is  eminently  natural  that  the  Germans, 
with  a  population  that  exceeds  ours  by  twenty 
millions,  a  trade  which  is  rapidly  overtaking  ours, 
a  higher  general  standard  of  education,  and  a 
capacity  for  applied  science  and  social  organiza- 
tion, which  has  been  cultivated  far  beyond  our 
present  level  of  achievement,  should  think  that  their 
estate  in  the  world  ought  to  correspond  more  closely 
to  their  national  stature.  Dr.  Friedrich  Naumann, 
in  "  Mitteleuropa,"  perhaps  the  most  powerful  book 
which  the  war  has  called  forth  in  any  European 
country,  points  out  that  even  the  realization  of  the 
dream  of  "  Central  Europe,"  in  its  fullest  sense  as 
a  coalition  for  trade  and  defence  of  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Turkey,  would  still  leave  this  com- 
posite structure  much  inferior  in  extent  and  popu- 
lation to  the  estates  of  the  other  world -Powers. 
Such  ambitions,  neither  better  nor  worse  than  those 
which  made  the  British,  French,  and  Russian  colonial 
empires,  are  capable  either  of  a  vulgar  or  of  an 


"244  A   LEAGUE   OF,    NATIONS 

idealistic  statement.  The  more  idealistic  and  liberal 
statements  are  undoubtedly  popular  with  the  German 
reading  public.  My  copy  of  Dr.  Paul  Rohrbach's 
very  readable  book,  "  The  German  Idea  in  the 
World  "  ("  Der  Deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt  ") 
— first  published  in  1912,  but  since  rewritten — is 
marked  "  Qoth  thousand."  Dr.  Rohrbach  is  a 
pastor,  whose  interest  in  Eastern  and  colonial  ques- 
tions began  with  his  work  as  a  missionary  in 
Turkey.  He  supports  this  war  (which  he  con- 
siders, with  evident  sincerity,  defensive),  and  advo- 
cates an  extension  of  the  German  colonial  empire 
in  Africa  and  of  German  enterprise  in  Turkey  and 
China.  He  is  opposed  to  annexations  in  the  West, 
and  feels  so  little  bitterness  against  England  that 
he  is  continually  reminding  his  readers  that  our 
success  as  a  colonizing  Power  depends  primarily 
on  character  ;  in  his  final  chapter  he  even  proposes 
a  programme  for  the  future  of  close  Anglo -German 
co-operation  in  China.  He  is  very  far  from  the 
self-complacency  of  the  average  Imperialist  in  most 
countries,  and  writes  some  eloquent  and  penetrating 
chapters  on  the  various  moral  and  intellectual  defects 
of  German  civilization — the  survival  of  class  barriers 
and  feudal  exclusiveness  in  German  society,  the 
spirit  of  caste  in  the  German  Protestant  Churches, 
the  aristocratic  tradition  in  diplomacy  and  the  lack 
of  any  popular  control  of  foreign  policy,  the  decline 
of  German  culture  and  the  growth  of  "  spiritual 
illiteracy  "  (inner  e  Unbildung)  in  our  generation 
through  an  excessive  specialization,  the  noisiness 
and  assertiveness  of  German  manners  ;  and,  finally, 
he  traces  the  unpopularity  of  Germany  abroad  to 
the  fact  that  she  is  regarded  as  an  anti -democratic 
State.  I  refrain  from  quoting  his  frank  and  scathing 
pages,  because  it  seems  to  me  that  our  present 
need  is  rather  to  see  the  good  elements  of  German 
culture  than  to  be  helped  to  diagnose  its  defects. 


EMPIRE,    SEA -POWER,    AND    TRADE      245 

It  is  worth  noting,  however,  as  a  sign  of  the  times, 
that  Germans  read  such  self -criticisms  eagerly,  and, 
further,  that  German  Imperialism  is  not  necessarily 
the  purely  materialistic  tendency  which  we  com- 
monly suppose  it  to  be.  It  is  an  inspiration  to 
minds  which  are,  according  to  their  lights,  liberal, 
Christian,  and  democratic.  It  is  fair  to  note  in 
this  connection  that  Dr.  Friedrich  Naumann  (also 
a  pastor  and  a  democrat)  includes  in  his  equally 
popular  book  some  frank  passages  of  confession 
as  to  the  "  meanness  "  of  German  policy  towards 
Alsatians,  Danes,  and  Poles.  These  things  are  not 
the  moralizings  of  defeat  :  they  were  written  partly 
before  the  war  and  partly  in  the  full  tide  of  German 
military  success.  These  writers  (but  more  especially 
Rohrbach)  see  in  German  expansion  primarily  the 
means  of  winning  scope  and  ground  for  the  working 
out  of  "the  German  idea"  in  the  world.  One 
suspects  that  Rohrbach's  Imperialism  was  largely 
a  reaction  from  the  flamboyant,  pretentious  British 
Imperialism  of  the  nineties  of  last  century,  when 
we  moved  from  the  conquest  of  the  Soudan  to 
the  conquest  of  the  Boer  Republics,  the  phase 
incarnated  in  Cecil  Rhodes  and  his  prophet, 
W.  T.  Stead.  Rohrbach  quotes  continually  what 
he  describes  as  a  current  English  saying,  "  The 
world  is  rapidly  becoming  Anglo-Saxon."  Certainly 
that  was  the  Rhodes -Stead-Kipling  attitude.  For 
Rohrbach  the  crucial  question  is  whether  the  British 
Empire,  which  at  present  dominates  the  world 
beyond  the  European  continent,  will  make  room 
for  Germany  beside  it.  Both  these  writers  dis- 
claim any  thought  of  dominating  the  world  :  their 
claim  is  for  a  share  in  shaping  its  destinies.  They 
cannot  stand  still,  they  argue  :  they  must  win  a 
place  by  the  side  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  or  perish. 
How  can  they  renounce  the  thought  of  expansion 
when  in  every  three  years  they  add  to  their  popu- 


246  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

lation  as  many  Germans  as  there  are  Swiss  in  the 
world,  and  in  a  generation  create  a  second  nation 
to   increase  their  former  numbers,  as  numerous  as 
the     Spaniards    and     Portuguese     together?       The 
decisive  and  absorbing  questions  which  confront  the 
world  are,  to  Rohrbach's  thinking,  these  three  :    the 
civilization    of   the   negro    races,    the   adaptation  of 
Islam  to   modern   conditions,   and  the   reawakening 
of    the    ancient    civilizations    of    the    East.      These 
three    questions,    it    seems    to    him,    are   at    present 
receiving  a  solution  in  an  Anglo-Saxon  sense.    Our 
hands  are  guiding  the  most  decisive  movements  of 
the  human  race.     He  pays  a  generous  tribute  to  the 
capacity   of    these    hands    of   ours,    but    he    has    the 
not    ignoble   ambition   to    use    his    own.      What   is 
the   German  idea  which  he  desires  to  see  at  work 
in  the  world?      It  is  primarily  an  ideal  of  intense, 
thorough,    co-operative   labour,    in   science,    in   pro- 
duction,   and    in    social     organization.       Rohrbach 
dwells  especially  on  German  accuracy  and  industry. 
Naumann  has  an  almost  lyrical  passage  on  the  com- 
munal  social  spirit   which  causes   German  scientists 
and    German    industrialists    to    work   together,    with 
a   pride   in   the   merging   of   the   individual   in   the 
greater  social  organism,  and  a  sense  of  patriotism 
which  permeates  all  they  undertake.      It  is  for  him 
the  antithesis  of  the  traditional  British  individualism 
in   thought   and   trade.      The    German    "  idea,"    in 
short,  is  not  merely  an  infinite  capacity  for  taking 
pains  :     it   is   a   social    genius.      The   desire   to   set 
this   tradition   to   the   solution   of   African,   Turkish, 
and  Chinese  problems  is  not  unworthy  of  practical 
idealists.      I    confess    to    some    mistrust    of   efforts, 
be  they   British  or   German,   to   disguise  the   plain 
economic    meaning    of    Imperialism.      The    "  intel- 
lectuals "  who  gild  it  with  an  exalted  ethical  inter- 
pretation are,  however,  helping  to  create  a  sentiment 
which    can    and    will    bring    the    more    predatory 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE     247 

elements  of  Imperialism  under  control.  Facile  as 
their  idealization  too  often  is,  it  has  its  uses  in 
helping  to  build  up  a  high  standard  of  administra- 
tion. For  Rohrbach  the  noblest  application  of  the 
creative  power  of  human  nature  is  the  shaping  of 
States.  The  Imperialism  which  conceives  its  task 
as  a  supreme  architectural  achievement  may  claim 
respect  as  a  movement  which  partakes,  in  some 
degree,  of  idealism. 

The  question  which  Dr.  Rohrbach  has  stated  is, 
indeed,  not  the  least  of  the  many  that  confronts 
us.  What  will  be  our  attitude  towards  .German 
Imperialism  ?  The  ability  always  latent  in  our  sea- 
power  to  frustrate  it,  to  thwart  and  even  to  veto 
it,  is  now  actuality.  We  occupy  all  the  promising 
beginnings  of  a  German  overseas  empire.  We  hold 
the  seas  ;  we  can  forbid  this  career  to  our  enemies 
— at  a  price  certainly  of  a  prolongation  of  the  war, 
possibly  of  a  bad  settlement  of  European  ques- 
tions, and  beyond  a  doubt  of  much  future  rancour. 
It  is  well  to  put  the  choice  in  concrete  terms.  If 
we  mean  to  keep  all  or  any  of  Germany's  colonies, 
if,  further,  we  are  bent  on  taking  Mesopotamia, 
and,  still  more,  if  France  must  have  Syria — if,  in 
short,  our  overseas  gains  are  regarded,  not  as  pawns 
to  be  bartered  in  the  settlement  but  as  permanent 
acquisitions,  then  plainly  we  must  either  continue 
the  war  until  the  enemy  is  literally  prostrate,  or  else 
we  must  abandon  some  of  our  purposes  for  the 
better  settlement  of  questions  of  nationality.  We 
may  have  to  choose  between  taking  colonies  or 
liberating  Poland  and  Lorraine.  Let  us,  however, 
for  argument's  sake,  dismiss  this  consideration,  and 
suppose  ourselves  omnipotent  at  the  moment  of  the 
settlement.  Is  our  policy  then  to  be  to  oppose  a 
universal  negative  to  German  expansion,  and  to 
confine  the  most  energetic  and  the  most  prolific 


248  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

of  West -European  peoples  in  an  era  of  world-trade 
and  world -politics  to  its  own  home  territories  ?  What 
in  that  case  will  be  its  reply  to  our  veto?  It  is 
possible  (though  extremely  doubtful)  that  the  con- 
sequence might  be  to  end  or  at  least  to  postpone 
indefinitely  the  ambitions  cherished  by  the  naval 
school.  The  idea  of  forcing  a  way  through  the 
Straits  of  Dover  might  be  forgotten  :  the  idea  of 
challenging  our  supremacy  at  sea  might  be  aban- 
doned ;  the  hope  of  expanding  in  Africa  or  of 
taking  a  share  in  the  development  of  China  might 
fade.  All  this  would  be,  the  reader  may  say,  an 
inexpressible  relief  to  ourselves.  Possibly,  but  at 
the  cost  of  turning  German  energies  in  another 
direction.  "  Empire  is  sea -power  and  sea-power 
is  empire  "  is  not  perhaps  so  axiomatic  as  it  sounds 
to  us.  There  are  some  achievements  within  the 
scope  of  land -power  alone.  The  vast  Russian 
Empire,  which  up  till  the  Revolution  was  still 
active  in  the  Far  East,  is  one  illustration.  Though 
Dr.  Naumann  nowhere  states  it  expressly,  the  direct- 
ing thought  which  led  him  and  his  school  to  the 
conception  of  "  Central  Europe  "  must  have  been 
a  perception  of  the  difficulty  of  competing  with 
our  naval  power,  in  the  hope  of  creating  a  wide- 
flung  empire,  scattered  in  many  seas.  The  line 
of  least  resistance  for  Germany,  the  path  dictated 
by  her  speciality  of  military  efficiency,  is  the  shaping 
of  a  continuous  continental  empire.  With  Germany 
and  Austria -Hungary  as  its  nucleus,  it  would  first 
consolidate  itself  by  linking  itself  through  Bulgaria 
with  Turkey.  It  might  hope  to  add  a  vassal 
Poland,  and  in  time  to  draw  into  its  system  Holland 
and  perhaps  the  Scandinavian  kingdoms.  Its  political 
structure  might  be  loose,  but  it  would  form  a  single 
economic  and  military  unit.  To  that  alternative 
the  German  imagination  will  infallibly  turn,  if  we 
deny  to  it  a  future  beyond  the  seas.  It  did,  in  fact, 


EMPIRE,    SEA- POWER,    AND    TRADE     '249 

turn  to  it,  because  the  necessity  of  seeking  our 
permission  to  expand  was  galling,  and  the  chances 
of  obtaining  our  permission  doubtful.  This  ambi- 
tion is  not  one  which  a  good  European  would  wish 
to  see  fulfilled.  It  would  perpetuate  the  division 
of  the  world  into  two  camps,  and  overshadow  the 
life  of  the  Continent  by  its  immense  military  power. 
Its  internal  structure,  moreover,  would  rest,  not  on 
federation  but  on  German  dictatorship.  None  the 
less  it  is  not  as  Naumann  outlines  it,  in  the  worst 
sense  of  the  word,  an  aggressive  conception.  It 
presupposes  the  voluntary  adhesion  to  the  system, 
for  mutual  advantage,  of  its  various  component  units. 
It  aims  at  creating  a  great  area  of  internal  Free 
Trade.  Its  central  idea  is  purely  economic — the 
extension  over  this  large  and  wealthy  region  of 
the  German  commercial  system,  its  cartels,  its  enter- 
prising banks,  its  national  organization  of  produc- 
tion and  exchange.  It  would  mean  primarily  the 
"  speeding  up  "  of  Austrian  and  Eastern  economic 
life  to  "  the  rhythm  of  German  work  "  ;  nor  should 
it  be  forgotten  that  in  the  wake  of  the  German 
capitalistic  cartel  there  would  follow  the  German 
socialistic  trade  union.  It  is  a  more  constructive 
ideal  than  our  schemes  of  "war  after  the  war"; 
it  contains  no  suggestion  of  a  tariff  war,  of  hostile 
or  punitive  measures  against  the  enemy,  or,  indeed, 
of  any  raising  of  trade  barriers  against  the  out- 
side world.  Its  aim  is  positive — to  develop  a  great 
estate  :  it  is  not,  as  our  answer  is,  negative,  to 
prevent  an  enemy  from  ever  "  raising  his  head." 
It  is  none  the  less  a  conception  full  of  menace 
to  the  world.  It  is  founded  on  the  negation  of 
any  international  ideal  :  it  cannot  be  fitted  into 
any  framework  of  a  League  of  Nations.  Naumann 
may  give  to  it  a  comparatively  liberal  and  un- 
aggressive  statement,  but  under  the  conduct  of  ruder 
and  cruder  minds  and  amid  the  stress  of  the  alarms 


250  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

and  retaliations  which  it  would  evoke,  it  would 
split  the  world  and  doom  it  to  intolerable  strife. 
It  is  probably,  in  its  fullest  and  completest  sense, 
an  unrealizable  conception,  partly  because  the  weaker 
members  of  the  partnership  are  jealous  of  German 
predominance,  and  still  more  because  German  trade 
itself  would  not  find  within  Central  Europe  an 
equivalent  for  its  overseas  trade,  which  the  inevitable 
reprisals  and  counter -coalitions  would  threaten. 

To  these  alternatives  we  must  oppose  a  third 
possibility — a  return  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pre-war 
policy,  an  attempt  by  definite  arrangements  to 
reconcile  our  sea-power  with  commercial  freedom, 
and  the  claims  of  others  to  a  reasonable  expansion. 
We  must,  in  short,  make  room  for  German  ambitions 
beside  our  own  in  the  world,  for  their  trade,  for 
their  colonies,  and  for  their  participation  in  the 
development  of  such  countries  as  Turkey  and 
China.  If  we  refuse  to  do  this,  our  "  navalism  " 
will  stand  at  the  bar  of  history  to  answer  a  heavy 
charge,  and  it  needs  no  prophet  to  warn  us  that 
our  refusal  will  impose  upon  us  and  our  children 
the  burden  of  continual  armaments  to  defend  our 
veto  on  German  expansion,  and  that  in  the  end 
all  our  precautions  may  fail  to  prevent  another 
explosion  of  the  human  forces  we  have  sought  to 
repress.  We  shall  consider  in  the  next  chapter 
what  measures  a  League  of  Nations  might  take 
to  enlarge  commercial  freedom,  and  regulate  the 
development  of  half-civilized  countries,  and  the  use 
which  it  might  make  of  the  economic  advantages 
which  it  would  confer  upon  its  members  to  ensure 
peace.  In  regard  to  Germany,  the  first  step  towards 
the  realization  of  this  policy  must  be  the  restora- 
tion of  her  colonies,  as  an  item  in  the  general 
balance  of  the  settlement  which  may  be  set  off 
against  the  heavy  sacrifices  which,  even  on  a  con- 
servative reading  of  it,  the  doctrine  of  nationality 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      [251 

must  impose  upon  the  Central  Powers.  There  are 
some  grave  difficulties  in  the  way  of  this  policy. 
Japan  will  not  tolerate  the  restitution  of  Kiao-Chau 
(Tsing-tau)  to  Germany.  Its  original  seizure  was 
a  predatory  act,  and  if  it  is  restored  in  good  faith 
to  China,  there  will  be  for  international  morality 
a  real  gain.  It  is  also  said  that  under  no  circum- 
stances will  our  colonies  yield  up  the  lands  in  the 
Pacific  and  in  Africa  which  they  have  won  from 
Germany  at  some  cost  in  blood.  General  Botha 
has  a  delicate  internal  situation  to  consider,  and 
the  German  effort  to  foment  a  Boer  rebellion  from 
South-West  Africa  left  the  natural  impression 
behind  it  in  the  colony  that  the  Germans  are  not 
desirable  neighbours.  It  is  difficult  to  see  any 
similar  justification  for  a  claim  (if  it  should  be 
officially  made)  from  Pretoria  to  retain  German 
East  Africa.  It  lies  far  beyond  the  natural 
geographical  limits  iof  South  Africa,  and  its  conquest, 
though  a  difficult  operation,  demanding  skill  and 
endurance,  is  not  to  be  compared  in  human  cost 
with  one  day's  "  push  "  in  France.  If  the 
colonial  forces  should  demand  that  they  shall  keep 
all  that  they  have  taken,  they  may  be  imposing 
on  the  Allies  further  efforts  which  may  cost  in 
blood  many  times  over  what  they  have  spent.  If 
we  cannot  reckon  East  Africa  as  a  piece  to  bargain 
with,  then  we,  or  the  French,  or  the  Russians  may 
have  to  take  at  vastly  greater  cost  some  region 
of  the  enemy's  home  territory,  which  will  serve  as 
an  equivalent  element  of  barter.  East  Africa  is 
a  comparatively  new  colony,  and  its  seizure  cannot 
be  compared  with  the  forcible  annexation  of  the 
smallest  strip  of  a  nation's  home  territory  ;  none 
the  less,  to  take  away  by  force  a  piece  of  work  on 
which  men  have  spent  much  labour  and  thought 
is  not  an  act  which  should  be  lightly  contemplated, 
nor  would  it  be  readily  forgotten.  It  may  be, 


252  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

however,  that  the  restoration  of  all  the  German 
colonies  will  be  impossible.  In  that  case  we  must 
be  prepared  to  find  equivalents  for  them.  This 
ought  not  to  be  inordinately  difficult.  It  is  doubt- 
ful whether  the  Belgians,  as  a  nation,  are  really 
anxious  to  carry  on  the  heavy  burden  of  the 
Congo.  Their  Liberal  Party  and  most  of  their 
Socialists,  except  M.  Vandervelde,  were  originally 
opposed  to  its  transference  by  King  Leopold  to 
Belgium.  The  genius  of  this  home-loving  people 
does  not  turn  readily  to  colonial  enterprise. 
Experts  warn  us  that  the  Congo  ought  to  cost 
Belgium  annually  at  least  a  million  sterling  for 
twenty  years,  if  it  is  to  be  administered  on  any 
plan  consistent  with  the  happiness  of  the  natives. 
At  present  the  reform'  of  King  Leopold's  night- 
mare rule  has  been  only  partial,  and  the  burden  is 
probably  beyond  the  resources  of  a  small  State. 
If  it  should  turn  out  that  Belgium  is  inclined  to 
part  with  her  rights  for  a  fair  price,  any  transfer 
must,  of  course,  be  made  outside  the  framework 
of  the  Belgian  settlement  itself.  Germany  owes 
an  indemnity  to  Belgium,  and  full  compensation 
for  the  devastations  of  her  armies.  If  she  cared 
to  purchase  the  Congo  or  part  of  it,  the  price 
must  be  something  distinct  from  the  indemnity,  and 
additional  to  it.  France  might  be  willing  to 
consider  some  rearrangement  of  the  confused  dis- 
tribution of  French,  British,  and  German  areas  in 
West  Africa.  There  is  also  to  be  considered  the 
problem  of  the  Portuguese  colonies.  If  the  Allies 
propose  to  retain  for  themselves  the  German  Pacific 
colonies  and  South-West  Africa,  the  equivalent 
might  be  found  by  concentrating  German  coloniza- 
tion in  the  wide  area  of  Equatorial  Africa,  and 
if  something  more  than  an  exact  equivalent  were 
offered,  the  settlement  of  European  questions  would 
be  the  easier.  In  any  arrangement  of  this  kind, 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      253 

if  we  retain  some  German  colonies  for  ourselves 
and  allow  her  to  acquire  others  in  their  stead,  the 
purchase  price  would,  of  course,  fall  on  us. 

An  arrangement  of  this  kind  must  satisfy  several 
tests.  Historically  the  Great  Powers  engaged  in 
colonization  for  their  own  advantage,  and  the 
predatory  element,  which  began  with  slave-raiding 
and  persists  in  various  forms  of  forced  labour,  has 
been  brought  only  slowly  and  not  everywhere 
completely,  under  the  control  of  a  humaner  opinion. 
One  half  of  our  duty  in  colonial  affairs  lies  in 
insisting  that  no  Power  ought  to  monopolize  oppor- 
tunities of  profit  and  gain.  But  it  would  be 
monstrous  to  discuss  colonial  rivalries  on  the 
assumption  that  our  duty  is  ended  when  we  have 
dealt  fairly  with  our  European  rivals  in  the  process 
of  capitalistic  expansion.  The  native  has  also  to 
be  considered.  Long  experience  and  the  slow 
victory  of  humane  opinion  over  predatory  impulse 
may  have  made  our  rule  the  best  for  the  natives, 
especially  in  tropical  Africa.  That  might  in  some 
extreme  cases  tempt  us  to  dispossess  other 
colonial  Powers  ;  but  if  we  were  to  act  on  that 
risky  principle,  there  are  unhappy  regions  of  Africa 
which  would  claim  our  attention  before  any  German 
colony.  I  have  no  first-hand  knowledge  on  this 
subject,  but  the  available  records  go  to  prove  that 
German  policy  towards  the  natives,  relatively  bad  in 
some  colonies  at  first,  and  still  only  moderately  good 
in  the  best,  has  profited  by  experience  ;  it  has  lately 
been  much  improved  by  reforming  colonial  secretaries 
from  Berlin,  and  there  is  growing,  even  outside  the 
Socialist  ranks,  an  organized  humanitarian  opinion 
which  has  even  now  some  effect  in  controlling  it. 
I  am  content  to  be  guided  by  the  opinion  of  a 
man  whose  comparative  knowledge  of  the  West 
African  colonies  is  intimate  and  extensive,  and 
whose  zeal  for.  native  welfare  has  inspired  the 


254  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

whole  of  his  career.  The  Rev.  John  H.  Harris, 
whose  services  to  the  Congo  are  second  only  to 
Mr.  Morel's,  in  a  book  published  shortly  before 
this  war  broke  out,  proposed  that  we  should  support 
an  immense  extension  of  Germany's  rule  in  Central 
Africa.  He  wished  that  we  should  facilitate  her 
purchase  of  the  whole  or  the  greater  part  of 
the  Belgian  Congo,  and  he  even  added  the  still 
more  daring  suggestion  that  in  return  for  some 
concessions  in  Alsace,  Germany  might  take  over 
the  whole  or  the  greater  part  of  the  French  Congo. 
During  the  war,  he  has,  for  other  detailed  reasons, 
modified  his  programme,  but  it  is  still  fair  to 
quote  his  opinion  that  "  on  the  whole,  both  from 
the  commercial  and  native  standpoint,  the  Congo 
basin  stands  to  gain  by  a  transfer  to  the  German 
Empire."  l  So  far  from  losing  their  value  as  the 
result  of  the  war,  these  proposals  rather  gain  a 
new  significance.  There  will  come  a  point  in  this 
war  (if  indeed  we  have  not  reached  it  already) 
when  France  will  have  to  face  the  fact  that  to 
conquer  Lorraine  (to  say  nothing  of  Alsace)  she 
must  be  prepared  to  fight  on  for  six  or  twelve 

1  "Dawn  in  Darkest  Africa,"  p.  301.  The  reason  advanced  by 
Mr.  Harris  against  the  return  of  any  of  her  African  colonies  to 
Germany  is  that  many  of  the  tribes  and  their  chiefs,  who  have 
supported  our  troops,  would  be  exposed  to  reprisals.  This  difficulty 
must  be  met,  but  it  is  surely  too  small  to  outweigh  the  many  objec- 
tions to  the  permanent  seizure  of  these  colonies.  The  Treaty  of 
Peace  must  stipulate  for  an  amnesty.  It  might  even  go  on  to  provide 
that  our  Consuls  should  have  the  right  to  watch  over  the  due  observ- 
ance of  the  amnesty.  Where  a  chief  is  heavily  compromised,  we 
might  be  able  to  offer  him  land  and  financial  compensation  in  our 
own  sphere.  Such  cases  occur  in  most  wars,  and  there  are  probably 
some  Flemings,  Serbs,  and  Roumanians  who  will  have  reason  to  fear 
the  return  of  their  own  Governments.  It  argues  a  want  of  the  sense 
of  proportion  to  make  this  difficulty  an  excuse  for  destroying  the 
German  Colonial  Empire.  I  discuss  in  the  next  chapter  the  general 
question  of  the  military  and  commercial  regulation  of  Tropical  Africa 


EMPIRE,    SEA-POWER,    AND    TRADE      255 

months  more,  at  the  cost  of  half  a  million  lives 
at  least.  The  same  equation  will  present  itself  in 
regard  to  Poland  and  every  other  claim  of 
nationality.  If  we  know  that  an  extension  of 
German  rule  in  Africa  might  be  a  gain  to  the  natives 
in  the  French,  Belgian,  and  Portuguese  colonies 
of  the  Congo  area,  if  we  know  also  that  it  would 
be  a  gain  to  commercial  freedom,  if  we  realize 
that  to  occupy  German  energies  here  is  to  give 
them  an  employment  which  must  make  for  peace 
in  Europe,  what  hinders  us  from  proposing  an 
honourable  exchange  of  colonial  expansion  against 
the  satisfaction  of  nationality?  From  a  sullen 
peace,  which  closed  the  avenues  of  national 
energy  to  one  great  nation,  and  deepened  its 
sense  that  it  is  hemmed  in  by  the  jealous  prosperity 
of  others,  we  can  hope  no  good.  The  best  peace 
will  be  the  peace  which  removes  the  enemy's 
grievance  as  well  as  our  own.  We  can  achieve 
this  double  end  by  exacting  from  him  concessions  to 
the  wronged  nationalities  of  Europe,  while  in  Africa 
and  Turkey  we  find  scope  for  his  reasonable 
economic  aims.  In  Turkey,  as  the  war  map  stands 
to-day,  he  is  already  in  possession,  and  there  we  can 
only  assent  to  his  existing  economic  predominance, 
while  removing  from  it,  by  opening  the  Straits, 
any  element  of  menace  to  Russia,  and,  by  restoring 
Serbia,  any  threat  to  Balkan  liberties.  If  Armenia 
is  liberated  (as  it  must  be),  and  some  reservations 
made  in  regard  to  French  interests  in  Syria, 
Turkey,  on  our  present  showing,  cannot  be  reckoned 
to  the  credit  side  of  the  Allied  account  in  a  bargain. 
Our  asset  in  a  bargain  of  economics  against 
nationality  is  Equatorial  Africa. 

What,  then,  are  to  be  our  gains  from  the  war  ? 
An  enduring  peace,  an  advance  from  the  era  of 
force  to  the  era  of  international  organization,  the 
gratitude  of  liberated  nationalities,  the  respect  of 


256  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

our  Allies,  and  even  of  our  enemies,  when  they 
realize  that  we  have  fought  with  clean  hands,  and 
come  out  with  empty  hands— are  these  no  gains? 
There  is  in  the  history  of  an  allied  nation  an 
example  which  might  inspire  us.  When,  on  the 
eve  of  her  own  Revolution,  a  chivalrous  France  sent 
her  army  and  gave  her  treasure  to  assist  the  cause 
of  liberty  in  America,  the  question  twice  arose 
whether  she  would  accept  compensation  for  her 
sacrifices.  The  Americans  suggested,  after  the 
triumph  of  Rochambeau  at  Yorktown,  that  they  in 
turn  might  help  the  French  to  recover  Canada. 
When  the  treaty  of  peace  was  negotiated,  they  next 
proposed  in  their  natural  gratitude  to  confer  some 
advantages  upon  French  as  against  British  trade. 
With  a  fine  gesture  of  generosity,  both  proposals 
were  rejected,  and  the  Government  of  France 
proved  itself  worthy  of  the  enthusiasm  of  Lafayette 
and  the  nobility  of  Rochambeau.  Her  motive  was 
as  simple  as  it  seems  unworldly.  She  would  not 
sully  a  noble  action  by  self-seeking".  That  was 
the  great  deed  of  an  aristocracy,  which  would  not 
forget  magnanimity,  because  it  had  learned  to  love 
liberty.  Must  a  democracy  be  less  generous? 


CHAPTER    IX 
THE  ECONOMICS  OF  PEACE 

THERE  stands  in  the  way  of  any  discussion  of  the 
economic  policy  of  a  League  of  Nations  the  hard 
fact  that  the  Allied  Governments  have  officially 
adopted  the  Paris  Programme.  That  programme, 
in  its  frank  declaration  of  a  war  of  tariffs  and 
exclusions  after  the  war  of  flesh  and  blood,  and 
in  its  refusal  to  admit  the  enemy  peoples  at  the 
return  of  peace  to  the  society  of  nations,  is  indeed 
a  flat  negation  of  that  "  partnership  "  to  which 
Mr.  Asquith  had  bidden  us  look  forward.  There 
is  one  hopeful  way  of  explaining  this  contradiction. 
Statesmen  do  not  disdain  the  minor  arts  of  "  bluff," 
and  it  is  possible  that  the  Allied  Governments,  in 
fact,  conceive  this  nightmare  of  a  "  war  after  the 
war  "  rather  as  a  means  of  putting  pressure  on  the 
enemy  at  the  settlement,  than  as  a  policy  which  they 
desire,  on  its  merits,  to  enforce.  They  may  regard 
it  as  a  kind  of  imaginary  prolongation  of  our 
blockade.  It  is  possible  that  some  at  least  of  the 
Allied  statesmen  intended  to  use  it  primarily  as  a 
means  of  bargaining.  We  may  threaten  to  refuse 
"  most  favoured  nation  "  treatment  to  German  trade, 
to  starve  her  of  raw  materials,  and  to  penalize  her 
shipping,  as  a  means  of  inducing  her  to  accept 
certain  conditions.  What  are  those  conditions? 
That  depends  on  the  open  question  what  our  war 
aims  really  are.  We  shall  not  know  until  the  treaty 
of  peace  is  signed,  whether,  in  fact,  we  have  been 

1 8  257 


258  A    LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

fighting  to  create  a  better  Europe,  or  merely,  in  the 
spirit  of  the  past,  to  weaken  an  enemy,  to  crush  a 
commercial  rival,  and  to  achieve  conquests  of  ter- 
ritory which  our  capital  may  exploit.  If  anything 
survives  of  the  exalted  spirit  with  which  we  began 
the  war,  then  the  only  bargain  which  can  suggest 
itself  is  that  to  Germany  we  concede  commercial 
freedom  in  return  for  her  adhesion  to  a  League  of 
Nations.  Let  us  barter  the  Paris  Resolutions  against 
her  militarism.  It  follows  that  if  this  strategy  is 
adopted,  the  League  of  Nations  must  be  more  than 
an  association  bound  by  a  promise  to  arbitrate.  It 
must  be  also  a  League  which  removes  economic 
opportunity  from  dependence  on  military  and  naval 
power. 

THE  SENTIMENTAL  TARIFF. 

Before  we  attempt  to  develop  this  constructive 
idea,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  some  subsidiary 
arguments  which  are  advanced  in  defence  of  a  trade 
war  against  Germany.  In  the  first  place  let  us 
dismiss  the  muddled  notion  that  such  a  "  war  " 
would  be  a  logical  application  of  the  economics  of 
Protection.  The  issue  is  much  narrower  than  the 
general  dispute  between  Protection  and  Free  Trade, 
and  a  Protectionist  is  no  more  committed  by  his 
premises  to  "  the  war  after  the  war  "  than  a  Free 
Trader.  A  "  scientific  "  tariff  follows,  or  attempts 
to  follow,  certain  aims  which  are  in  flat  contradiction 
to  the  scheme  of  this  "  war."  It  may  try,  by  impos- 
ing disabilities  on  foreign  imports,  to  win  a  more 
favourable  position  for  our  own  exports  in  foreign 
markets.  Any  idea  of  such  a  bargain,  aiming  at 
reciprocity  through  retaliation,  is  excluded  by  the 
new  political  Protection,  which  seeks,  not  to  obtain 
advantages  for  ourselves  but  to  inflict  injury  on 
others.  The  skilful  constructor  of  a  tariff  considers 
minutely  what  is  the  minimum  stimulus,  in  the  shape 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         259 

of  a  protective  duty,  that  he  must  administer  to  a 
growing,  a  struggling,  or  a  decadent  trade  in  order 
to  ensure  its  development  or  recovery,  and  he  will 
not  allow  himself  to  be  driven  by  the  least  fraction 
above  that  minimum,  lest  he  demoralize  instead 
of  strengthening  the  trade  in  question,  and  enable 
it  to  advance  its  prices,  to  the  detriment  of 
the  consumer,  far  beyond  what  a  reasonable  margin 
of  profit  demands.  The  new  Protection  is  debarred 
from  such  nice  graduation  of  duties  as  this  :  against 
German  goods,  at  least,  it  must  impose,  not  the 
minimum  duty  which  might  stimulate  our  own  trade, 
but  a  prohibitive  maximum.  Finally,  the  attempt 
might  be  made  (as  the  Trade  Union  Congress 
desires),  if  we  are  going:  to  adopt  Protection,  to 
discriminate  against  certain  foreign  goods  because 
they  are  produced  by  underpaid  or  overdriven  labour, 
to  exclude  "  sweated  goods,"  and  to  realize  some- 
thing like  that  abortive  Australian  conception  of  a 
quasi-Socialistic  "  new  Protection  " — which  is,  of 
course,  only  a  project  even  in  Australia,  for  the 
Law  Courts  have  defeated  it  in  action.  This,  too, 
would  be  impossible  under  the  Paris  plan,  which 
would  oblige  us  to  favour,  for  example,  the 
"  sweated  "  produce  of  Japanese  industry  against 
German  goods  manufactured  under  an  enlightened 
system  of  labour  legislation  and  the  check  of  well- 
organized  trade  unions.  One  need  not  pause  to 
insist  that  "  war  after  the  war  "  would  be  an 
especially  flagrant  departure  from  Free  Trade.  It  is 
no  less  to  the  point  that  it  would  defeat  every  object 
which  a  rational  or  "  scientific  "  Protection  might 
pursue.  Under  it  there  could  be  neither  bargains 
for  reciprocity,  nor  the  skilful  graduation  of  duties, 
nor  the  use  of  tariffs  to  protect  labour.  The  con- 
ception, in  short,  is  not  merely  one  irrelevant  to 
economics,  it  is  anti -economic.  Based  on  hatred, 
envy,  and  fear,  it  proposes  to  subject  economics  to 


260  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

politics.  The  popular  conception  of  a  sentimental 
tariff,  which  will  give  a  preference  to  Colonies  over 
Allies,  to  Allies  over  neutrals,  and  to  neutrals  over 
enemies,  assumes  that  we  are  prepared  to  subordinate 
our  business  to  our  emotions,  and  to  make  of  our 
likes  and  dislikes  the  foundation  of  our  trade.  The 
chaos  into  which  this  principle  would  lead  us  is 
beginning  to  be  recognized  to-day  ;  in  its  extremer 
form  it  can  hardly  survive  the  annihilating  argument 
of  Mr.  Hobson's  analysis  in  "  The  New  Protection- 
ism "  (Cobden  Club,  6d.).  There  is  no  guarantee, 
there  is  barely  a  possibility,  that  Russia  and  France, 
devoted,  both  of  them,  to  high  Protection,  will  so 
lower  their  duties  in  our  favour  as  to  compensate  us 
for  the  loss  of  the  German  market.  Nor  can  Russia 
(which  especially  valued  the  German  market  for 
her  grain,  because  geographically  it  is,  for  some  of 
her  provinces,  more  accessible  than  her  own  ports) 
hope  for  compensation  in  our  market,  if  we  are  going 
to  give  a  preference  to  Canadian  wheat.  If  we 
discriminate  against  neutrals,  it  is  to  be  foreseen  that 
they  will  retaliate  against  our  goods,  a  situation  of 
which  the  Germans  will  know  how  to  take  advantage. 
British  trade  under  such  a  system  would  find  itself 
obliged  to  confine  its  hopes  of  expansion  mainly 
within  our  own  Empire.  America  and  Germany 
would  be  united  against  the  Allied  policy,  and  might 
eventually  be  driven,  in  spite  of  their  present 
hostility,  into  an  economic  alliance  against  us.  This 
crazy  scheme  can  hardly  outlive  the  emotional  exal- 
tation of  war.  If  we  are  destined  to  adopt  Protection 
(it  is  to  be  hoped  devoutly  that  we  are  not),  its 
mischiefs  will  be  redoubled,  and  its  alleged 
benefits  frustrated,  unless  we  are  free  to  confer 
advantages  and  erect  barriers  on  economic  grounds 
alone. 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         261 

KEY  INDUSTRIES  AND  "RESTORATION." 

Some  special  reasons  (apart  from  the  anger  and 
fear  which  are  the  real  reasons)  are  advanced  in 
support  of  "the  war  after  peace."  Most  of  these 
arguments  are  inadequate  ;  while  they  may  suffice 
to  support  some  minor  changes  in  our  traditional 
fiscal  system,  they  will  not  carry  the  weight 
of  the  case  for  a  general  boycott  of  German 
trade. 

The  more  we  act  on  the  assumption  that  future 
wars  are  probable,  and  proceed,  at  some  incon- 
venience to  ourselves,  to  reorganize  our  manufactures 
and  our  commerce  on  a  war  basis,  the  more  likely 
is  it  that  this  anxious  expectation  of  war  will  realize 
itself.  The  dilemma  is  familiar.  If  a  nation  refuses 
to  prepare  adequately  for  war,  its  unreadiness  (if 
it  is  rich,  ambitious,  and  possessed  of  vast  and 
enviable  estates)  may  invite  attack.  But  if  it  so 
prepares  that  its  preparations  overshadow  peace  with 
the  ever-present  thought  of  war,  it  will  sooner  or 
later  militarize  the  minds  of  its  citizens  as  well 
as  its  institutions.  These  special  adjustments  of 
our  trade  to  the  possibility  of  future  war  all  involve 
some  departure  from  the  ethical  ideal  of  Free  Trade, 
which  sees  in  the  interdependence  of  nations  an 
image  of  their  fraternity  and  a  pledge  of  peace. 
If  we  should  ever  realize  the  militarist  ideal  of 
national  independence  in  trade,  wars  might  indeed 
be  fought  with  less  risk  of  commercial  loss,  but 
the  restraint  on  the  war -makers  which  comes  from 
the  fear  of  commercial  loss  would  be  correspondingly 
diminished.  To  the  idealistic  Free  Trader  the  whole 
world  is  a  co-operative  society.  He  aims  at  a 
natural  division  of  labour,  so  that  each  nation  shall 
produce,  for  the  good  of  the  whole  human  society, 
the  things  which  its  genius,  its  resources,  and  its 
climate  best  fit  it  to  produce.  He  sees  in  protec- 


'262  A1   LEAGUE    OF.    NATIONS 

tive  tariffs,  and  in  the  endeavours  of  militarism 
and  nationalism  to  limit  the  free  exchange  of 
goods,  interferences  with  this  natural  division  of 
labour  which  inflict  a  double  injury.  They  mean 
that,  by  one  expedient  or  another,  a  people  whose 
aptitudes  or  resources  have  not  naturally  led  it  to 
produce  a  particular  kind  of  goods,  are  stimulated 
or  obliged  to  make  these  things  which  others  were 
producing  elsewhere  better  and  more  cheaply. 
There  is  a  money  loss,  for  the  goods  so  produced 
behind  a  tariff  wall  will  commonly  be  dearer  than 
those  which  had  been  imported  freely.  That  is 
the  smallest  part  of  the  injury.  What  really  happens 
is  that  something  has  been  added  wantonly  to  the 
sum  of  the  world's  labour.  The  effort  to  make 
dearly  in  England  what  had  been  made  cheaply 
in  Germany,  implies  that  there  is  some  addition  to 
the  world's  unnecessary  toil  and  some  subtraction 
from  the  world's  possible  leisure.  A  man  (may 
be  justified  in  producing  dear  vegetables  in  ,his 
own  garden,  though  a  market -gardener  can  do  it 
better  and  more  cheaply,  because  gardening  is  good 
exercise  and  a  pleasant  recreation.  But  if  we  insist 
by  means  of  a  tariff  on  growing  in  England  with 
much  toil  what  can  be  produced  with  less  toil  in 
a  more  genial  climate,  we  are  laying  a  burden  on 
the  backs  of  our  countrymen.  Protection  must 
nearly  always  mean  that  on  the  whole  something 
is  added  to  the  sum  of  a  nation's  hours  of  labour. 
That  is  the  ethical  aspect  of  dearness  and  high 
prices.  No  one  would  dispute  this  principle  where 
climate  is  the  prime  factor  in  cheapness  :  only  a 
lunatic  would  suggest  that  we  ought  to  tax  foreign 
bananas  and  grow  them  at  home  under  glass.  But 
it  applies  also  to  national  aptitudes.  The  taste  and 
manual  deftness  of  the  French  give  them  a  pre- 
eminence in  producing  for  the  world  beautiful  articles 
of  luxury.  The  scientific  training  of  the  Germans 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         263 

gives  them  a  similar  superiority  in  the  chemical 
industries.  Other  specialized  trades,  like  the  watch- 
making of  Switzerland,  depend  on  a  local  organiza- 
tion which  has  become  traditional  and  a  skill  which 
is  almost  hereditary.  To  insist  on  interfering  with 
this  natural  division  of  labour  among  nations  is  to 
increase  toil  wantonly,  to  diminish  the  total  wealth, 
comfort,  and  leisure  of  mankind,  and  to  destroy 
its  sense  of  solidarity  and  mutual  inter- 
dependence. 

This  general  argument  is  so  strong  that  every 
plea  for  a  departure  from  it  in  special  cases  demands 
a  critical  and  sceptical  scrutiny.  It  may  be  pushed 
unreasonably  far.  If  we  left  the  whole  production 
of  beautiful  things  to  the  French,  we  should  starve 
our  own  aesthetic  aptitudes  for  lack  of  exercise. 
If  we  abandoned  the  trades  that  require  scientific 
knowledge  to  the  Germans,  we  should  be  depriving 
ourselves  of  an  intellectual  stimulus.  A  nation 
which  lives  by  exporting  dyes  and  drugs  will 
develop  its  brains  somewhat  further  than  a  nation 
which  lives  by  exporting  steam  coal.  There  are, 
of  course,  other  means  of  stimulating  our  intelli- 
gence, but  clearly,  if  this  consideration  weighs  with 
us,  we  shall  wish  that  British  chemical  industries 
should  achieve  success  by  merit,  and  not  by 
monopoly.  The  surest  way  to  fit  ourselves  to 
succeed  is  to  diffuse  scientific  education,  and  that 
not  only  among  the  salaried  experts,  but  among 
the  capitalists  and  managers  who  conduct  our  manu- 
factures. A  subsidy  or  a  guarantee  of  profits  would 
be  infinitely  preferable  as  a  means  of  stimulating 
these  new  trades  to  a  prohibitive  tariff,  for  if 
all  foreign  competition  is  excluded,  the  consumer 
has  no  check  upon  the  inertia  of  the  producer,  who 
might  be  content  with  high  profits  on  a  dear  and 
inferior  article  within  a  closed  market.  A  man 
who  has  built  himself  a  wall  may  be  tempted  to 


'264  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

go  to  sleep  behind  it.  But  State  aid  involves  State 
control  over  prices  and  conditions  of  labour,  and 
it  ought  to  be  limited  to  a  few  years.  Another 
alternative  would  be  to  nationalize  the  industry.  If 
our  concern  were  solely  to  provide  against  the 
eventuality  of  war,  it  would  suffice  to  accumulate 
large  stocks  of  these  products  of  the  so-called 
"key"  industries  under  State  control.  That  plan 
is  under  consideration  in  Germany,  where  it  is  pro- 
posed to  concentrate  grain,  rubber,  copper,  oils, 
and  other  necessities  of  foreign  origin  in  national 
stores.  These  stores  may  be  so  managed  by  the 
State  in  time  of  peace  as  to  stabilize  prices,  while 
in  war  they  will  serve  to  defeat  a  blockade.  We 
might  adopt  the  same  plan  in  the  case  of  dyes 
and  drugs,  to  supplement  any  possible  deficiency 
during  war  in  our  home  production.  There  are, 
to  sum  up,  several  alternatives  to  the  imposition 
of  a  tariff.  If  we  should  in  the  end  adopt  the  worst 
method  of  protecting  these  few  "  key  "  industries 
— a  duty  on  certain  imports — even  this  is  far  from 
committing  us  to  a  general  tariff  on  all  manufactured 
goods.  Further,  if  our  aim  be,  for  military  reasons, 
to  foster  the  home  production  of  these  few  articles, 
the  duty  ought  logically  to  be  imposed  impar- 
tially on  all  imports  of  these  goods,  and  not 
merely  upon  imports  from  Germany.  A  few 
exceptional  duties,  if  levied  impartially,  would  not 
seriously  modify  our  fiscal  system,  and  though,  in 
fact,  they  would  injure  some  important  German 
trades,  they  need  not  by  their  form  or  their  inten- 
tion commit  us  to  the  principle  of  the  boycott  and 
the  "  war  after  peace." 

Finally,  it  is  urged  that  in  order  to  stimulate 
the  recovery  of  the  districts  of  France  which  have 
been  occupied  by  the  enemy,  the  Allied  countries 
ought  for  a  period  to  exclude  German  trade,  and 
in  some  degree  to  penalize  neutral  trade.  The 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         265 

logic  of  this  argument  eludes  me.     By  shutting  out 
German  competition  we  should  do  little  to  stimulate 
the    lamed   industries   of    these    devastated    regions, 
which   would   have   to   meet   in   the   Allied   markets 
the    concentrated    competition    of    uninjured    Allied 
rivals.     It  is  by  other  expedients  that  the  industry 
and  agriculture  of  the   devastated  regions   must  be 
revived — direct    subsidies,    the    supply    of    necessary 
materials  as  gifts  or  at  reduced  prices,  the  remission 
of  taxes  for  a  term  of  years.     The  burden  must  not 
fall  on  France.     The  problem,  moreover,  is  general. 
The  Russians  devastated  Galicia  and  East   Prussia. 
The  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  stripped  Poland  of  every- 
thing portable  before  he  evacuated  it,  and  the  Allied 
Staffs  insisted   (a  legitimate  precaution)   on   wreck- 
ing the  Roumanian  oil-wells.    Elsewhere  the  damage 
is  due,  not  to  policy,  but  to  the  inevitable  effect  of 
artillery  in  the  area  of  conflict.      Save  in  the  case 
of  Belgium,  which  calls  for  separate  treatment,  most 
of    the    Allied    Governments    have    renounced    any 
thought  of  claiming  penal  indemnities.     Theoretically 
it   would  be  just  to  insist   that  all   damage   due  to 
measures    which    the    Hague    Convention    does    not 
sanction,  ought  to  be  repaired  by  the  guilty  Power. 
But  the  cost,  the  delay,  and  the  friction  would  be 
intolerable  before  investigation  and  litigation  could 
decide  the  exact  facts  and  the  exact  law  in  the -case 
of   every   wrecked   farmstead.      The   Pope   proposes 
the  usual   solution  familiar  to   history — mutual  con- 
donation.    By  far  the  humaner  plan  is  that  which 
some    Russians    have    put    forward.      They    suggest 
that  an   International   Commission  should  assess   all 
the  devastation  suffered  by  all  the  belligerents,  that 
a  common  fund  for  repairing  it  should  be  constituted 
by  all  the  belligerents,  and  that  each  of  them  should 
contribute  to  it   in  proportion  to   his   total   war  ex- 
penditure.    All  Europe  would  thus  bear  collectively 
the  cost  of  enabling  these  ruined  populations  to  start 


'266  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

life  again,  and  each  Power  would  contribute  on  a 
ratio  which  would  approximately  correspond  to  its 
relative  wealth . 

THE  RETURN  TO  MERCANTILISM. 

None  of  these  subsidiary  arguments,  even  if 
all  of  them  were  sound,  supply  any  reason  for 
the  adoption  of  the  policy  of  the  trade  war  ;  they 
may  at  the  most  convince  us  that  there  is  a  case 
for.  some  modification  of  our  traditional  system  of 
free  trade,  to  encourage  "  key  "  industries,  and 
protect  ourselves  against  "  dumping."  The  real 
reasons  for  the  adoption  of  the  Paris  policy  are 
simpler  and  cruder.  Clausewitz  said  that  war  is 
a  continuation  of  policy  by  other  means.  The  Paris 
Programme  means  the  continuation  of  war  itself 
by  other  means.  Its  design  is  plainly  by  an 
economic  combination  to  pursue  the  aims  of  war, 
to  weaken,  if  not  to  subjugate,  the  enemy.  The 
authors  of  this  policy  have  given  us  an  object- 
lesson  of  its  working.  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  not  content 
with  drastic  measures  which  have  rooted  out  all 
the  agencies  of  German  trade  in  our  African 
colonies,  winding  up  their  firms,  and  selling  their 
warehouses,  lands,  and  wharves,  has  taken  steps 
to  deprive  them  for  a  term  of  years  of  the  use  of 
one  of  the  most  important  raw  materials  iwhich 
West  Africa  produces.  To  exclude,  or  at  least 
to  discourage,  the  German  buyer  in  our  colonies  is, 
be  it  noted,  an  injury,  not  merely  to  German  trade 
but  also  to  the  native  producer.  The  Germans 
had  been  prompter  than  we  were  to  grasp  the  value 
of  the  oil  derived  from  palm -kern  els  as  the  basis 
of  margarine,  soap,  and  cattle  cake.  They  had 
installed  powerful  crushing  mills,  and  by  attention 
to  the  details  of  through  rates,  efficient  handling 
at  their  ports,  and  canal  transport  had  got  the  trade 
almost  entirely  into  their  own  hands.  The  war  gave 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         '267, 

to  our  "infant  industry1"  its  opportunity,  which 
it  was  prepared  to  take  ;  but  the  usual  argument 
was  advanced,  that  a  monopoly  during  three  or  more 
years  of  war  would  not  suffice  to  establish  it 
securely.  One  way  of  ensuring  its  future  would 
have  been  (if  good  machinery  and  a  reform  of 
our  ports  were  not  enough)  to  place  a  duty  on 
imported  palm-kernel  oil.  Mr.  Bonar  Law  pre- 
ferred the  much  more  drastic  method  of  refusing 
to  the  German  industry  all  access  to  the  raw 
material.  Note  the  meaning  of  this  choice. 
Either  measure  would  have  involved  a  sharp 
departure  from  Free  Trade.  An  irriport  duty  on 
the  oil  would  have  protected  our  own  industry. 
An  export  duty  on  the  kernels  aims  at  two  objects  : 
it  protects  our  industry,  but  it  also  destroys  the 
German  industry.  The  old  Protection  was  com- 
monly a  defensive  policy  :  the  new  Protection  is 
avowedly  offensive.  Its  aim  is  not  merely  to  benefit 
ourselves,  but  also  to  weaken  and  injure  others. 
That  is  not  the  only  objection  to  this  method.  It 
inflicts  injury  at  the  same  time  on  the  native 
colonial  producer,  nor  does  the  injury  to  him  involve 
a  benefit  to  the  home  consumer.  The  duty  of 
£2  a  ton  to  be  imposed  for  five  years  after  the 
end  of  the  war  on  all  kernels  exported  from  West 
Africa  to  foreign  countries  will  probably  be  pro- 
hibitive, and  Mr.  Law  has  stated  that  if  it  should 
not  prove  to  be  so  it  will  be  raised.  It  will  con- 
tinue in  peace  the  conditions  which  war  had  already 
brought  about.  The  German  buyer  was  eliminated, 
and  the  British  buyers,  representing  a  very  small 
number  of  firms,  were  able  to  combine  to  lower 
the  price  paid  for  kernels.  The  price  paid  to  the 
native  rapidly  fell,  but  the  price  paid  by  the  home 
consumer  at  Liverpool  did  not  fall  with  it.1  The 

1  See  the  Commons  debate  of  August  3,  1916,  Mr.  Molteno's  speech 
in   Hansard.     The  price  per  ton  at  Lagos  fell  from  £19  in  1913  to 


268  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

shipping  interest  was  not  to  blame  ;  what  happened 
was  what  might  have  been  foreseen  :  the  few  dealers 
made  a  "  corner  "  in  kernels  to  the  equal  disad- 
vantage of  the  native  producer  and  the  British 
consumer.  The  result  must  be  a  rapid  decline  in 
the  prosperity  of  the  colony. 

We  have  in  this  instructive  object-lesson  an 
illustration  of  the  comprehensive  reaction  which 
war  commonly  brings  with  it.  The  Coalition  raced 
backwards,  not  to  the  Protection  of  the  early 
nineteenth  but  to  the  mercantilism  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  This  is  the  policy  denounced  by  Adam 
Smith,  the  policy  which  destroyed  the  Spanish 
colonial  empire,  and  with  its  '*  impertinent  badges 
of  slavery  "  jeopardized  our  own.  It  started  from 
the  premise  that  colonies  are  estates  controlled  by 
the  mother  country  for  its  own  exclusive  commer- 
cial advantage.  It  applied  this  principle  chiefly 
by  drawing  up  ample  lists  of  "  enumerated  "  articles 
of  colonial  produce,  which  our  colonists  were  for- 
bidden to  sell  to  any  but  British  purchasers.  The 
calculation  was  simple.  By  limiting  the  market 
open  to  the  colonial  producer  our  forefathers 
reckoned  on  keeping  prices  low  for  their  own 
advantage,  while  by  monopolizing  many  important 
raw  materials  they  gave  to  our  manufacturers  an 
advantage  over  those  of  other  nations.  Mercantilism 
caused,  while  it  dominated  the  world,  an  endless 
series  of  colonial  wars  between  the  French,  the 
Spanish,  the  Dutch,  and  the  British  peoples — for 
it  meant  that  only  by  seizing  colonies  for  itself 
could  a  trading  nation  hope  to  thrive— and  an 
endless  series  of  colonial  revolts,  for  it  drove  the 
colonists  to  protest  against  its  doctrine  of  exploita- 
tion. If  we  are  about  to  revive  it  in  the  twentieth 

£9  and  £10  in  1915,  and  finally  to  £6  153.  When  kernels  cost 
.£19  in  Lagos,  they  stood  at  £24  in  Liverpool.  When  they  fell  to 
£10  in  Lagos,  they  rose  to  £25  35.  9d.  in  Liverpool. 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         269 

century,  the  consequences  can  hardly  be  less  disas- 
trous to  the  world.  It  may  be  objected  that  one 
mischievous  tax  does  not  make  mercantilism.  But 
we  have  pledged  ourselves  in  the  Paris  Resolutions 
to  continue  in  this  course.  The  Allies  are  there 
bound  to  "  conserve  for  the  Allied  countries  before 
all  others  their  natural  resources  "  during  the 
"  transitional  period  of  reconstruction,"  which  is  ap- 
parently to  last  for  five  years.  If  these  words  mean 
what  they  say,  they  imply  that  we  shall  refuse'  to 
supply  Germany  with  coal,  and  that  France  will  stop 
her  former  exports  of  iron -ore.  They  also  mean 
(if  they  are  applied  in  the  spirit  of  the  palm- 
kernel  tax)  that  the  Allies,  who  among  them  con- 
trol Africa  and  subtropical  Asia,  will  deny  to 
German  industry  the  raw  materials  which  their  over- 
seas dominions  produce.  In  some  cases  (e.g.  palm- 
kernels)  there  is  no  alternative  source  of  supply. 
In  other  cases  the  Germans  will  inevitably  turn 
to  the  alternative  sources  of  supply  in  South 
America,  and  the  Dutch  Indies,  and  endeavour  by 
bargaining  or  by  pressure  to  draw  these  neutrals 
within  their  economic  camp,  and  even  to  monopo- 
lize their  raw  materials  for  German  use.  Indians 
and  Egyptians  might  not  be  quite  so  helpless  as 
West  Africans,  if  we  should  forbid  them  to  sell 
their  cotton  to  German  buyers  :  the  new  mercan- 
tilism would  not  be  more  conducive  to  loyalty  than 
the  old.  But  the  worst  consequence  of  this  policy 
will  be  its  reaction  on  international  relations.  It 
means  that  the  whole  politics  of  the  world,  its 
alliances,  its  sympathies,  and  its  armaments  will 
revolve  inevitably  round  the  question  of  raw 
materials.  We  shall  arm  and  intrigue,  and 
eventually  we  may  have  to.  fight,  over  iron  and  coal, 
copper  and  tin,  oil  and  rubber.  The  attempt  to 
destroy  German  industry  (to  prevent  it  "  raising 
its  head  "  is  the  correct  ministerial  phrase)  by 


270  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

denying  its  access  to  raw  materials  m!eans  primarily 
that  possessions  beyond  the  seas  and  sea-power, 
which  Mr.  Churchill  once  described  as  a  "  luxury  " 
for  Germany,  will  have  become  for  her  a  dire 
necessity.  Sooner  or  later,  with  the  aid  of  one 
ally  or  another,  she  would  be  driven,  if  only 
to  recover  her  pre-war  level  of  commercial  pros- 
perity, to  challenge  our  supremacy  at  sea.  The 
Paris  policy  means  the  frank  abandonment  of  that 
condition  which,  to  Sir  Henry  Campbell -Banner- 
man's  mind,  rendered  our  sea -power  tolerable  to 
the  rest  of  the  world  :  it  means  the  end  of  com- 
mercial freedom.  This  forecast  is  perhaps  too 
pessimistic.  Formulas  rarely  mean  what  they  say, 
and  statesmen,  when  they  have  spoken  a  phrase  to 
amuse  the  gallery,  forget  it  when  hard  facts  con- 
front them.  The  danger  is  not  so  much  that  wie 
shall  really  follow  the  policy  of  "  war  after  peace  " 
with  a  consistent,  ruthless,  and  intelligent  purpose  : 
it  is  that  by  playing  with  it  in  a  spirit  of  demagogic 
levity,  we  shall  stimulate  the  resistance  of  the  enemy, 
prolong  the  war,  and  miss  at  the  settlement  the 
opportunity  for  a  healing  and  constructive  peace. 
There  will  be  no  League  of  Nations  while  a  vestige 
of  this  policy  remains,  and  that  for  two  reasons  :• 
Germany  will  not  enter  such  an  association  if  wei 
menace  her  future  ;  America  will  not  help  to 
guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe  if  we  make  peace 
impossible  by  an  egoistic  policy.  But  even  if  this 
policy  should  survive  the  settlement,  I  refuse  to 
believe  in  its  permanence.  Those  dismal  phrases, 
"  war  after  war  "  and  "  war  after  peace  "  which 
to-day  excite  our  elderly  non-combatants  and  amuse 
our  sedentary  men  of  letters,  stir  in  our  soldiers  a 
movement  of  contempt  and  disgust.  They  feel  no 
hate  (as  one  of  them  has  put  it)  against  "  the  men 
who  sat  opposite  to  us  in  the  mud."  They  know 
what  war  is,  and  they  want  no  more  of  it.  They 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         271 

enlisted  in  the  pathetic  hope  of  making  an  end 
of  wars.  Their  votes,  when  they  can  cast  them, 
will  turn  the  country  to  a  policy  more  worthy  of 
its  traditions  and  ideals.  Flesh  and  blood  will 
not  for  ever  submit  to  be  sacrificed  in  wars  of 
tariffs  and  trade. 


A   CONSTRUCTIVE   ECONOMIC   POLICY. 

Let  us  turn  from  these  controversial  discussions 
to  inquire  what  the  economic  policy  of  a  League  of 
Nations  must  be.  The  reader  may  object  on  the 
threshold  that  he  sees  no  reason  why  a  League  of 
Nations  should  adopt  any  economic  policy  at  all. 
"  Each  nation  or  group  of  nations,"  he  may  contend, 
"  must  settle  its  economic  policy  for  itself.  A 
League  of  Peace  must  pursue  the  limited  but  all- 
important  object  of  securing  peace,  by  enforcing 
the  obligation  to  refer  all  disputes  to  some  process 
of  peaceful  settlement.  Commercial  freedom  may 
be  a  matter  of  the  first  importance,  but  it  is  no 
concern  of  the  League's.  Its  only  aim  must  be  to 
enforce  peace."  This  objection  implies  a  curiously 
negative  conception  of  peace.  Peace  must  mean 
something  more  positive  than  the  existence  side 
by  side  of  nations  which  just  contrive  to  avoid 
bloodshed.  If  it  be  only  the  bare  avoidance  of 
war,  it  will  stir  no  enthusiasm  and  enlist  no  loyalty. 
It  must  come  to  mean  for  us  some  conception  of 
a  worldwide  human  society,  within  which  a  sense 
of  solidarity  may  grow  up.  It  must  learn  to  impose 
checks  on  national  egoism,  not  merely  because  this 
egoism  leads  in  the  end  to  the  horror  and  waste 
of  war,  but  even  more  because  nations  are  aware 
of  a  certain  solidarity,  and  desire  to  exchange 
services,  intellectual  and  economic,  for  their  mutual 
good.  This  sense  of  corporate  unity  cannot  be  made 
by  treaties  or  leagues  :  what  these  outward  bonds  can 


27,2  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

do  is  to  create  the  material  conditions  in  which  it 
may  develop.  It  will  not  develop  (save  by  reaction) 
while  Great  Powers  are  using  their  military  success 
and  their  sea-power  to  refuse  any  reasonable  expan- 
sion to  their  rivals,  to  monopolize  for  themselves  the 
profitable  enterprises  of  undeveloped  countries,  to 
close  the  markets  of  their  colonies,  and  to  reserve 
for  themselves  the  raw  materials  which  force  has 
brought  within  their  control.  The  attempt  to 
enforce  peace  under  such  conditions  would  be 
impossible.  No  League,  however  powerful,  can  in 
the  long  run  enforce  peace,  unless  it  will  also 
enforce  justice.  It  will  be  a  hopeful  undertaking 
to  enforce  peace,  only  when  we  have  first  removed 
the  more  general  causes  of  war.  Of  these  general 
causes  the  failure  to  recognize  nationality  is  one, 
and  we  have  argued  that  the  League  must  be 
prepared  to  require  from  its  members  at  least  some 
elementary  tolerance  for  the  language,  the  culture, 
and  the  religion  of  racial  minorities.  No  less 
important,  as  a  general  cause  of  war,  is  the  failure 
to  recognize  commercial  freedom.  The  world  is 
not  yet  ripe  for  a  proposal  to  establish  universal 
Free  Trade,  though  to  me  it  seems  that  those  who 
in  all  countries  aim  sincerely  at  peace  must  direct 
their  thoughts  and  unite  their  efforts  to  this  end. 
Short  of  this  broad  solution,  however,  there  are 
some  elementary  economic  principles  which  must 
even  now  be  laid  down,  if  nations  are  sincerely 
resolved  to  live  in  harmony. 

The  narrower  conception  of  a  League  of  Peace 
as  an  organization  which  functions  only  when  it 
is  called  in  to  prevent  a  dispute  from  becoming 
a  war,  would  hardly  succeed  for  long  in  avoiding 
these  economic  issues.  They  would  arise  in  dispute 
after  dispute,  and  to  attempt  to  solve  them 
empirically,  in  each  case  as  it  arose,  would  be 
hazardous  and  unsatisfactory.  Judge-made  law  is 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         273 

rarely  an  adequate  substitute  for  legislation.  Let 
us  imagine  a  case.  We  will  suppose  that  in  spite 
of  the  Paris  Resolutions  the  League  of  Nations  has 
been  founded,,  and  that  Germany  has  joined  it, 
and  further  that  the  war  has  ended  as  Allied  opinion 
hopes  that  it  will  end.  Germany  has  lost  Lorraine. 
Her  industries  struggle  to  recover,  but  as  the 
months  go  by,  she  finds  that  without  an  adequate 
supply  of  iron-ore  she  is  faced  with  ruin.  Her 
capitalists  become  clamorous,  and  her  workers 
desperate.  France,  however,  has  forbidden  the 
export  of  iron.  Germany  attempts  to  negotiate  with 
France  for  the  free  export  of  the  ores  which  she  used 
to  control  in  Lorraine.  France  refuses,  and 
Germany  thereupon  calls  upon  the  League  to  con- 
sider the  dispute.  The  Council  of  Conciliation  meets, 
and  the  neutral  votes  upon  it  are  just  numerous 
enough  to  lay  down  the  general  principle  that  no 
nation  ought  to  be  starved  of  an  essential  raw 
material  in  this  way,  and  to  recommend  that  France 
shall  allow  the  free  export  of  ore.  France  again 
refuses,  appeals  to  the  Resolutions  of  the  Paris 
Conference,  protests  her  loyalty  to  her  Allies,  and 
calls  upon  them  for  support.  They  give  her  their 
support — how  could  they  do  otherwise  ?  She  is 
carrying  out  their  common  policy.  That  would 
mean  the  disruption  of  the  League.  Such  questions 
cannot  be  left  to  be  solved  step  by  step  as  the 
League  develops.  There  must  be  some  agreement 
at  the  start  on  the  essentials  of  peaceful  intercourse 
among  civilized  nations. 

The  case  for  a  constructive  economic  policy  as 
the  basis  of  any  League  of  Nations  may  be 
approached  from  another  angle.  Our  thinking, 
while  the  war  lasts,  is  inevitably  preoccupied  with 
questions  of  force.  Force  is  to-day  the  only  power 
at  work  in  Europe.  Even  the  current  ideas  of  a 
League  turn  to  force  as  its  foundation.  The 

19 


274  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

American  propagandist  society  has  laid  stress  on 
this  aspect  in  its  title  :  it  calls  itself  a  League  to 
"  enforce  "  Peace.  We  seem  unable  to  conceive 
any  international  association  which  rests  on  any- 
better  than  threats.  To  some  of  its  advocates 
in  the  American  press  the  League  is  merely  an 
international  court  of  criminal  justice,  which  is  to 
deal,  perhaps  justly  but  certainly  sharply,  with  any 
aggressive  offender.  The  machinery  for  redressing 
grievances  preoccupies  these  thinkers  very  little. 
They  will  recommend  some  kind  of  settlement  when 
a  dispute  arises,  but  they  will  take  no  steps  to 
ensure  its  adoption.  They  care  more  about  stop- 
ping wars  than  about  removing  injustice.  That 
commonly  is  the  spirit  of  criminal  justice.  It  will 
prevent  a  starving  man  from  stealing  a  loaf,  but 
it  will  not  help  him  to  earn  his  bread.  Unless  we 
can  evolve  somewhat  beyond  this  harsh  conception 
of  international  relations,  the  League  may  do  some- 
thing for  law,  it  will  do  little  for  justice.  A  basis 
of  force  is  indispensable  as  the  world  exists  to-day, 
and  a  league  which  was  not  prepared  to  use 
concerted  force  to  repress  anarchic  force  would 
hardly  be  worth  creating.  For  the  moment  we 
divide  mankind  into  allies,  enemies,  and  neutrals, 
and  the  sense  of  common  interests  and  a  common 
purpose  in  civilization  has  deserted  us.  As  our 
thinking  becomes  more  normal,  we  may  realize  that 
all  fruitful  associations,  whether  of  individuals  or 
of  nations,  must,  in  the  end,  find  their  sanction  and 
their  justification  rather  in  advantages  than  in 
threats.  Unless  the  nations  Who  compose  it  can 
look  upon  the  League  with  a  sense  of  gratitude, 
they  will  never  come  to  feel  loyalty  towards  it. 
It  must  be  their  benefactor  before  it  can  hope  to 
command  their  obedience.  If  it  is  ever  regarded 
merely  as  an  overwhelming  association  of  forces 
too  strong  for  resistance,  it  will,  even  at  the  height 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         275 

of  its  power,  bear  the  seeds  of  its  dissolution  within 
itself.  Nations  must  think  of  it  as  the  once  sundered 
fragments  of  nations  think  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
of  United  Italy,  of  the  German  Empire.  It  must 
be  an  association  which,  with  a  new  security,  has 
also  given  them  an  ampler  intellectual  life  and  a 
larger  and  more  prosperous  economic  existence. 
Every  union  which  has  in  the  course  of  history 
.commended  itself  and  achieved  permanence  has  had, 
in  fact,  this  dual  basis  of  advantage,  spiritual  and 
material.  The  ampler  intellectual  life  will  come 
of  itself  :  it  will  be  largely  independent  of 
organization,  and  will  make  its  own  organization 
as  it  comes  to  self-consciousness.  The  basis  of 
material  advantage  must  be  organized,  and  some- 
thing of  its  foundations  must  be  apparent  at  the 
start.  It  would  be  futile  to  propose  at  this  stage 
anything  resembling  the  immense  advantage  of 
economic  unity  and  complete  internal  freedom  of 
trade  which  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  German  Zollverein,  and  United  Italy  were  able 
to  offer  to  their  component  States.  But  something 
of  the  kind  we  must  offer.  We  are  engaged  in 
a  difficult  adventure.  We  are  trying  to  make, 
consciously,  artificially,  a  great  association  of 
peoples.  There  is  no  unity  of  race  beneath  it, 
nor  of  religious  faith.  So  far  from  possessing  the 
unifying  influence  of  a  common  history  of  struggle 
and  comradeship,  it  will  inherit  the  memory  of  a 
bitter  feud.  There  has  been  no  slow  growth  of 
the  spirit  of  unity  as  there  always  was  in  history. 
Bismarck  and  Cavour  did  not  make  Germany  and 
Italy  :  they  merely  executed  the  aspirations  of 
millions  of  Germans  and  Italians.  Perhaps  the 
aspiration  towards  the  unity  of  civilization  is  deeper 
to-day  than  we  can  see.  But  the  obstacles  to  the 
factitious  creation  of  a  League  are  so  serious  that 
we  cannot  afford  to  neglect  the  lesson  that  emerges 


2j 6  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

from  more  natural  and  less  conscious  achievements. 
The  narrower,  parochial,  provincial  minds  among 
Germans  and  Italians  were  reconciled  to  union, 
because  it  carried  with  it  evident  gains  to  their 
commerce.  To-day  there  are  interests  which 
imagine  that  they  are  going  to  derive  immense 
advantages  from  a  policy  of  commercial  egoism  : 
that  it  will  be  very  profitable  to  destroy  our  chief 
commercial  rival,  to  keep  her  colonies,  and  to 
monopolize  the  world's  raw  materials.  They  may 
be  right.  To  some  groups  of  financiers  it  wjill 
be  profitable.  Against  them  we  must  appeal  to 
a  broader  calculation.  It  must  be  evident  to  most 
of  mankind  that  the  organization  of  peace  does 
promise  something  to  the  general  prosperity,  not 
merely  because  it  will  diminish  the  waste  of 
armaments,  and  may  end  the  waste  of  wars,  but 
also  because  at  the  same  time  it  promises  a  measure 
of  commercial  freedom.  The  statesmanship  of  the 
League  must  learn  to  rely  on  this  calculation.  It 
must  seek  to  keep  nations  loyally  within  it,  not 
because  they  dread  superior  force  and  bow  to 
threats,  but  because  they  see  their  interest  in 
remaining  within  it.  Inevitably  we  shall  have  to 
ask  sacrifices  from  them.  It  will  not  always  be 
easy  for  a  strong  Power  to  refrain  from  war  when 
victory  seems  certain,  nor  to  accept  an  award  that 
tells  against  it,  nor  to  keep  its  word  to  its  own 
hurt.  They  must  be  made  to  feel  that  these 
sacrifices  are  trivial  in  comparison  with  what  they 
gain.  Is  it  not  enough  that  they  gain  peace? 
Peace,  to  the  generation  which  will  grow  up  with 
no  memory  of  this  hideous  war,  may  not  appear  a 
gain  so  clear  as  it  seems  to  us.  We  live  in  an  iron 
age,  and  the  ideal  advantages  of  peace  are  little 
regarded  in  comparison  with  the  economic  advan- 
tages. The  surest  way  of  keeping  the  League  to- 
gether will  be  to  attach  to  membership  of  it  economic 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         277 

advantages  so  evident  and  so  large  that  no  sane 
nation  will  venture  to  forfeit  them  by,  secession, 
or  by  disloyal  conduct  to  bring  about  its  own 
eviction.  Commercial  freedom  must  be  realized  if 
the  world  is  to  have  peace,  and  clearly  it  ought  to 
come  as  the  gift  of  the  League.  It  has  often 
been  pointed  out  with  much  reason,  especially  by 
American  writers,  that  an  economic  boycott  of  a 
self-willed  Power  might,  if  the  world  were  united, 
avail  as  effectively  as  war  to  reduce  it  to  reason. 
That  is  true  only  on  one  condition.  The  condition 
is  that,  before  committing  or  meditating  its  offence 
against  civilization,  the  Power  in  question  were 
living  in  a  condition  of  reciprocal  intimacy  with 
its  neighbours,  that  it  depended  on  its  trade  with 
them,  and  enjoyed  in  their  markets  advantages 
whose  withdrawal  would  threaten  its  prosperity.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  are  all  moving  towards  the 
conception  of  national  economic  independence,  if 
we  give  few  favours  to  others  and  receive  few  in 
return,  if  half  the  world  is  normally  boycotting  the 
other  half,  then  clearly  no  use  could  be  made  of 
the  economic  weapon  to  ensure  peace,  and  war 
would  be  the  only  effective  means  of  enforcing 
the  general  will.  The  more  the  League  of  Nations 
can  bring  about  a  general  condition  of  economic 
interdependence,  the  larger  the  diffused  advantages 
of  mutual  commerce  which  it  has  secured  to  its 
members,  the  greater  will  be  its  power  in  an 
emergency  to  act  through  economic  pressure  and 
without  the  use  of  force.  Nor  need  this  strategy 
be  confined  to  the  future.  On  the  contrary,  the 
moment  of  all  others  when  it  may  be  used  with 
the  greatest  effect  will  be  at  the  settlement  of 
this  war.  If  the  Allies  of  the  Entente,  with 
America  behind  them,  can  say  to  Germany  :  "Our 
purpose  is  to  make  an  end  of  militarism,  both 
yours  and  ours.  Our  terms  include  here  and  there 


2;8  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

some  sacrifices,  even  it  may  be  some  territorial 
sacrifices  in  the  interests  of  nationality  which  you 
may  be  reluctant  to  make.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
offer  you,  in  addition  to  a  reasonable  colonial 
settlement,  a  degree  of  commercial  freedom  which 
the  world  has  not  hitherto  known,  assured  by 
general  and  permanent  conventions.  Agree  on  your 
side  to  come  into  the  League  of  Peace,  and  to 
discuss  with  us  measures  of  general  disarmament, 
and  we,  on  our  side,  will  work  out  with  you  a 
general  charter  of  commercial  freedom.  Refuse 
your  consent  to  the  international  organization  of 
peace,  and  we  withdraw  our  offer  of  an  economic 
charter.  The  answer  to  your  militarism,  if  you 
insist  on  maintaining  it,  will  be  on  our  side  the 
withholding  of  the  generous  economic  concessions 
which  we  are  ready  to  discuss  with  you."  Let 
us  consider  what  such  a  charter  of  commercial 
freedom  might  include.  It  must  touch  on  these 
four  questions  at  least  :  ( I )  tariffs  in  home  markets, 
(2)  tariffs  in  colonial  markets,  (3)  the  regula- 
tion of  the  export  of  capital,  and  (4)  guarantees 
for  the  access  on  equal  terms  of  all  industrial 
peoples  to  raw  materials. 

A  CHARTER  OF  COMMERCIAL  FREEDOM. 

i .  It  must  be  assumed  that  no  European  Power  is 
prepared  to  give  up  its  sovereign  power  of  de- 
vising tariffs  for  its  own  home  market.  None  of  the 
European  Powers  seem  to  be  moving  towards  Free 
Trade,  and  our  own  attachment  to  it  appears  to 
be  weakening.  It  is  useless  at  this  stage  to  suggest 
any  restriction  on  the  right  of  each  Parliament  to 
protect  its  own  home  trade  by  imposing  such  duties 
as  it  may  see  fit  to  fix.  There  is,  however,  one  con- 
dition which  ought  to  be  laid  down  as  the  basis 
of  any  League  of  Nations  :  that  its  members  shall 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         279 

not  discriminate  from  any  motive  of  political  hostility 
against  each  other.  It  is  our  right,  for  example, 
if  we  wish  to  develop  our  manufacture  of  dyes, 
to  impose  a  duty,  even  a  prohibitive  duty,  on  all 
foreign  dyes.  That  is  an  economic  duty.  Clearly 
if  our  intention  is  to  protect  the  British  producer, 
we  must  protect  him  as  much  against  French  and 
American  dyes  (if  there  are  any)  as  against  German 
dyes.  A  general,  impartial  duty  involves  no  political 
hostility.  A  special  duty  imposed  only  on  German 
dyes,  or  a  differential  duty  with  varying  levels 
according  to  our  sentimental  affinities,  is  not 
economic  Protection  at  all  :  it  is  political  warfare. 
That  we  shall  continue  to  feel  political  disapproval, 
distrust,  and  even  resentment  after  the  peace  may 
be  inevitable,  but  to  perpetuate  it  and  proclaim 
it  by  Act  of  Parliament  is  to  destroy  any  hope  of 
a  League  of  Peace.  Our  tariff  would  be  a  prosaic 
Hymn  of  Hate.  There  is  only  one  recognized  and 
traditional  guarantee  against  hostile  political  dis- 
crimination in  trade,  and  that  is  a  return  to  the 
general  practice  of  the  past,  by  which  virtually 
every  State,  while  it  lived  in  outward  friendship 
with  its  fellows,  accorded  to  them  and  received 
from  them  "  most  favoured  nation  "  treatment.  The 
phrase  sounds  almost  emotional  in  its  generosity. 
It  means,  in  fact,  very  little,  but  it  does,  at  any 
rate,  forbid  tariff  wars  and  boycotts.  It  would 
not  prevent  us  from  destroying  the  German  trade 
with  Great  Britain  in  drugs  and  dyes,  for,  since  we 
imported  them  from  no  other  country,  a  duty,  how- 
ever general  in  form,  would  strike  in  effect  only 
at  German  trade.  All  it  does  is  to  impose  upon 
us  a  certain  decency  in  the  form  of  doing  the 
thing.  Germany  would  doubtless  answer  with  a 
counter-blow  at  some  speciality  of  ours,  but  still 
with  the  same  appearance  of  impartiality.  An 
agreement  that  all  members  of  the  League  will 


280  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

accord  "  most  favoured  nation  "  treatment  to  each 
other  in  their  home  markets  would,  however,  pre- 
clude boycotts  and  differential  tariffs,  and  that  is 
virtually  all  that  it  would  do.  It  is  a  negative  but 
indispensable  sign  of  peace. 

Two  difficulties  arise  in  applying  this  formula. 
We  accept  tariff  preferences  from  our  colonies, 
though  we  allow  none  to  them.  When  this  policy 
was  first  originated  it  led  to  a  tariff  war  between 
Germany  and  Canada,  and  to  some  rather  delicate 
diplomatic  passages  between  London  and  Berlin, 
In  the  end  the  status  of  our  colonies  as  independent 
States  in  the  matter  of  their  tariffs  was  accepted. 
Plainly  on  this  basis  we  could  not  on  our  side  in 
the  future  give  a  preference  to  colonial  trade  with- 
out risking  our  own  "  most  favoured  nation  "  posi- 
tion in  foreign  markets.  None  the  less  to  give 
favours  to  a  colony  is  hardly  an  act  of  political 
hostility  towards  other  peoples — certainly  not  in  the 
same  sense  as  a  discrimination  between  foreign 
States  would  be.  The  difficulty  would  disappear, 
of  course,  if  the  whole  British  Empire  were  a  true 
Customs  LTnion  (Z  olive  rein),  with  a  single  tariff 
(high  or  low,  protectionist  or  for  revenue  only) 
against  all  outsiders.  The  other  difficulty  turns 
on  the  peculiar  relations  of  Austria  and  Germany. 
They  are  not  merely  allies  of  long  standing  ;  they 
are  also  neighbours,  with  somewhat  similar  insti- 
tutions, a  partial  identity  in  race,  and  a  common 
language  in  general  use  for  trade.  This  is  a  much 
closer  tie  than  exists  between  any  of  the  Allies  of 
the  Entente.  The  Central  Empires  will  certainly 
fail  to  create  immediately  the  system  of  internal 
Free  Trade  which  Dr.  Naumann  advocates.  They 
may  possibly  (though  not  probably)  agree  on  a 
common  tariff  against  the  outer  world,  while  adopt- 
ing a  lower  tariff  against  each  other.  If  we  should 
object  (as  of  course  we  should),  and  claim  for 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         281 

ourselves  equal  treatment  as  "  most  favoured 
nation  "  with  Austria,  the  German  answer  might 
be  :  "  We  have  no  colonies  to  compare  with  your 
Canada  and  Australia.  Legally  they  may  be  your 
colonies.  In  fact,  they  are  independent  sister 
nations.  That  is  really  our  relation  to  Austria. 
She  relies  on  us  for  military  and  economic  support 
in  a  unique  way.  It  is  rather  unreasonable  that  you 
by  a  legal  quibble  may  receive  preferences  from 
your  colonies,  while  we  by  the  fiction  of  Austria's 
independence  are  debarred  from  accepting  the  same 
favours  from  her."  There  is  some  reason  in  this 
argument  (which  may  never,  in  fact,  be  presented, 
for  it  is  doubtful  whether  Austria-Hungary  will 
accept  the  Central  Europe  idea),  and  it  is  worth  con- 
sidering whether  in  fairness  such  cases  can  be  treated 
on  different  lines.  If  we  object  to  Germany's 
receiving  favoured  tariff  treatment  from  Austria,  we 
probably  ought  to  surrender  the  preferences  which 
our  self-governing  colonies  accord  to  us.  The 
effect  in  both  cases  of  this  surrender  of  special 
privileges  would  probably  be  some  desirable 
lowering  of  tariffs  generally. 


AFRICA  AND  COLONIAL  FREE  TRADE. 

2.  The  suggestion  put  forward  by  the  Belgian 
economist  M.  Henri  Lambert,  and  also  by  the  New 
York  Reform  Club,  that  all  colonial  Powers  should 
agree  to  impose  in  their  non-self-governing  colonies 
tariffs  for  revenue  purposes  only,  is  far  from  being 
visionary,  nor  would  it  involve  any  violent  or  general 
change.  It  was  our  rule  in  India  and  the  Crown 
Colonies,  and  it  had  been  followed  also  in  the 
German  and  Dutch  colonies. 

In  none  of  these  did  the  trade  of  the  home 
merchant  enjoy  any  advantage  in  the  customs -house. 
The  Berlin  Convention  of  1885  forbade  all  monopo- 


282  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

lies  and  made  the  impartial  treatment  of  all  over- 
seas trade,  whether  from  the  mother  country  or 
from  foreign  countries,  in  respect  of  the  free  use 
of  rivers  and  ports,  as  well  as  in  the  matter  of 
tariffs,  an  obligatory  rule  in  the  "  conventional 
area  "  of  the  Congo — a  wide  term  which  covered 
all  Equatorial  Africa,  including  German  East  Africa. 
In  practice  it  was  ill -observed  by  the  French, 
Belgians,  and  Portuguese,  though  even  by  them  it 
was  rather  circumvented  than  defied.  Formal 
pledges  (whatever  their  value  may  be)  of  a  similar 
kind  have  applied  also  to  Morocco  and  Tunis.  There 
seems  to  be  no  insuperable  difficulty  in  extending 
this  or  some  similar  Convention  to  all  colonies  and 
spheres  administered  by  Powers  which  adhere  to  the 
League.  The  chief  opposition  would  come  from 
France,  but  her  objections  might  be  overcome  if 
as  an  article  of  the  same  settlement  she  recovered 
Alsace.  Russia  is  in  an  anomalous  position,  for 
though  Siberia  and  Central  Asia  resemble  colonies, 
they  are  legally  on  the  same  footing  as  any  other 
part  of  Russian  territory.  If  this  case  were  not 
pressed  against  Russia,  that  might  stand  to  her 
credit  side  in  the  balance  of  the  settlement.  If  the 
proposal  seems  too  large  (and  why  should  it  be -so?), 
it  might  at  least  be  adopted,  by  way  of  a  beginning, 
as  a  general  rule  for  Africa — 'excluding  the  Medi- 
terranean colonies  and  the  self-governing  Dominion 
of  South  Africa.  The  case  for  it  follows  so  neces- 
sarily from  our  previous  argument  that  it  needs  no 
enlargement  here.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  all 
experience  proves  that  colonies  do  not  thrive  under 
a  system  of  monopoly,  it  is  clear  that  only  by  allow- 
ing to  all  comers  a  general  use  of  the  advantages 
of  colonial  trade  can  the  Powers  which  chanced,  by 
the  good  fortune  of  past  history  or  the  use  of  their 
greater  sea-power,  to  acquire  great  colonial  estates, 
protect  themselves  against  the  inevitable  jealousy  of 
others . 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         283 

The  problem  of  Equatorial  Africa  offers  itself 
as  the  most  fruitful  field  in  which  the  international 
idea  can  work.  The  British  Labour  Party  has  seen 
this  possibility,  but  its  proposals  err  by  excess.  It 
would  abolish  all  the  existing  national  administra- 
tions south  of  the  Sahara  and  north  of  the  Zambesi, 
and  create  in  their  place  a  single  International  State., 
administered  by  the  League  of  Nations.  The  burden 
is  too  heavy,  the  task  too  large  to  thrust  upon  a 
League  which  has  yet  to  be  created.  It  is  easy  to 
construct  on  paper  an  International  Civil  Service, 
composed  of  Englishmen,  Frenchmen,  Germans,  and 
Americans,  'but  it  would  start  \vork  without  a  common 
tradition,  or  rather  with  a  set  of  extremely  various 
traditions.  Each  of  these  races  has  its  own  notion 
of  dealing  with  natives,  and  each  is  critical  of  the 
methods  of  the  others.  Put  a  Frenchman  as  junior 
under  a  British  senior  or  vice  versa,  and  the  result 
will  be  friction  ;  introduce  Germans  into  the  mixture 
and  the  case  will  be  much  worse.  Do  we  really 
want  to  disturb  the  good  work  which  is  being  done 
in  Nigeria  or  Uganda  by  British  officials  ?  Some  of 
them  might  remain,  it  will  be  urged.  But  the  British 
tradition  is  conserved  by  the  Colonial  Office,  and  by 
the  control  of  public  opinion  at  home.  A  number 
of  white  men,  isolated  in  Africa,  cut  off  from  the 
home  tradition  and  from  home  control,  and  with  no 
fear  of  debates  and  questions  in  Parliament  before 
them,  would  be  unlikely  to  maintain  their  present 
standard.  International  finance  would  be  busy  in 
this  inevitably  bureaucratic  State,  and  with  no  Par- 
liament in  Europe  to  call  attention  to  scandals,  the 
League's  colony  might  come  to  resemble  King 
Leopold's.  There  are  other  objections  to  the  plan. 
It  would  wipe  out  the  German  Colonial  Empire 
while  leaving  to  us  and  the  French  most  of  our  more 
valued  possessions.  But  there  is  no  likelihood  that 
British  public  opinion  would  consent  to  make  over 


284  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

our  colonies  to  the  League.     In  this  form  there  is 
no  immediate  future  for  Internationalism  in  Africa. 

The  path  of  advance  is  to  carry  somewhat  further, 
and  to  extend  more  widely  the  method  of  the  Berlin 
Convention.  We  do  not  want  to  wipe  out  national 
administrations.  4What  is  wanted  is  rather  to  lay 
down  certain  principles  to  which  all  of  them  must 
conform  in  the  interest  alike  of  the  native,  of  Euro- 
pean trade  and  of  ^European  peace .  ( i )  The  first 
of  these  principles  must  be  the  recognition  of  the 
native's  right  to  his  traditional  property  in  the  land 
and  its  produce.  Equatorial  Africa  can  never  be 
a  white  man's  country.  Its  future  depends  on  thie 
success  of  the  administration  in  encouraging  the 
natives  to  develop  its  resources.  They  must  work 
for  their  own  profit.  Only  as  they  become  pro- 
ducers, will  they  in  return  demand  European  goods. 
The  plantation  system  is  destructive  alike  to  native 
freedom,  to  native  progress,  and  to  trade.  With 
some  instruction  and  some  organization  and  with 
improved  transport,  the  natives  are  capable  of  cul- 
tivating or  collecting  all  the  raw  materials  which 
European  industry  requires  from  Africa.  This  prin- 
ciple presents  a  direct  negative  to  the  schemes  which 
certain  British  Imperialists  have  recently  advanced 
for  the  exploitation  of  Africa  as  a  tributary  posses- 
sion. (2)  The  second  of  these  principles  is  that 
all  discrimination  must  be  forbidden  throughout  this 
area,  whether  in  customs  or  in  transport  rates,  be- 
tween traders  of  any  nationality  adhering  to  the 
League.  (3)  Something  might  be  done  by  inter- 
nationalizing the  more  important  railways,  as  they 
are  constructed,  to  equalize  opportunities  for  the 
capital  of  different  countries.  (4)  Finally,  the 
neutralization  of  part  of  this  area  which  the  Berlin 
Convention  recommended  but  did  not  enforce,  ought 
to  be  extended  to  the  whole  area,  and  made  obli- 
gatory. Neutralization  must  be  defined  to  mean 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         285 

much  more  than  the  immunity  of  Tropical  Africa 
from  warlike  operations.  It  must  include  a  general 
prohibition  of  the  arming1  and  training  of  native 
levies.  The  number  of  native  troops  who  may  be 
raised  for  purposes  of  police  ought  to  be  rigidly 
limited  by  agreement.  In  default  of  this,  the  next 
chapter  in  the  history  of  militarism  and  imperialism 
will  be  the  conscription  of  the  negfo  races  and 
their  employment  in  the  next  European  war.  That 
hideous  proposal  has  been  discussed  in  Paris,  in 
London,  and  in  Berlin  :  it  would  mean  the  final  ruin 
of  civilization . 

Subject  to  these  four  general  principles,  the  Ger- 
man colonies  should  be  restored,  and  there  need  be 
no  objection  to  some  rearrangement  of  African 
territory,  by  purchase  or  exchange,  which  might 
ease  the  European  settlement.  To  watch  over  the 
observance  of  these  principles  it  would  be  desirable 
to  create  a  permanent  African  Commission  under  the 
League  of  Nations.  There  are  many  ways  of  cir- 
cumventing free  trade,  and  the  charter  of  native 
rights  in  the  land  and  its  produce  would  require 
expert  study  of  native  customs.  This  commission 
would  send  its  travelling  inspectors  to  Africa,  and 
would  deal  with  complaints  that  might  be  made 
under  any  of  these  four  heads  against  any  of  the 
national  administrations  in  this  area. 

CHINA  AND  THE  EXPORT  OF  CAPITAL. 

3.  It  is  much  more  difficult,  but  it  is  hardly 
less  important,  to  devise  some  means  by  which  the 
capital  of  the  various  industrial  peoples  may  enjoy 
some  approach  to  equality  of  opportunity  overseas. 
The  case  for  creating  some  organization  to  secure 
this  end  is  in  principle  the  same  as  the  case  for 
the  opening  of  the  non -self -governing  colonies  to 
equality  of  trade  in  goods.  In  the  modern  world 


286  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  export  of  capital  has  becomfe  perhaps  more 
important,  and  certainly  more  contentious,  than  the 
trade  in  goods.  The  opportunities  for  large  invest- 
ments in  loans,  railways,  harbour  works,  and  mines 
are  peculiarly  valued,  and  because  they  involve  direct 
dealings  with  the  Government  (native  or  European) 
of  the  territories  in  question,  they  inevitably  engage 
the  attention  of  diplomacy,  and  lead  almost  as  inevit- 
ably to  international  rivalry,  not  merely  between 
national  groups  of  financiers  but  also  between  their 
Governments.  The  struggle  to  "  develop  "  some 
potentially  wealthy  area  commonly  ends  (after  it 
has  done  its  full  tale  of  mischief  to  the  relations 
of  the  competing  Powers  and  left  its  mark  on  their 
naval  and  military  budgets)  in  an  agreement  by 
which  "  spheres  of  influence  "  are  recognized  as 
monopoly  areas  for  the  enterprise  of  a  particular 
nation.  The  result  is  commonly  fatal  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  a  weak  State  which  is  monopolized  or 
partitioned  in  this  way,  and  the  Power  which  has 
got  the  big  concessions  is  also  in  a  privileged 
position  in  pushing  its  ordinary  trade  in  goods  in 
the  local  market.  Most  of  the  rivalry  of  the  Powers 
in  the  past  generation  has  turned  on  this  economic 
issue  of  the  export  of  capital,  in  Egypt,  Morocco, 
Asiatic  Turkey,  Korea,  Manchuria,  China,  and  Persia  ; 
and  the  struggle  for  a  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe, 
with  its  restless  groupings,  combinations,  and  arma- 
ments, had  for  one  of  its  chief  motives,  probably 
its  chief  motive,  the  decision  of  the  question  which 
of  them  should  control  the  economic  development 
of  these  great  areas  overseas.1  To  break  down  the 

1  There  is  a  brief  but  masterly  statement  of  this  question  in  Mr. 
Hobson's  essay  on  "The  C;  "  in  "Towards  a  Lasting  Settle- 

ment "  (Allen  and  Unwin,  2.s.  6d.)  and  a!  .-o  in  "The  New  Protectionism." 
It  is  the  principal  subject  of  my  book  "The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold" 
(Bell,  2s.  6d ).  See  also  Walter  Lippmann,  "  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy  " 
(Henry  Holt  &  Co.). 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         287 

customs  barriers  which  protect  some  of  the  colonies 
of  certain  Great  Powers  is  not  a  complete  solution 
of  this  question.  No  Power  does  in  practice  admit 
foreign  contractors  or  financiers  to  a  share  in  the 
construction  of  public  works  or  allow  them  to  build 
commercial  railways.  In  this  respect  even  our  own 
policy  is  one  of  monopoly  (perhaps  inevitably),  both 
in  India  and  tropical  Africa.  Such  enterprises  are 
now  regarded  as  "  political,"  and  in  respect  to  them 
it  cannot  be  said  that  we  practise  without  large 
reservation  the  policy  of  the  "  Open  Door."  While 
this  is  so,  the  pressure  from  other  Powers,  especially 
from  Germany,  to  obtain  "  places  in  the  sun  " 
and  monopoly  areas  of  their  own  is  bound  to  con- 
tinue. 

So  long  as  the  dread  of  war  remains,  every 
Power  will  maintain  its  objection  to  the  participa- 
tion of  foreign  finance  in  enterprises  within  its  own 
territories  which  are  political  or  strategical,  especially 
in  railways. 

Africa  is  partitioned,  and  an  one  way  or 
another  the  destinies  of  Turkey  will  be  determined 
by  this  war.  The  rest  of  Asia  is  occupied  or 
annexed,  with  one  large  exception — China.  The 
political  problem  of  the  export  of  capital  relates 
now  primarily  to  two  great  regions  of  the  world, 
China  and  Latin  America.  The  Monroe  Doctrine 
for  the  present  excludes  South  America  from  the 
arena  of  strife. 

The  question  of  China  cannot  be  postponed. 
Japan  has  used  the  opportunity  lof  the  war 
to  demand  for  herself  a  general  hegemony  in 
China,  with  rights  over  the  appointment  of 
"  advisers  "  and  "  instructors  "  which  amount  to  a 
claim  to  exercise  a  protectorate.  The  Chinese  have 
managed  to  resist  Japan's  more  sweeping  claims, 
but  she  will  emerge  unexhausted  from  this  war 
in  a  very  strong  position.  This  immense  area  for 


288  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

capitalistic  development  will  not  be  abandoned  by 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  and  Germany  with- 
out a  struggle.  The  real  issue  is  whether  a  solution 
will  be  sought  by  delimiting  spheres  of  influence 
or  on  international  lines.  The  former  solution  would 
mean  in  the  long  run  the  partition  and  the  disrup- 
tion of  the  Chinese  Republic,  which  of  itself  tends 
to  split  up.  The  latter  solution  would  conserve 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  China,  avoid  a 
dangerous  scramble  for  spheres  between  the  Powers, 
and  test  the  ability  of  the  League  of  Nations  to 
follow  a  constructive  policy  of  internationalism.  It 
is  not  feasible,  in  dealing  with  a  weak,  corrupt, 
and  disunited  Republic,  to  propose  that  diplomacy 
should  stand  aside  and  leave  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment itself  to  treat  directly  with  financial  groups, 
whose  morals  are  often  predatory.  One  plan  would 
be  to  encourage  European,  Japanese,  and  American 
financiers  to  form  international  syndicates  for  bank- 
ing, railway,  and  mining  development  which  would 
operate  over  the  whole  territory  of  the  Republic, 
thus  avoiding  the  delimitation  of  national  spheres. 
Questions  arising  between  these  syndicates  and  the 
Chinese  Government  might  be  decided  by  an  Inter- 
national Commission,  nominated  by  the  League  of 
Nations.  It  might  (following  a  slightly  different 
line  of  thought)  be  possible  to  create  for  them  an 
international  legal  status— to  invent  the  conception 
of  an  international  legal  personality — so  that  they 
might  sue  or  be  sued  before  the  Court  of  The 
Hague.  In  any  event,  it  seems  essential  to  create 
for  a  term  of  years  an  International  Commission, 
composed  of  men  who,  while  understanding  finance, 
could  be  trusted  to  deal  honourably  with  China. 
This  Commission  must  represent  all  the  Govern- 
ments chiefly  concerned  (Great  Britain,  the  United 
States,  Japan,  Germany,  Russia,  and  France),  and 
enjoy  full  powers  to  control  the  operations  of 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF.    PEACE         289 

foreign  capital  in  China,  with  a  mission  to  avoid 
international  conflicts  and  preserve  the  political 
independence  of  China. 

ACCESS  TO  RAW  MATERIALS. 

4.  The  war  has  familiarized  us  with  the  control 
of  raw  materials  by  the  belligerent  Governments, 
and  with  the  use  of  this  control  as  an  instrument  of 
policy.  Shall  we,  after  the  war,  relapse  into  the 
old  habit  of  free,  individualistic  trading?  In  other 
words,  when  an  "  enemy  "  German  firm,  an  Allied 
Italian  firm,  or  a  neutral  Greek  firm  want  to  buy 
steam  coal,  will  they  all  compete  freely  on  equal 
terms  with  the  British  buyers  at  Cardiff  and  pay  a 
price  which  is  regulated  solely  by  supply  and 
demand  ?  If  that  should  be  so,  and  if  the  sale  of 
iron -ore,  copper,  rubber,  palm-kernels,  arid  other 
important  raw  materials  is  equally  free,  there  is  no 
acute  political  problem.  But  the  Paris  Resolutions 
contemplate  the  continued  official  regulation  of  the 
international  supply  of  raw  materials.  The  Allies 
not  only  agree  to  "-  conserve  "  these  resources  for 
each  others'  use,  but  "  undertake  to  establish  special 
arrangements  to  facilitate  the  interchange  of  these 
resources."  That  means,  if  it  is  anything  more 
than  verbiage,  an  end  of  "  commercial  freedom  " 
altogether,  and  the  establishment  in  a  period  of 
nominal  peace  of  a  militaristic  quasi -socialism 
which  must  subject  all  the  chief  articles  of  inter- 
national exchange  to  rigid  regulation.  Raw  materials 
will  no  longer  move  freely  across  the  seas  from 
producer  to  consumer  in  obedience  to  economic 
demand  :  they  will  have  become  pawns  in  the  diplo- 
matic game.  The  intention  is,  of  course,  to  starve 
German  industry .  But  have  the  architects  of  this 
policy  reflected  on  the  consequences  to  other  nations  ? 
Take,  for  example,  the  case  of  Italy,  which  has  no 

20 


290  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

coal  of  her  own  and  depends  almost  absolutely  on 
supplies  bought  from  us.  German  writers,  who 
enjoy  cynical  plain  speaking,  sometimes  predicted, 
even  before  this  war,  that  this  single  fact,  which 
placed  her  whole  economic  life  at  our  mercy,  would 
force  Italy  to  remain  in  our  camp.  It  is  wiser  not 
to  inquire  too  closely  into  the  diplomatic  mysteries 
of  the  recent  past.  Looking  into  the  future,  how- 
ever, it  is  plain  that,  up  to  a  certain  point,  our 
Foreign  Office,  if  it  can  control  Italy's  coal  supply, 
can  control  Italy's  foreign  policy.  Repeat  this  illus- 
tration indefinitely,  and  it  is  plain  that  an  alliance 
which  will  control  a  great  proportion  of  the  world's 
raw  materials  may  dictate  to  the  world.  The  system 
of  "  rationing  "  little  neutrals  must  continue,  and 
diplomacy  will  not  be  diplomacy  if  it  doles  out  our 
"  natural  resources  "  without  some  political  equiva- 
lent. The  system  might  normally  be  administered 
slackly  and  mildly.  In  times  of  tension  it  would 
be  tightened,  and  it  might  then  become  the  most 
terrific  instrument  of  oppression  which  the  world  has 
known.  There  could  be  no  freedom  in  such  a 
world,  and  if  there  is  no  freedom  there  will  be  no 
peace. 

Can  we  go  back  to  free  exchange  and  the  open 
market?  It  is  doubtful  whether  we  can.  War  has 
given  an  impetus  to  the  consolidation  of  trade  into 
national  groups,  and  there  will  be  more  trusts, 
cartels,  and  syndicates  in  the  world  than  ever  before, 
and  inevitably  Governments  will  have  to  control 
them.  Even  without  a  diplomatic  motive  there  was 
a  good  deal  of  this  undesirable  control  of  natural 
resources  before  the  war.  Brazil  restricted  the 
export  of  the  coffee  crop  ;  Germany  limited  the 
output  of  artificial  fertilizers — in  both  cases  solely 
to  keep  up  prices.  Much  worse  was  the  conduct  of 
those  ingenious  persons  who,  having  discovered  in 
India  the  only  workable  deposit  of  the  rare  mineral 


THE    ECONOMICS    OF    PEACE         291 

required  for  the  manufacture  of  incandescent  mantles, 
sold  it  cheaply  to  the  German  and  charged  a  pro- 
hibitive price  to  the  British  manufacturer.  If 
national  syndicates  of  consumers  can  monopolize 
raw  materials  in  this  way,  the  effect,  though  not 
political  in  intention,  may  be  extremely  irritating 
and  destructive  of  good  international  relations.  The 
effect  of  the  war  has  been  to  make  it  probable  that 
all  these  essays  in  monopoly  will  be  extended,  organ- 
ized, and  dominated  by  a  definite  political  purpose 
— here  to  control  and  there  to  ruin  another  nation. 
A  League  of  Nations  could  not  ignore  this  fruitful 
source  of  resentment  and  oppression.  The  way  out 
has  been  indicated  by  the  Paris  Resolutions.  There 
must  be  "  special  arrangements  to  facilitate  the  inter- 
change of  these  resources."  But  over  the  conduct 
and  control  of  these  arrangements  all  the  nations 
which  adhere  to  the  League,  the  small  peoples  as 
well  as  the  Great  Powers,  the  "•  enemies  "  as  well 
as  the  Allies,  must  have  a  share.  The  less  inter- 
ference there  is  with  free  exchange  the  better  : 
"  rationing  "  is  at  best  a  cumbersome,  offensive, 
and  risky  system.  But  wherever  there  is  inter- 
ference, above  all,  wherever  there  is  an  attempt  to 
use  the  pressure  of  monopoly  for  diplomatic  ends, 
there  the  aggrieved  nation  must  have  a  right  of 
appealing  to  a  standing  International  Commission  on 
Raw  Materials,  which  will  administer  and  enforce 
the  League's  principle  of  commercial  freedom.  If 
any  Power  should  persistently  defy  that  principle, 
and  frustrate  the  work  of  the  Commission,  it 
would  have  to  answer  an  indictment  before  the 
Courts  and  Councils  of  the  League  itself,  and  the 
penalty  for  its  continued  defiance  would  be  the 
withdrawal  from  it  of  the  privileges  secured  to  it 
in  this  charter .  '-  Most  favoured  nation  ' '  treatment 
in  the  home  markets  of  the  member  States,  and 
equality  of  treatment  for  its  trade  in  their  colonies, 


•292  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

are  valuable  privileges.  The  power  to  cancel  them 
where  there  is  gross  and  continued  offending  and 
to  expel  the  offender  from  the  League,  will  be  the 
chief  sanction  at  its  disposal.  The  ability  of  the 
League  to  control  offenders,  to  redress  oppression, 
and  to  check  aggression  must  not  be  measured  in 
terms  of  its  military  power  alone.  The  less  we 
parade  that,  the  sooner  shall  we  reach  the  atmosphere 
of  reasonable  discussion  and  conference.  The  real 
power  and  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  League  must 
rest  on  its  ability  to  confer  benefits.  If  it  assures 
to  the  world,  not  peace  alone  but  commercial  free- 
dom, not  commercial  freedom  only  but  with  it  the 
political  freedom  which  commercial  monopoly  in 
the  hands  of  diplomacy  would  threaten,  it  will 
command  the  loyalty  of  nations  by  its  title  to 
their  gratitude. 


CHAPTER    X 
THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE 

THE  difficulty  of  drafting  a  formal  constitution, 
real  as  it  is,  is  perhaps  the  least  of  all  the  obstacles 
which  confront  a  League  of  Nations.  No  promise 
to  arbitrate  and  no  machinery  to  enforce  arbitra- 
tion will  preserve  the  world  from  war,  unless  it  has 
first  removed  by  a  bold  treatment  of  the  questions 
of  nationality  and  economic  expansion  the  chief 
causes  of  war.  If  the  elementary  rights  of  nation- 
ality are  still  insecure,  if  the  Powers  are  still  divided 
into  two  unyielding  groups  of  allies,  if  sea-power 
can  be  so  used  as  to  impair  commercial  freedom 
and  check  the  legitimate  expansion  of  growing 
nations,  the  task  of  a  League  which  attempted 
from  crisis  to  crisis  to  impose  reason  upon  an 
anarchical  world  would  be  impossible.  Whether 
at  the  settlement  of  the  war,  or  in  Congresses  which 
immediately  follow  it,  some  general  principles  must 
be  laid  down  for  the  ordering  of  our  chaos,  and 
these  principles  must  serve  as  the  basis  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  In  the  previous  pages  an 
attempt,  inevitably  hasty  and  tentative,  has  been  made 
to  explore  this  difficult  ground.  The  suggestions 
which  have  so  far  been  discussed  may  be  summarized 
briefly  as  follows  :  ( I )  That  every  adherent  of 
the  League  must  agree  to  respect  the  cultural  liberty 
of  racial  minorities  ;  (2)  that  the  obligations  of 
allies  to  each  other  must,  in  case  of  conflict,  yield 
to  their  obligation  to  the  League;  (3)  that  the 
extremer  uses  of  sea-power  shall  be  reserved  for  wars 

293 


'294  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

declared  or  sanctioned  by  the  League  ;  (4)  that 
a  general  recognition  of  commercial  freedom  and 
commercial  amity  shall  obtain  within  the  League, 
which  will  by  international  commissions  safeguard 
the  "  Open  Door  "  for  capital  and  trade,  and  ensure 
free  access  to  raw  materials  in  an  open  market. 
A  world  which  recognized  these  principles  might 
contrive  to  work  the  difficult  machinery  of 
conference  and  arbitration.  A  world  absorbed  in 
the  pursuit  by  rival  alliances  of  the  balance  of 
power,  a  world  distracted  by  the  spectacle  of 
oppressed  and  persecuted  races,  a  world  abandoned 
to  the  greeds  and  hatreds  of  a  trade  war,  would 
profess  in  vain  its  zeal-  for  the  abstract  principle 
of  arbitration.  No  promise  will  hold  nations  who 
pursue  an  ideal  of  national  egoism,  and  no  common 
action  for  a  disinterested  end  could  be  organized 
among  them.  These  principles,  or  something  like 
them,  are  the  indispensable  charter  of  any  League 
of  Nations  which  hopes  to  maintain  an  enduring 
peace,  If  we  can  start  from  this  basis,  but  not 
sooner,  we  m£y  go  on  to  consider  the  specific 
question  of  the  obligations  into  which  the  members 
of  the  League  shall  enter,  the  Courts,  Councils,  and 
Conferences  by  which  it  shall  conduct  its  common 
life,  and  the  sanctions  by  which  their  decisions  shall 
be  enforced.  These  constitutional  questions  have 
already  been  the  subject  of  close  study,  both  in 
our  country  and  in  America.  In  the  sketch  which 
follows,  I  shall  attempt  to  give  a  brief  outline  of 
the  results  of  these  discussions,  and  to  note  certain 
divergencies  and  doubtful  points  in  the  schemes 
which  are  generally  accepted. 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  OBLIGATION. 
The  problem  of  stating  the  fundamental  obliga- 
tion  which   must    underlie   any   League   of   Nations 
would  seem  to  be  the  most  difficult  of  all,  but  it  is 


THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE   LEAGUE      295 

precisely  here  that  the  fullest  measure  of  unanimity, 
exists.  It  seems  to  be  agreed  that  no  Sovereign 
State  will,  as  yet,  so  far  abandon  its  own  self- 
determined  independence  as  to  renounce  the  right 
in  the  last  resort  to  go  to  war  for  the  maintenance 
or  advancement  of  its  own  interests.  ; There  is, 
however,  a  general  belief  that  even  to-day  civilized 
States  will  pledge  themselves  to  submit  to  a  certain 
delay  in  order  to  allow  of  the  discussion  on  its 
merits  of  every  dispute,  by  the  appropriate  process, 
before  the  most  suitable  Court  or  Council.  That 
is  the  minimum  on  which  any  League  of  Peace  could 
be  founded.  There  is  also  agreement  in  dividing 
disputes  into  two  categories,  ( I )  those  which  are 
justiciable,  and  can  be  decided  by  legal  process 
before  such  an  arbitral  tribunal  as  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague,  and  (2)  those 
which  involve  broader  questions  of  policy  and  are 
unsuitable  for  legal  settlement. 

The  first  class  of  disputes  will  include  questions 
of  the  interpretation  of  treaties,  all  questions  covered 
by  international  law,  questions  of  fact  as  to 
breaches  of  international  obligation,  questions  of 
the  reparation  due  for  such  breaches,  and  boundary 
disputes  in  so  far  as  they  depend  upon  treaties. 
Such  questions  rarely  lead  to  war,  unless  they  are 
deliberately  used  as  pretexts  to  cover  wider  differ- 
ences. It  should  lie  with  the  Permanent  Court 
of  The  Hague,  or  with  any  Court  which  may  replace 
it,  to  decide  whether  a  dispute  is  of  a  justiciable 
character.  Some  propose  that  members  of  the 
League  should  pledge  themselves  in  the  general 
treaty  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  Court.  This 
would  be  in  form  a  great  step  in  advance,  but 
it  is  not  strictly  necessary,  for  a  long  experience 
of  arbitration  shows  no  instance  of  a  refusal  by 
any  Government,  when  once  it  has  gone  to  arbitra- 
tion, to  accept  the  award  of  the  Court. 


296  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

The  disputes  of  the  second  category  include  all 
the  wider  questions  of  policy  which  in  fact  lead 
to  war — the  questions  of  "  honour  and  vital  interest  " 
which  are  commonly  excluded  from  the  scope  of 
treaties  of  arbitration.  These  must  be  submitted 
to  a  Council  of  Conciliation,  which  will  have  no 
recognized  code  of  political  wisdom  to  apply  to 
them,  and  can  only  make  a  recommendation  based 
on  common  sense  and  the  political  morality  of 
the  day,  a  decision  which  will  not  claim  to 
render  ideal  justice,  but  will  aim  in  the  given 
circumstances  at  a  practical  adjustment  which  may 
avail  to  keep  the  peace.  It  is  not  proposed  that 
the  States  involved  shall  pledge  themselves  to  accept 
the  Council's  recommendations,  nor  that  the  League 
itself  shall  be  bound  to  enforce  them.  The  essence 
of  the  obligation  is  simply  that  no  member  of  the 
League  will  go  to  war  until  his  case  has  been 
submitted  to  the  Council  of  Conciliation,  and  for 
some  short  period  after  it  has  made  its  report. 
The  exact  definition  of  the  time  limit  need  not 
detain  us  at  this  stage.  There  must  be  some 
provision  against  dilatory  procedure  by  the  Council, 
and  there  must  also  be  some  period  of  grace  after 
it  has  reported,  in  which  further  steps  may  be  taken 
to  renew  negotiations  and  permit  public  opinion 
to  act.  The  Council  must  report,  say,  within  twelve 
months — perhaps  too  long  a  limit.  The  period  of 
grace  after  the  issue  of  its  report  ought  not  to  be 
less  than  six  months.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  to  forbid 
actual  war  within  this  period  of  delay.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  all  "  hostile  preparations  " 
against  any  signatory  Power  should  be  forbidden. 
Certainly  mobilization  must  be  forbidden. 

THE  MORATORIUM. 

On  the  novel  principle  of  a  moratorium  for 
hostilities  all  these  schemes  are  based.  There 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF,  THE  LEAGUE      297 

is,  I  think,  a  tendency  to  place  too  much  faith 
in  the  benefits  of  mere  delay.  American  writers 
commonly  refer  to  it  as  a  "  cooling-ofT  '  time, 
and  beneath  their  insistence  on  it  there  lies  a 
somewhat  optimistic  psychology  of  war.  The 
suggestion  is  that  nations  go  to  war  only  in  hot 
blood,  often  over  trifles,  and  always  under  the 
influence  of  the  sensational  press  or  the  demagogue. 
Allow  time  for  passions  to  cool,  and  no  nation  will 
go  to  war.  There  are  two  assumptions  here.  The 
first  of  them  is  that  on  a  cool  view,  and  "with 
sufficient  deliberation,  nations  will  rarely  go  to  war, 
and  the  second  is  that  delay  will  promote  coolness. 
Both  assumptions  are  questionable.  Some  nations 
will  cherish  for  a  generation  the  project  of  some 
necessary  change,  scheme  and  arm  for  the  inevitable 
struggle,  bend  all  their  minds  to  it,  and  march 
with  full  knowledge  into  a  war  of  which  the  last 
details  have  been  thought  out.  That  is  what 
Bulgaria  did  in  1912  against  Turkey  in  order  to 
win  Macedonia,  and  no  moratorium  would  have 
"  cooled  "  her  perfectly  cold  and  deliberate  resolve. 
The  only  way  to  prevent  that  war  would  have  been 
to  liberate  Macedonia  without  war.  Further,  w,ill 
delay  make  for  coolness  ?  Perhaps  it  will  when 
the  Atlantic  separates  the  disputants.  In  Europe, 
however,  across  conterminous  land  frontiers  the  year 
of  inquiry  and  delay  would  commonly  be  a  period 
of  tension  and  apprehension.  Each  side  would 
wonder  week  by  week  what  the  other  was  doing. 
"Is  he  inventing  a  new  battle-plane,  a  '  tank/  a 
submarine,  a  new  explosive  ?  Is  he  stealthily 
mobilizing?  Is  he  laying  up  great  stores  of 
munitions?  "  Rumours  and  lies  and  suspicions  would 
heat  the  air  to  an  intolerable  temperature.  It  is 
proposed  to  forbid  "  hostile  preparations,"  including 
of  course,  chiefly  mobilization.  Could  any  human 
power  secure  the  literal  observance  of  this  provision  ? 


298  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

Any  Power,  in  such  a  case,  would  at  least 
insist  on  overhauling  its  equipment,  completing  its 
railways,  perfecting  its  plans,  and  drilling  every 
available  man.  Nor  would  this  prohibition  tell 
impartially.  It  puts  a  premium  on  a  state  of 
constant  preparedness.  A  militarist  Power,  always 
armed  and  ready,  would  lose  nothing  by  it.  An 
easy-going,  pacific  Power  would  be  condemned  to 
remain  unready  during  the  crucial  year.  Two 
morals  emerge  from  this  brief  examination  of  the 
idea  of  a  moratorium,  (i)  To  dwell  on  the  gains 
of  delay  unduly  may  lead  us  to  think  too  much  of 
the  means  of  preventing  an  outbreak  of  war,  and 
too  little  of  the  means  of  enforcing  the  changes 
which  can  alone  avail  to  make  war  unnecessary. 
(2)  To  ensure  the  observance  of  the  rule  as  to 
41  hostile  preparations  "  demands  a  much  higher 
development  of  international  organization  than  most 
of  these  schemes  contemplate.  A  query  should  be 
marked  against  this  particular  phrase.  Mobilization 
by  Powers  engaged  in  arbitration  or  conciliation 
must,  certainly  be  forbidden,  but  it  would  be 
difficult  and  it  might  be  unfair  to  forbid  them 
to  furbish  up  their  equipment,  and  to  lay  up 
stores. 

When  a  dispute  turns  on  an  alleged  injury  by 
one  Power  against  the  subjects  or  possessions  of 
another,  the  aggrieved  Power  may  be  unwilling  to 
await  the  result  of  arbitration  unless  the  injury  ceases 
while  the  case  is  tried.  If  disputed  territory  has 
been  entered,  the  invaders  must  stay  their  advance, 
or  if  wrongful  arrest  is  alleged,  the  victim  must  be 
liberated  on  bail.  In  such  cases  the  Hague  Tribunal 
must  have  power  to  act  instantly  as  a  court  of 
summary  jurisdiction,  which  can  issue  an  interim 
edict  pending  the  trial  of  the  case. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  '299 

THE  SANCTIONS  OF  THE  OBLIGATION. 

The  fundamental  obligation  is,  then,  that  no 
member  of  the  League  shall  go  to  war  [or  mobilize 
its  army  or  fleet  ?]  until  it  has  submitted  its  case  to 
arbitration  or  conciliation  and  allowed  an  interval 
[of  six  months?]  to  elapse  after  the  Council  or 
Tribunal  has  issued  its  recommendation  or  award. 
What  is  to  happen  thereafter  we  shall  presently 
discuss.  The  first  question  is  to  consider  what 
steps  the  League  will  take  to  ensure  that  this  fun- 
damental obligation  shall  be  observed.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  repeat  the  argument  scattered  through- 
out the  previous  chapters,  that  in  the  last  resort  the 
League  must  be  prepared  to  enforce  this  obligation. 
That  is  the  whole  meaning  of  President  Wilson's 
teaching,  that  in  a  world  conscious  of  its  international 
obligations,  no  nation  can  henceforward  stand  by 
indifferent  when  another  violates  international  right. 
We  may  hope  that  the  mere  knowledge  of  this 
resolve  would  usually  avail  to  ensure  loyalty  to  the 
fundamental  pledge  of  the  League.  Against  some 
Powers  it  might  suffice  to  use  economic  pressure — 
first  to  refuse  them  loans  and  forbid  the  sale  of 
munitions  to  them,  and,  finally,  to  lay  an  embargo 
on  all  their  communications.  The  last  measure 
would  be  apt  to  lead  to  war,  unless  the  State 
in  question  were 'a  small  one.  The  possibility  of 
a  war  by  the  League  against  some  defiant  Power 
cannot  be  ignored,  and  ought  not  to  be  minimized. 
However  the  obligation  to  join  in  such  a  war  may 
be  worded,  it  would  be  cowardly  to  shirk  the  central 
fact  that  the  League  must  contemplate  the  possi- 
bility of  such  common  wars.  It  follows  that  it  must 
prepare  for  them,  and  the  risk  that  they  will  occur 
will  be  the  greater  in  proportion  as  the  organization 
to  conduct  them  is  weak  and  unready. 

One  way  of  securing  the  necessary  cohesion  and 


300  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

decision  within  the  League  may  be  to  make  its 
statutory  obligation  extremely  definite  and  drastic. 
This  is  the  basis  both  of  the  American  League 
to  enforce  Peace  and  of  the  British  League  of 
Nations  Society.  They  say  bluntly  f<  the  signatory 
Powers  shall  jointly  use  forthwith  both  their 
economic  and  military  forces  "  against  the  offender. 
Another  way  of  defining  the  undertaking  would  be 
to  say  that  the  members  of  the  League  will  support 
any  fellow-member  who  may  be  attacked  in 
defiance  of  the  fundamental  obligation  of  the  League 
with  such  concerted  measures,  economic  or  military, 
as  may  be  most  effective  and  appropriate.  This 
implies  an  obligation  in  certain  circumstances  to  go 
to  war.  It  is  still  too  vague,  however,  for  it  does  not 
yet  tell  us  what  organ  of  the  League  shall  decide 
what  measures  are  effective  and  appropriate  (whether 
an  economic  boycott,  for  example,  will  suffice),  nor 
does  it  attempt  to  define  to  what  extent  each  Power 
is  committed  to  share  in  the  common  war.  The 
latter  point  is  crucial,  for  clearly  little  is  gained  by 
extracting  in  advance  a  promise  to  go  to  war,  if 
the  obligation  can  be  discharged  by  a  formal 
declaration  of  war,  followed  by  the  dispatch  for 
the  sake  of  appearances  of  a  gunboat  to  the  scene 
of  operations,  or  a  small  expeditionary  corps  to  one 
of  the  enemy's  colonies.  From  some  of  the  minor 
members  of  the  League  this,  perhaps,  is  all  that 
would  be  required.  But  the  common  war  might 
come  to  a  lamentable  end  if  the  Great  Powers  were 
to  act  in  this  spirit.  An  alliance  which  "  means 
business  "  commonly  stipulates  that  each  ally  shall 
make  a  certain  minimum  contribution,  and  put  a 
certain  number  of  men  in  the  field.  Stipulations  of 
this  kind  would  be  of  little  use,  however,  to  a  League 
of  Nations,  which,  unlike  most  alliances,  might  have 
to  act  anywhere  and  (theoretically)  against  any 
Power.  It  will  break  down  unless  several  of  the 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE     301 

greater  Powers  are  prepared  to  use  their  whole 
strength  at  need  in  its  service,  while  the  others  join, 
at  least  passively,  by  maintaining  a  boycott  of  the 
enemy.  The  exact  conditions  of  such  a  war  cannot 
be  foreseen,  which  means  that  effective  action  will 
depend  on  the  League's  possessing  a  strong  and 
vigilant  Executive  Council,  which  will  assign  to  each 
member  his  part  in  the  common  effort.  None  of 
the  published  schemes,  as  it  happens,  provide  for 
the  creation  of  any  executive  authority  whatever. 

This  academic  argument  may  be  sound  in  theory, 
but  it  takes  no  account  of  the  prejudices  of  Sovereign 
States.  One  would  expect  that  they  will  be  chary 
of  promising  to  take  part  in  a  common  war,  that 
they  will  be  still  more  reluctant  to  define  their 
contribution  to  it  in  advance,  and  most  reluctant 
of  all  to  allow  any  executive  to  dictate  to  them  what 
part  they  will  play  in  it.  None  the  less  Lord  Grey 
has  laid  special  stress  on  the  obligation  to  take  part 
in  common  wars.  Two  difficulties  especially  present 
themselves  :  ( i )  Will  any  Power  (if  alliances  survive 
the  war)  really  promise  to  take  an  active  part  in 
applying  forcible  coercion  to  an  ally  ?  Are  we  going 
to  invade  France  in  co-operation  with  a  German 
army,  if  France  should  make  war  on  Germany  on 
some  "  question  of  honour  "  over  which  she  refused 
to  arbitrate?  Is  Germany  going  to  join  Italy,  in 
similar  circumstances,  in  an  invasion  of  Austria  ? 
If  the  undertaking  were  given,  it  would  be  only 
because  both  allies  were  convinced  that  the  case 
would  never  arise.  (2)  More  delicate  still  is  the 
position  of  the  smaller  European  States.  Are 
Holland  and  Denmark  going  to  promise  to  make 
war  (if  the  case  should  arise)  on  Germany,  knowing 
very  well  that  their  geographical  situation  might 
expose  them  to  the  fate  which  befell  Belgium  in 
this  war,  before  the  lumbering  forces  of  the  League 
could  come  to  their  aid?  It  is  easy  for  British  and 


302  A    LEAGUE    OF,    NATIONS 

American  advocates  of  the  League  to  lay  down  these 
onerous  obligations  in  drastic  and  absolute  terms,  for 
we  run  little  risk  of  enduring  the  worst  horrors  of 
war.  But  Holland  and  Denmark  are  unlikely  to 
face  such  risks  lightly  against  Germany,  while 
Sweden  and  Roumania  would  feel  equally  prudent 
in  regard  to  Russia.  Is  it  likely  that  Japan  or  the 
Latin -American  Republics  will  promise  to  share  in 
every  common  war  in  Europe,  or  necessary  that  they 
should  do  so  ?  A  League  of  Nations  might  perhaps 
be  formed  without  these  small  States,  but  in  that 
case,  dominated  as  it  would  be  by  the  Great  Powers, 
it  might  be  tempted  to  follow  towards  the  smaller 
nations  an  overbearing  or  contemptuous  policy,  while, 
for  want  of  the  element  of  impartiality  which  they 
can  contribute,  it  would  in  its  turn  suffer  heavily  by 
their  absence.  A  Leagtie  of  Nations  from  which 
the  smaller  peoples  were  excluded  might  come 
to  bear  an  unpleasant  resemblance  to  the  Holy 
Alliance. 

The  fact  is  that  we  are  not  yet  sufficiently  in 
possession  of  the  continental  view  to  carry  this  dis- 
cussion very  far  as  yet.  It  mtist  inevitably  differ 
somewhat  from  the  British  and  American  view.  The 
question  whether  the  League  is  workable  depends 
very  little  upon  paper  treaties.  This  war  has  offered 
us  the  spectacle  of  two  States,  one  of  them  a  Great 
Power,  actually  engaged  in  hostilities  with  the 
Central  Empires  to  which  in  August  1914  they  were 
still  bound  by  treaties  of  alliance.  Peoples  must 
pledge  themselves  as  well  as  Governments.  The 
League  will  be  a  reality  only  if  the  chief  nations 
adhere  to  it  with  sincerity.  If  the  peoples  of 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  Germany,  and  the  United 
States  mean  that  it  shall  succeed,  formulse  are  a 
secondary  consideration.  On  the  whole,  the  best 
formula  might  be  one  which  pledged  the  League  to 
secure  the  desired  end,  while  leaving  its  Executive 


THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE      303 

to  devise  the  means.  It  might  be  worded  some- 
what as  follows  : — 

When  a  breach  of  the  fundamental  obligation  of  the  League  is 
threatened,  the  Executive  of  the  League  shall  forthwith  determine 
by  what  means,  military  or  economic,  its  observance  may  be  secured. 
The  States  which  adhere  to  the  League  shall  give  their  support  to 
such  common  measures  as  the  Executive  may  prescribe  in  accordance 
with  the  undertakings  which  each  of  them  shall  have  given  on  its 
entry  into  the  League. 

This  form  of  the  pledge  contemplates  the  probability 
that  some  States  may  make  reservations — that  some 
will  not  bind  themselves  in  advance  in  all  cases  to 
join  in  military  measures  against  an  ally,  that 
some  will  share  in  economic  but  not  necessarily  or 
in  all  cases  in  military  measures,  or  that  they  will 
share  to  a  limited  extent,  in  certain  fields,  or  with  so 
many  ships  and  so  many  army  corps.  Better  such 
reservations  honestly  made  at  the  start  than  faithless- 
ness when  the  emergency  arises.  It  may  be  neces- 
sary to  make  some  distinction  in  status  between  the 
Great  Powers  and  the  smaller  nations.  The  former 
alone  may  be  willing  to  promise  in  all  cases  to 
enforce  the  fundamental  treaty  by  arms,  and  they 
alone  would  be  represented  on  the  Executive.  The 
latter  would  adhere  to  the  League  and  enjoy  its 
advantages,  but  their  share  in  its  common  military 
operations  would  depend  on  circumstances  and  their 
own  free  will.  They  cannot,  however,  escape  all 
contributions  nor  all  risks  :  the  strategic  use  of  their 
territory,  for  example,  and  their  help  in  an  embargo, 
might  be  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  an  effective 
campaign. 

These  military  questions  lead  us  into  difficult 
ground.  They  must  be  faced,  but  it  is  possible  to 
exaggerate  their  importance.  In  practice  I  believe 
that  the  provision  on  which  Chapter  VI  laid  stress — 
that  allies  shall  not  support  each'  other  against  the 


304  A   LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

League— is  really  the  clue  to  the  military  problem, 
and  would  of  itself  suffice  in  all  the  graver  cases  to 
ensure  the  authority  of  the  League.  If  a  lawless 
Power  can  be  isolated,  there  is  force  enough  to 
ensure  its  defeat  in  the  rest  of  the  world,  even  if  its 
own  allies  and  the  smaller  States  took  no  active 
military  part  against  it.  Let  us  not  lose  sight  of 
the  possibility  of  using  a  more  persuasive  strategy 
to  hold  the  League  together.  It  cannot  dispense 
with  arms.  But  it  will  go  ill  with  it  if  it  comes  to 
rely  on  force  alone.  Its  best  course  is  to  link  its 
members  by  internal  cohesion,  to  attract  and  hold 
them  by  economic  advantages  which  they  will  be 
loath  to  forfeit  by  disloyalty. 

THE  LEAGUE  AND  OUTSIDERS. 

The  American  draft  of  the  principles  of  the 
League  provides  for  no  means  of  defence,  if  a 
member  of  the  League  is  attacked  by  a  State  which 
has  not  adhered  to  it,  or  by  a  State  which  has 
seceded  from  it.  This  oversight  would  wreck  any 
League  from  the  start.  If  any  Power  wished  to 
behave  aggressively,  all  it  need  do  is  to  remain 
outside  the  League,  or  to  step  outside  it,  in  order 
to  enjoy  complete  immunity.  The  League  will  be 
called  upon  to  coerce  its  own  members  only  if  they 
adhere  to  it  insincerely.  If  it  has  to  act,  it  will 
usually  be  against  outsiders  or  seceders.  We  cannot 
at  present  foresee  what  States  will  adhere  to  the 
League  :  that  may  depend  on  how  far  it  uses 
economic  privileges  as  its  force  of  attraction.  No 
commercial  Power  could  afford  to  remain  outside 
it,  if  the  enjoyment  of  large  commercial  advantages 
is  dependent  on  membership.  But  clearly  it  cannot 
be  assumed  that  all  States  will  join  it.  If  the 
League  is  to  maintain  peace  in  the  world,  it  must 
pledge  its  members  (as  in  Article  IV  of  the 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE   LEAGUE      305 

British  version)  to  mutual  defence  against  outsiders. 
Should  it  fail  to  do  this,  it  will  never  replace  the 
old  alliances,  and  if  it  is  to  these  that  nations  must 
look  for  security,  the  League  will  maintain  a  feeble 
academic  life  beside  them,  forgotten  and  ignored. 


THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  AWARDS. 

So  far  we  have  considered  only  the  steps  by  which 
the  League  may  seek  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of 
lawless  war.  It  will  by  these  measures  ensure  a 
period  of  delay  before  disputes  can  culminate  in 
war.  The  Council  will  issue  its  recommendations, 
and  the  constitution  of  the  League  then  requires 
a  further  delay  of  six  months,  during  which  the 
Council's  report  may  be  considered  by  Parliament 
and  public  opinion  in  the  nations  concerned.  They 
may  resume  direct  negotiations  and  agree  between 
themselves  to  settle  their  dispute  more  or  less  on 
the  lines  recommended.  They  will  be  aware  that 
the  civilized  world  expiects  from  them  some  defer- 
ence to  an  impartial  report  ;  they  will  be  subject 
to  considerable  moral  pressure,  and  each  will  know 
that  if  it  becomes  involved  in  war  through  its  failure^ 
to  adopt  the  Council's  report,  the  public  opinion  of 
the  rest  of  the  League  will  be  against  it. 

In  all  minor  disputes  and  in  some  grave  disputes 
this  would  suffice  (if  the  Council's  recommenda- 
tions were  themselves  equitable  and  moderate)  to 
bring  about  a  peaceful  settlement.  Neither  the 
British  nor  the  American  draft  proposes  any  further 
action  to  ensure  peace  or  to  enforce  the  Council's 
recommendation.  Some  reserve  is  essential  in  this 
matter.  It  is  neither  possible  nor  desirable  that 
the  nations  of  the  League  should  bind  themselves 
to  enforce  the  report  of  the  Council.  One  cannot 
bind  millions  of  men  to  act  on  the  opinions  of  a 
bare  majority  of  a  non -elected  Council,  however 

21 


306  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

distinguished  it  may  be.  Moreover,  if  this 
tremendous  responsibility  did  attach  to  the  de- 
cisions of  the  Council,  it  would  with  difficulty  confine 
its  thoughts  to  the  merits  of  the  question,  nor  would 
the  Governments  behind  the  Councillors  be  will- 
ing to  allow  them  to  speak  and  vote  freely.  A 
Councillor  must  not  be  hampered  by  the  thought  that 
if  he  votes  for  an  equitable  settlement,  he  may  be 
committing  his  own  country  to  war.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  seems  a  mockery  of  justice  that  the  civilized 
world  should  hold  back  two  States  from  war,  call 
upon  its  ablest  men  to  recommend  a  settlement 
of  their  dispute,  and  then  wash  its  hands  of  the 
consequences  if  the  stronger  of  the  two  (after  wait- 
ing for  the  prescribed  term)  laughs  at  the  Council's 
proposals  and  proceeds  to  fall  upon  the  weaker. 
Morally  the  Power  which  ignores  the  voice  of 
impartial  justice  is  as  clearly  the  aggressor  as  the 
Power  which  goes  to  war  without  waiting  for  it 
to  speak.  When  in  any  dispute  one  of  the  parties 
will  accept  the  Council's  decision  and  the  other 
will  not,  the  League  can  hardly  fail  to  discriminate 
between  them.  It  seems  essential  that  from  the 
moment  that  the  Council  has  reported,  the  League's 
Executive  must  prepare  itself  for  some  possible 
action.  The  two  disputants  may  negotiate  directly 
with  success,  but  a  further  offer  of  mediation  by 
one  or  more  of  the  Powers  may  now  be  a  hopeful 
step,  for,  by  some  adroit  modifications,  the  Council's 
report  may  be  made  acceptable  to  them  both.  If 
one  of  the  two  is  clearly  in  the  right  and  the  other 
as  clearly  in  the  wrong,  then  it  can  hardly  be  dis- 
puted that  the  League  ought  to  defend  the  former 
and  repress  the  latter,  and  that  it  must  enforce,  if 
not  the  Council's  actual  recommendations,  at  least 
some  minimum  based  upon  them.  Unless,  in  the 
long  run,  and  by  one  expedient  or  another,  the 
League  can  ensure  some  elements  of  justice  to  its 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE      307 

members,  and  bring  about  changes  in  the  status 
quo  which  are  urgent  and  necessary,  it  will  not 
succeed  in  preventing  wars.  In  some  cases,  how- 
ever, the  issue  may  not  be  clear,  and  in  others  both 
disputants  may  reject  the  Council's  decision.  There 
are  many  courses  before  the  Executive.  It  may 
announce  that  it  will  make  common  cause  on  behalf 
of  the  League  with  one  of  the  disputants,  if  neces- 
sary by  arms.  It  may  threaten  to  expel  one  or 
both  of  them  from  the  League  and  cut  them  off 
from  its  economic  privileges.  It  may  be  content 
to  apply  temporary  economic  pressure — a  boycott 
or  embargo — to  one  or  both  of  them.  It  may 
wash  its  hands  of  their  quarrel,  hold  the  ring,  and 
enforce  the  strictest  reading  of  neutral  rights  against 
them  both,  refusing  to  either  of  them  the  right  to 
have  recourse  to  an  embargo  or  a  blockade  (see 
p.  216).  At  the  least  it  must  remind  the  allies 
of  the  State  which  becomes  involved  in  war,  by 
reason  solely  of  its  own  failure  to  adopt  the  Council's 
decision,  that  it  expects  them  to  remain  neutral 
(see  p.  194).  It  seems  essential  to  add  to  the 
two  model  drafts  a  provision  to  this  effect  :  that 
if  any  Power  should  fail  to  accept  or  to  give  effect 
to  the  award  of  the  Tribunal,  or  the  report  of  the 
Council  of  Conciliation,  the  Executive  of  the  League 
shall  meet  forthwith  to  devise  such  collective  action 
(if  any)  as  it  may  be  expedient  to  take  to  meet 
this  situation. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  OF  THE  LEAGUE. 

A  League  which  intends  to  act  must  acknow- 
ledge some  executive  authority.  Neither  of  the 
drafts  before  us  provides  for  it,  and  presumably 
the^drajLigjitsmen  assumed  that  when  action  was  re- 
quired, the  Governments  of  the  member  States  would 
confer  among  themselves,  either  by  telegraphing 


308  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

right  and  left  to  one  another  or  by  summoning  a 
conference.  Discussion  by  telegram  between  eight 
or  more  centres  involves  time  and  is  apt  to  lead  to 
misunderstanding.  Conferences,  if  they  must  be 
called  for  each  special  occasion,  involve  still  more 
time.  Unless  we  make  some  provision  to  the 
contrary,  the  smallest  of  civilized  States  would  have 
a  right  to  be  consulted.  Must  the  League  wait, 
before  it  can  act  to  prevent  an  outbreak  of  war 
in  the  Balkans,  until  it  has  consulted  the  Latin  - 
American  republics,  or  until  an  envoy  from  Buenos 
Ay  res  or  Tokio  has  travelled  to  The  Hague  ?  If 
the  League  starts  with  such  a  constitution,  it  will 
either  find  that  it  cannot  act  and  will  fall  to  pieces, 
or  else  three  or  four  of  the  greater  Powers  will 
form  a  habit  of  acting  for  it.  It  seems  essential 
that  the  League  should  have  a  permanent  Executive, 
that  it  should  sit  at  a  fixed  centre  ;  and  probably 
it  ought  to  represent  only  the  Great  Powers,  though 
it  should  summon  others  to  consult  with  it  when 
their  interests  are  directly  affected. 

The  term  "  executive  "  is  perhaps  a  misnomer. 
The  real  Executive  will  always  be  the  Cabinets  of 
the  Great  Powers.  No  Government  would  place 
in  the  hands  of  any  representative  the  right  to 
commit  it  to  steps  which  might  involve  war.  If 
the  Executive  consists  of  eight  men,  representing 
the  six  European  Great  Powers,  the  United  States, 
and  Japan,1  each  of  the  eight  will,  in  fact,  be  an 
Ambassador,  who  will  keep  in  constant  telegraphic 
communication  with  his  Government.  In  effect  he 
might  come  to  be  regarded  as  a  more  important 
personage  than  the  Foreign  Minister,  for  in  his 
hands  would  lie  all  the  graver  issues  of  policy  ; 
but  clearly  he  must  be  the  nominee  of  his  Govern- 
ment, obeying  detailed  instructions  and  subject  at 

1  Japan  may  not  wish  to  take  part  where  the  issue  at  stake  is 
purely  European. 


THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE   LEAGUE      309 

any  moment  to  recall.  From  time  to  time  certain 
Ministers  of  the  Great  Powers  might  attend  the 
Council,  as  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  Allies  have 
met  in  this  war.  The  Executive  of  the  League 
would  be,  in  short,  a  Cabinet  of  the  Cabinets  of 
the  Great  Powers. 

The  alternative  of  telegraphic  communications 
through  ambassadors  between  the  eight  capitals 
would  throw  us  back  upon  the  dilatory  procedure 
of  the  old  Concert.  It  would,  moreover,  be  no 
one's  business  to  set  it  in  motion — if  motion  be  the 
name  for  its  actions  and  inactions.  The  model 
for  the  League's  Executive  is  to  be  sought  rather 
in  the  Conference  of  London  which  sat  during  the 
Balkan  wars.  It  might  move  in  rotation  among  the 
capitals  of  the  Great  Powers,  sitting  in  each  of 
them,  under  the  presidency  of  the  Foreign  Minister. 
That  would  have  awkward  consequences  when  the 
Power  in  question  was  involved  in  a  current  dis- 
pute. It  seems  better  that  the  Executive  should 
have  a  fixed  seat  in  some  city,  which  should  come 
to  be  regarded  as  the  capital  of  the  League.  This 
city  might  be  Constantinople,  if  any  sort  of  inter- 
national regime  is  established  there.  No  other  city 
save  Rome  would  make  the  same  appeal  to  the 
world's  imagination.  Strasburg  is  a  possibility  (if 
Alsace  should  be  neutralized),  or  Berne,  or 
Geneva.  Probably  the  best  choice  (failing  Con- 
stantinople) would  be  The  Hague,  which  already 
has  its  associations.  The  Executive  would  then 
consist  of  the  Ministers  (raised,  of  course,  in 
their  standing)  accredited  to  the  Dutch  sovereign, 
and  its  chairman  and  convener  must  be  either 
that  sovereign's  delegate  or,  preferably  perhaps, 
one  of  the  Ministers  themselves,  chosen  by  vote, 
rotation,  or  seniority.  They  would  necessarily 
have  a  capable  suite  of  military,  naval,  legal, 
and  commercial  attache's.  The  military  and  naval 


310  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

attaches  would  form  an  Advisory  General  Staff  for 
the  League,  which  would  watch  over  any  arrange- 
ments it  may  make  for  the  reduction  of  armaments, 
and  conduct  communications  when  forcible  action 
was  required.  The  commercial  attaches  would  be 
charged  in  the  same  way  with  a  watching  brief 
over  the  League's  policy  of  commercial  freedom. 
If  a  Commission  is  nominated  to  deal  with  raw 
materials,  its  seat  would  be  here.  Here,  too,  would 
sit  the  Tribunals  and  the  Council  of  the  League,  and 
here  would  naturally  be  gathered  the  offices  of  the 
Postal  Union  and  other  existing  international  insti- 
tutions. 

THE  CAPITAL  OF  THE  LEAGUE. 

The  chosen  city  would  come  to  be  the  physical 
embodiment  of  the  international  idea.  Let  us  not 
neglect  the  task  of  endowing  the  League  with  some 
imaginative  appeal  to  the  masses  of  mankind.  It 
must  seem  to  exist  somewhere,  to  have  some 
corporeal  form,  if  it  is  to  impress  the  plain  man 
and  the  growing  child.  The  conception  which 
children  in  elementary  schools  all  over  Europe  form 
of  it,  when  teachers  try  to  explain  to  them  that 
the  Great  War  ended  in  the  creation  of  a  League 
of  Nations  to  maintain  a  lasting  peace,  may  in  the 
end  matter  more  to  the  future  of  the  League  than 
all  the  details  of  its  constitution.  If  the  children 
of  the  European  masses  grow  up  with  some  definite 
cosmopolitan  idea  which  has  gripped  their  imagina- 
tion and  touched  their  emotions,  as  the  idea  of  the 
Fatherland  does  to-day,  then,  and  only  then,  will 
the  League  exist  in  the  hearts  of  mankind.  The 
child  must  be  able  to  visualize  the  League  under 
some  figure  :  his  thoughts  must  be  fixed  on  some 
centre.  He  must  turn  to  this  favoured  city  when 
he  prays  for  peace,  as  the  Moslem  turns  to  Mecca 
and  the  Christian  to  Jerusalem.  No  detail  of  archi- 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF]  THE  LEAGUE     311 

tecture  should  be  neglected  which  can  give  to  the 
idea  some  concrete  form.  One  would  wish  to  see 
in  the  capital  a  cathedral  dedicated  to  the  idea  of 
humanity  and  peace— might  it  be  St.  Sofia  !  An 
international  University,  devoted  especially  to  social 
studies— the  history  of  civilization,  economics, 
anthropology,  and  international  law — might  attract 
the  learned  world.  Labour  would  fix  here  its  inter- 
national headquarters,  and  congresses,  whether  of 
Socialists  or  of  learned  societies,  would  naturally 
be  held  here.  It  must  be  the  meeting -place  of 
nations  as  well  as  the  capital  of  the  League. 

THE  COUNCIL  OF  CONCILIATION. 

The  conception  of  a  Standing  Council  of  Inquiry 
and  Conciliation  for  all  non -justiciable  disputes  is  the 
big  experimental  idea  through  which  the  British  and 
American  movements  have  made  a  new  contribu- 
tion to  the  constructive  mechanism  of  peace.  It 
marks  a  reaction  against  the  old  diplomatic  expe- 
dient of  conferences  and  congresses.  At  these  there 
sat  only  the  official  delegates  of  Governments,  "diplo- 
matists by  profession,  bound  hand  and  foot  by 
instructions,  and  tied  to  the  telegraph-wire.  They 
bargained,  they  bartered,  they  bought  and  sold 
nations  and  populations.  Their  whole  training 
taught  them  to  think  only  of  the  interests  of  the 
Powers  they  represented.  Rarely  or  never  were  they 
guided  by  the  plain  resolve  to  find  a  solution  just 
on  its  merits  and  acceptable  to  the  nations  con- 
cerned. If  the  League's  Council  continues  this 
tradition,  it  will  register  only  the  fluctuating 
calculations  of  the  Great  Powers.  The  new  con- 
ception is  that  the  members  of  the  Council  shall 
be  appointed  by  the  Governments  adhering  to  the 
League  for  fixed  terms,  and  without  reference  to 
current  disputes,  that  they  shall  not  be  tied  by, 


312  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

instructions  from  home,  and,  save  in  rare  cases, 
it  is  not  desirable  that  they  should  be  professional 
diplomatists.  It  follows  that  their  decisions  will 
in  no  case  bind  their  Governments.  On  this  Council 
the  small  States  must  be  represented  as  well  as 
the  Great  Powers.  Som'e  elaborate  schemes  have 
been  drawn  up  to  fix  a  basis  of  representation  by 
population,  or  by  wealth,  or  by  volume  of  trade, 
or  by  some  cunning  combination  of  these  factors. 
There  are  difficulties  in  all  these  schemes.  Perhaps 
the  simple  proposal  that  the  ;eight  Great  Powers 
shall  each  send  three  representatives,  and  other  civi- 
lized States  one  each,  may  be  as  good* a  working 
basis  as  any.  Italy  and  Japan  would  be  over- 
represented  and  Spain  under -rep resented,  but  no 
possible  scheme  can  reflect  quite  accurately  the  real 
relative  importance  of  nations  as  factors  in  civi- 
lization. Such  a  Council  would  not  be  an 
unmanageably  large  body,  and  it  would  probably 
conduct  its  business  largely  through  sub -committees, 
which  would  report  to  it.  Where  disputes  arise 
between  members  of  the  League  and  outside  States 
the  Council  must  be  free  to  report  on  them  also, 
and  in  that  case  should  admit  a  representative  of 
the  outside  State  for  the  special  occasion. 

The  Council  must  be  free  to  act  on  its  own 
initiative,  not  merely  when  an  international  dispute 
has  arisen,  but  when  a  condition  of  unrest  threatens 
to  lead  to  a  dispute.  It  ought  also  to  be  free  to 
draw  up  recommendations  of  a  general  scope  when 
the  state  of  the  world  calls  for  legislation  or  for 
the  reform  of  international  law,  to  make  proposals 
for  the  reduction  of  armaments  or  for  the  better 
organization  of  commercial  freedom.  It  might 
deliberate  also  on  matters  referred  to  it  by  the 
Executive  of  the  League,  or  at  the  request  of  the 
Government  of  any  civilized  State.  When  its  report 
is  drawn  up  it  will  communicate  it  to  all  the  Govern- 


THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE      313 

ments  which  adhere  to  the  League,  and  especially 
to  the  Executive  of  the  League.  Its  procedure 
will  be  public  or  private  at  its  own  discretion, 
but  its  completed  reports  must  be  published  to  the 
whole  world,  for  an  appeal  to  public  opinion  is  the 
whole  meaning  of  its  existence. 

MEMBERSHIP. 

It  is  common  ground  that  the  membership  of 
the  League  must  be  open  to  all  civilized  sovereign 
States.  Since  its  essence  is  that  it  is  a  voluntary 
association  of  nations,  the  right  of  secession  from 
it  must  be  acknowledged  and  respected.  It  seems 
inevitable,  especially  if  full  use  is  made  of  the 
idea  that  it  will  confer  valuable  economic  privileges, 
that  it  should  have  the  right  of  expulsion  against 
any  State  which  has  violated  its  constitution  in  the 
letter  or  the  spirit.  It  remains  to  determine  which 
of  its  organs  shall  decide  the  delicate  question 
whether  a  State — e.g.  China  or  Mexico — is  "  civi- 
lized "  and  may  be  admitted,  and  when  a  State  must 
be  expelled.  This  power  might  be  vested  in  the 
Executive,  but  perhaps  it  would  be  well  to  add  the 
provision  that  if  the  Executive  is  not  unanimous, 
it  shall  take  the  opinion  of  all  the  Governments 
adhering  to  the  League,  and  expel  or  exclude  only 
if  there  is  a  majority  for  this  course  both  among 
the  Great  Powers  and  among  the  lesser  States.  The 
Great  Powers  must  not  be  permitted  to  establish  a 
dictatorship,  but  scope  must  be  allowed  to  their 
leadership. 

THE  LIMITS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION. 

In  discussing  any  scheme  it  is  often  as  important 
to  consider  what  it  omits  as  what  it  includes.  The 
American  and  the  British  plans  for  the  constitution 
of  a  League  of  Nations  are  agreed  in  this,  that  they 


314  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

are  confined  to  the  one  central  task  of  defining  the 
machinery  by  which  wars  may  be  prevented.  Mr. 
Wilson  went  much  farther,  and  evidently  had  in  his 
mind  a  larger  and  more  organic  scheme.  His 
League  will  do  more  than  assure  peace.  It  will 
establish  the  principle  of  nationality,  and  guarantee 
the  freedom  of  the  seas  (see  p.  45).  One 
imagines  that  a  thinker  who  started  from  these 
premises  would  be  willing  to  assent  to  the  argu- 
ment of  this  book,  that  the  League  must  also  in 
some  sense  and  to  some  degree  assure  to  its  member 
nations  some  elementary  measure  of  commercial 
freedom.  The  objection  is  to  be  anticipated  that 
to  add  provisions  of  this  kind  to  a  simple  scheme 
to  assure  peace  by  arbitration  and  conciliation  is 
to  confuse  and  overload  it,  I  would  answer  to 
that  objection  that  a  scheme  which  omits  these 
essential  conditions  of  any  real  peace  is  delusive 
in  its  simplicity.  One  wants  to  know  before  one 
insures  a  man's  house  against  fire  whether  he  keeps 
a  powder-magazine  in  his  cellar  and  habitually 
smokes  on  top  of  it.  To  my  thinking,  a  world 
which  respected  nationality  and  acknowledged  com- 
mercial freedom  would  hardly  need  any  elaborate 
coercive  machinery  for  arbitration.  Its  whole 
atmosphere  would  make  for  peace.  The  machinery 
is  wanted,  firstly,  to  ensure  these  two  real  condi- 
tions of  peace,  and,  secondly,  to  provide  a  channel 
for  change.  To  this  I  imagine  two  answers  will 
be  offered.  In  the  first  place,  it  will  be  said  that 
an  agreement  for  commercial  freedom  may  very 
well  be  reached  outside  the  League,  or  perhaps  in 
due  course  within  the  League,  but  why  aim  at  it 
from  the  start  or  embody  it  in  the  constitution  ? 
There  are  two  practical  reasons.  The  first  is  that 
no  League  can  be  formed  until  the  idea  of  "  the 
war  after  the  war  "  is  definitely  negatived.  The 
second  is  that  by  including  certain  commercial  privi- 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF,  THE   LEAGUE      315 

leges  in  the  terms  of  membership  of  the  League  we 
gain  a  new  sanction  for  its  decisions.  To  rely 
solely  on  military  coercion  is  risky  and  a  positive 
encouragement  to  a  new  phase  of  militarism.  The 
power  to  expel  a  disloyal  member  is  a  sanction 
easier  by  far  to  apply  than  military  coercion.  But 
it  will  not  be  effective  unless  expulsion  entails  the 
loss  of  valued  privileges. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  League  will 
be  from  the  start  and  throughout  its  career  engaged 
in  a  very  delicate  conflict  with  the  idea  of 
sovereignty.  The  presumption  will  be  that  it  entails 
no  restrictions  on  sovereignty  other  than  those  which 
expressly  figure  in  its  constitution.  The  sovereign 
State  promises  to  adopt  a  certain  procedure  in  dis- 
putes. That,  as  these  two  drafts  stand,  is  the  only 
limitation  imposed  on  its  sovereignty.  If  the 
attempt  were  made  to  deal  empirically  and  by  the 
light  of  common  sense  with  questions  of  nationality 
and  commercial  freedom  in  the  Council  of  Con- 
ciliation, the  offending  State  would  certainly  answer 
that  such  infringements  of  sovereignty  were  never 
contemplated  by  it,  or  by  any  one  else,  when  it 
joined  the  League.  It  would  maintain  that  it  is  a 
prerogative  of  sovereignty  to  fix  the  rights  of  racial 
minorities,  or  to  determine  the  conditions  in  which 
raw  materials  may  be  exported.  British  and 
American  jurists  are  accustomed  to  courts  which 
enjoy  a  much  wider  latitude  in  interpreting  and 
even,  in  effect,  in  making  law  than  continental  States 
allow.  Our  law  rests  in  the  main  on  precedent. 
It  is  natural,  therefore,  for  us  to  imagine  that  the 
Courts  and  Council  of  the  League  might  build  up 
a  system  of  case-law  for  the  League  and  settle 
questions  without  an  appeal  to  accepted  principles. 
An  international  Court  or  Council,  influenced  by 
continental  traditions,  might  not  be  so  bold,  and 
continental  Governments  might  be  less  complacent 


316  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

than  we  anticipate,  in  bowing  to  it,  if  it  did  venture 
on  pioneer  decisions.  The  first  question  which  every 
Government  will  ask  about  the  League  will  be  : 
11  In  what  particulars  does  it  limit  my  sovereignty?  " 
If  we  intend  that  it  shall  be  limited  to  the  extent 
that  it  may  not  grossly  oppress  iracial  minorities 
or  aggressively  infringe  commercial  freedom,  we 
must  say  so  in  plain  words.  For  these  reasons  I 
would  urge  the  inclusion  in  the  constitution  of 
elementary  charters  of  national  rights  (p.  139) 
and  of  commercial  freedom  (p.  278). 

LEGISLATION. 

The  American  draft  lays  stress  on  the  conferences 
which  the  League  will  call  from  time  to  time  to 
elaborate  a  code  of  international  law.  It  does  not, 
however,  enter  into  the  difficult  question  of  their 
composition.  The  model  of  the  Hague  Conferences 
clearly  stands  in  need  of  radical  reform.  They 
are  too  large,  including  the  representatives  of  States 
which  are  neither  truly  civilized  nor  effectively 
sovereign.  Their  whole  procedure  is  vitiated  by, 
the  antique  theory  of  the  equality  of  sovereign 
States.  Venezuela  counts  for  as  much  as  the  United 
States,  and  Montenegro  for  as  much  as  Russia. 
The  result  is  that  these  Conferences  do  not  in 
reality  vote  at  all,  and  are  dominated  by  the  Great 
Powers.  They  can  do  nothing  unless  they  are 
unanimous,  and  their  legislation  has  no  binding 
force  on  any  State  which  omits  to  adopt  it.  The 
first  step  towards  reform  is  to  exclude  the  half- 
civilized  and  half-sovereign  States.  The  next  is 
to  devise  some  method  of  voting  which  recognizes 
the  plain  fact  that  nations  are  not  equal,  either  by 
adopting  the  rough  rule  that  a  Great  Power  has 
three  votes  and  a  small  State  one,  or  by  attempting 
some  more  accurate  measurement.  This  done,  the 


THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE      317 

question  arises  in  what  circumstances,  if  any,  a 
majority  vote  can  establish  legislation  which  the 
Courts  of  the  League  may  enforce,  irrespective  of 
its  ratification  by  Governments — a  tremendous 
infringement  of  the  tradition  of  sovereignty.  These 
questions  have  been  worked  out  in  great  detail  by 
the  Fabian  Society,  and  the  results  are  available 
in  a  brilliant  book  edited  by  Mr.  Woolf.1  This 
problem,  however,  does  not  affect  the  League  in 
its  initial  stages,  and  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss 
it  here.  One  note  of  interrogation,  however,  must 
be  appended  to  its  able  scheme.  It  proposes  to 
unite  in  one  body  the  functions  of  a  Legislative 
Council  and  of  a  Council  of  Inquiry  and  Concilia- 
tion. This  is  a  risky  proposal  which  might  in 
effect  destroy  the  utility  of  the  Council  of  Concilia- 
tion. It  ought  to  be  a  body  whose  authority  rests 
on  its  independence  and  the  individual  distinction 
of  its  members.  On  the  other  hand,  a  Council 
which  is  going  to  legislate  for  the  world  cannot 
be  independent.  Its  members  would  inevitably  act 
for  their  Governments  and  under  their  instructions. 
Governments  will  not  leave  their  representatives  free, 
if  they  may  be  bound  by  what  their  representa- 
tives do. 

THE   REPRESENTATION   OF  PEOPLES. 

By  mechanism  alone  we  shall  never  unite  the 
world,  yet  without  mechanism  its  best  impulses,  its 
instincts  of  fraternity,  and  its  craving  for  peace 
may  be  squandered  and  frustrated.  The  best 
achievement  of  a  rational  constitution  is  that  it  will 
constantly  bring  the  Powers  together,  and  link  them 
in  undertakings  which  will  develop  the  perception 
of  common  interests,  and  strengthen  the  devotion 

1  See  "  International  Government,"  by  L.  S.  Woolf  (Geo.  Allen  and 
Unwin,  Ltd.),  6s. 


3 1 8  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

to  common  principles.  Is  it  only  the  Powers  that 
can  be  united  ?  The  word  itself  is  sinister  :  it 
calls  up  only  the  vision  of  battleships  and  great 
guns,  of  parks  of  artillery  and  legions  of  uniformed 
automata.  Is  it  impossible  to  evolve  an  international 
organization  which  will  unite  nations  as  well  as 
Powers  ?  We  have  brought  together  a  few  eminent 
men  nominated  by  Governments  in  a  Council  of 
Conciliation,  seated  judges  of  many  races  on  the 
same  Bench,  gathered  Ambassadors  in  an  Executive, 
and  foreseen  the  meeting  in  World-Congress  of 
legislators  who  will  be  the  instructed  delegates  of 
their  Governments.  Nowhere  in  all  this  mechanism 
will  nations  come  into  touch.  Not  a  single 
spokesman  of  the  working  class  is  likely  to  find 
his  way  into  any  of  these  gatherings.  They  will 
all  be  composed  of  rather  elderly  and  highly 
successful  men  of  the  professional  and  ruling 
classes,  and  comparatively  few  of  them  are  likely 
to  hold  even  moderately  liberal  or  progressive 
opinions.  It  is  inevitable  that  we  should  begin  in 
this  way.  On  Governments  it  will  depend  whether 
any  League  of  Nations  can  come  into  being,  and 
in  foreign  affairs  all  Governments  are  jealous  of 
sharing  their  authority  even  with  the  Parliaments 
to  which  they  are  responsible.  Unless  the  war 
should  bring  in  its  wake — as  conceivably  it  may 
— a  revolutionary  mass  movement  for  peace,  we  must 
be  content  to  act  through  Governments,  and  to  press 
no  proposals  to  which  Governments  will  object. 
Better  an  orderly  and  peaceful  world  secured  by 
Governments,  than  the  anarchy  and  strife  which 
Governments  have  made  in  the  past. 

So  long  as  our  Councils,  Executives,  and 
Congresses  represent  Governments  directly,  it  is 
inevitable  that  they  should  bring  together  only 
delegates  who  each  stand  for  the  idea  of  a  State 
and  for  nothing  more.  The  several  delegations 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE      319 

may  come  together  with  more  or  less  fraternity, 
but  it  will  only  be  because  they  speak  for  States 
which  have  certain  common  interests.  The  danger 
will  be  that  the  British,  French,  and  Russian  delega- 
tions will  form  the  habit  of  acting  together  en  bloc. 
The  Germans  and  Austrians  will  do  likewise.  Each 
faction  will  endeavour  to  win  over  neutral  votes, 
not  by  argument  but  by  barter  and  concession. 
The  only  hope  of  moderation  and  fair  play  may  lie 
in  constituting  for  each  dispute  special  panels  of 
neutrals  chosen  from  the  whole  body  of  the  Council 
of  Conciliation. 

There  is  a  way  out  of  this  difficulty,  and  probably 
there  is  only  one.  It  is  to  adopt  a  system  of 
representation  which  will  give  play,  not  merely  to 
national  interests,  but  to  opinions  which  cut  across 
the  lines  of  nationality.  Men  are  not  merely 
Britons  or  Germans.  They  are  also  Liberals, 
Conservatives,  and  Socialists,  with  an  outlook  on  life 
curiously  similar,  in  spite  of  the  differences  of 
nationality.  If  in  our  common  Councils  we  could 
devise  a  means  by  which  our  several  representatives 
should  speak,  vote,  and  group  themselves,  not 
merely  according  to  nations  but  according  to 
opinions  which  are  broader  than  nationality,  the 
Councils  themselves  would  come  to  represent  some- 
thing more  than  a  balance  and  compromise  between 
States  :  they  would  reflect  the  real  opinion  of  the 
population  of  Europe.  There  is.,  I  believe,  a  simple 
device  by  which  this  end  can  be  attained.  All 
the  States  which  are  likely  to  adhere  to  the  League 
have  Parliaments.  Each  of  these  Parliaments 
represents  a  population  of  so  many  millions  of 
human  beings.  Let  us  say  that  for  each  five 
millions  represented  by  it  a  Parliament  shall  send 
one  delegate  to  an  International  Council — or  twice 
that  ratio,  as  might  be  determined.  In  that  case 
the  British  House  of  Commons  would  have  to  elect 


320  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

nine  international  members.  How  should  it  choose 
them?  By  some  better  process,  one  hopes,  than 
the  manipulation  of  "  whips,"  who  would  nominate 
only  tame  official  personalities.  Let  us  suppose  that 
the  House  voted  for  the  nine  by  a  system  of 
proportional  representation.  They  would  then  reflect 
its  oalance  of  parties  and  opinions.  We  should 
have  to-day  (roughly)  four  Conservatives,  three 
Liberals,  an  Irish  Nationalist,  and  a  Labour  Member. 
Each  of  the  other  national  Parliaments  would  act 
on  the  same  plan,  and  in  the  result  the  International 
Council  would  reflect  (albeit  indirectly)  the  real 
balance  of  opinions  in  Europe.  At  first,  perhaps, 
the  national  delegations  would  hold  together,  and 
seek  associations  according  to  national  alliances. 
But  little  by  little  as  debates  proceeded,  and  the 
members  came  to  know  each  other,  loose  inter- 
national groups  would  be  formed.  The  Socialists 
of  all  countries  would  be  the  first  to  come  together. 
The  clericals  would  soon  find  a  common  bond. 
Liberals,  anxious  on  the  whole  to  develop  the  inter- 
national idea,  would  tend  to  unite.  Conservatives, 
jealous  for  the  rights  of  sovereign  States,  would 
associate  for  their  defence.  Free  Traders  and 
Protectionists  would  form  groups.  Leaders  would 
presently  be  recognized.  All  over  Europe  Socialists 
would  think  of  Kerensky,  or  Branting,  or  Bernstein 
not  merely  as  a  distinguished  Russian,  Swede,  and 
German  (if  they  should  be  elected),  but  as  European 
leaders.  Such  a  figure  as  M.  Briand  or  Professor 
MiliukofT  might  come  to  lead  European  Liberalism, 
while  Mr.  Balfour,  or  perhaps  Bethm'ann-Hollweg, 
would  rally  European  Conservatism^.  No  one  would 
think  of  a  vote  of  such  a  Council  as  a  victory  for 
some  nations  over  others.  The  delegations  would 
rarely  vote  solidly.  What  would  happen  would  be 
that  British  Liberals,  Russian  Cadets,  German 
Radicals,  and  French  Radical  Socialists,  and 


THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  LEAGUE     321 

Socialists  of  all  nations  might  unite  against  British 
Conservatives,  the  German  Centre  and  Right,  and 
the  Russian  Octobrists  and  Nationalists  to  prefer 
some  more  progressive  to  some  less  progressive 
plan.  Is  the  idea  fantastic?  Fantastic  it  is  not, 
but  shocking  and  subversive  it  may  be,  to  minds 
which  cling  to  national  separation  and  an  exclusive 
patriotism  as  the  foundations  of  world-order. 

A  true  Parliament  of  this  type,  which  would 
prepare  schemes  of  world -legislation  and  appoint 
a  standing  committee  to  act  as  a  Council  of 
Conciliation,  may  not  come  into  being  in  our  day. 
The  opinion  of  experienced  and  sagacious  men  is 
rightly  fixed  on  schemes  more  easily  realized,  and 
more  likely  to  commend  themselves  to  Governments. 
It  would  be  unwise  at  this  stage  to  press  a  more 
democratic  ideal,  but  it  would  be  weak  to  forget 
it.  There  is  nothing,  however,  to  prevent  the  early 
creation  of  a  Parliament  as  a  consultative  body 
within  the  League,  but  not  at  first  as  its  sovereign 
body.  The  various  national  Parliaments,  if  one  of 
them  would  lead,  have  the  right  to  act.  They 
need  only  proceed  by  resolution,  on  the  plan 
suggested,  to  elect  their  delegates.  If  once  these 
delegates  came  together,  and  met  annually  for  two 
or  three  months,  the  Parliament  constituted  in  this 
informal  way  would  soon  come  to  attract  the 
interest  of  the  European  peoples.  It  might  send 
up  resolutions  on  disarmament,  on  commercial 
freedom,  on  international  labour  agreements,  or 
sketches  of  reforms  in  international  law  to  the 
League's  Executive.  It  could  not  be  ignored,  for 
its  representative  character  could  not  be  questioned. 
Little  by  little  it  would  establish  itself  as  a 
recognized  consultative  Council,  and  eventually, 
though  not  perhaps  in  our  generation,  it  would 
become  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  League.  We 
may  begin  with  a  workable  official  scheme,  but  with 

22 


322  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  firm  intention  of  evolving  towards  democracy. 
Our  advance  to  peace  and  the  organization  of 
international  life  will  depend  more  on  education 
than  upon  the  work  of  the  makers  of  Constitutions. 
This  battle  is  to  be  won  in  the  schools,  in  the 
universities,  in  newspaper  offices,  and  in  associations 
of  working  men  and  women.  Of  all  the  instruments 
which  may  hasten  it,  the  Socialist  "  International  " 
will  be  the  most  powerful  and  the  most  helpful. 
Without  an  international  opinion  we  are  helpless. 
But  let  us  not  forget  that  for  the  average  man  and 
woman,  and  above  all  for  the  child,  opinion  depends 
on  the  concrete  realization  of  an  idea.  The  average 
human  being  believes  in  what  he  sees.  Ideas  for 
him  must  wear  a  human  face  and  stand  upon  the 
earth.  They  must  be  embodied  in  institutions. 
When  we  have  housed  our  League  in  its  capital, 
and  given  it  a  voice  in  its  Parliament,  then  and  then 
only  will  simple  men  begin  to  think  an  international 
thought . 


CONCLUSION 

THROUGH  its  wandering  course  this  book  has  pur- 
sued a  single  idea.  The  meaning  of  the  war  was 
changed  from  the  moment  that  the  conception 
of  a  League  of  Nations  became,  through  the 
prophetic  declarations  of  Mr.  Asquith,  the  eloquent 
hints  of  M.  Briand,  the  reasoned  support  of  Lord 
Grey,  the  determined  advocacy  of  President  Wilson, 
-and  the  support  of  the  German  Chancellor,  the  pro- 
gramme of  statesmen  who  have  power  to  realize  it. 
Defeat  means  our  failure  to  achieve  international 
organization,  and  victory  means  our  success.  It 
is  impossible  any  longer  to  measure  our  accomplish- 
ment by  any  scattered  tests.  We  may  acquire 
colonies,  impose  indemnities,  conquer  regions  of 
Turkey,  and  effect  territorial  changes  in  Europe, 
but  if  we  fail  to  create  the  organization  of  an  endur- 
ing peace  we  have  failed  in  the  only  aim  which 
could  compensate  the  world  for  these  years  of 
heroism  and  misery,  of  endurance  and  slaughter. 
The  settlement  of  the  war  and  the  creation  of  the 
League  are  not  two  separate  problems.  They  are  a 
single  organic  problem.  The  League  cannot  be 
based  on  a  settlement  which  merely  registers  the 
claims  of  successful  force.  The  settlement  must  be 
the  preparation  for  the  League,  and  its  guiding  prin- 
ciple must  be  to  make  the  changes,  and  only  those 
changes,  which  are  indispensable  for  an  enduring 
peace.  If  we  despair  of  a  League  of  Nations,  then 
perhaps  no  other  choice  might  be  open  to  us  but 
to  follow  the  weary  precedent  of  other  wars,  to 

323 


324  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

weaken  the  enemy  and  to  strengthen  ourselves,  to 
isolate  him  and  to  consolidate  our  own  faction  in  the 
world.  From  that  logic  follow  "  wars  after  peace," 
trade  boycotts,  armaments,  and  permanent  conscrip- 
tion. If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  reason  to 
believe  that  the  solid  structure  of  a  League  of 
Nations  can  be  created,  we  must  find  in  it  a  place, 
not  for  ourselves  only  but  for  the  enemy  also.  We 
must  face  the  thought  that  he,  too,  will  be  a  partner 
in  a  co-operative  task.  The  world  which  creates  a 
League  of  Nations  must  be  a  world  in  which  all 
may  labour  freely  and  fruitfully,  cherishing  neither 
the  hope  of  revenge  nor  a  grievance  which  will 
prompt  them  to  break  the  peace.  Without  the 
promised  co-operation  of  America  we  might  well 
have  despaired  of  making  this  League  in  our  own 
generation.  Her  aid  is  indispensable;  but  if  we  know 
that  we  must  come  to  her  to  countersign  our  bonds 
and  guarantee  the  enemy's  observance  of  the  treaty, 
it  follows  that  the  settlement  must  make  a  world 
which  has  in  her  view  the  elements  of  permanence, 
order,  and  goodwill.  She  will  not  guarantee  a  peace 
which  is  based  on  exclusions  and  boycotts,  on  con- 
quests and  punishments.  Her  offer  is  to  ensure  the 
idea  of  international  right. 

We  have  to  choose  between  two  conceptions  of 
security.  One  is  a  world  in  which  victorious  force, 
always  prepared,  always  united,  imposes  its  will  on  an 
enemy  whose  numbers  and  talents  and  spirit  cannot  be 
destroyed,  a  world  which  would  pass  from  exhaustion 
to  a  renewal  of  strife,  and  from  strife  to  war.  The 
other  is  a  world  which  has  used  the  shock  and  dis- 
turbance of  war  to  purge  itself  of  its  worst  mischiefs, 
and  on  that  foundation  of  contentment  has  built  a 
society  of  co-operative  work  and  international  con- 
ference. -  This  better  world  is  within  our  reach.  Our 
own  statesmen  desire  it.  America  will  help  us  to 
create  it.  The  enemy,  himself,  through  his  chief 


CONCLUSION  335 

spokesmen  had  declared  his  assent.  We  set  out  to 
destroy  Prussian  militarism.  It  will  be  destroyed  at 
the  moment  when  a  German  Government  pledges 
itself  to  enter  a  League  based  on  arbitration  and  con- 
ciliation. Short  of  that  we  may  slaughter  Prussians, 
but  we  cannot  destroy  militarism. 

In  the  remaining  pages  I  propose  to  sum  up  and 
set  together  in  a  balanced  whole  the  various  sug- 
gestions scattered  throughout  the  book  for  a  settle- 
ment designed  to  prepare  a  League  of  Nations.  Two 
preliminaries  must  be  assumed.  The  first  is  that  the 
enemy  will  agree  to  restore  without  reserves  the  in- 
dependence of  Belgium  and  to  indemnify  her  for  the 
wrong  done  to  her,  to  render  back  to  France  (if  he 
still  holds  them)  the  occupied  Departments,  and  to 
restore  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia.  In  these  pre- 
liminaries the  positive  designs  of  his  militarism  are 
overthrown,  for  he  will  have  given  up  the  military 
road  to  Calais  and  the  military  road  to  Bagdad.  The 
second  is  that  he  has  agreed  in  principle  to  enter  a 
League  of  Nations,  and  has  thereby  with  his  own 
hands  (no  others  can  do  it)  destroyed  the  moral 
spirit  of  his  militarism.  After  these  preliminaries 
the  Powers  may  proceed  to  a  negotiated  peace. 
Nothing  else  is  for  us  a  vital  question  of  honour, 
and  the  extent  of  the  concessions  which  we  may 
secure  will  depend  on  the  extent  of  the  concessions 
which  we  are  prepared  to  make.  The  formula  which 
would  best  answer  the  real  needs  of  both  sides  would 
be  :  concessions  from  the  Central  Powers  to  the 
idea  of  nationality  in  Europe  ;  concessions  from 
the  Allies  to  the  idea  of  commercial  freedom  and 
colonial  opportunity  beyond  Europe.  The  war 
settlement  must  come  first,  and  in  it  the  ideas  of 
a  League  of  Peace,  of  commercial  freedom,  of 
the  reduction  of  armaments,  and  of  the  reform 
of  the  law  of  war  at  sea  would  be  defined  only  in 
outline.  To  work  out  these  conceptions  would  be 


A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

the  task  of  further  Congresses  over  which  America 
would  naturally  preside.  The  order  of  these  Con- 
gresses might  be  so  arranged  that  our  final  assent 
to  a  charter  of  commercial  freedom  might  be  delayed 
until  the  enemy  on  his  side  had  ratified  a  satisfactory 
Constitution  for  the  League  of  Nations,  and  assented 
to  a  reasonable  plan  for  the  reduction  of  armaments. 
With  the  reminder  that  nationality  may  be  secured, 
not  merely  by  partitions  and  annexations  but  by 
the  concession  of  autonomy,  let  us  proceed  to  trace 
this  settlement  in  broad  outlines.  If  the  form  of 
the  sketch  seems  dogmatic,  that  is  only  because  to 
say  at  each  sentence  "  I  venture  to  suggest  "  or 
"  perhaps  we  might  consider  "  would  consume  space 
and  time. 

I.    THE  WAR  SETTLEMENT. 

1.  Guarantees. — The  signatory  Powers  agree  to  meet  in  congress 
after  the  conclusion  of  this  treaty,  to  evolve  permanent  plans  for  the 
future  organization   of  international   relations.     They  will  draw  up 
(a)  a  plan  for  the  prevention  of  wars  by  enforced  recourse  to  arbitra- 
tion or  conciliation  ;  (b)  a  plan  for  the  general  reduction  of  arma- 
ments ;  (c)  a  scheme  for  the  reform  of  the  laws  of  war  on  land  and 
»ea  ;  and  (d)  a  general  charter  of  commercial  freedom.    Ratification 
shall  follow  only  when  all  these  Guarantees  are  settled. 

In  the  interval  the  communications  between  the  belligerents  shall 
be  resumed  provisionally,  on  the  bnsis  of  the  commercial  treaties  in 
force  before  the  outbreak  of  this  war. 

2.  Restoration. — Germany    will   recognize    the    independence,    in- 
tegrity, and  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  pay  to  her  as  Reparation  an 
indemnity  to  be  fixed  by  an  international  Commission. 

The  belligerents  will  on  the  signature  of  this  treaty  evacuate  the 
occupied  territory  held  by  them,  save  as  provided  below. 

A  Common  Fund  shall  be  constituted,  to  which  each  belligerent 
shall  contribute  in  proportion  to  his  total  war-expenditure,  for  the 
compensation  of  the  populations  of  the  devastated  districts,  whose 
losses  shall  be  assessed  by  an  International  Commission. 

3.  Nationality. — The  recognition    of  the  rights  of  nationality   in 
Europe  shall  be  ensured  by  the  following  territorial  and  political 
changes.     Commissions  shall  be  nominated  under  neutral  presidency 
to    delimit   frontiers,   to    conduct  plebiscites  in    cases  where  either 
party  contends  that  the  wishes  of  the  population  are  in  doubt,  and 


CONCLUSION  327 

to  arrange,  with  the  minimum  of  hardship,  for  the  migration  of  such 
portions  of  their  population  as  may  desire  to  remove. 

(a)  The  population  of  Alsace-Lorraine  shall  decide  its  own  destiny 
by  a  referendum.  [Alternative  solutions  include  (i)  the  cession 
of  the  French-speaking  districts  to  France,  with  full  equality  as  a 
federal  state  of  the  empire  for  the  rest  of  the  province,  or  (2)  the 
erection  of  the  whole  province  into  a  neutral  independent  state.] 

(6)  The  Italian-speaking  districts  of  the  Trentino  shall  be  ceded 
to  Italy.  Trieste  to  be  made  a  free  (autonomous)  city  within  the 
Austrian  Empire. 

(c)  Poland  shall  be  constituted  an  independent  State.    A  Conven- 
tion directly  elected  by  universal  suffrage  shall  determine  its  Con- 
stitution, and  elect  its  sovereign  (if  it  decides  for  a  monarchy).     The 
Polish  State  consists  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  [the  western  region  of 
Galicia  and  certain  regions  of  Posen  and  Silesia]. 

(d)  Austria-Hungary  undertakes  that  it  will  forthwith  so  remodel 
its  Constitution  as  to  ensure  full   autonomy  to  all  the  component 
nationalities  of  both  monarchies.    Russia  will  give  a  similar  under- 
taking. 

(e)  The  restored  [and  united]  kingdoms  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
shall,  by  the  necessary  rectification  of  frontiers,  obtain  access  to  the 
Adriatic. 

(/)  To  Bulgaria  shall  be  restored  the  "  uncontested  zone  "  of  Mace- 
donia as  fixed  by  the  treaty  of  1912,  and  her  former  Dobrudja  frontier. 

(g)  Albania  is  restored  within  its  former  limits,  and  placed  for  a 
period  of  twenty  years  under  the  protectorate  of  Italy. 

(//)  Cyprus  shall  be  ceded  to  Greece. 

(/)  Turkey  shall  cede  suitable  territory  in  which  an  Armenian  State 
may  be  founded,  either  as  an  independent  creation  with  the  guarantee 
of  the  League,  or  as  part  of  an  autonomous  Armenia  included  in 
Russia. 

(;' )  Kiao-Chau  is  restored  to  China. 

4.  The  Slraits  of   the  Bosphorus  and   Dardanelles   shall   be   open 
in  peace  and  war  to  the  navigation  of  Russian  vessels  whether  naval 
or  commercial.      They  shall   be   neutralized,  and  their  shores   dis- 
armed,   and    placed    under    the    guardianship    of    an    international 
Commission. 

5.  The   Powers    recognize    the   priority   of    German    claims    to 
the    development    of    industrial    enterprises    requiring    concessions 
in  Asiatic   Turkey  generally.     Neither  by  customs  nor  by  railway 
or  harbour    rates  shall  Turkey  discriminate  or  allow  discrimination 
against  any  signatory  Power.     Palestine   shall  be   created  an  auto- 
nomous province  with  a  Jewish  Administration  under  an  international 
guarantee.    Mesopotamia  is  placed  under  international  control.    The 
League  assumes  the  guardianship  of  the  non-Turkish  races  of  Turkey. 


328  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

6.  East  Africa  is  restored  to  Germany.  The  Allies,  if  they  elect  to 
retain  the  other  occupied  German  colonies,  shall,  among  themselves, 
whether  by  purchase  or  exchange,  arrange  to  cede  a  convenient  and 
accessible  zone  of  Equatorial  Africa  to  Germany,  equivalent  in  value 
and  extent  to  her  annexed  colonies.  [The  further  extension  of  this 
zone  may  be  provided  for  by  understandings  conferring  on  Ger- 
many the  right  of  pre-emption  over  certain  adjoining  regions  under 
French,  Belgian,  or  Portuguese  rule,  or  by  the  exchange  of  the 
French  Congo,  in  part  or  whole,  against  Alsace-Lorraine.] 

The  European  Powers  which  have  territory  in  Tropical  Africa  shall 
undertake  to  observe  in  it  the  principles  of  neutrality,  freedom  of 
trade,  and  respect  for  native  rights  in  the  land  and  its  produce.  The 
natives  shall  not  be  armed,  save  for  purposes  of  police. 

The  passages  within  square  brackets  in  the  above  outline  include 
questionable  items,  some  of  which  are  not  within  the  scope  of  a 
negotiated  settlement  as  the  military  balance  now  stands.  Details 
manifestly  depend  on  the  course  and  duration  of  the  war.  It  is 
difficult  to  secure  an  exact  balance  of  gain  and  loss  between  allies  on 
either  side.  This  might  be  achieved  within  each  group  by  a  division 
of  the  financial  costs  of  the  war.  It  should  be  noted  that  though 
Serbia  and  Roumania  will  not  on  the  balance  gain  territory,  Serbia 
achieves  her  ambition  of  an  outlet  to  the  Adriatic,  and  both  States 
secure  the  liberation  of  their  kinsmen  in  Austria- Hungary  by  the 
gift  of  autonomy.  Russia  surrenders  Poland,  but  only  to  the  Poles. 

II.    THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS. 

The  constitution  and  principles  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall 
be  determined  by  a  Congress  which  shall  sit  [within  one  year  from 
the  conclusion  of  peace].  To  this  Congress,  in  addition  to  the  late 
belligerents,  such  other  civilized  sovereign  States  as  the  American 
President  may  name,  shall  be  invited.  The  following  sketch  conveys 
suggestions  for  the  constitution  of  the  League  : — 

I.  The  Prevention  of  War. 

The  signatory  States  agree  to  refer  all  disputes  incapable  of  adjust- 
ment by  diplomacy — (a)  if  justiciable,  to  a  court  of  arbitral  justice  ; 
(6)  if  non-justiciable,  to  a  standing  Council  of  Inquiry  and  Concilia- 
tion, to  which  their  Governments  will  nominate  representatives  for 
a  term  of  years.  They  undertake  neither  to  make  wars  nor  to 
mobilize  against  each  other  until  the  Cotirt  or  Council  has,  within 
a  stipulated  time,  issued  its  award  or  recommendation,  nor  for  a 
stipulated  time  thereafter. 

The  Executive  of  the  League  [representing  the   Governments  of 


CONCLUSION 

the  Great  Powers]  shall,  in  case  of  a  threatened  breach  of  this 
fundamental  obligation,  concert  effective  measures,  military  or 
economic,  to  ensure  its  observance.  The  signatory  States  will 
support  this  common  action,  subject  to  the  several  undertakings  into 
which  each  of  them  may  enter  on  their  adherence  to  the  League. 

The  Executive  will  concert  measures  for  mutual  defence  when  a 
signatory  State  is  attacked  by  any  State  which  refuses  to  submit  its 
case  to  the  appropriate  Tribunal  or  Council. 

Should  any  State  fail  to  accept  and  give  effect  to  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  Council  of  Conciliation  or  the  award  of  the  Tribunal,  the 
Executive  will  forthwith  determine  what  collective  action,  if  any, 
is  required  to  meet  this  situation. 

The  Executive,  subject  to  safeguards  to  be  agreed  upon,  shall 
determine  the  right  of  any  State  to  be  admitted  to  the  League,  and 
may  expel,  subject  to  safeguards  and  the  right  of  appeal,  any  State  which 
has  violated  its  constitution.  The  right  of  secession  is  recognized. 

No  treaty  of  alliance,  past  or  future,  shall  bind  any  State  adhering 
to  the  League  to  support  an  ally  who  has  engaged  in  war  without 
submitting  his  case  to  a  Court  or  Council  of  the  League,  or  has 
become  involved  in  war  by  reason  of  his  failure  to  accept  or  give 
effect  to  the  award  or  recommendation  of  a  Court  or  Council  of 
the  League. 

a.  Ratification. 

The  above  obligations  shall  not  only  be  assumed  by  the  Govern- 
ments adhering  to  the  League,  but  shall  be  adopted  by  tht  vote  of 
their  Parliaments  and  a  referendum  of  their  populations. 

3.  A  Charter  of  Commercial  Freedom. 

(a)  The  signatory  Powers  shall  accord  to  each  other  in  their  home 
markets  "  most  favoured  nation "  treatment ;  (b)  in  their  non-self- 
governing  colonies  they  will  impose  tariffs  (if  any)  for  revenue 
purposes  only  ;  (c)  they  will  concert  measures  to  secure  "  the  Open 
Door"  to  all  foreign  enterprise  in  undeveloped  regions,  particularly 
in  China  ;  (d)  they  will  appoint  as  an  organ  of  the  League  an 
International  Commission  to  ensure  free  access  for  the  trade  of  all 
the  signatory  Powers  to  raw  materials  and  other  natural  resources. 

4,  Nationality. 

The  signatory  Powers  will  define  in  a  declaration,  to  be  embodied 
in  the  constitution  of  the  League,  their  resolve  to  accord  to  all  racial 
minorities  in  their  European  territories  full  liberty  for  the  use  of 
their  language,  the  development  of  their  culture,  and  the  exercise  of 
their  religion. 


330  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

5.  Reduction  of  Armaments. 

The  Powers  will  consider  measures  for  a  general  reduction  of 
armaments  on  land  and  sea.  [This  might  provide  (a)  for  the  limita- 
tion of  the  term  of  service  in  national  armies,  say  to  six  months  in 
the  infantry  ;  (6)  for  the  suspense  of  all  building  of  capital  ships  for 
a  term  of  years,  until  a  permanent  agreement  could  be  reached  as 
to  ratios  of  building.] 

6.  The  Law  of  War  at  Sea. 

This  may  be  remodelled  on  the  principle  that  embargoes  on  com- 
merce, blockades,  and  the  capture  of  enemy  merchant  vessels  are 
permitted  only  in  public  wars  sanctioned  or  declared  by  the 
Executive  of  the  League.  In  private,  unauthorized  wars  the  strictest 
definition  of  neutral  rights  as  maintained  by  the  American  school  will 
be  enforced. 

/.  Humanity  in  Warfare. 

The  conventions  regulating  warfare  shall  be  revised,  particularly 
as  regards  aircraft,  submarines,  floating  mines,  the  use  of  gas,  and 
the  exception  of  food  destined  for  a  civilian  population  from  the 
rigours  of  a  blockade. 

A  writer  who  attempts  amid  the  noise  and  passion 
of  war  to  frame  some  sketch  of  the  better  organiza- 
tion which  we  hope  to  build  on  the  sacrifices  and 
heroism  of  those  who  have  fallen,  works  in  the  dark 
and  questions  the  unknown.  It  may  be  that  agree- 
ments concluded  in  secrecy  commit  the  peoples  of 
Europe  to  protracted  warfare  for  very  different  ends. 
It  may  be  that  the  passions  which  strife  has  kindled, 
have  obscured  in  the  minds  of  statesmen  the  aims 
which  still  survive  in  the  hearts  of  the  volunteers 
who  took  up  arms  to  make  an  end  of  wars.  That 
early  impulse  of  idealism  still  lives,  but  it  struggles 
with  the  resentments,  the  fears,  and  the  appetites 
which  have  grown  up  in  three  years  of  bitterness 
and  disillusion.  It  is  easier  to  believe  in  victory 
than  to  cherish  faith  in  the  organization  of  peace. 
The  danger  is  not  that  we  shall  deliberately  reject 
the  programme  of  a  League  of  Nations  :  it  is  that 
we  shall  postpone  it.  Because  the  noise  of  strife 


CONCLUSION  331 

has  distracted  our  efforts  to  think  of  it  at  leisure,  we 
are  tempted  to  thrust  it  into  the  remoter  future.  To 
postpone  it  may  be  in  effect  to  reject  it.  Unless 
we  know  ourselves  what  we  intend  by  it,  unless  our 
plans,  through  neutral  channels,  are  known  to  our 
enemies,  unless  America,  encouraged  by  both  sides, 
will  push  her  advocacy  of  the  scheme,  we  shall  reach 
the  settlement  undecided  and  unprepared.  Without 
the  firm  resolve  to  make  the  League  itself  an  article, 
and  the  first  article,  in  the  settlement,  our  need  of 
security  will  drive  us  inevitably  to  other  expedients. 
The  settlement,  unless  the  idea  of  the  League 
penetrates  it  and  inspires  it,  must  draw  its  principle 
from  the  older  statecraft  of  anarchy  and  force.  It 
will  not  make  the  Europe  that  could  enter  into  a 
League.  The  hope  may  still  haunt  us,  but  the 
moment  of  creation  will  have  passed.  Each  side 
v*ill  turn  away,  sullen  and  alienated,  from  the  Con- 
gress which  will  have  ended  the  war  only  to  make 
an  armed  peace.  We  shall  return  to  our  normal 
lives  only  to  resume  the  old  precautions.  Naval 
programmes  must  be  drafted.  Alliances  must  be 
renewed.  Conscription  must  become  a  permanency. 
Treaties  of  commerce  must  be  negotiated,  and  if 
they  cannot  be  based  on  the  idea  of  co-operative 
work  and  commercial  freedom,  they  will  announce 
the  "  war  after  peace."  Amid  recriminations  and 
retaliations,  our  movement  will  not  be  towards  a 
League  of  Nations.  There  are  those  who  contem- 
plate five  years  of  a  penal  and  hostile  peace,  a  time 
for  boycotts  and  punishments,  a  time  for  the  passing 
of  resentments  which  the  slaughter  and  pain  of  the 
battlefield  had  not  sated.  In  five  years,  they  say, 
the  world  will  be  purged  of  its  crimes  and  its  hatreds, 
and  we  may  turn  with  relief  to  the  organization  of 
peace.  Men's  passions  will  not  keep  these  time- 
tables. The  blows  we  dealt  would  be  answered. 
Boycott  would  reply  to  boycott,  and  wherever  the 


3J2  A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

enemies  met  in  the  wide  world,  it  would  be  as  foes 
who  would  add  new  counts  with  each  embittered 
year  to  the  indictments  of  the  past.  The  five  penal 
years  would  bring  no  healing,  and  at  their  end  we 
should  be  farther  from  the  League  of  Nations  than 
we  are  on  the  battlefields  of  to-day.  The  hope  of 
the  world  is  in  our  grasp.  At  the  settlement  of 
this  war  we  may  realize  it.  If  that  moment  escapes 
us,  we  and  our  children  may  expiate  our  cowardice 
and  our  indecision  in  an  epoch  which  will  turn  to 
revolution  as  a  mild  alternative  to  war. 

We  are  nearer  to  our  goal  than  we  know.  In  both 
camps  men  have  fought  for  it,  died  for  it,  and  slain 
each  other  to  realize  it.  The  enduring  peace  is  the 
hope  which  has  sustained  the  enemy's  soldiers  no 
less  than  our  own.  The  will  to  realize  it  is  more 
massive  and  more  general  than  the  will  for  strife. 
The  future  of  Europe  is  irredeemably  dark  only  to 
the  pessimist  who  has  seen  in  this  war  nothing  but 
the  working  of  forces  of  destruction.  Violent  and 
egoistic  as  the  impulses  were  which  ranged  the 
nations  in  antagonisms  that  could  issue  only  in  war, 
these  impulses  were  in  themselves  a  proof  of  vitality. 
They  have  driven  countless  legions  to  death,  they 
have  squandered  the  productive  forces  of  hand  and 
brain,  and  poisoned  civilization  itself.  It  is  possible, 
none  the  less,  to  look  on  all  this  ruin  and  yet  to 
hope.  It  sprang  from  many  passionate  resolves  to 
extort  change  from  destiny.  It  was  an  act  of  insur- 
gence  against  the  death  in  life  which  acquiesces  in 
hampered  conditions  and  unsolved  problems.  There 
was  in  this  concerted  rush  to  ruin  and  death  the  force 
of  a  rebellious  and  unconquerable  life.  It  was  bent 
on  change,  for  it  knew  that  the  real  denial  and  sur- 
render of  life  is  not  physical  death  but  the  refusal  to 
move  and  progress.  The  evil  in  Europe  was  not  so 
much  the  statement  of  these  positive  demands  for 
change,  reckless  and  self -regarding  as  some  of  them 


CONCLUSION  333 

were.  It  was  rather  the  inertia,  the  impotence,  the 
suspicion,  the  lack  of  social  sense  which  stood  in  the 
way  of  these  necessary  changes.  The  way  of  hope 
is  not  in  the  retrospective  moralizings  which  dis- 
tribute blame  and  to  blame  would  add  punishment. 
The  way  of  hope  is  to  accept  these  impulses  which 
uttered  a  genuine  tendency  of  living  men,  to  find 
for  them  by  adjustment  and  compromise  the  satis- 
factions which  are  possible  in  the  settlement,  and  to 
prepare  in  the  future  organization  of  the  nations,  the 
promise  and  possibility  of  regulated  and  ordered 
change.  Let  us  defeat  anything  rather  than  a  genuine 
impulse  of  life.  The  settlement  will  be  fragile  and 
temporary  if  it  leaves  any  nation  thwarted  and  frus- 
trated. Some  ambitions  must  be  content  with  partial 
satisfaction.  Some  must  be  realized  with  less  than 
that  dramatic  completeness  which  flatters  the  vanity 
of  one  people,  while  it  condemns  the  other  to  the 
bitterness  of  revenge.  For  all  the  warring  nations 
we  must  make  the  conditions  of  present  life  and 
future  growth.  On  a  peace  which  aims  at  general 
contentment  we  may  build  the  League  of  Nations. 
From  penalties  and  retaliations  it  will  not  come  : 
these  are  the  means  by  which  an  ill  past  perpetuates 
itself.  It  will  come  when  each  nation  turns  to  its 
fellow  and  speaks,  though  it  be  still  in  bewilderment 
and  pain,  the  wish  to  create  the  co-operative  world  in 
which  all  may  live  and  grow. 


APPENDIX 


THE    TWO    WAR-PARTIES 

IN  several  passages  of  this  book,  notably  on  pages  145-6,  I  have 
referred  to  the  part  which  Russian  Imperialism  played  among  the 
causes  of  this  war.  A  frank  treatment  of  this  subject  was  difficult 
before  the  fall  of  the  Autocracy,  and  some  essential  data  were 
absent  when  this  book  was  first  written. 

A  chance  question  addressed  to  a  witness  at  the  trial  in  Petrograd 
of  General  Sukhomlinoff,  ex-Minister  of  War,  for  corruption  and 
treason,  has  uncovered  this  obscure  chapter  of  contemporary  history. 
Like  the  Tsar-Kaiser  telegrams  of  1904,  it  reveals  the  mind  and 
character  of  men  who  were  in  power  at  the  outbreak  of  the  world- 
war.  A  vacillating  and  incapable  but  well-meaning  autocrat,  sur- 
rounded by  soldiers  who  disobeyed  him  and  lied  to  him — that  was 
the  circle  which,  on  one  side  of  the  frontier,  played  its  part  in  the 
making  of  the  world-war.  I  will  try  to  summarize  these  disclosures.1 
The  Chief  of  the  Russian  General  Staff.  General  Januschkevitch, 
stated  in  his  evidence  that  during  the  last  week  of  peace  he  held 
the  conviction  that  war  was  inevitable,  and  since  Germany  stood 
behind  Austria,  he  insisted  that  Russia  must  mobilize  generally 
i.e.  against  Germany  as  well  as  against  Austria.  On  the  29th  of 
July,  1914,  he  had  an  audience  with  the  Tsar  at  Peterhof,  convinced 
him  that  this  opinion  was  sound,  and  obtained  from  him  a  Ukase 
for  a  general  mobilization.  The  Tsar  instructed  him  to  go  and  see 
the  German  Ambassador.  With  this  Ukase  he  drove  back  to 
Petrograd,  found  the  Cabinet  sitting,  and  obtained  the  counter- 
signatures  of  three  Ministers  to  the  Ukase,  which  were  necessary 
for  its  validity.  M.  Sazonoff  suggested  that  he  should  arrange 
an  interview  with  the  German  Military  Attache  instead  of  the 
Ambassador.  This  must  have  been  fixed  for  2  p.m.  on  the  29th, 
for  the  Attach6  came,  an  hour  late,  at  3  p.m.  At  this  interview 


1  The  evidence  was  published  from  Russian  sources  in  the 
Manchester  Guardian  of  September  22,  1917,  and  from  German 
sources  in  The  Times  of  September  6  (p.  5,  col.  6).  See  also  the 
Cambridge  Magazine  for  October  6th. 

335 


336  APPENDIX 

Januschkevitch  assured  the  Attache^  on  his  word  of  honour  as  a 
soldier,  that  the  position  was  unchanged,  and  that  no  mobilization 
had  taken  place.  He  added  that  he  could  give  no  guarantee  for 
the  future,  but  that  on  the  fronts  directed  towards  Germany  the 
Tsar  desired  no  mobilization.  The  Attach^  did  not  believe  him 
(compare  German  Denkschrift,  p.  410.  I  will  throughout  refer 
to  the  pages  of  the  British  Red  Book,  "  Collected  Diplomatic 
Documents").  In  point  of  fact,  as  Januschkevitch  said  in  the 
witness-box,  he  had  the  Tsar's  mobilization  edict  "  in  his  pocket  " 
as  he  spoke.  He  told  no  verbal  untruth,  but  undoubtedly  his 
communication  was  intended  to  mislead.  That  same  even- 
ing (agth)  the  Tsar  received  the  Kaiser's  second  telegram,  which 
according  to  Prince  Troubetski,  "  made  a  deep  impression  "  upon 
him  (430).  It  well  might  do  so.  It  accepted  the  role  of  mediator 
but  urged  the  Tsar  not  to  mobilize  against  Austria  (432)  : — 

"  I  believe  that  a  direct  understanding  is  possible  and  desirable 
between  your  Government  and  Vienna,  an  understanding 
which,  as  I  have  telegraphed  you,  my  Government  endeavours 
to  aid  with  all  possible  effort.  Naturally,  military  measures  by 
Russia,  which  might  be  construed  as  a  menace  by  Austria- 
Hungary,  would  accelerate  a  calamity  which  both  of  us  desire 
to  avoid,  and  would  undermine  my  position  as  mediator, 
which,  upon  your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and  aid,  I  willingly 
accepted." 

As  yet  the  Kaiser  was  aware  only  of  the  mobilization  against 
Austria  ;  the  Tsar  knew  that  the  case  was  worse  than  that.  He 
telephoned  about  u  p.m.  on  this  same  night  (29-30)  to  the  two 
generals.  He  asked  Januschkevitch,  to  whom  he  mentioned  the 
Kaiser's  telegram,  to  stop  the  general  mobilization  and  to  proceed 
only  with  the  preparations  in  the  four  south-western  districts 
against  Austria.  To  this  the  answer  was  that  there  were 
technical  objections.  The  machine  was  already  at  work  and 
could  not  be  stopped ;  400,000  men  had  already  been  called  up. 
To  Sukhomlinoff  the  Tsar  had  been  more  peremptory  and  gave  a 
"  definite  order,  which  admitted  of  no  objections/'  to  stop  the 
mobilization — by  which  this  General  understood  him  to  mean  any 
mobilization  whatever.  The  two  Generals  then  telephoned  to  each 
other.  Sukhomlinoff  gave  the  advice,  "  do  nothing,"  i.e.  allow  the 
general  mobilization,  already  in  process,  to  go  on.  He  heard  a 
sigh  of  relief  on  the  telephone.  Meanwhile,  Januschkevitch  had 
consulted  M.  Sazonoff,  who  was  of  the  same  opinion.  Next  day 
(3Oth)  about  4.30  p.m.,  M.  Sazonoff  met  the  two  Generals,  and  in 
"ten  minutes'  conversation"  they  decided  that  the  mobilization 
must  go  on.  In  the  course  of  the  morning  of  this  day  (soth)  the 
Tsar  had  been  ^brought  round  by  M.  Sazonol  to  hii  Ministers' 


APPENDIX  337 

opinion.  From  tho  dock,  Sukhomlinoft  trankly  admitted  that 
he  "  lied  to  the  Tsar,  and  explained  to  him  that  the  mobilization 
was  going  on  only  in  the  south-western  districts."  The  weakest 
of  all  the  autocrats  even  congratulated  Sukhomlinoff  on  his 
performance.  As  a  social  picture  all  this  is  interesting.  Let  us 
now  attempt,  by  placing  it  in  its  full  context,  to  estimate  its 
historical  importance. 

Up  till  July  28th  the  history  of  the  crisis  showed  on  the  side  of  the 
Central  Powers  a  reckless  but  calculated  and  ruthless  reaction  to 
the  provocation  of  Serajevo.  The  provocation,  indeed,  was  gross. 
The  murder  of  the  Archduke  and  his  consort  by  two  Bosnian  Serbs 
was  the  climax  to  a  series  of  similar  murders.  Some  part  of  the 
Austrian  charges — that  the  assassins  came  from  Belgrade,  used 
bombs  from  the  Serbian  arsenal,  and  were  aided  by  various  minor 
Serbian  officials  and  soldiers — is  probably  true.  Behind  the  South- 
Slav  irredentist  movement  stood  the  entire  Serbian  nation,  far  too 
proud  and  far  too  reckless  to  conceal  its  ambition  of  repeating  the 
part  of  Piedmont.  Behind  Serbia  stood  the  Pan-Slavist  party  in 
Russia,  with  considerable  official  backing.  The  Balkan  League 
had  been  created  in  1912  by  M.  Sazonoff,  rather  to  oppose  Austria 
than  Turkey.  To  all  this  Austria  reacted  with  the  resolve  to 
deal  with  the  Serbian  menace  once  for  all.  It  was  for  Viennese 
public  opinion,  as  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  put  it,  a  choice  between  subduing 
Serbia  or  submitting  to  mutilation  at  her  hands  (116).  Save 
by  the  adoption  of  a  Liberal  policy  towards  her  own  South  Slavs, 
there  was  no  radical  cure  for  this  Austrian  difficulty,  but  some 
action  against  Serbia  was  probably  inevitable.  Our  own  diplomacy 
admitted  that  Austria  had  legitimate  grievances,  and  that  Serbia 
must  submit  to  some  degree  of  humiliation.  The  result  of  a  war 
or  punitive  expedition  would  be  to  tear  Serbia  out  of  the  orbit  of 
Russia,  and  bring  her  back  to  her  old  place  in  the  Austrian  sphere 
of  influence.  This  involved  a  challenge  to  Russia,  and  a  tremendous 
blow,  if  it  succeeded,  to  Russian  prestige.  Some  degree  of  risk  was 
admitted,  but  the  universal  opinion  in  Central  Europe  was  that 
Russia  was  not  ready  for  war,  and  would  not  move.  So  Vienna 
believed  (148,  281).  So  the  German  Ambassador  in  Petrograd 
reported  (101).  So  the  German  Foreign  Office  thought  (29,  207). 
This  also  was  the  general  view  in  diplomatic  circles  in  Constantinople 
(186).  A  dangerous,  a  criminal  gamble,  one  must  say,  and  a 
characteristic  piece  of  bullying  and  bluff,  but  not  a  calculated 
march  into  a  general  war.  There  was,  however,  even  at  this  stage 
a  Moderate  party,  which  had  been  overruled  and  bided  its  time. 
The  most  violent  of  the  war-makers,  the  German  Ambassador  in 
Vienna,  stated  that  the  German  Chancellor  was  not  "  in  entire 
agreement  with  him"  (No.  18  p.  151.  See  also  No.  24,  p.  382). 

One  may  sum  up  this  period  in  a  few  words.  Austria  (with  some 
German  participation)  slowly  and  secretly  concocted  an  exctssive 

23 


338  APPENDIX 

ultimatum  to  Serbia,  refused  to  delay  its  execution,  to  eoniider 
Serbia's  surprising  concessions,  or  to  discuss  her  proceedings  with 
Russia.  On  this  she  was  adamant :  it  was  the  whole  point.  Her 
real  contention  was  that  Serbia  was  her  vassal,  not  Russia's.  In 
all  this  Germany  backed  her,  and  rebuffed  Sir  E.  Grey's  offer  of 
mediation.  Even  from  the  Chancellor  there  were,  as  yet,  some 
words  perhaps,  but  no  decisive  acts  of  moderation.  On  the  28th 
Austria  had  declared  a  state  of  war  with  Serbia,  and  had  refused 
a  courteous  and  pressing  Russian  invitation  to  renew  the  interrupted 
conversations.  So  ended  the  first  chapter  of  war-making. 

The  second  chapter  records  a  powerful  rally  by  the  German 
Moderates,  and  it  culminates  in  Berlin  on  the  29th.  One  may 
detect  earlier  signs  of  moderation,  if  one  searches  for  them  (see 
documents  13-15,  p.  429),  and  it  was  on  the  28th  that  the  Kaiser 
sent  his  useful  first  telegram  to  the  Tsar.  On  the  29th,  however, 
the  Chancellor,  after  a  Potsdam  Council,  initiated  two  parallel  lines 
of  action.  One  proceeded  on  the  hypothesis  that  a  European  war 
might  result,  and  it  ranged  from  accentuated  military  preparations 
(which  fell  short,  however,  of  actual  mobilization)  to  the  bid  for 
our  neutrality.  The  other  line  of  action  was  a  desperate  last  attempt 
to  ensure  peace.  Two  telegrams  had  reached  the  Chancellor  on  this 
day  from  London  (67).  One  was  Sir  E.  Grey's  sharp  warning  that 
Germany  must  not  reckon  on  his  neutrality,  the  other  was  his  final 
proposal  that  Austria  should  arrest  her  advance  at  Belgrade,  hold 
it  as  a  pledge  for  the  satisfaction  of  her  legitimate  demands,  and  then 
await  the  mediation  of  the  Powers.  The  Chancellor  now  saw  the 
abyss  before  him,  and  sat  down  to  "  press  the  button  "  in  real 
earnest  (78,  84) ;  in  other  words,  to  compel  the  Austrians  to  behave 
reasonably.  The  text  of  his  telegram  was  divulged,  only  after 
two  years  of  war,  in  his  Reichstag  speech  (Nov.  n,  1916),  and  its 
immense  significance  has  hardly  been  realized  in  this  country. 

"  Should  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  refuse  all 
mediation,  we  are  confronted  with  a  conflagration  in  which 
England  would  go  against  us,  and  Italy  and  Roumania,  accord- 
ing to  all  ndications,  would  not  be  with  us  ;  so  that,  with 
Austria -Hungary,  we  should  confront  three  Great  Powers. 
Germany,  as  the  result  of  England's  hostility,  would  have  to 
bear  the  chief  brunt  of  the  fight.  The  political  prestige  of 
Austria-Hungary,  the  honour  of  her  arms,  and  her  justified 
claims  against  Serbia  can  be  sufficiently  safeguarded  by  the 
occupation  of  Belgrade  or  other  places.  We  must  therefore 
urgently  and  emphatically  ask  the  Vienna  Cabinet  to  consider 
the  acceptance  of  mediation  on  the  proposed  conditions. 
Responsibility  foi  the  consequences  which  may  otherwise 
arise  must  be  extraordinarily  severe  for  Austria-Hungary  and 
ourtelvM." 


; 


APPENDIX  339 

This  seems  emphatic  enough,  but  the  Chancellor  knew  that  ail 
his  messages  had  to  pass  through  the  deflecting  medium  of  Herr 
von  Tchirchsky,  and  some  hours  later,  on  the  morning  of  the  3Oth, 
he  sent  off  the  still  more  peremptory  telegram  (published  in  the 
Westminster  Gazette  of  August  i,  1914)  which  concludes  thus  : — 

"  As  an  ally,  we  must  refuse  to  be  drawn  into  a  world-confla- 
gration through  Austria-Hungary  not  respecting  our  advice. 
Your  Excellency  will  express  this  to  Count  Berchtold,  with  all 
emphasis  and  great  seriousness." 

This  was  the  maximum  form  of  pressure,  for  it  conveyed  a  clear 
threat.  It  told  at  once.  On  the  3oth,  Count  Berchtold  resumed 
the  interrupted  conversations.  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  (117)  has  recorded 
the  result.  Austria  "conceded  the  main  point  at  issue."  She  had, 
in  fact,  "  finally  yielded,"  for  she  had  renounced  her  tacit  claim  to 
treat  Serbia  as  her  own  sphere  of  influence.  So  far  as  Austria  was 
concerned,  peace  was  in  sight.  No  thanks  for  this  are  due  to  her. 
It  was  the  work  of  the  Chancellor  and  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Turn  now  to  the  doings  of  the  29th  in  Petrograd.  What  was 
M.  Sazonoff's  real  attitude  ?  He  had  every  reason  to  be  alarmed 
at  Austria's  intransigeance.  He  believed  that  "  war  was  probably 
inevitable  "  (287).  He  was  impatient  of  the  diplomatic  delays,  an 
impatience  which  the  French  Cabinet  echoed  (283,  288).  He  was 
aware  that  the  Central  Powers  doubted  his  will  or  ability  to  fight 
(101),  a  knowledge  which  may  have  driven  him  to  strong  action. 
Oddly  enough,  however,  he  himself  doubted  whether  Germany 
wanted  war  (22).  His  is  a  complicated  character  and  a  tortuous 
record,  ranging  from  the  somewhat  treacherous  Pro-Germanism  of 
the  Potsdam  Convention  (1910)  to  the  Pan-Slavism  of  1912  and  the 
disastrous  Balkan  policy  of  1913,  a  shifty,  but  not  in  the  best 
sense  an  intelligent  mind.  His  uncertainty  as  to  the  attitude  of 
Great  Britain  during  these  days  must  have  been  torturing,  and 
several  of  his  expressions  in  the  recorded  conversations  suggest  a 
state  of  extreme  nervous  tension.  He  was  charged  at  the  Council  on 
the  25th  (174)  with  the  duty  of  fixing  the  date  of  mobilization,  but 
only  against  Austria.  He  came  to  the  decision  to  put  it  into  force 
on  the  28th,  and  his  circular  telegram  of  that  date  arrived  in  the 
European  capitals  on  the  29th,  with  the  news  that  mobilization  would 
be  publicly  declared  on  that  day  in  the  four  South-Western  Districts 
(55).  On  the  2Qth,  as  we  now  know,  the  influence  of  the  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  prevailed  with  the  Tsar  to  secure  a  much  more 
extensive  measure,  an  order  for  general  mobilization,  which  included 
the  districts  bordering  on  Germany.  The  prime  mover  in  this  de- 
cision was  apparently  not  M.  Sazonoff,  but  General  Januschkevitch, 
and  it  seems  beside  the  point  to  look  for  any  precise  diplomatic 
cause  for  it.  The  General,  by  his  own  account,  acted  on  the  im- 


340  APPENDIX 

preesion  that  war  was  inevitable.*  The  decisive  factor  with  the 
Russian  General  Staff  may  have  been  that  about  this  time,  as  the 
Belgian  Minister  reported,  the  Russian  War  Party  acquired  in  some 
way  the  inner  conviction  that  Great  Britain  would  not  remain 
neutral,  and  it  laid  great  stress  upon  our  naval  support.  Officially 
M.  Sazonoff  can  have  had  no  warrant  for  this  belief,  if  in  fact  he 
held  it,  for  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  steadily  refused  to  commit  himself, 
and  at  this  period  the  majority  of  the  British  Cabinet  was  very  far 
from  contemplating  our  share  in  the  war.  Russia  was  the  first 
Great  Power  to  order  a  general  mobilization,  an  act  which  always 
degrades  negotiations  by  the  appeal  to  force.  Against  Austria, 
M.  Sazonoff  had  some  reason  for  this  action  :  she  had  refused  to 
negotiate  further.  Against  Germany,  he  had  no  such  excuse : 
she  had  offered  her  mediation. 

Mobilization  was  in  this  case  more  than  buckling  on  the  sword  : 
it  was  drawing  the  sword.     From  the  earliest  days  of  the  crisis 


»  The  suggestion  that  Russia  decided  on  a  general  mobilization 
in  consequence  of  a  communication  made  by  Count  Pourtales, 
the  German  Ambassador,  to  M.  Sazonoff,  is  untenable.  This 
communication,  as  the  Count  has  explained  in  an  interview  (see 
Temps,  13  September.  22  September,  14  October,  1917),  was  made 
at  7  p.m.  on  the  29th.  The  order  for  a  general  mobilization,  as 
we  have  seen,  must  have  been  signed  by  the  Tsar  on  the  morning 
of  the  29th,  and  counter-signed  by  the  Ministers  well  before  2  p.m. 
The  communication  was  delivered  five  hours  later.  It  is  repre- 
sented in  the  Russian  and  French  accounts  as  a  blunt  threat.  The 
paraphrases  which  they  supply  (287)  are  exaggerated.  The  German 
Government  has  now  published  its  exact  terms  (North  German 
Gazette,  October  7,  1917).  It  was  an  instruction  from  the  Chancellor 
to  his  Ambassador,  and  ran  thus : — 

"  Please  point  out  again  to  M.  Sazonoff,  that  any  fresh 
development  of  the  Russian  measures  of  mobilization  would 
oblige  us  to  mobilize.  It  would  then  be  almost  impossible 
to  avoid  a  European  War." 

It  is  possible  that  this  rather  vague  but  not  unfriendly  warning  may 
have  been  tactlessly  delivered  by  the  Ambassador.  Late  on  the 
same  night  (2  a.m.  on  the  3oth)  he  was,  however,  discussing  with 
M.  Sazonoff  the  conditions  on  which  Russia  would  consent  to 
demobilize.  M.  Sazonoff  at  this  interview  produced  his  unsatis- 
factory formula  of  conciliation,  which  he  afterwards  stiffened  and 
sharpened,  raising  his  terms  as  the  crisis  went  on  (76).  It  had  no 
sequel,  for  the  German  Chancellor  preferred,  as  a  basis,  the  far 
more  reasonable  formula  proposed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey. 


APPENDIX  341 

warnings  had  reached  M.  Sazonoff  of  the  consequences.  They  came 
from  Berlin,  from  Paris,  from  London,  from  Count  Pourtales  (503), 
from  Herr  von  Jagow  (39,  187),  and  from  Sir  George  Buchanan  (22, 
40,  60).  It  was  known,  it  was  frankly  advertised,  that  if  Russia 
mobilized  on  the  German  front  Germany  would  mobilize  too,  and 
her  mobilization  was  equivalent  to  war.  The  warnings  did  not 
always  distinguish  between  a  partial  and  a  general  mobilization. 
Germany  would  have  preferred  to  prevent  any  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion, and  the  General  Staff  was  probably  anxious  to  act  on  the 
minimum  of  provocation.  It  was  not  easy,  by  making  too  sharp 
a  distinction,  to  authorize  Russia,  as  it  were,  to  mobilize  against 
Germany's  ally.  None  the  less  it  is  clear  that  the  German 
Moderates,  i.e.  the  Chancellor  and  Herr  von  Jagow,  had  come  to  a 
decision  as  to  what  the  casus  belli  would  be.  It  would  be  a  mobili- 
zation on  the  German  front,  and  this  was  a  provocation  which 
Russia  could  easily  have  avoided.  This  decision  was  communi- 
cated by  Herr  von  Jagow  to  the  British  and  French  Ambassadors 
on  the  27th.  To  the  former  he  said  (No.  43,  p.  39)  : 

"  that  as  yet  Austria  was  only  partially  mobilizing,  but  that 
if  Russia  mobilized  against  Germany  the  latter  would  have  to 
follow  suit.  I  asked  him  what  he  meant  by  '  mobilizing 
against  Germany.'  He  said  that  if  Russia  only  mobilized  in 
the  south  Germany  would  not  mobilize,  but  if  she  mobilized 
in  the  north,  Germany  would  have  to  do  so  too." 

The  conversation  with  the  French  Ambassador  (p.  187,  Yellow 
Book,  No.  67)  was  even  more  explicit.  "  I  asked  him,"  writes  the 
Ambassador,  "  if  Germany  would  regard  herself  as  bound  to  mobil- 
ize in  the  event  of  Russia  mobilizing  only  on  the  Austrian  frontier  : 
he  told  me  "  No,"  and  authorized  me  formally  to  communicate  this 
limitation  tq  you."  The  reason  for  this  German  decision  was  a 
perfectly  rational,  if  brutal,  technical  calculation.  Germany  had 
to  fight  on  two  fronts,  and  must  deal  with  France  before  the  Russian 
millions  had  time  to  concentrate.  The  Chancellor  was  fighting  a 
battle  with  his  own  war-party,  and  he  knew  very  clearly  at  what 
point  it  would  pass  beyond  his  control.  It  would  become  unmanage- 
able if  Russia  mobilized  on  the  East  Prussian  front.  (See  M.  Jules 
Cambon,  214.)  The  attacks  made  upon  the  Chancellor  during 
1916  by  the  clique  of  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  show  clearly  that  the 
war-party  wished  to  mobilize  on  the  29th  or  3oth.  They  blamed 
him  bitterly,  especially  in  the  pamphlet  by  Junius  Alter,  for 
delaying  their  action,  and  his  reply  in  the  Reichstag  was  that 
be  was  unwilling  to  incur  the  responsibility  for  causing  a 
European  war. 

The  German  Chancellor's  diplomacy  in  this  rapid  and  complicated 
eriiii  wae  not  adroit.  Though  his  decisive  action  for  peace  on 


342  APPENDIX 

the  29th  is  now  beyond  dispute  as  a  historical  fact,  he  did  little 
directly  to  convince  M.  Sazonofif  of  his  change  of  attitude,  and 
trusted  too  much  to  the  Kaiser's  telegraphic  correspondence  with 
the  Tsar.  The  Chancellor  may  have  been  uncertain  as  to  how 
long  he  could  hold  his  own  War-party  back  ;  thus  we  find  Herr 
von  Jagow  telling  M.  Jules  Cambon  (217)  that  the  undertaking 
not  to  mobilize,  unless  Russia  first  mobilized  on  the  German 
front,  must  not  be  regarded  as  a  "  firm  engagement,"  though 
the  context  shows  that  on  this  day  it  still  held  good.  If  we 
had  to  judge  by  the  texts  alone,  we  might  be  in  some  doubt  as 
to  what  the  German  Government  exactly  intended.  Any  doubt 
is  removed  by  a  simple  reference  to  what  it  did.  It  knew 
officially  on  the  2gth  that  Russia  was  mobilizing  against  Austria. 
It  refrained  from  counter-measures.  It  waited  till  the  3ist,  when 
it  learned  officially  that  the  Russian  mobilization  was  general.  It 
then  sent  its  ultimatum,  and,  after  waiting  for  a  reply  (which 
meant  nearly  a  day's  delay),  itself  mobilized  on  August  ist.  The 
facts  make  it  clear  that  Russia  might  with  impunity  have  mobilized 
against  Austria  alone.  Had  the  Tsar  been  obeyed  when  on  the 
evening  of  the  zgth  he  ordered  the  general  mobilization  to  be  stopped, 
there  would  have  been  no  war.  It  was  the  action  of  the  Russian 
War-party,  in  forcing  a  general  mobilization,  which  undid  the 
effects  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  patient  efforts,  and  of  the  Chancellor's 
intervention  in  Vienna.  The  warnings  of  Herr  von  Jagow  duly 
reached  Petrograd.  Whatever  else  is  doubtful,  it  is  clear  that 
M.  Sazonoflf  did  on  the  29th,  with  his  eyes  open,  the  one  thing 
which  to  his  full  knowledge  was  certain  to  precipitate  war. 

There  is  another  aspect  to  this  intricate  story.  General 
Sukhomlinofif  frustrated  the  Tsar's  pacific  intervention  by  lying 
to  him  about  the  mobilization.  M.  Sazonofif  frustrated  the  moder- 
ating counsels  of  his  Allies  by  similar  tactics.  The  impression 
made  on  the  French  Government  is  well  reflected  in  Sir  F.  Bertie's 
despatch  (No.  134,  p.  98),  in  which  President  Poincare  defends 
Russia,  on  the  ground  that  so  far  from  being  in  a  hurry  to  mobilize 
generally,  she  had  waited  (as  he  supposed)  until  Austria  ordered 
a  general  mobilization.  In  point  of  fact,  the  Austrian  general 
mobilization  was  ordered  nearly  two  days  after  Russia's,  in  the 
early  morning  of  the  3ist.  The  worst  deception  of  this  whole 
crisis  was  that  which  the  Russians  practised  on  their  Allies.  From 
the  29th  onwards  they  represented  themselves  as  the  patterns  of 
pacific  moderation,  and,  thanks  to  this,  they  dragged  France  into 
their  war,  and  we  followed  France.  Thus  we  find  M.  Sazonofif  on 
the  29th,  fresh  from  signing  the  order  for  a  general  mobilization 
assuring  our  Ambassador,  in  reply  to  one  of  his  many  warnings, 
that  the  mobilization  "  would  be  directed  only  against  Austria  " 
(p.  60,  No.  78).  This  untruth  stands  in  all  its  perfection  in  this 
despatch  to  his  Govwnmwit  from  th«  French  Ambassador  (211), 


APPENDIX  343 

dated  July  soth,  while  the  general  mobilization  wa»  actually  in 
full  swing  (I  have  corrected  a  mistranslation  in  the  Red  Book)  : — 

"  M.  Sazonoff,  to  whom  I  communicated  your  desire  that 
every  military  measure  that  could  offer  Germany  the  pretext 
for  general  mobilization  should  be  avoided,  answered  that  in 
the  course  of  last  night  the  General  Staff  had  suspended  some 
measures  of  precaution,  so  that  there  should  be  no  misunder- 
standing. Yesterday  the  Chief  of  the  Russian  General  Staff 
sent  for  the  Military  Attache  of  the  German  Embassy,  and 
gave  him  his  word  of  honour  that  the  mobilization  ordered 
this  morning  was  exclusively  directed  against  Austria." 

If  the  French  had  known  the  truth,  if  Jaures  had  known  it 
and  had  lived  to  use  it,  the  West  of  Europe  would  have  been 
spared  this  war. 

The  historical  conclusion  emerges  clearly  from  this  tangled  chapter. 
In  1914  there  were  two  war-parties  in  Europe,  and  between  them 
they  made  the  war.  It  is  the  story  of  1870  over  again:  the 
Russians  were  as  unready  as  Louis  Napoleon,  but  inefficiency  did 
not  make  for  sobriety.  The  time-table  kept  no  parallelism. 
On  the  2gth  moderation  had  prevailed  in  Berlin,  while  the  war- 
makers  triumphed  in  Petrograd.  The  practical  conclusions  are 
harder  to  draw.  One  of  them  is,  that  the  belief  of  the  German 
people  that  it  is  fighting  a  defensive  war  has  more  warrant  for 
it  than  we  have  ever  admitted  in  this  country.  It  is  not  an 
adequate  reading  of  the  facts,  for  it  ignores  the  criminal  gambling 
of  the  Austro-German  procedure  during  the  earlier  part  of  the 
crisis.  In  its  last  days,  however,  a  heavy  responsibility  falls  on 
the  Russian  war-party.  Our  own  popular  view,  that  one  evil  will, 
the  will  of  the  rulers  of  Germany,  deliberately  planned  the  world- 
war,  must  be  discarded  with  all  its  consequences.  Two  war- 
parties,  both  of  them  unscrupulous,  acted  and  reacted  on  each 
other,  within  a  European  system  which  fostered  antagonisms  and 
thwarted  goodwill.  Our  problem  is  to  change  that  system. 


INDEX 


Adriatic,  101 

Aerenthal,  Count,  73,  74  «.,  161 

Africa,  Equatorial,  281-5,  328 

Aggression,  equivocal  idea,  61  ; 
test  of,  63 

Albania,  102,  327 

Alexandrovsk,  147 

Algeciras,  234 

Alliance,  Franco-Russian,  179 ; 
Holy,  the,  20,  40,  42,  81,  302  ; 
Triple,  185,  188,  226  ;  Pan- 
Teutonic,  227 

Alliances,  future  of,  176-96  ; 
within  the  League  of  Nations, 
194 

Alsace-Lorraine,  33,  80,  124  seq., 

327 
America     and     the    League    of 

Nations,  Chap.  II  passim,  324 
America,  Latin,  287 
American  "  preparedness,"  228 
Anglo-French  rivalry,  229 
Anglo-German  rivalry  21,  230 
Anglo-German       understandings, 

163,  185,  190 

"  Anglo-Saxon  Powers,"  the,  204 
Angola,  231,  236 
Antwerp,  18 
Arabs,  165  «.,  170 
Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  73 
Armaments,    reduction    of,     198, 

330 

Armenia,  175,  327 
Asquith,  Mr.,  198,  208,  323 
Australia,  242 


Austria-Hungary,  68  seq.,  100,  107 
scq.,  136,  180,  181,  188,  189,  280, 
327 

Bagdad  Railway,  155-66,  236 
Balance  of  power,  179  seq.  -— 
Balfour,  Mr.  A.,  35,  215 
Balkan  League,  71,  145 
Balkan  wars,  78,  105 
Basra,  167 

Belgium,  55  seq.,  126,  326 
Berlin  Congress,  188 
Berlin  Convention,  281,  284 
Bessarabia,  no 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  Herr  von,  25, 

36  «.,  63,  79,  190,  192,  236 
Bismarck,    61,     133,     188,     266, 

241 

Blockade,  209  seq. 
Boer  War,  54,  129,  224,  227,  228 
Bohemia,  107  seq. 
Briand,  M.,  320,323 
Bulgaria,  104  seq.,  150,  297,  327 
Biilow,  Prince,  31,  129 
Bunder  Abbas,  168 
Bundesrat,  32 

Caliphate,  165  n. 
Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  H.,  219 

seq. 

Canning,  68 

Capital,  export  of,  10,  238,  285 
Caprivi,  Count,  190,  226 
Carnegie  Commission,  106  n. 
Cecil,  Lord  R.t  219 


343 


346 


INDEX 


"  Central  Europe,"  idea  of,  182, 

243,  245,  246 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  224,  227 
Charter  of  Commercial  Freedom, 

273  scq. 

China,  285  seq.,  321 
Chirol,  Sir  V.,  227  «. 
Coal,  289 

Colonial  preference,  280 
Congo,  Belgian,  252,  255 
Congo,  French,  240,  255,  282 
Constantinople   (see  also  Straits), 

75,  101  seq.,  309 

Council  of  Conciliation,  sec  League 
Crete,  74  n. 
Croats  (see  also  South  Slavs),  73, 

82 

Cyprus,  327 
Czechs,  sec  Bohemia 

Dalmatia,  102,  103,  104 
Danes,  133 
Debidour,  M.,  229  n. 
Democracy    and    Peace,    35 ;   in 

Germany,  30 

"  Der  Deutsche  Gedanke,"  244 
"  Deutschlands         Auswartige 

Politik,"  223 

Dickinson,  Mr.  Lowes,  233 
Disarmament,  36,  37  H. 
Dobrudja,  no 

Edward  VII,  King,  159,  232 
Embargo,  211,  216,  217 
Entente  Cordial e,  184-8 
Epirus,  103,  104  n. 

Fabian  Society,  44,  317 

Fashoda,  229 

Ferdinand,    King,    of    Bulgaria, 

104 
Ferdinand,   King,  of    Roumania, 

no 

Finland,  99,  100 
Fleet,  British,  7,  *oo,  201 


"  Flying  Squadron,"  227 

France,    79,  80,   124-36,   165    //., 

181,  186,  264,  265 
Franco-Russian  Alliance,  179 
Frederick,  the  Empress,  128 
Free  Trade,  ideal  of,  261-4 
Freedom,  Charter  of  Commercial, 

278 

Freedom  of  seas,  see  Seas 
French  colonies,  234  seq. 
French  Congo,  240,  254 

Galicia,  119,  123,  327 
Gasparri,  Cardinal,  37  it. 
George,    Rt.     Hon.     D.     Lloyd, 

234 

German  attitude,  to  British  sea- 
power,  225 ;  on  eve  of  war, 
186,  187,  191,  192  ;  to  League 
of  Nations,  36  «.,  53  ;  to  the 
war,  16  ;  commercial  policy  in 
colonies,  230 ;  economic  am- 
bitions, 162-6,  222,  227,  240 
seq.  ;  emigration,  240  seq.  ; 
idealism,  imperialist,  244  seq. ; 
naval  rivalry,  233  ;  population, 

245 

Germany,  and  Angola,  231,  236  ; 
and  her  colonies,  253,  281  ;  and 
Morocco,  233;  and  South  Africa, 
231  ;    and    Turkey,    Chap.    V 
passim  ;  as  Colonial  Power,  238, 
254  ;  British  attitude  to,  21,  22, 
163,  232,  233  ;  democratization 
of,  31-5  ;  restoration  of  colonies 
to,  251,  252;  see  also   Central 
Europe 
Gibraltar,  199 
Gladstone,  W.  E.,  56,  57 
Godwin,  Wm.,  181 
Greece,  19,  102,  104  n.,  327 
Grey,  Viscount,  and  Sir  Edward, 
56,  63,  67,  164,  187,  192,   198 
209,    ai8,    330,  236,    237,  250, 


INDEX 


347 


Hague,  The,  309,  316 

Hague  Conference  (second),  220 

Haldane,  Lord,  188,  190,  236 

Hartwig,  M.,  71 

Harris,  Rev.  J.  H.,  230  /*.,  254 

Hobson,  Mr.  J.  A.,  260,  286  «. 

Hungary,  108,  114,  115 

Indemnities,  265 

India,  the  road  to,  166  scq. 

Ireland,  101 

Iron-ore,  124-6,  234,  273 

Isvolsky,  M.,  161 

Italy,  18,  101,  102,  103,  185,  289 

Januschkevitch,  General,  335  scq. 
Jaures,  38  «.,  342 
Japan,  18,  35,  196,  287,  308 
Jews,  172,  327  ;  Roumanian,  no, 

140  ;  Russian,  98 
Jordan,  Dr.  D.  S.,  135 

Kaiser,  the  German,  31,  47,  128, 

185,  227 
Kant,  I.,  121 
Key  industries,  264 
Kiderlen-Waechter,     Herr    von, 

236  n. 

Kinglake,  82 
Koritsa,  104 

Kotchubey,  Prince,  146  n. 
Kruger,  P.,  54,  60,  227 

Labour  Party  and  Africa,  283 

Lambert,  H.,  281 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  228  n.,  230 

Law,  Bonar,  266 

Law  of  sea-warfare,  207 

League  of  Nations  or  of  Peace, 
alliances  under,  Chap.  VI 
passim,  301  ;  American  scheme 
of,  44,  304 ;  basis  of  repre- 
sentation, 312,  316 ;  British 
scheme  of,  45  n.  ;  capital  of, 
151.  309-11  ;  and  change,  Si, 


92  ;  and  commercial  freedom, 
271  seq.,  314;  constitution  of, 
293  seq.  ;  Council  of  Concilia- 
tion, 311  ;  economic  policy, 
271  ;  enforcement  of  awards, 
305  ;  executive  of,  307  ;  funda- 
mental obligation,  294;  German 
adherence  to,  36 ;  justiciable 
questions,  295  ;  legislation,  316  ; 
membership,  313  ;  moratorium, 
296  ;  and  nationality,  139,  293, 
314  ;  non-justiciable  questions, 
296  ;  and  outsiders,  304 ;  parlia- 
ment of,  317  scq.  ;  and  public 
opinion,  15  ;  ratification  of,  36, 
65  ;  sanctions,  273  seq.,  299 ; 
sea-power,  Chap.  VII  passim  ; 
sovereignty,  315  ;  summary, 
328-30 ;  tests  of  success,  47 
seq. ;  when  to  create,  88,  330  ; 
without  Germany,  19 

Leibnitz,  81 

Letts,  141  11. 

Lithuanians,  141  n. 

Lorraine,  124  scq.,  273,  327 

Macedonia,  104,  327 

Magyars,  114 

Mahan,  Capt.,  225 

Malta,  199 

Manchester  School,  208 

Marschall  v.  Bieberstein,  155, 156, 

190 

Mercantilism,  266 
Mesopotamia,  158,  167-71 
Metz,  126 

Michaelis,  Dr.,  25,  32 
Miliukoff,  72  n.,  106  n.,  143,  152, 

320 

Mitrofanoff,  Prof.,  71  «.,  145  n. 
Mobilization,  296-8 
Mobilization,     Russian,    60,    335 

seq. 

Molteno,  Mr.,  267  «. 
Mommsen,  36 


348 


INDEX 


Monopolies,  237-40 
Monroe  Doctrine,  40,  287 
Morel,  E.  D.,  233 
Morocco,  1 86,  233-5,  239 
"  Most-favoured  nation,"  279 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  201 
Napoleon,  Louis,  61,  71,  105,  132 
Nationality  and  culture,  136  scq. 
Natives,  African  and  settlement, 

253 

Naumann,   Dr.   F.,  32,  182,  210, 

223,  227,  243,  245 
Naval  policy  in  the  war,  210 
Navies,  limitation  of,  220 
Xnvy,  British,  7 
Neutrality  and  League,  2 16 
Nicholas  I,  Tsar,  159 
Nuremburg,  60 

Open  door,  285  seq. 

Palestine,  171,  327 
Palm  kernels,  266 
Pan-Teutonic  alliance,  227 
Paris,    economic    conference  of, 

10,   20,   25  seq.,    124  seq.,  183, 

257  scq.,  289 
Pears,  Sir  Edwin,  150 
"  Perpetual    peace "    (Projet    de 

paix  perpetuelle),  40,  81 
Persia,  167 
Persian  Gulf,  168 
Peter  the  Great,  144 
Piedmont,  71 
Plebiscite,  124  seq. 
Poincare,  President,  186 
Poland,  33,  117  seq.,  141  n.,  327 
Pope  Benedict,  36,  265 
Portugal,  225,  231,  232,  236 
Posen,  109,  123 
Potsdam  agreement,  185 
Preferences,  colonial,  280 
Preparedness,  American,  228 
Protection,  n,  258 


Raw  materials,  8,  269,  289 
Reichstag,  25-8,  33,  34 
Reinsurance,  188 
Reval  meeting,  159 
Reventlow,  Count,  22,  222,  228 
Revolution,  French,  5 
Rhine,  Left  Bank,  101,  126 
Rohrbach,  Dr.  P.,  223,  234  n.,  244, 

245 

Roosevelt,  T.,  204 
Roumania,  no,  150 
Rousseau,  178,  184 
Runciman,  Rt.  Hon.  W.,  16 
Russia   (see  Mobilization,  Straits, 

Constantinople),  186 
Russia  and    Bulgaria,   105  ;   and 

India,   167  ;   and   Serbia,    161  ; 

and  Siberia,  282  ;   on  the  eve 

of  war,  145  n. 
Ruthenians,  see  Ukrainians 

Saint- Pierre,  Abbe  de,  39,  81,  178 

Salisbury,  late  Lord,  163,  219,  231 

Sanders,  General  L.  v.,  74,  144 

Saturday  Review,  22 

Sazonoff,  M.,  70,  72  «.,  335  seq. 

Schleswig-Holstein,  132 

Sea  policy,  American  view  of  our, 

214 
Sea -power,      7,      160-1,      169, 

Chaps.  VII  and   VIII  passim  ; 

and  commercial  freedom,  250  ; 

legitimate    use  of,    215  ;    and 

expansion    of     other    nations, 

224,  226  ;  and  League,  200  seq. ; 

and  neutral  trade,  207,  209,  213 
Sea,  right  of  capture  on,  209,  210, 

213 

Seas,  freedom  of,  46,  213,  224 
Secret  agreements,  233,  236 
Serajevo  murder,  69,  73 
Serbia,  68  seq.,  104  seq.,  160,  164, 

325,  327 

Sidebotham,  H.,  208  n. 
Silwia,  114,  r§4 


INDEX 


349 


Smith,  Adam,  268 

Socialists,    German,  24,   34,    59, 

133 

South  Slavs,  72  s^.,76,  123  «. 

Spain,  198 

Straits,  the  Turkish,  74,  144  seq.t 

327 

Suez,  199 

Sukhomlinoff,  General,  335  seq. 
Syria,  165  w. 

Taft,  ex-President,  43 

Talleyrand,  18 

Tariff  Reform,  224 

Tcharikoff,  M.,  74  ». 

Theiss,  no 

Thirty  Years  War,  222 

Tirpitz,  Admiral   von,    227,    228, 

236 

Tolstoy,  181 
Toynbee,  A.,  108,  151 
Trade  and  war,  10,  211  seq. 
Trade  as  motive  of  war,  21-3 
Transylvania,  no 
Treaties,   insecurity    of,    16,   56 ; 

America  as  guarantor  of,  52,  56 
Treitschke,  222 


Trentino,  102,  107,  116,  337 

Trieste,  102,  107 

Tsar  of  Russia,  335  seq. 

Turkey,  Chap.  V  passim,  327  ; 
reform  of,  173  seq.  ;  partition 
of,  159, 162  ;  British  concessions 
in,  163-4 

Turkish  Straits,  freedom  of,  237 

Turks,  Young,  156 

Ukrainians,  99,  116 
Ulster,  6 

"  Ulsters  "  in  Europe,  109 
United  States,  see  America 
University,  international,  311 

Verdun,  126 
Victoria,  Queen,  227 

"  War  after  war,"  see  Paris  Con- 
ference 

Washington,  G.,  40 
Wilson,  President,  39  seq.,  214  «., 

3H 
Woolf,  Mr.  L.  S.,  317 

Zionism,  165  «.,  327 


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